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Introduction
Plato’s Republic is one of those books that most people have probably 
heard of, even if they have not actually read it. Even Bubbles, the good-
hearted, bespectacled doofus of the long-running Canadian comedy 
Trailer Park Boys knows enough of the Republic to appeal to the famous 
Noble Lie in a conversation with another resident of Sunnyvale Trailer 
Park.
I first encountered the Republic like so many others have: in my first 
semester of college. This was many years ago, but my memory of the 
experience was one of feeling lost much of the time. I had a fine high 
school education, but philosophy was new to me, with its focus on big, 
abstract questions and especially on rigorous, rational arguments as the 
means to answering them. I did reasonably well in the course, but the 
Republic was tricky terrain, and I did not really know my way about. 
My aim in this book is to help readers traverse Plato’s philosophical 
masterpiece with fewer falls and less befuddled wandering than I 
experienced. I try to do this by pointing out important landmarks and 
interesting bits of topography, helping readers not to miss the forest 
for the trees, as the saying goes, but also to appreciate the importance 
of particular trees, hills, and streams. I consider objections to the 
views and arguments Plato has Socrates express and make. Thinking 
philosophically requires, among other things, stating arguments clearly 
and carefully, articulating assumptions that lurk in the background, and 
making judgments—hopefully, good judgments—about whether the 
reasons offered in support of a claim are good reasons. 
© Sean McAleer, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0229.16
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The Republic’s Two Main Questions
The Republic addresses two overarching questions, What is justice? 
and Is a just life happier—more profitable or personally advantageous—
than an unjust life? Plato addresses these questions in what is for 
modern readers an unexpected way: in dialogue form. Instead of 
writing an essay or a treatise directly arguing for his view, he gives 
us a philosophical drama, so to speak, a conversation between 
Socrates and several others in which answers are offered, discussed, 
and typically rejected. Plato wrote almost all of his philosophy as 
dialogues, most of them featuring Socrates talking with someone he 
would encounter in Athens (though Plato’s later dialogues no longer 
feature Socrates). Plato was not Socrates’ student in a formal sense, 
since Socrates himself wrote nothing and started no school—unlike 
Plato, who founded the Academy, where Aristotle studied before 
founding his own school, the Lyceum. But like many young men of 
his day, Plato was taken with Socrates, struck by his sharp and open 
mind and his fearless but often failed pursuit of knowledge. Whether 
the views the character Socrates expresses in the Republic are his own 
or whether Plato uses him to express his own views is an interesting 
issue, but it is not one that we need worry over to come to terms with 
the Republic. I will usually make no distinction between Plato and 
Socrates in this book, except when doing so helps our understanding, 
as when, for example, Socrates seems to make an error in reasoning 
or allows a crucial assumption to pass unquestioned. Is the mistake 
one that Plato himself does not recognize? Or does he intentionally 
have Socrates stumble or ‘pull a fast one’ because this is what actually 
happened in the conversation, of which the dialogue is a faithful but 
stylized representation? Or—more likely, I think—because he wants 
us, his readers, to engage in imaginary dialogue with Socrates, to raise 
objections and questions where the other characters are silent or too 
agreeable? That Plato writes philosophy in dialogue-form complicates 
the life of the reader, but it is a complication that is rich and rewarding, 
and also enables Plato to manifest respect for his readers. His aim is 
not the transmission of truth or doctrine from the knowing sage to 
a passive but receptive learner—indeed, in presenting the famous 
Allegory of the Cave he explicitly rejects the idea that education is 
‘putting knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind 
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eyes’ (7.518b).1 Instead, we are expected to be active, engaged readers 
who wrestle with the questions and arguments for ourselves. Writing 
dialogues suggests that philosophy—which I take to be clear, rigorous 
thinking about those important questions that are outside the ambit of 
the natural or social sciences—is best done in conversation with others 
rather than alone in one’s study.
Readers with some familiarity with philosophy will not be surprised 
that one of our first tasks in trying to understand how Plato has Socrates 
answer the Republic’s two main questions is to question the questions 
themselves. What exactly does Plato mean when he asks about the 
nature of justice and whether it is ‘more profitable’ than injustice? An 
important point straightaway is that δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosunê), which is 
translated as ‘justice’, can have broader meaning than the English word 
‘justice’ has, which typically involves fair distributions or the idea of 
rights. Dikaiosunê certainly has this narrower sense too; in Book V of 
his Nicomachean Ethics, Plato’s student Aristotle distinguishes between 
specific and general senses of justice, where specific justice concerns 
what today we would call distributive justice (which asks whether a 
particular distribution of goods is fair) and retributive justice (which 
asks if and how wrongdoers should be punished). The broader sense 
that Plato has in mind connotes moral goodness more generally, a virtue 
of ‘doing the right thing’ (though we will ultimately see that for Plato 
justice is primarily about being a certain sort of person rather than doing 
certain kinds of things). Justice in this broad sense might be rendered by 
‘righteousness’, but that seems rather archaic and can have misleading 
religious connotations. Aristotle suggests that justice in this general 
sense is ‘complete virtue’, the whole of virtue, of which the narrower 
kind of justice is a part.2 When Socrates asks what justice is, he is asking 
1  I will cite the Republic in this way. ‘7.518b’ means that the passage quoted is in Book 
VII of the Republic at page 518 in the standard Greek text of Plato’s work, section b 
(about one-fifth of the way down that page). Thus, regardless of which translation 
readers have before them, we can all quite literally ‘be on the same page’, so long 
as the translation provides the ‘Stephanus numbers’—named after a sixteenth-
century editor of Plato’s works—in the margins. I will quote from G.M.A. Grube’s 
translation, as revised by C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992), 
which is excellent and inexpensive. 
2  Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by W. D. Ross and rev. by J. O. Urmson, in The Complete 
Works of Aristotle (Revised Oxford Translation), ed. by Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 1783 [Book V, Chapter 1, Bekker page 1129b25]. 
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about the nature of moral goodness generally, asking what is it to be a 
good person.
The Republic’s second question asks whether being a good person 
makes one personally better off—whether it ‘would make living most 
worthwhile for each of us’ (1.344e). There is no question of whether 
a just life is a morally better than an unjust life; the issue the second 
question raises, by contrast, is whether a just life is prudentially better, 
as philosophers often put it—whether it is in one’s interest to be just 
and act justly. This question has great practical importance, given the 
overwhelmingly plausible assumption that each of us wants to be 
happy. As Socrates puts it, ‘the argument concerns no ordinary topic 
but the way we ought to live’ (1.352d). In ordinary English there is a 
subtle distinction between leading a good life and having a good life. At 
the funeral of a friend who was devoted to the wellbeing of others we 
expect the eulogy to focus on the former: they led a good life, helping 
others without thought of self and often to their own detriment. At the 
funeral of a friend devoted to the pleasures of the table and the bedroom 
we are likelier to hear that they had a good life. So the Republic’s second 
question inquires about the connection between leading a good life and 
having a good life. It is a comparative question, asking if the just person 
is happier than the unjust person. Socrates is not arguing that justice 
is sufficient for happiness, that being just alone makes for a happy life. 
Instead, he will argue that justice is necessary for happiness, that we 
cannot be happy without being just. Socrates thinks that justice alone 
will not guarantee happiness, since there may be external circumstances 
that make happiness impossible, even for the just person. But the just 
or morally good person will be as happy as it is possible to be in those 
circumstances and always be happier than the unjust person, since 
justice always makes one better off than injustice, he thinks. As we follow 
along, it will be helpful to bear in mind ways in which ‘happiness’ can 
be a misleading translation for the Greek word εὐδαιμονία (eudaimonia), 
which connotes flourishing or thriving, something deeper and longer 
lasting than the perhaps fleeting psychological state of enjoyment that 
we might associate with our word ‘happiness’. A flourishing person 
All translations of Aristotle will be drawn from The Complete Works and will be cited 
by title, book and chapter, and Bekker page (the Aristotelian analog of the Platonic 
‘Stephanus’ numbers), thus: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.1 1129b25.
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will typically enjoy their life, but the enjoyment is best thought of as a 
by-product of happiness rather than its essence. 
The Structure of the Republic
The Republic’s two main questions give it its structure, which I sketch 
here:
Book I introduces but ultimately fails to answer the Republic’s two 
main questions. Socrates discusses the nature and value of justice first 
with Cephalus and Polemarchus and then with Thrasymachus, a more 
sophisticated and less friendly interlocutor. Socrates initially thinks 
that he has refuted Thrasymachus’ view that the unjust life is happier 
than the just life, but he soon realizes that he has left the Republic’s first 
question unanswered and thus that he has not really answered the 
second question; how could he know which life is happier if he does not 
yet know what justice is?
Books II–IV answer the Republic’s first question, ‘What is justice?’. 
Socrates’ young friends Glaucon and Adeimantus (who in real life 
are Plato’s brothers) challenge Socrates to continue after the failure 
of Book I. They agree with him that the just life is happier than the 
unjust life, but they recognize that they cannot justify their view and 
thus do not really know that the just life is more profitable. They press 
Socrates to forgo the rapid-fire argumentation of Book I and to offer 
a more intuitive, accessible way of answering the Republic’s questions. 
Although these questions concern justice as a virtue of persons (which 
we’ll call personal justice), Socrates suggests that, since a polis (a Greek 
city-state) is just like a person, only bigger, the best way to figure out the 
nature of personal justice is to investigate justice in the polis (political 
justice) since it will be easier to find justice in the larger thing. Thus they 
set out to theoretically construct an ideal polis, which is completed by 
the end of Book III. And by the end of Book IV, Socrates thinks he has 
answered the first question and starts on the second.
In Books V–VII, Socrates answers questions about and objections 
to his answer to the Republic’s first question. These are dubbed ‘the 
Three Waves’, since they threaten to destroy the ideal city. The First 
Wave concerns whether women can be rulers in the ideal polis. Socrates’ 
view on this might surprise you. The second addresses the ideal city’s 
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communal life, especially how children are to be raised—which seems 
to do away with the traditional family. The third and most threatening 
concerns the ideal polis itself: is their ideal city merely theoretical, or 
could it be realized in the actual world? Socrates thinks such a city can be 
realized only if it is ruled by philosophers, which leads to an investigation 
of what a philosopher is. This investigation will last through Book VII. 
In addressing the Third Wave, Plato has Socrates introduce the famous 
theory of the Forms and offer one of the Republic’s central arguments, 
the Powers Argument, in defense of this view; he presents the analogies 
of the Sun and the Divided Line in Book VI, and the famous Allegory of 
the Cave in Book VII, among other things.
Having addressed the Three Waves to the company’s satisfaction, in 
Books VIII-IX Socrates turns to the Republic’s second question, ‘Is the 
just life happier than the unjust life?’. Expanding on the psychology and 
political philosophy developed earlier, he distinguishes between five 
possible kinds of souls and city-states and argues that the just life is 
happier than the unjust life. 
Having answered the Republic’s two questions, in Book X Socrates 
returns to the status of poetry, which featured prominently in the 
educational program sketched in Books II and III. Despite his love 
for poetry, especially the works of Homer, he argues that most poetry 
should not be allowed in the ideal city because of its power to corrupt 
us. He concludes with the intriguing Myth of Er, about the importance 
of choice in a happy, well-lived life.
Readers will often find it helpful to keep the Republic’s overall 
structure in mind while making their way through the text, since 
what a character is talking about often makes more sense when we 
understand why they are talking about it. So it can be helpful, when 
feeling a little lost, to orient oneself by asking which question of the 
Republic’s two main questions is being addressed—although it might 
take a bit of intellectual sleuthing to determine that. For example, the 
details of the educational program Socrates develops in Books II and III 
are interesting in their own right, but it is easy to lose sight of why he 
devotes so much time and intellectual energy to this topic. If we keep the 
Republic’s overall structure in mind, we can see that Socrates discusses 
education and culture because he is exploring what an ideal polis is 
like, which requires an understanding of how the polis’s rulers will be 
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educated. And of course, he wants to create this ideal polis because the 
plan is to define political justice in order to define personal justice. And 
while the Republic’s first question about the nature of personal justice 
is interesting in its own right, Socrates wants to answer it because, as 
he realizes at the end of Book I, we cannot satisfactorily answer the 
Republic’s second question about whether the just life is happier until 
we know what justice is. 
As orienting oneself by overall structure is an aid to understanding, 
I will try to offer signposts and reminders as we proceed through the 
Republic. Shortly I will offer more detail about what individual chapters 
of this book will contain, but before doing that I want to draw the 
reader’s attention to one more big-picture topic.
Arguing about Justice
Thrasymachus, Socrates’ main antagonist in the second half of Book 
I, thinks that justice and happiness are at odds with each other, that 
being just and acting justly leave one worse off. Socrates disagrees, 
and it is instructive to see what he does and does not do in the face 
of this disagreement. First, what he does not do: he does not insult 
Thrasymachus or impugn his intelligence or his motives. Sadly, the 
same cannot be said for Thrasymachus, who responds to Socrates’ 
arguments in a rather nasty way. Nor does Socrates shrug and say 
things like, ‘Everyone’s got a right to their opinion, I guess’ or ‘Who’s 
to say?’ or ‘That’s just your opinion, man’, like a Lebowski of classical 
antiquity who has traded his bathrobe for a chiton (the ancient Greeks 
did not wear togas; that was a Roman thing). Socrates does not think 
that reason merely sheds light on the Republic’s main questions, he 
thinks it can answer them. Some readers will be less confident in the 
power of rational argument and conceptual clarity; they may be more 
comfortable than Socrates and Plato are with there being more than 
one correct answer to these questions—or with there being none. But 
even though Socrates himself is not a moral pluralist, it is important 
to see that the method he employs in arguing against Thrasymachus 
is consistent with there being a plurality of answers to moral questions 
of the sort that the Republic devotes itself to. For while Socrates’ 
method of question-and-answer—formally called elenchus, a kind of 
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cross-examination—is impersonal in the sense of focusing on principles 
rather than personalities, it is in another sense profoundly personal, for 
its focus is what the person he is engaging with thinks. The best way to 
investigate the nature of justice, he thinks, is to critically examine the 
views of someone who claims to know what justice is, to see if such 
a view can survive rigorous cross-examination and coherently hang 
together. So he proceeds from premises that his interlocutors endorse. 
Although Socrates thinks that there is an Archimedean point from 
which one can definitively settle moral questions, the Socratic method of 
question-and-answer does not presuppose this exalted view of reason. 
Its aim is more modest: to discover whether one’s philosophical and 
moral beliefs are internally consistent. While this method is no respecter 
of persons in that it does not defer to someone based upon their social 
class, etc., it is, I think, profoundly respectful of persons, since it takes 
seriously a person’s moral and philosophical views. Even though these 
views are usually found wanting, a willingness to examine a person’s 
views about the nature of justice or courage or knowledge or whatever 
is certainly a way of taking those views, and that person, seriously. 
What to Expect in this Book
This book is not a line-by-line commentary of the Republic, but it 
hews closely to the main contours of the Republic. I intend it as an aid 
to reading the Republic rather than as a substitute for doing so. In the 
chapters to come I try to guide readers, especially those new to the 
Republic or returning to it after a long absence, to a clear understanding 
of the Republic’s main themes and distinctive arguments. But we will 
also pause to linger over details that are interesting in themselves and 
which contribute to a nuanced understanding of Plato’s philosophical 
thought and literary artistry. I will try to clearly and accurately spell 
out the arguments Plato has Socrates offer and then critically reflect on 
them, asking questions such as ‘Does the conclusion logically follow 
from the premises?’ and ‘Do we have good reasons to think the premises 
are true?’ and ‘What assumptions are driving the argument?’, etc. We 
will see that Socrates’ interlocutors often accept arguments that they 
have good reason to doubt. This is something most of us do, especially 
when we think the conclusion is true, but setting aside one’s belief in a 
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conclusion and querying the quality of the reasons offered in support 
of it is the hallmark of good critical thinking. I will try to model that 
in the pages to come and hopefully help readers sharpen their own 
philosophical skills. Since one of Plato’s aims is for us, his readers, to 
think philosophically for ourselves, nothing would delight me more than 
readers disagreeing with and arguing against claims, interpretations, 
and assessments I make. Needless to say, there is a lot I will leave out 
as we proceed through the Republic, but by the end readers should have 
a good sense of the main themes and arguments of the Republic and of 
some of the philosophical problems with them. Here is a chapter-by-
chapter rundown of the main issues to be discussed. 
Chapter One, ‘Fathers and Sons’, covers the first half of Book I of 
the Republic, where Socrates raises the Republic’s first question about 
the nature of justice at the home of Cephalus, a wealthy merchant who 
lives in a suburb of Athens. Cephalus suggests that justice is paying 
one’s debts and telling the truth, but Socrates thinks this cannot be the 
essence of justice, since there are times when one should not return 
what one has borrowed. This alerts us to an important fact about what 
Socrates is looking for in an account of justice: the account should 
be unconditionally correct, with no ifs, ands, or buts. Cephalus’ son 
Polemarchus jumps into the conversation and offers a revision of his 
father’s definition, suggesting that justice—right conduct, generally—is 
benefiting one’s friends and harming one’s enemies. Socrates finds this 
account has implications that Polemarchus himself cannot accept, so 
the chapter explores Socrates’ reasoning, especially the assumption that 
justice, a virtue of character, is a craft or skill. We then discuss Socrates’ 
more direct argument against Polemarchus’ account, that the just person 
would not harm anyone. 
Chapter Two, ‘Taming the Beast: Socrates versus Thrasymachus’, is 
devoted to Socrates’ encounter with the sophist Thrasymachus in the 
second half of Book I. Thrasymachus’ answers to the Republic’s main 
questions are a provocative challenge to the reverential attitude Socrates 
has toward justice in particular and virtue in general. Thrasymachus 
defines justice as whatever benefits the politically powerful and 
argues that a conventionally just person lives less happily than their 
unjust counterpart. Socrates offers five different arguments against 
Thrasymachus’ views, which are spelled out clearly and evaluated 
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carefully, with attention paid to the connections between them and 
to the crucial concepts around which they orbit (e.g., the notion of a 
virtue). Socrates’ arguments fall short of the mark, and we will examine 
why this is the case, exploring avenues of response that Thrasymachus 
could but does not take. By the close of Book I, Socrates realizes that he 
has not answered the Republic’s second question because he has not yet 
answered the first: we cannot know whether the just life is happier until 
we first know what justice is. 
Chapter Three, ‘A Fresh Start’, explores the way in which Socrates 
tries to address the Republic’s two questions, ‘What is justice?’ and ‘Is 
the just life happier than the unjust life?’. Rather than offering a battery 
of arguments as he did in Book I, Socrates offers an analogy between 
the polis (the Greek city-state) and the psychê (individual soul) that will 
structure the rest of the Republic. The plan is to first discover the nature 
of justice as a political virtue—as a virtue of the polis—and then apply 
this to the individual soul in order to discover the nature of personal 
justice. 
Chapter Four, ‘Blueprints for a Platonic Utopia: Education and 
Culture’, examines Socrates’ account of education in the ideal polis, 
focusing especially on informal, cultural education in music and poetry. 
We will explore the fascinating connections Socrates draws between 
aesthetic and moral development, especially the role that poetic and 
musical style play over and above content. We then discuss Socrates’ 
rather disturbing attitude toward disabled citizens before focusing on the 
famous Noble Falsehood, which concludes Book III, discussing the role 
that myth, especially myths of origin, play in civic self-understanding. 
Chapter Five, ‘Starting to Answer the First Question: The Political 
Virtues’, focuses on the first third of Book IV. The ideal polis complete, 
Socrates and company investigate the political virtues of wisdom, 
courage, moderation, and justice, defining each and discussing their 
location in the polis. We will explore these accounts and the issues they 
raise, for example how the kind of agreement that constitutes political 
moderation differs from the idea of consent in modern liberal political 
thought, and the question of whether there are other virtues in addition 
to the four cardinal virtues. 
We continue discussing Book IV of the Republic in Chapter Six, ‘The 
Republic’s First Question Answered at Last: Personal Justice’. We first 
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attend to Plato’s foray into psychology (literally, his account (logos) of 
the soul (psuchê)) in which he tries to justify the analogy between city 
and soul that has shaped the Republic. By appealing to the idea that 
the same thing cannot simultaneously undergo or perform opposite 
states or activities (dubbed the Opposition Principle), Socrates argues 
that the soul has a three-part structure, just as the city does: a rational 
part, which corresponds to the guardian-rulers in the polis; a spirited 
part (the seat of anger and pride), which corresponds to the soldierly 
auxiliaries of the polis; and an appetitive part, which corresponds to the 
craftspeople. Socrates then derives the personal virtues by applying 
the political virtues to the soul. The most important personal virtue, of 
course, is justice, which he conceives of as each part of the soul doing its 
own work: reason, not appetite or spirit, governs the just soul. We will 
pay attention to important features of this account, for example how it 
differs from Cephalus’ and Polemarchus’, for whom justice is a matter 
of interpersonal, external doing (of how one treats one’s fellows), while 
for Socrates and Plato is it a matter of intrapersonal, internal being, of 
what one’s soul is like.
In Chapter Seven, ‘Questions about the Ideal Polis: The Three 
Waves’, we see Polemarchus and Adeimantus begin Book V by putting 
the brakes on Socrates’ attempt to immediately begin answering the 
Republic’s second question, whether living a morally good life is good 
for the person living it. They raise questions about and objections to the 
ideal polis, known as ‘the Three Waves’, which is an apt metaphor for 
a sea-faring culture. The First Wave concerns the question of whether 
women can be guardian-rulers in the ideal city. Socrates’ affirmative 
answer—surprising to his companions and to many readers alike 
(though for different reasons)—raises the question of whether Plato is 
a feminist. The Second Wave concerns the ideal city’s communal living 
arrangements, especially child-rearing. Socrates argues that not only is 
the abolition of the traditional family possible, it is beneficial. The Third 
Wave is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Eight, ‘Surfing the Third Wave: Plato’s Metaphysical 
Elevator, the Powers Argument, and the Infallibility of Knowledge’, 
focuses on the Third Wave, which concerns the very possibility of the 
ideal city. Socrates famously claims that the ideal city can be made real 
only if philosophers rule. This leads him to explore how philosophers 
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differ from non-philosophers, which will guide the last part of Book 
V as well as Books VI and VII. A crucial point of difference is that 
philosophers have knowledge while non-philosophers merely have 
belief, a distinction which is explored in some depth and detail. We 
devote special attention to one of the Republic’s most crucial arguments, 
the Powers Argument, in which Socrates argues for the existence of the 
Forms, the mind-independently real, timeless essences of the many 
particular things that populate the everyday world of our senses. The 
reality of the Forms is perhaps Plato’s most distinctive metaphysical 
view, so we devote quite a bit of attention to stating, explaining, and 
evaluating the Powers Argument, and to discussing the implications of 
its being seriously flawed. 
Chapter Nine, ‘The Philosopher’s Virtues’, continues to explore the 
distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers, focusing on 
their different characters. Central to the discussion is the distinction 
between virtues of character (for example, justice), intellectual virtues 
(for example, a good memory), and virtues of personal style (for 
example, grace and elegance), attending to the light this last category 
sheds on Plato’s moral vision. As a prelude to the key analogies of Book 
VI, the rest of this chapter is devoted to the interesting analogies Socrates 
appeals to in addressing features of the Third Wave. 
Chapter Ten, ‘Metaphors to Think By: The Sun and Divided Line 
Analogies’, is devoted to the marquee analogies of Book VI, both of 
which address the Third Wave by developing the distinction between 
the sensible world of concrete particular things and the intelligible 
world of the Forms. Having suggested that the Form of the good is 
even more important than justice, Socrates cannot or will not say what 
the good is, but he does say what he thinks it is like: the good plays 
the same role in the intelligible world as the sun plays in the visible 
world. In the Analogy of the Divided Line, Socrates further develops the 
distinction between belief, which is appropriate to the sensible, visible 
world, and knowledge, which is appropriate to the intelligible world of 
the Forms. By exploring the role that hypotheses play in reasoning, he 
distinguishes philosophical knowledge from mathematical knowledge, 
somewhat surprisingly taking the former to be more rigorous.
True to its name, Chapter Eleven, ‘Shedding Light on the Allegory 
of the Cave’, devotes itself to exploring the famous Allegory of the 
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Cave from Book VII of the Republic, carefully considering its various 
stages and themes before examining the issue posed by the enlightened 
philosopher’s return to the Cave. As Socrates describes it, the enlightened 
philosopher descends back into the Cave not because they want to, 
but because they recognize that justice requires them to do so. This 
raises an issue for discussion that Socrates does not seem to notice: the 
enlightened philosopher would be happier if they ignored the demands 
of justice and remained in the intelligible world of the Forms, which 
suggests that, contrary to Socrates’ view, the just life is not happier than 
the unjust life. 
In Chapter Twelve, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Ideal City-Soul’, we 
begin exploring Socrates’ answer to the Republic’s second question. In 
Books VIII and IX, Socrates sketches five kinds of cities and souls, noting 
what each takes as its primary end or goal and which part or class 
governs the soul and city, respectively. We trace the decay from the best 
city-soul to the worst, attending to the role that changes to education 
play and to interesting features of each stage, and discuss at some length 
Plato’s distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires. 
Chapter Thirteen, ‘The Republic’s Second Question Answered: 
Three and a Half Arguments that the Just Life is Happier’, explores the 
arguments Socrates gives in Book IX that the just life is happier—indeed, 
729 times happier—than the unjust life. There are fascinating features 
of the first two arguments, for example that the tyrannical person is 
incapable of friendship and that each part of the soul has a distinctive 
kind of pleasure. The third argument, the Metaphysics of Pleasure 
Argument, argues that since what is more filling is more pleasant 
and what is more real is more filling, the Forms, being the most real 
things, ground the most pleasant pleasures. We discuss this argument 
at some length, noting its dependence on the Powers Argument but also 
exploring ways in which Socrates seems to anticipate and preemptively 
respond to objections. In the last argument, which Socrates does not 
identify as such (hence the ‘half’), is a metaphorical argument which, 
despite its being less philosophically rigorous than the Metaphysics 
of Pleasure Argument, is more intuitively persuasive and in no way 
relies on the problematic Powers Argument. This chapter concludes 
with a discussion of Plato’s paternalism: his view that most of us, being 
incapable of the philosophical wisdom that consists of knowledge of 
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the good, are incapable of good self-governance, so we are all better 
off being governed by someone else’s (i.e., a philosopher-king’s or 
-queen’s) reason.
Chapter Fourteen, ‘Are We There Yet? Tying up Loose Ends in Book 
X’, explores the three topics of the Republic’s final book, Book X. The 
first is the status of poetry, which Socrates wants to revisit since he now 
has a psychology (the three-part soul) that he lacked when poetry was 
first discussed. He concludes, quite reluctantly, that very little poetry 
will be allowed in the ideal city, mainly because of its power to corrupt 
us: we give ourselves over to emotion and thus dethrone reason from 
its rightful place. After exploring his arguments for this view, we turn 
to his argument for the immortality of the soul, which Socrates offers 
in the context of showing the external advantages of living a just life 
(namely, having a reputation for justice), which were set aside to 
answer Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ challenge of showing that justice 
was intrinsically good—that all by itself it made its possessor better 
off. Lastly, we attend to the Myth of Er, with which the Republic ends. 
Er’s story is an allegory about the importance of careful choice in living 
justly and thus happily. It is a fascinating way to end the Republic, in 
terms of both content and style; we briefly explore what philosophical 
points Plato might be making by ending a work of philosophy this way. 
Needless to say, I have not mentioned everything we will discuss, 
but this should give readers a good sense of the main contours of the 
Republic and a decent idea of what is to come. Now, on to the Republic!
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1. Fathers and Sons:  
Book I
Plato packs a lot into the Republic’s first book, so we will have an easier 
time of it if we break the discussion into two chapters. In this chapter 
we will examine Socrates’ conversations with Cephalus and then 
with Cephalus’ son, Polemarchus. In the next chapter we will explore 
Socrates’ encounter with Thrasymachus.
The ever-curious Socrates wants to know what justice is not simply 
for its own sake but to determine whether a just life—a morally good 
life—is happier than an unjust one. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
the Greek word δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosunê) is broader in meaning than the 
English word ‘justice’, which often suggests fair distributions or the idea 
of rights. I will continue to use it, but I will often also use synonyms such 
as ‘right’ and ‘moral goodness’ and their ilk. ‘Righteousness’ seems a 
bit archaic and can have religious connotations that can be misleading. 
It is often thought that Book I of the Republic was initially a stand-
alone dialogue as it ends, like so many of Plato’s other dialogues do, 
without an answer to its central question. Most of these dialogues have 
Socrates asking, ‘What is ____?’ where an important notion like justice, 
knowledge, or courage fills in the blank. Socrates examines the answers 
his companions propose but typically finds them wanting, usually 
because they conflict with other beliefs held by the interlocutor. While 
not knowing what something is can be frustrating, knowing what it is 
not is often a helpful kind of knowledge, as it narrows the field and leaves 
us a bit closer to knowing what the thing—here, justice—is. Though 
Book I ends without a satisfactory answer to its central question, rather 
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than the discussants going their separate ways, as usually happens in 
Plato’s dialogues, two of the participants, Glaucon and Adeimantus 
(Plato’s real-life brothers) insist that Socrates continues, that he shares 
his beliefs about the nature and value of justice, even if he cannot in 
good conscience claim to know its nature and value. 
Polemarchus Wants You to Wait (1.327a–328c)
One of the many rewards of reading Plato is the literary quality of the 
dialogues, which are extraordinarily well crafted. That Plato writes 
dialogues rather than straightforward essays suggests that he regards 
philosophy as essentially conversational, that it involves back-and-
forth, give-and-take, that two (or three) heads are better than one when 
addressing philosophical topics like the nature of justice. The dialogue 
form also invites us to be active rather than passive readers, to engage 
in the dialogue by thinking of responses and questions that the people 
on the page do not make. In addition to Plato’s making a philosophical 
point by writing in dialogue form, his writing this way allows him to 
raise themes and issues that are at work in the background, where the 
conversation he is depicting is in the foreground. The opening lines of 
the Republic are an excellent example of this.
The Republic is Socrates’ first-person account of a long conversation 
about the nature and value of justice that he has at the house of Cephalus, 
a wealthy merchant who lives in the Piraeus, the port of Athens. Plato’s 
situating the conversation outside of Athens might be his way of 
suggesting that the ideal city Socrates and his friends will imaginatively 
construct is an alternative to Athens; he is not offering suggestions for 
ways in which Athens might change for the better but instead offers a 
different political arrangement entirely. 
It is worth noting that the Republic is written around 380 bce, in the 
shadow of Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War about twenty years 
previously. The conversation depicted takes place well before that, 
though scholars disagree about the dialogue’s dramatic date. One likely 
candidate is 421 bce, during ‘the optimistic springtime Peace of Nicias’, 
the truce marking the end of the first phase of the War; another is 411 
bce, after the War has resumed and is going quite badly for Athens, ‘a 
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gloomy, violence-torn, pessimistic time’.1 Plato’s contemporaries would 
know—and many contemporary readers will know—that Socrates 
was tried, convicted, and executed in 399 bce for corrupting the youth 
and introducing false gods. Few contemporary readers, by contrast, 
will know that Polemarchus, who features prominently in Book I, was 
executed by the so-called Thirty Tyrants, who, installed by Sparta at the 
War’s end, ruled briefly and bloodily in 404 bce. 
Socrates’ reason for venturing out of Athens—to attend a religious 
festival and ‘offer up my prayers to the goddess’ (1.327a)—is a good 
example of Plato’s subtle authorial artistry. As we noted above, the 
historical Socrates was tried, convicted, and put to death by the citizens of 
Athens for impiety and corrupting the youth. Plato memorably recounts 
Socrates’ defense speech in the Apology (a title that will seem odd, given 
how unapologetic Socrates is in it, until we realize that apologia is Greek 
for defense). So Plato’s depiction of Socrates’ conventional piety at 
the very outset of the Republic provides an ironic take on then-recent 
Athenian history that would not be lost on any of Plato’s contemporaries. 
Socrates’ opening words, ‘I went down’, which translate the Greek 
κατέβην (katabên), seem an unremarkable way to begin a remarkable 
book. But we will appreciate their significance and Plato’s subtle 
authorial artistry later in the Republic, when, in the famous Allegory 
of the Cave, Socrates insists that the enlightened philosophers ‘go 
down again’ into the cave to govern its benighted prisoners and free 
those who are capable of making it out. It is the same verb in both 
cases, and in subtly drawing this parallel Plato seems to be telling us 
that Socrates’ interlocutors—and by extension, us, his readers, whatever 
our accomplishments and pretension—do indeed live in the darkness 
of the Cave. ‘It’s a strange image you are describing’, says Glaucon, ‘and 
strange prisoners’. ‘They are like us’, Socrates replies. (7.515a)
Socrates tells his unnamed audience that Polemarchus’ slave tugged 
on his cloak and asked him to wait. The casual invocation of slavery 
may bring many contemporary readers up short. Slavery was a fact 
of life in the Greek world, and lovers of Plato and other great classical 
authors such as Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and Aristotle, to name just 
three near the beginning of the alphabet, should at the very least pause 
1  Debra Nails, ‘The Dramatic Date of Plato’s Republic’, The Classical Journal, 93.4 
(1998), 383–96 (p. 385).
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at the possibility that the cultural achievement of classical Athens was 
possible only because it was a slave society. Although the claim is not 
uncontroversial, the consensus of contemporary scholars is that there 
is slavery in Plato’s ideal polis. We may have occasion to investigate this 
later, but for now we might just note the fact that Polemarchus’ slave 
is the first person Socrates quotes in the Republic. Although Athenian 
slavery might partially frame the Republic for modern readers, Plato 
does not seem to raise it as a background issue worthy of philosophical 
attention and there is no explicit discussion of its nature or moral status. 
Plato seems to accept it as something natural (later, he suggests that an 
individual might be ‘by nature suited to be a slave’ (4.444b), an idea 
Aristotle develops in the first book of his Politics) but subject to moral 
constraint—for example, we are told that Greeks should not enslave 
other Greeks (5.469c) and that rather than being harsh with his slaves, 
a good and properly educated person will merely look down on them 
(8.549a).
When Polemarchus finally catches up to Socrates he tells him, ‘You 
must either prove stronger than we are or you will have to stay here’ 
(1.327c). This sounds ominous, but it is just an innocent pun on Socrates’ 
name, the central element of which is κράτος (cratos), meaning ‘strength’ 
or ‘power’. One suspects this is not the first time Socrates has endured 
this rather lame pun, but he replies graciously and without groaning, 
asking if there is not another alternative, ‘that we persuade you to let us 
go’ (1.327c). This little exchange is Plato’s way of raising an important 
theme of the Republic: the opposition between force and persuasion, 
between the irrational and the rational. The conflict sometimes comes 
to the surface, for example, in the Cave Allegory mentioned above. 
Education, as Plato conceives of it, involves quite a bit of force: the 
freed prisoner is ‘compelled to stand up, turn his head […] and look up 
toward the light’ (7.515c) and is ‘dragged […] from there by force, up 
the rough, steep path’ and then ‘dragged […] into the sunlight’ (7.515e). 
Though the enlightened philosophers would rather remain above, they 
return to the cave—not because they are physically or psychologically 
compelled to do so, but because they are persuaded to. 
In response to Socrates’ appeal to persuasion, Polemarchus jokingly 
plays a trump card: ‘But could you persuade us, if we won’t listen?’ 
(1.327e). Here Plato is recognizing a practical limit to the power of 
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rational persuasion: people who refuse to listen cannot be persuaded. 
Most of us have probably encountered people who seem impervious 
to evidence and argument. More chillingly, the psychologists Brendan 
Nyhan and Jason Reifler have identified what they call the backfire 
effect: some of us are psychologically constituted so as to not merely 
remain unpersuaded by evidence and reasons that should lead us to 
give up certain beliefs, but actually tend to hold such beliefs even more 
strongly in the face of such evidence—so attempts to persuade the other 
by appeals to good evidence are likely to backfire.2 Plato is reminding 
us that genuine discussion and dialogue, as opposed to dueling 
monologues, cannot occur when we refuse to entertain reasons and 
evidence that go against our views. He is raising an important theme 
that will be at work in the background of the Republic, and raising it in 
the subtle way skilled literary artists do.
There is more we could say about the subtleties of the Republic’s 
opening, however the goal was not an exhaustive—and exhausting—
catalog and discussion of them but rather to help the reader begin to 
appreciate the literary quality of the Republic and how inseparable its 
literary and philosophical aspects are for Plato. 
Cephalus: Justice is Paying Your Debts and 
Telling the Truth (1.328c–331d)
The entire conversation that is the Republic takes place at the suburban 
home of Cephalus, a wealthy merchant, whose son, Polemarchus, has 
a keen interest in philosophy. Cephalus likes Socrates, and Socrates 
clearly likes him. Nowadays telling someone that you enjoy talking to 
them because you ‘enjoy talking with the very old’ (1.328d) is unlikely 
to be well received, but Cephalus does not mind, in part because of the 
association of age and wisdom: since Cephalus is farther along the road 
of life, he might have some insight about whether that road is ‘rough 
and difficult or smooth and easy’ (1.328e). The metaphor of the road or 
path is one we will see elsewhere in the Republic. 
2  Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, ‘When Corrections Fail: The Persistence 
of Political Misperceptions’, Political Behavior, 32 (2010), 303–30, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11109–010–9112–2 
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Cephalus is a fine spokesperson for moral common sense; his idea 
of a good life is not a life of ‘sex, drinking parties, [and] feasts’ (1.329a) 
but rather one of moderation. Being wealthy does not hurt, he admits, 
but all by itself material comfort is not sufficient for living well. ‘A good 
person would not easily bear old age if he were poor’, he remarks, ‘but 
a bad one would not be at peace with himself, even if he were wealthy’ 
(1.330a). Despite his conventional decency, Cephalus is not especially 
reflective and when the discussion turns philosophical, he congenially 
excuses himself to take care of a religious sacrifice. Cephalus exhibits an 
attractive kind of humility, as he is sufficiently self-aware to recognize that 
external factors play an important role in his being morally decent and 
thus that he himself is not the sole cause of his goodness. Plato is deftly 
setting up a contrast between character and circumstance, between the 
inner and the outer, that will come into play later in the Republic as he 
addresses the question of whether one can cultivate one’s soul in such a 
way that one is more or less impervious to external forces that can lead 
one to act unjustly.
Before Cephalus leaves, Socrates pursues this question of wealth a 
bit further, asking Cephalus what the greatest good that his wealth has 
brought him is. Cephalus’ answer is a bit surprising (and is no doubt 
part of why Socrates likes him). It is not that it enables a life of self-
indulgence, cushy comfort, and lots of toys. Rather, it is that wealth is a 
kind of buffer against moral temptation: ‘Wealth can do a lot to save us 
from having to cheat and deceive’ (1.331b), Cephalus says, and thus it 
allows a person to face the afterlife without trepidation, since it enables 
one to live ‘a just and pious life’ (1.331a). 
Most of us will agree that wealth is merely instrumentally and not 
intrinsically valuable—that it is not good in itself, but rather it is good 
as a means to something else. Cephalus is making a related but subtly 
different point about the sort of value wealth possesses, that wealth 
is conditionally good: its goodness depends not just upon the use to 
which it is put, but on who is doing the putting—on whose wealth it 
is. If my wealth enables my pursuing pleasures that are ultimately self-
destructive, then my being wealthy is bad for me. A ‘decent and orderly’ 
(1.331a) person will benefit from their wealth, since they will use it well.
This distinction between conditional and unconditional value provides 
a nice segue to a distinctively philosophical turn in the conversation. 
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Though Cephalus has not himself offered a definition of justice, Socrates 
hears one lurking beneath the surface and asks, ‘But speaking of this 
very thing itself, namely, justice, are we to say unconditionally that it 
is speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred? 
Or is doing these things sometimes just, sometimes unjust?’ (1.331c) 
It is important to understand that Socrates is not looking for a verbal 
definition of ‘justice’ here, the sort of thing that one can look up in a 
dictionary or use to explain its meaning to someone learning one’s 
language. He is looking for the real definition of justice, for an account of 
the thing itself. (Here ‘real’ does not contrast with ‘fake’ or ‘imaginary’ 
but with ‘verbal’; etymologically ‘real’ derives from the Latin word ‘res’, 
which means ‘thing’ or ‘matter’.) There is no question about the verbal 
definition of dikaiosunê, the word we are translating ‘justice’: it means 
morally right conduct generally. But exactly what morally right conduct 
is is what Socrates wants to know. Trying to get clear about everyday 
concepts like justice, courage, knowledge, etc., by making explicit what 
is usually left implicit is one of philosophy’s main tasks, for Plato. Plato’s 
dialogues typically consist of Socrates encountering someone who 
claims to know the real definition of a virtue like justice or courage or 
temperance. But after some Socratic question and answer, it becomes 
clear that the proposed definition will not work, usually because it is 
inconsistent with other things his interlocutor believes, and that is what 
happens here. Most of the dialogues end without a definition being 
arrived at—they end in what scholars call ἀπορία (aporia) difficulty, 
perplexity. 
On Cephalus’ definition of justice (more accurately, the definition 
Socrates attributes to him) justice is telling the truth and paying one’s 
debts. It is instructive to note what Socrates does not do here. He does 
not shrug and offer a relativistic platitude such as, ‘well, everyone’s 
got a right to their opinion’. Socrates does not think that questions like 
the one he is asking are mere matters of taste, and there would be little 
point in discussing them if they were. If you think broccoli is delicious 
and I cannot stand it, an argument about who is right is pointless, since 
there is no fact of the matter about whether broccoli is delicious—hence 
the maxim de gustibus non est disputandem: there is no disputing about 
matters of taste. If, by contrast, we disagree about the cube root of 729, 
at least one of us is wrong. Philosophical questions about the nature of 
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justice (and knowledge, courage, temperance, love, etc.) will seem to 
many thoughtful people to fall somewhere in between these extremes, 
not mere matters of taste but not as certain as truths of mathematics. 
Socrates thinks that there is a correct answer to his question about 
the nature of justice (and about knowledge, courage, temperance, etc.), 
so in one sense of the term, he is a realist: he thinks there really is a fact 
of the matter of what justice is, a way things are that is independent of 
what we might think, which is the very thing the relativist denies. When 
Hamlet, by contrast, says that ‘there is nothing either good or bad, but 
thinking makes it so’ (Hamlet, II.2.244–45), he is expressing an antirealist 
view about the nature of goodness: things are not mind-independently 
good or bad; their being good or bad is determined by our attitudes 
toward them. Realism is not an all-or-nothing affair: one can be a realist 
about morality, thinking that there really are moral facts such as ‘murder 
is wrong’ and ‘kindness is good’, but an anti-realist about aesthetics, 
thinking that beauty really is just in the eye of the beholder. While 
many readers will be leery about Socrates’ moral realism, an attractive 
feature of his method of rigorous cross-examination is that it does not 
depend on his realism, for it aims to discover whether someone’s view is 
consistent with other things they believe. So the elenchus aims to lead the 
cross-examined party not to the unvarnished moral truth but rather to 
intellectual self-awareness—and, hopefully, to intellectual humility if, as 
is often the case, one recognizes that one’s beliefs do not hang together 
consistently. 
Having noted what Socrates does not do in his conversation with 
Cephalus, let us look at what he does do. He argues that if Cephalus’ 
definition of justice is correct, then it would be just to return a borrowed 
weapon when its now-deranged owner asks for it back. But Cephalus 
himself does not think this. Since his definition implies something that 
he thinks is false, Cephalus should think that his definition is false. This 
form of argument is as common in everyday life as it is in philosophy. If 
A implies B and B is false, A must be false too. Any argument that fits 
this pattern is valid: if its premises are true then its conclusion must be 
true. If it is true that the sidewalk gets wet if it rains and it is true that 
the sidewalk is not getting wet, then it must also be true that it is not 
raining—for if it were raining, the sidewalk would be getting wet, and 
it is not; thus, it cannot be raining. If my aggrieved friend says, ‘if (A) 
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you were a good friend, then (B) you would have helped me move’, I 
know how the rest of the argument goes even if they do not spell it out: 
(not-B) you did not help me move; therefore (not-A) you are not a good 
friend. I might reply by hanging my head in shame and conceding that I 
am not a good friend. That is, I take the argument to be not only logically 
valid (in other words, its conclusion must be true if its premises are 
true) but sound as well: it is valid and its premises are in fact true. But I 
might also reply by insisting that while the argument is logically valid, it 
is not sound, since its first premise is false. While it is generally true that 
a good friend will help one move, it is not true without exception. If I 
was in the hospital donating a kidney to another friend and was unable 
to help you move, my not helping does not imply that I am not a good 
friend. A more plausible version of the first premise would be ‘if (A) 
you were a good friend and (C) were able to help me move, then (B) you 
would have done so.’ On this more nuanced version of the argument, 
the conclusion to draw from the fact that I did not help is that either 
(not-A) I am not a good friend or (not-C) I was not able to help. I do not 
want us to get too bogged down in detail, but attention to the logic of 
the arguments offered is crucial to doing philosophy in general and to 
understanding the Republic in particular, especially Book I. 
Now, just as I had some options in responding to my friend’s 
argument, so too does Cephalus have options in responding to 
Socrates. Perhaps he should concede that his definition is false. But 
he could also change his mind about whether it would be wrong to 
return the weapon. This seems less plausible; most of us are surer of 
particular moral judgments we make than we are about more general 
moral principles. But if Cephalus is very confident in the truth of his 
definition, we might be willing to ‘bite the bullet’, as philosophers say, 
and accept an initially unpalatable claim. Another option would be 
to argue that the definition does not actually imply the problematic 
judgment, much as I did with my friend in the example above. Or he 
can challenge Socrates’ unstated assumption that the definition of 
justice must be unconditional, never allowing any exceptions. Note 
that this is not a challenge to Socrates’ definitional realism; Cephalus 
can still think that there is a uniquely correct definition while at the 
same time thinking that the correct definition is the sort of thing that 
holds only for the most part. In his imposingly titled Groundwork of 
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the Metaphysics of Morals, the great modern philosopher Immanuel 
Kant insisted that moral principles must hold universally and not 
merely generally,3 while Plato’s student Aristotle, by contrast, thought 
that moral truths hold only for the most part, and that we must not 
demand more rigor than a subject affords.4 Plato is closer to Kant on 
this score than he is to Aristotle. We will not settle this dispute here (or 
anywhere in this book); I raise it not only to show that Cephalus has 
philosophical options he does not seem to be aware of, but also to show 
that an important task of philosophy is making the implicit explicit: 
Socrates assumes that real definitions must hold without exception. 
While he may be correct about this, he may not be: moral definitions 
and principles might lack the universality and precision we expect of 
their mathematical cousins. 
A related assumption Socrates makes is that there really is one feature 
that all just things have in common, something in virtue of which they are 
all just. In other words, there must be an essence of justice—and similarly 
an essence of courage, wisdom, tree, table, etc. Plato has a surprising 
view about the nature of these essences, which he calls the Forms: he not 
only thinks that the Forms are mind-independently real, he thinks that 
they are more real than the particular things that are instances of them. We 
will get to that in Chapter Eight, when we will also query the assumption 
that there is an essence—a real definition—of justice and that the task of 
philosophy is to figure out what that essence is. 
Polemarchus: Justice is Benefiting Friends and Harming 
Enemies (1.331d–336a)
Socrates thinks that the proposed definition of justice has been decisively 
refuted, but Polemarchus, Cephalus’ son, disagrees, and for support he 
appeals to the poet Simonides. This appeal to poetic authority raises an 
important theme that will be explored later in the Republic: do poets—
especially great poets such as Homer—have knowledge of things such as 
the nature of justice? Does the fact that Homer or Pindar or Simonides 
says something give us a good reason to think that it is true? Anyone who 
3  Immanuel Kant, Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. by 
Mary K. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 34 [Ak. 4:424]. 
4  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.3 1294b12–15.
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has spent much time on Facebook and who has a philosophical bent has 
probably asked similar questions. Does the fact that George Clooney, 
for example, thinks drastic action needs to be taken to deal with climate 
change give me good reason to think so, too? It seems not, but many of 
us find the deliverances of celebrities persuasive nonetheless. Socrates 
plainly loves Homer; he quotes him and other poets throughout the 
Republic. He will reluctantly conclude in Book X that poets and artists 
generally do not possess the moral authority that the Polemarchuses 
of the world attribute to them. But for now, he sets this issue aside and 
queries the definition of justice Polemarchus appeals to.
Polemarchus first suggests that justice is giving to each what they 
are owed. While his father’s definition was too specific, Polemarchus’ 
is perhaps too general: what exactly are people owed? Polemarchus 
answers that we owe good to our friends and bad to our enemies. This is 
not an outlandish view; indeed, it is commonsense to Polemarchus and 
his contemporaries. The countervailing Christian idea that we should 
love our enemies would find few adherents in classical Athens. 
Socrates makes two arguments against Polemarchus’ definition 
of justice as benefiting one’s friends and harming one’s enemies, but 
before looking at them, we should attend to a problematic feature of 
his definition: it divides the moral world into friends and enemies—but 
surely that does not exhaust the possibilities. It is likely that most of 
the people one encounters on any given day do not fall into either 
category. And though I am lucky enough to have some people I 
consider genuine friends, my life is not interesting enough for me 
to have any enemies, alas. A central moral question most thoughtful 
people ask is what if any moral duties they have toward strangers, 
especially strangers halfway around the world, who do not fit into 
either camp. Polemarchus’ definition of justice gives us no help in 
answering that question.
As with his argument against Cephalus, Socrates’ argument against 
Polemarchus’ account of justice is an indirect argument, aiming to show 
that the definition implies things that Polemarchus himself thinks 
are false. Socrates argues that Polemarchus’ account of justice implies 
that justice is not especially valuable and moreover that it is a craft of 
stealing. Since Polemarchus does not think either of those implications 
is true, Socrates argues, his definition must be false. The pattern is the 
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same one we saw above: A implies B, B is not true, so A must not be true. 
Here, B has two parts, the sub-claims that justice is not valuable and that 
justice is a craft of stealing, so the argument is a slightly more complex 
variation on the argument Socrates made against Polemarchus, but they 
exhibit essentially the same pattern. 
P1 If Polemarchus’ definition of justice is correct, then justice is not 
valuable and it is a craft of stealing.
P2 But it is false that justice is not valuable and that it is a craft of 
stealing.
C Therefore, Polemarchus’ definition of justice is not correct.
As with the argument above, this one is valid: if its premises are true, 
its conclusion—that Polemarchus’ definition is mistaken—must be 
true. Since the argument is valid, the only way to avoid the truth of the 
conclusion is to find at least one of the premises to be false. Polemarchus 
feels himself in a bind because he thinks that his definition is true (and 
thus that the conclusion of Socrates’ argument is false), and also that 
both premises seem true. He does not seem to know how to respond: ‘I 
do not know any more what I did mean, but I still believe that to benefit 
friends and harm one’s enemies is justice’ (1.334b). 
Polemarchus’ plight is not uncommon among Plato’s characters: they 
recognize that Socrates has them intellectually cornered but they do not 
seem to know what to do. Adeimantus describes the experience of many 
of Socrates’ interlocutors a bit later in the Republic: ‘Just as inexperienced 
checkers players are trapped by the experts in the end and cannot make 
a move, so [your interlocutors] too are trapped in the end and have 
nothing to say in this different kind of checkers, which is played not 
with discs but with words’ (6.487b).
I think that Plato puts Polemarchus in this predicament because he 
wants us, his readers, to engage philosophically in the discussion by 
doing for ourselves what Polemarchus is not able to do: to carefully 
scrutinize Socrates’ reasoning and to think through his assumptions. 
Perhaps we can help Polemarchus out. Since Socrates’ argument is valid, 
the main issue is whether it is sound. Why should we think that its first 
premise is true? 
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Is Justice a Craft? (1.332c–334b)
Socrates’ argument that P1 is true (and notice that he offers an 
argument for a premise that itself is part of a larger argument) turns 
on the idea of a craft—τέχνη (technê), in Greek, from which words like 
‘technique’ and ‘technology’ derive. A doctor is a person skilled in 
the craft of medicine; they know how to use their skill to benefit their 
friends by healing them and harm their enemies by poisoning them. 
Similarly, the person skilled in the craft of cooking can use that skill 
to benefit their friends and harm their enemies via the food they cook. 
(Readers who have seen the film The Help might think of Minny’s 
special chocolate pie as an example.) 
The crucial move takes place when Socrates says, ‘Now, what does 
the craft we call justice give, and to whom or what does it give it?’ 
(1.332d) If justice is a craft in the same way that medicine, cooking, 
navigation, and the like are crafts, then like them it will have its 
own special sphere in which it operates to benefit friends and harm 
enemies. Medicine’s sphere or domain is health; it is there that its 
skilled practitioner can benefit friends and harm enemies. Medicine 
is not useful outside its sphere—for example, the person skilled in 
navigation can benefit friends and harm enemies at sea, not the person 
skilled in medicine. This is not to say that these spheres do not overlap: 
there is a sense in which a doctor can benefit and harm passengers on 
a ship, but their being at sea is irrelevant to the doctor benefiting and 
harming them.
Polemarchus does not challenge the assumption that justice is a 
craft; indeed, he agrees that partnerships are the sphere of the craft 
of justice. But, Socrates argues, when choosing a partner for checkers 
we want a skillful checkers player, not someone skilled in the craft of 
justice. The same can be said for other crafts such as house-building 
and horse-breeding. When we form a partnership to build a house or 
buy a horse, we want someone skilled in those crafts, and being just 
does not make anyone a better builder or breeder. It is when we are 
not using something and want to safeguard it, Socrates argues, that 
we choose the person skilled in justice, who will not steal our money 
or our horse or our prized violin. So, Socrates concludes, ‘justice is not 
worth very much, since it is only useful for useless things’ (1.333e). 
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This conclusion is an embarrassing one for Polemarchus’ view, but 
it is not fatal to it. The fatal blow comes next. The person most skilled 
at protecting a computer network, to use an anachronistic example, 
is the person most skilled at hacking into networks; since they know 
where the weak spots are, they will know how to patch them. At the 
end of the film Catch Me If You Can,5 master forger Frank Abagnale goes 
to work for the FBI, teaching agents how to spot forgeries. Socrates’ 
general point is this: ‘Whenever someone is a clever guardian, then, he 
is also a clever thief’ (1.334a). But since the person skilled in the craft 
of justice is the best guardian of an item, they will also be best able 
to steal it and presumably avoid detection. Thus the just person is a 
kind of thief, and justice, by being a craft of guarding what is valuable, 
turns out to be a craft of stealing. Polemarchus is flummoxed. He does 
not think that justice is useless or a craft of stealing, but he has been 
led to the view that justice is useless and a craft of stealing by a series 
of steps that he agreed to. 
I think that Polemarchus should, but does not, question the 
assumption driving the argument: that justice is a craft. Certainly, 
character virtues like justice are similar to crafts in interesting and 
important ways. For example, both are practical, involving know-how. 
Both are acquired by practice, by doing. Both are desirable to possess 
and objects of praise. But the (or at least a) crucial difference between 
them is that crafts are morally neutral, while character virtues—moral 
virtues—are not. As Socrates points out, the doctor, who possesses 
the craft of medicine, can use their craft for good or ill, to benefit and 
harm. If Polemarchus’ definition of justice is correct, the doctor uses 
their craft to benefit their friends and harm their enemies and thereby 
exhibits justice. But a doctor who uses the craft of medicine to harm 
their friends is acting unjustly, on Polemarchus’ view. Whether the 
doctor acts justly depends upon how they use their craft. Crafts are 
good—but they are conditionally good, good only if used appropriately; 
their moral goodness is not intrinsic. Virtues, by contrast, seem to 
be unconditionally, intrinsically good. Possessing them makes their 
possessor morally better off, even if it makes them, say, financially 
worse off. (Courage might seem to pose a problem for this claim, but 
5  Catch Me If You Can, dir. by Stephen Spielberg (DreamWorks Pictures, 2002).
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we can set that worry aside for now.) When Socrates asks, ‘Is someone 
a good and useful partner in a game of checkers because he is just or 
because he is a checkers player?’ (1.333a), he is treating the craft and 
the virtue as the same kind of thing. Instead of agreeing, Polemarchus 
should say, ‘That is a false dilemma, Socrates. You are assuming that 
someone cannot be both just and a good checkers player—because 
you are assuming that justice is a craft, and it is not. I want to play 
against someone who is good at checkers—the challenge makes the 
game more fun—and someone who is not going to cheat.’ Being just 
does not make anyone a better builder or breeder or checkers player, 
but it does make someone a better partner to engage in those crafts 
with, since it makes her less likely to take unfair advantage or cheat. 
Perhaps Polemarchus has some implicit grasp of this point, which may 
be one reason why he remains unconvinced by Socrates’ argument 
against his definition. 
It turns out that the first premise of Socrates’ argument against 
Polemarchus’ definition is more complex than it initially seemed. It is 
not 
P1 If (A) Polemarchus’ definition of justice is correct, then (C) 
justice is not valuable and (D) justice is a craft of stealing
but rather 
P1* If (A) Polemarchus’ definition of justice is correct and (B) 
justice is a craft, then (C) justice is not valuable and (D) justice 
is a craft of stealing.
With the structure of P1 thus clarified, Polemarchus has a good response 
to Socrates. His conceding that C and D are both false no longer entails 
that A is false (i.e., that his definition of justice is not correct). Instead, 
the falsity of C and D entail that either A is false or B is false (and 
maybe both). And we have independent reasons for thinking B is false: 
character virtues such as justice are like crafts in many ways, but they 
are not crafts, since crafts are morally neutral while character virtues 
(and vices) are morally loaded. 
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Speaking of Friends… (1.334c–335a)
The next argument has the same structure as the first: the definition 
implies something that is false, so it must be false—or at least 
Polemarchus ought to think it is false. In fact, Socrates seems to show 
that Polemarchus’ definition implies that it is just to harm people 
who have done us no injustice—i.e., who are not our enemies: ‘Then, 
according to your account, it is just to do bad things to those who do no 
injustice’ (1.334d). Here the culprit is Polemarchus’ mistaken account of 
who a friend is. Socrates distinguishes between subjective and objective 
accounts of friendship. On a subjective view, you are my friend if I 
think you are good and useful; what matters are my beliefs about you. 
On the objective view, you are my friend if in fact you are good and 
useful, regardless of whether I think so. Polemarchus opts for the first, 
subjective option, but Socrates points out that we are often mistaken 
about this sort of thing, which can lead to harming our friends and 
benefitting our enemies. 
Notice that here Polemarchus recognizes that his view is defective, 
since it implies something he knows to be false. ‘My account (λόγος 
[logos]) must be a bad one’ (1.334d), he says, proposing that they modify 
the subjective account of friendship, opting for a hybrid account that 
combines the objective and subjective accounts: ‘Someone who is both 
believed to be useful and is useful is a friend; someone who is believed 
to be useful but is not, is believed to be a friend but is not’ (1.334e).
This exchange shows Polemarchus in a better light than the first. 
He is much more active than in the first argument, where for the most 
part he limited himself to one-word replies to Socrates’ somewhat 
leading questions. At the conclusion of the first argument he seemed 
helplessly befuddled, vaguely recognizing that there was some problem 
with his view but sticking to it nonetheless: ‘I do not know any more 
what I did mean, but I still believe that to benefit one’s friends and 
harm one’s enemies is justice’ (1.334b). In this exchange he not only 
clearly recognizes the problem (his subjective account of friendship) 
but articulates the solution: ‘let us change our definition’ (1.334e) of 
friendship. He is more rationally engaged in this exchange and provides 
a pretty good model for thinking philosophically—which, in the end, 
really just comes down to thinking clearly. It may be that his rational 
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vision is sharper in this exchange, however I suspect it is not that his 
vision has improved, but rather that the problem is more visible in this 
exchange than in the first. 
But Does the Just Person Harm Anyone? (1.335b–336a)
Where Socrates’ first criticisms of Polemarchus’ definition are indirect, 
aiming to show that it implies things that Polemarchus himself rejects, 
the last criticism is more direct, challenging the definition itself—and, 
indeed, is a direct challenge to an element of Greek commonsense 
morality that would seem to most Athenians to be unassailable. The 
proposed definition cannot be right, Socrates argues, because ‘it is never 
just to harm anyone’ (1.335e). It is an argument that is important both to 
the scheme of Book I of the Republic and to moral philosophy generally.
One of the argument’s key elements is the concept of a virtue, which 
we employed without exploring whether a virtue such as justice is a 
craft. While we are perhaps likelier to think of virtue in the singular, 
referring to someone’s character in general (or, anachronistically, to 
sexual chastity), it is usually plural in the Republic. Indeed, in Book 
IV we will find Socrates giving accounts of the four cardinal virtues: 
justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom. The Greek word is ἀρετή 
(aretê), which does not have the necessarily moral connotation that the 
English word ‘virtue’ possesses. The word ‘virtuoso’ retains this non-
moral sense; it is still an evaluative term, but not a morally evaluative 
one. The word ‘good’ often functions this way. When you call someone 
a good person, you are morally evaluating and praising them; when 
you call them a good dancer or a good mechanic or a good thief, you are 
evaluating them, but you are not evaluating them morally; you are saying 
that they are good at a particular craft or activity. Some translators try to 
remind their readers of this non-moral aspect by opting for ‘excellence’ 
instead of ‘virtue’ in translating aretê. This makes sense, since if things 
like dogs and knives have virtues—which they do, as Plato understands 
the concept—it must have a non-moral dimension. But our translator 
opts for ‘virtue’, so to avoid confusion we will follow his lead.
The concept of a virtue is best understood in terms of the concept of a 
function. A thing’s function is the work it does, its goal-directed purpose. 
The Greek word for function is ἔργον (ergon), which is the root of the 
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English word ‘ergonomic’. Some readers have ‘ergonomic’ computer 
keyboards that are wedge-shaped or chairs that are ‘ergonomically 
designed’, which means that they are designed to enable their users to work 
more efficiently as they carry out the object’s function. More technically, 
the function is the goal-directed activity characteristic of the kind of 
thing in question. Artifacts like knives and cars have functions, but so 
too do natural objects. The function of a knife is to cut; the function of a 
heart is to pump blood. In one sense, a thing’s function is what makes it 
what it is. Understood in terms of function, a plastic knife and a metal 
knife have more in common with each other than a plastic knife and 
a plastic fork do. Understood materially rather than functionally—that 
is, understood in terms of the matter they are composed of rather than 
their tasks—the plastic knife and plastic fork are more similar to each 
other than either is to the metal knife. A hallmark of modern science 
since Galileo and Newton is jettisoning functional or teleological 
(that is, goal-directed) explanations of natural phenomena in favor of 
material and mechanistic explanations. Rain does not have a purpose 
in the modern worldview; that rain waters crops and thus enables life is 
a welcome side-effect of rain. A scientific account of why it rained this 
morning will appeal to various meteorological facts, not to the function 
or purpose of rain. But these functional or teleological explanations, 
while out of place in physics and chemistry, still find a home in biology 
and psychology, for example, and in ordinary life. When in The Silence 
of the Lambs Clarice seeks Hannibal’s help in catching Buffalo Bill, he 
encourages her to think teleologically: ‘What does he do, this man you 
seek?’ When she answers, ‘He kills women’, Hannibal replies in his 
eerie, sing-song voice, ‘No! That is incidental’. He is telling her that until 
she understands the goal around which he organizes his murderous 
activity—i.e., until she understands Bill’s function—she will not be 
able to understand him, much less to catch him.6 A virtue, then, is the 
state that enables the thing to perform its function well, and a vice, by 
contrast, is the state that prevents the thing from performing its function 
well. Sharpness is the virtue of a knife, since sharpness is what enables 
the knife to cut well, and dullness is a knife’s vice, since it prevents the 
knife from cutting well. A dull knife still might cut, but it will not cut 
6  The Silence of the Lambs, dir. by Jonathan Demme (Orion Pictures, 1991).
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well. So a virtue is a good-making feature of thing: sharpness makes for 
a good knife, since a sharp knife cuts well. If it sounds odd to talk of a 
knife’s virtue, keep in mind that ‘excellence’ is another way to translate 
aretê. The virtue of a heart is a bit more complicated, which makes sense, 
given how complicated hearts are, but the basic idea is the same: the 
heart’s virtue is the condition that enables it to pump blood well. 
Now that we have explored the concept of a virtue, let us see 
how Socrates puts it to work in his third, direct argument against 
Polemarchus’ definition of justice. Since possessing the relevant virtue 
makes something good, you make something worse by depriving it of 
its virtue. Thus, making a knife duller makes it worse. Now of course 
there may be times when a dull knife is preferable to a sharp one: one 
does not use a sharp knife as a prop in a movie or play, because it is too 
dangerous. But notice how the knife’s function has quietly changed: as 
a prop, its function is not to cut but to appear to do so. You do not give 
scalpel-sharp scissors to a kindergartener but instead scissors that do 
not cut as well, since we will sacrifice cutting capacity in favor of safety. 
The upshot of all this is that to harm something is to make it worse off 
with respect to the relevant virtue. 
The key move in the argument occurs when Polemarchus agrees with 
Socrates’ suggestion that justice is the human virtue (1.335c). There is 
no mention of the human function here—something that Plato’s student 
Aristotle will make the centerpiece of his ethics—but we can reason 
backwards to it, if we are so inclined. Perhaps our function is, at least in 
part, to live peacefully in communities; if so, then justice will be the trait, 
or surely among the traits, that will enable us to do so. When speaking of 
making objects worse, we tend to reserve ‘harm’ for animate objects and 
employ ‘damage’ for inanimate ones. It sounds odd to say that I harmed 
the lawnmower by not putting oil in the engine. But harm and damage 
are both ways to make something worse, and in both cases I make the 
thing worse by depriving it of the relevant virtue. So, just as I would 
damage the knife by depriving it of its characteristic virtue, sharpness, 
I would harm a person by depriving them of the characteristic human 
virtue, justice: ‘people who are harmed must become more unjust’ 
(1.335c). 
But, Socrates asks, how could a just person, acting justly, make 
someone else less just? A musician cannot by exhibiting musical 
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excellence make others less musical, he thinks, any more than an 
excellent parent or teacher can make someone else a worse parent or 
teacher through the very exercise of their excellence. The very idea is 
incoherent, Socrates thinks. Thus the proposed definition is intrinsically, 
rather than extrinsically, flawed: the problem is not that the definition 
has false or undesirable implications; the problem is that its core idea, 
that justice involves harming those who deserve it, makes no sense.
This conclusion has fascinating implications for theories of 
punishment—though this is not something that Socrates pursues here. 
If Socrates is correct, then retributivist accounts of punishment are 
deeply morally mistaken. Only punishment aiming at the wrongdoer’s 
moral improvement would be justified; retributive punishments, which 
seek to inflict harm because the wrongdoer deserves to suffer, would 
not be justifiable. Here it is important to remember that not all pain is 
harmful; we often inflict pain on ourselves and others for our and their 
own good—and it is especially heart-rending when that other is a small 
child or companion animal with whom we cannot communicate our 
reasons for inflicting pain. 
We will see in the next chapter that Thrasymachus, who bursts on 
the scene at this argument’s conclusion, has a lot to say in opposition 
to this argument’s key premise, that justice is the human virtue, so we 
will not explore the argument in great detail here. One might wonder, 
though, about Socrates’ point that a person or thing possessing virtue V 
cannot, by exercising V, make other things un-V or less V. Sharp knives 
become dull by their repeated use, after all—though the great Daoist 
Zhuangzi (aka Chuang Tzu) might attribute this to a lack of excellence 
in the person wielding the knife, since Cook Ding’s knife finds the 
empty spaces between the joints and thus ‘is still as sharp as if it had just 
come off the whetstone, even after nineteen years’.7 But let us set this 
aside and attend to how differently Polemarchus reacts to this Socratic 
refutation. After the first argument, he still stuck to his definition, 
insisting that justice was benefiting friends and harming enemies, 
even though he sensed something was amiss. Here, by contrast, he is 
completely convinced that his definition is mistaken, and profoundly so. 
7  Zhuangzi: The Complete Writings, trans. by Brook Ziporyn (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 2020), p. 30.
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Moreover, he agrees to be Socrates’ ‘partner in battle’ (1.335e) against 
those who advocate it. 
It is worth noting, as we wind down this chapter, how Socrates 
seeks to preserve the moral authority of the poet Simonides, to whose 
definition Polemarchus appealed when entering the conversation. 
When Polemarchus first jumps into the argument, Socrates describes 
Simonides as ‘a wise and godlike man’ (1.333e)—though perhaps a 
bit ironically. A few pages later, having, he thinks, decisively refuted 
the definition, he suggests that the definition could not be Simonides’ 
after all, since no wise and godlike person could be so mistaken about 
the nature of justice. Instead, it must be the definition of a wealthy 
and powerful person seeking to cloak their bad conduct in the mantle 
of justice. This is yet another of the subtle ways in which Plato works 
important themes into the argument. As noted above, whether poets 
have the moral authority customarily ascribed to them will be explored 
later in the Republic. 
We have covered a lot of ground in this chapter. Hopefully readers 
have a good grasp of some of the key concepts that will be explored in 
the remainder of the Republic and especially of the give-and-take that 
characterizes philosophical conversation.
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2. Taming the Beast:  
Socrates versus Thrasymachus,  
Book I
The last half of Book I (336a–354c) depicts Socrates’ encounter with 
Thrasymachus. Like most characters in the Republic, Thrasymachus is 
a real person, and the views Plato attributes to him square with what is 
known of the historical Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus is a sophist—a 
professional, itinerant teacher of rhetoric, or the art of persuasion. 
Plato’s worry about sophists is that their teaching is neither grounded 
in nor aimed at the truth; its only concern is persuasion.
Enter Thrasymachus: Justice Is Whatever Benefits the 
Powerful (1.336a–39b)
Thrasymachus bursts into the conversation like a wild beast, and 
Socrates twice remarks how frightening it was. His entrance might be 
merely an overly aggressive case of ‘calling bullshit’ were it not for the 
antipathy he clearly has for Socrates. Socrates asks questions but never 
answers them, Thrasymachus complains—and not, Thrasymachus 
thinks, because of any ‘Socratic wisdom’ of knowing that he does 
not know the answers, but because of his ‘love of honor’ (1.336c): 
Thrasymachus thinks that Socrates just wants to win arguments. He 
responds to Socrates’ assertions of the value of justice as ‘a thing more 
valuable than even a large quantity of gold’ (1.336e) and of intellectual 
humility (‘we are incapable of finding it’ (1.336e)) with ‘a loud, 
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sarcastic laugh’, dismissing them as ‘just Socrates’ usual irony’ (1.337a). 
This last charge might sound strange to modern ears; irony is often 
prized for its elegance. But here, irony (εἰρωνεία [eirôneia]) is seen as 
false modesty and thus a vice. In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle rates 
irony—which he calls ‘mock modesty’—as one of the vices flanking the 
virtue of truthfulness (roughly: being a straight shooter), the other being 
boastfulness,1 and in his Rhetoric he notes that people often respond to 
irony with anger, since it can seem to show contempt.2 Perhaps that is 
what earns Thrasymachus’ ire.
In any case, Thrasymachus has an answer to Socrates’ question about 
the nature of justice, one he is very proud of: ‘justice is nothing other than 
the advantage of the stronger’ (1.338c). Two things to notice straightaway 
about Thrasymachus’ account are its political nature and its reductive, 
deflationary tone. By ‘the stronger’ he means the politically powerful, 
who make laws to benefit themselves; good people follow those rules, 
thinking it just to do so, which benefits the rule-makers. The definition’s 
deflationary, reductive aspect is brought out in the ‘nothing other than’ 
locution. Claims that love is nothing but a biochemical phenomenon or a 
fairy tale or a social construction are meant to deflate the kinds of lofty 
claims one encounters at wedding receptions and on Valentine’s Day 
cards. Thrasymachus offers his definition of justice in a similar vein.
Though Socrates and Thrasymachus agree that justice is beneficial, 
they disagree about whom it benefits. Socrates thinks that justice, like 
any character virtue, benefits its possessor: my being just makes my life 
better. Thrasymachus, who will soon deny that justice is a virtue at all, 
claims that my being just benefits someone else—namely, the politically 
powerful rule-makers, who benefit from my following the rules which 
they have crafted for their own benefit. A just person, Thrasymachus 
argues, always gets less than an unjust one (1.343d): they do not cheat 
their business partners or customers, they do not cheat on their taxes, 
and when they govern they make laws that benefit others rather than 
themselves. 
We will see soon enough that Socrates rejects Thrasymachus’ picture 
of what a happy or flourishing human life looks like. Thrasymachus is a 
materialist—not in the philosophical sense of thinking that there are no 
1  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV.7 1127b22–31. 
2  Aristotle, Rhetoric, II.2 1379b30–31.
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immaterial objects, but in the everyday sense of thinking that material 
success is the main goal of life and measure of success. Thrasymachus 
is also an egoist: one’s own interests are the ultimate standard for how 
one should act. Note that the egoist does not counsel doing whatever 
one feels like doing at any moment, for that may not be in one’s interest. 
Acting impulsively is often at odds with enlightened self-interest, so 
it is not something Thrasymachus endorses. And there may be times 
when following the rules will be to one’s advantage, especially if one 
is likely to be caught and punished for breaking the rules. While it is 
almost always in one’s interest to appear to be just—a point that Glaucon 
and Adeimantus will focus on in Book II—it is rarely in one’s interest 
to actually be just, Thrasymachus thinks. On his view, people who wish 
to be just are either naïve simpletons who cluelessly enable their own 
exploitation, or they are savvy enough to recognize their own inability 
to act unjustly with impunity and so agree to the rules in order to protect 
themselves against those strong enough to do so. Justice is for the weak, 
he thinks: ‘Those who reproach injustice do so because they are afraid 
not of doing it but of suffering it’ (1.344c).
Five Arguments Against Thrasymachus’ Definition of 
Justice
There is more to say about Thrasymachus’ definition of justice, but the 
best way to do that is to turn to the arguments Socrates gives against 
it. As with the conversations with Cephalus and Polemarchus, Socrates 
will argue from premises that Thrasymachus accepts to conclusions 
that are at odds with those premises. That is, he will try to show that 
Thrasymachus’ view is at odds with itself, and thus that Thrasymachus 
himself has reason to discard or at least revise his view. Socrates makes 
five such arguments. The first two target Thrasymachus’ answer to the 
Republic’s first question about the nature of justice—that is, his claim 
that justice is whatever benefits the stronger. The last three target his 
answer to the Republic’s second question about whether a just life is 
happier than an unjust one. We will take them each in turn.
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The Error Argument (1.338c–343a)
I have dubbed the first argument ‘the error argument’ because it turns 
on the possibility that rulers, being fallible, are prone to error in crafting 
laws. The argument is straightforward. Thrasymachus agrees that justice 
is or at least requires following laws laid down by the rulers. But rulers, 
being fallible, sometimes make mistakes and thus enact laws that are 
not in their own interests. So—sometimes, at least—justice is not what 
benefits the stronger. Since on Socrates’ view an adequate definition of a 
thing’s essence must not allow for exceptions, Thrasymachus’ definition 
must be rejected or revised, since there are times when justice does 
not benefit the stronger. Reconstructed in premise-conclusion form, 
Socrates’ Error Argument against Thrasymachus goes like this: 
P1 In a political system, the rulers are stronger than the ruled. 
(1.339a)
P2 Justice is (obedience to) whatever the rulers command. (1.339c)
P3 Rulers sometimes err and do not command what is to their 
advantage. (1.339d)
C So, justice is not (always) the advantage of the stronger. 
(1.339d)
The argument seems deductively valid; that is, its conclusion must be 
true if its premises are true. Since Thrasymachus rejects the conclusion, 
rational consistency requires him to reject at least one of the premises. 
Hopefully this requirement makes sense. Since the argument is valid, 
if all its premises are true, its conclusion would have to be true. So if 
I think the conclusion of a valid argument is false, I cannot think that 
all the premises are in fact true, because if the premises were in fact 
true, the conclusion would be true, too. It is irrational to think that all 
the premises of a valid argument are in fact true and to think that the 
conclusion that follows from them is false. If I think the conclusion of a 
valid argument is false, I must also think at least one of the premises is 
false. 
Someone who does not value consistency will be unmoved by all 
of this. We have probably all encountered a kind of skepticism—and 
perhaps embodied it with youthful exuberance—that is skeptical about 
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consistency itself. ‘What is so great about consistency?’, such a skeptic 
asks. ‘Who cares if I am being inconsistent’? If the skeptic is bookish, 
they might even quote from Ralph Waldo Emerson’s well-known essay, 
‘Self-Reliance’: ‘A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, 
adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines’.3 Or they might 
appeal to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s assertion in The Crack-Up that ‘the test of 
a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the 
mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function’.4 One way 
to respond to our skeptic is to point out that for Emerson the bogeyman 
wasn’t consistency but rather foolish consistency: ‘With consistency a 
great soul has simply nothing to do […] Speak what you think now in 
hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words 
again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day’.5 It is refusing 
to change one’s mind that Emerson is attacking here. And Fitzgerald is 
not questioning the value of consistency or celebrating inconsistency; 
he is concerned less with belief than he is with action: ‘One should, for 
example, be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined 
to make them otherwise’.6 There is nobility in fighting the good fight, he 
suggests, even when we do not believe we will succeed.
Ultimately, though, if the skeptic continues to deny the value of 
consistency, there is little one can say to convince them otherwise, 
since rational argument depends upon consistency. Such a person 
is in effect demanding a sound argument for why they should find 
sound arguments persuasive. It they stick to their guns, there is no 
point in arguing with them. To do falls afoul of the folksy wisdom of a 
needlepoint pillow I happened upon years ago: ‘Never try to teach a pig 
to sing; it wastes your time and annoys the pig.’
Thrasymachus, whatever his other faults, is not this sort of skeptic. 
He is skeptical about the value of justice—we will soon see that he 
thinks it is a vice rather than a virtue—but he is not skeptical about the 
importance of consistency. Let us assume that Thrasymachus recognizes 
the argument as logically valid. (Since it wasn’t until Aristotle that 
3  Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), p. 41. 
4  F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up (New York: New Directions Publishing, 2009), p. 
69.
5  Emerson, p. 41.
6  Fitzgerald, p. 69.
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anyone worked out the notion of logical validity, it is anachronistic 
to speak of Thrasymachus as recognizing the argument’s validity, 
but doing so seems a harmless aid to clarity.) If he wants to resist its 
conclusion—which presumably he does, since it says that his account 
of justice is false—he must think at least one of the premises is false. P1 
seems unassailable: at least insofar as strength is understood in terms of 
political power, the law-making rulers are stronger than their subjects. 
P2 is never challenged by Thrasymachus or anyone else, despite 
Socrates’ bringing it up almost half a dozen times. I cannot help but 
think that these are winks or gentle nudges to prod readers to look more 
closely at P2. Thrasymachus agrees that ‘it is just to obey the rulers’ 
(1.339b), a proposition that he repeatedly assents to: ‘it is just for their 
subjects to do whatever their rulers order’ (1.339d); ‘it is just for the 
others to obey the orders they give’ (1.339e); ‘it is just to obey the orders 
of the rulers’ (1.340a). While obeying the law is typically just, we might 
ask whether it is always, unconditionally, just to do so, just as Socrates 
questioned Cephalus’ definition. Many readers will think that there is a 
presumption in favor of obeying the laws of our communities: obedience 
is the default position. But fewer will think that this presumption is 
exceptionless, for there seem to be times when this presumption does 
not hold—for example, if a law is unjust. Some thinkers, among them 
Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther King, go even farther and think 
that unjust laws are not really laws at all but are counterfeits, and that we 
should no more obey them than we should accept a $20 bill we know to 
be counterfeit. 
P2, as I have stated it, does not merely claim that legal obedience 
is just; it claims that that is what justice is. It is a subtle but important 
difference, apparently unnoticed but accepted by Thrasymachus. When 
Socrates asks him, ‘And whatever laws they make must be obeyed by 
their subjects, and this is justice ((τὸ δίκαιον) [to dikaion]: the just)?’, he 
replies ‘Of course’ (1.339c). By adding the definite article τὸ—‘the’ in 
English—the adjective, ‘just’, gets promoted to a noun, ‘the just’, which is 
a typically Platonic way to talk about justice itself. On this view, all there 
really is to justice is obeying the rules, regardless of their content. Justice 
on such a view is merely a matter of convention: there are no mind- 
or culture-independent facts about whether something is really just or 
not. The only fact that makes something just is that it is a rule of one’s 
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community. If the laws of one’s community mandate racial segregation, 
then justice requires obedience to them. Some readers—though fewer 
now than sixty years ago—will agree with this, holding that one should 
always obey the law, even laws one considers unjust, though one can 
work within the system to change unjust laws. Notice, too, that the 
conventionalism about justice expressed in P2 implies that there really 
is no standard by which to assess the laws of one’s community as just or 
unjust. All there is to justice on such views is following whatever rules 
there are, regardless of their content, and there is no way to assess that 
content morally. Different communities have different rules, but if this 
deep cultural conventionalism or relativism is correct, no community’s 
rules are better than any others, they are just different—and the same 
goes within a community over time: if a community allows slavery at 
time t1 but abolishes it at t2, the new legal code is not better, it is just 
different. This is something that few people are willing to accept, upon 
reflection. When we associate conventionalism and relativism with 
open-mindedness and tolerance of other cultures’ practices and norms, 
they can seem attractive, but they often seem significantly less so when 
we examine their implications. 
To draw on some vocabulary developed in the previous chapter, 
this conventionalism about justice is an anti-realist view: there are no 
culture-independent moral facts by which to morally assess the laws and 
norms of one’s culture. The contrast between nature and convention—
between what is mind- and culture-independent and what is mind- and 
culture-dependent—is a pervasive theme in the Republic. The border 
between Illinois and Wisconsin seems purely conventional, the result 
of a decision to draw the line in a particular place. The border between 
Wisconsin and Minnesota seems more natural, since the Mississippi and 
St. Croix rivers are natural objects, existing whether we think they do 
or not. But even this boundary is not completely natural, since it is the 
border only because people decided it was. 
We have spent a lot of time on a view no one in the Republic mentions 
because I think Plato wants us, his readers, to do what his characters do 
not do, to think through issues that are ignored or given short shrift in 
the text. If we pause and double-click here, so to speak, examining the 
issues more thoroughly than Socrates’ interlocutors do, we will be doing 
philosophy for ourselves. And if we do, we might well think that P2 is 
32 Plato’s ‘Republic’: An Introduction
false or at least in need of serious revision, even if no one in the Republic 
questions it.
Despite Socrates’ repeated prompting, Thrasymachus ignores P2. 
He will reject P3, which he initially assented to but now, on reflection, 
finds problematic. But before Thrasymachus addresses P3, Cleitophon 
tries to come to his rescue, suggesting that Thrasymachus’ view is that 
justice is what the stronger believe to be to their advantage. In short, 
Cleitophon is suggesting that the Error Argument is irrelevant, since it 
misunderstands Thrasymachus’ view. Polemarchus objects that is not 
what Thrasymachus said. It is telling how Socrates responds here: ‘If 
Thrasymachus wants to put it that way now, let us accept it’ (1.340c). 
This suggests that, contrary to what Thrasymachus says about him, 
Socrates is not primarily interested in winning an argument; he is 
interested in getting at the truth. If Cleitophon’s revision more accurately 
reflects what Thrasymachus thinks, then that is what we should attend 
to, Socrates thinks. What he meant is more important than what he said, 
for Socrates. To think otherwise would be a foolish consistency indeed. 
Thrasymachus declines to go through the door Cleitophon has 
opened for him, however. Instead, he does what philosophers often do: 
he makes a distinction between different senses of a key term or concept. 
Here, Thrasymachus distinguishes between the ordinary and precise 
senses ‘ruler’, claiming that P3 is true in the ordinary sense of ‘ruler’ 
but false in the precise, philosophical sense. Thus he can consistently 
reject the argument’s conclusion, since he thinks that P3, the seemingly 
plausible claim that rulers sometimes err and make laws that are not 
to their own advantage, is false, strictly speaking. In the strict or precise 
sense, rulers do not make mistakes, he claims. ‘Do you think I’d call 
someone who is in error stronger at the very moment he errs?’ (1.340c), 
Thrasymachus asks. 
For all his bluster and swagger, Thrasymachus shows himself 
capable of subtle, philosophical thought when he distinguishes between 
the precise and ordinary senses of terms. ‘When someone makes an 
error in the treatment of patients’, Thrasymachus asks rhetorically, ‘do 
you call him a doctor in regard to that very error?’ (1.340d) The same 
goes for accountants, grammarians, and any person said to possess a 
craft. A craftsperson, after all, possesses expertise and knowledge; the 
names for possessors of such expertise—carpenter, shepherd, doctor, 
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teacher, etc.—are not merely descriptive but are to an extent normative, 
indicating that their possessor has earned the right to be so called. 
Someone might be on the roster as quarterback or employed by the 
university as a teacher. But if they are so bad at their jobs, we might 
want to withhold the name: ‘He’s no quarterback’, says the disgruntled 
football fan of a now-departed player. The fan is not saying that, say, 
Jay Cutler did not play that position; they would be likelier to say ‘he 
is not a quarterback’ if the description is factually incorrect, if say the 
player were a linebacker and not a quarterback. Typically, ‘s/he is no 
x’, where x is a term for a craftsperson, makes the normative claim that 
the person in question is not good enough at their craft to merit the 
title. It is a normative issue, rather than a descriptive one, and it extends 
beyond names for craftspeople, as when someone says of rap—or rock 
and roll or jazz, in their early days—‘that’s not music’. This issue, by 
the way, is an important one in Confucianism. Confucius and especially 
his follower Xunzi were concerned with the ‘rectification of names 
(zhengming)’, given the importance of social roles to their thinking. 
Someone who regularly fails to display the required filial piety does not 
deserve to be called a son—or, as Thrasymachus would put it, is not a 
son in the precise sense.
So Thrasymachus thinks that while P3 of the Error Argument is 
true in the ordinary, descriptive sense of ‘ruler’, it is false in the precise, 
normative sense—and that is the relevant sense here. There is a certain 
logic to his view. Since a craftsperson is so called because they possess 
the requisite knowledge, when they make a mistake, they seem to 
lack this knowledge—or at least they are unable to act on it at that 
moment. ‘It is when his knowledge fails him that he makes an error’, 
Thrasymachus says, ‘and in regard to that error he is no craftsman. No 
craftsman, expert, or ruler makes an error at the moment when he is 
ruling, even though everyone will say that a physician or a ruler makes 
errors’ (1.340e). When he agreed with P3 earlier (1.339c), he had the 
ordinary, imprecise sense in mind. But on the precise account—and 
Socrates is ‘a stickler for precise accounts’ (1.340e)—P3 is false, since 
‘no craftsman ever errs.’
There is certainly something to what Thrasymachus says. But is he 
overstating his case in holding that any error renders the craft-title in 
question inapplicable? Does expertise really require such infallibility? 
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A baseball player need not throw a perfect game in to be called pitcher 
in the precise sense. If Thrasymachus were right, there have only been 
twenty-three genuine pitchers in the history of major league baseball. It 
is not just that perfect games depend on more than the pitcher’s skill. 
And it is not just a matter of human imperfection. Rather, it seems that 
some level of failure is consistent with possessing the relevant expertise, 
which is rarely an all-or-nothing matter. The best hitters in baseball, after 
all, make outs more often than they get hits. What level of imperfection 
is acceptable varies by craft: a batter who gets a hit only a third of the 
time is an excellent hitter; an orthopedic surgeon who successfully sets 
a broken bone for only a third of their cases seems far from competent.
Thrasymachus’ distinction between the precise and ordinary senses 
of ‘ruler’ allows him to avoid accepting the conclusion that his definition 
of justice is false, since it allows him to claim, with some reason, that 
one of the argument’s premises is false. Socrates does not challenge 
Thrasymachus’ distinction between the ordinary and precise senses of 
‘ruler’ (and, presumably, of other terms for experts in various crafts). 
Instead, he turns the distinction back against Thrasymachus in what we 
will call the Craft Argument. 
The Craft Argument (1.341c–348b)
The heart of the Craft Argument is Socrates’ insistence that craftspeople, 
in the strict sense, always seek to benefit their subjects, never themselves. 
Doctors, for example, insofar as they are doctors, seek to heal their 
patients; horse-breeders seek to raise healthy horses; etc. If we think of 
craft-knowledge as a kind of strength—as cognitive-practical strength 
rather than physical strength—then the expertise the craftsperson 
possesses is a kind of strength; thus ‘crafts rule over and are stronger 
than the things of which they are the craft’ (1.342c). Stated in premise-
conclusion form, the Craft Argument begins thus:
P1 All crafts seek to benefit the objects over which they rule, not 
their practitioners. 
P2 All objects over which a craft rules are weaker than the craft, 
which is stronger. 
C1 So, all crafts seek to benefit the weaker, not the stronger.
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The argument is valid, and though Socrates has given only a few 
examples in support of P1, Thrasymachus accepts it. So far, so good. 
Now, to get to his desired conclusion that Thrasymachus’ account of 
justice is false, Socrates has to assume that justice is a craft; there is no 
way to get to a conclusion about justice without a premise about justice. 
Since Socrates needs to make this assumption, let us state it clearly in the 
second half of the Craft Argument:
P3 Justice is a craft.
C2 Therefore, justice seeks to benefit the weaker, not the stronger.
C3 Therefore, justice is not the advantage of the stronger. 
This half of the argument is valid, too. C2 follows from C1 and P3 by 
plugging ‘justice’ into the general claim that all crafts seek to benefit the 
weaker. And then C3 follows from C2, because if justice seeks to benefit 
the weaker, then justice is not the advantage of the stronger.
Thrasymachus’ initial reaction to the conclusion is a lesson in how 
not to react rationally to an argument: ‘Tell me, Socrates do you still have 
a wet nurse? […] Because she is letting you run around with a snotty 
nose, and does not wipe it when she needs to!’ (1.343a). Needless to say, 
such insult-ridden responses, sadly not uncommon in cyberspace, do 
not pass philosophical muster. And Thrasymachus’ second response is 
not much better. For rather than challenging one of Socrates’ premises, 
as one should do when one rejects the conclusion of a valid argument, 
Thrasymachus does what many of us often do: he simply repeats his 
view, loudly and more stridently: ‘justice is really the good of another, 
the advantage of the stronger ruler, and harmful to the one who 
obeys and serves’ (1.343b). His merely repeating his view rather than 
engaging with Socrates’ objections to it echoes Polemarchus’ reminder 
in the opening scene that one cannot be persuaded to change one’s mind 
if one will not listen. 
Thrasymachus’ responding as he does is not terribly surprising 
when we remember his profession: he is a sophist, a wandering teacher 
of rhetoric, who teaches students how to make speeches in law courts. 
If he is any good at his job, he can teach his students to make a speech 
for or against any view. ‘You want to argue that the defendant is guilty? 
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Here’s how you do that. You want to argument that the defendant is 
innocent? Here’s how you do that. You want to figure out whether 
the defendant is really guilty or not? Not my department.’ He is a 
master of the art of disputation, engaging in what Plato calls eristic, the 
etymology of which is telling: Eris was the Greek goddess of strife; but 
for her rolling an apple engraved ‘to the fairest’ at a divine wedding 
reception, the Trojan War might not have happened. To be ἐριστικός 
(eristikos) is to be fond of strife, to enjoy combat—at least the verbal 
variety. However effective good speeches are at persuading one’s 
listeners of pre-determined conclusions, they are not especially effective 
for arriving at philosophical conclusions. Socrates thinks his method 
of elenchus, the method of question-and-answer that proceeds from 
premises his interlocutor agrees to, is a better way to get at the truth. 
Now if you already know—or, like Thrasymachus, think you know—
the truth about an issue, a rhetorically sound speech (or op-ed piece 
or book) may be the best way to bring your audience around to your 
view. But if, like Socrates, you do not think you know the answer to the 
question, Socratic cross-examination seems a better way to get at the 
truth, whatever it will turn out to be. ‘Whatever direction the argument 
blows us’, Socrates says a bit later in the Republic, ‘that is where we 
must go’ (3.394d). Where Thrasymachus draws on his rhetorical skills 
to get to that pre-determined end, Socrates will accept ‘the [answer] 
that seems right to me after I have investigated the matter’ (1.337c). 
This difference between their approaches is ultimately the difference 
between indoctrination and inquiry. 
It is a shame that Thrasymachus is unwilling or unable to query 
Socrates’ argument, for it is not as airtight as Socrates seems to think 
it is. As is often the case in the Republic, we will have to do for one of 
the interlocutors what they cannot or will not do for themselves. For 
starters, Thrasymachus might question P1, the claim that all crafts seek 
to benefit their objects, not their practitioners. The trouble here is not 
that the argument Socrates gave in support of P1 is too brief, although 
it is that. From just a few examples of crafts that aim at the benefit of 
their objects rather than their practitioners, Socrates arrives at a general 
conclusion that all crafts are like this. Perhaps more examples would 
strengthen this inductive argument. 
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A more serious problem with the Craft Argument is that Socrates 
himself provides a counterexample to its first premise when he 
introduces ‘the craft of wage-earning’ (1.346c). Crafts are distinguished 
by their different ends and their different means for achieving their 
ends—that is, by their different functions: ‘every craft differ[s] from 
every other in having a different function’ (1.346a). The function of a 
doctor, in the precise sense, is healing patients, not making money. And 
similarly for the other crafts Socrates lists: navigation, horse-breeding, 
etc. Making money is the function of a different craft, the craft of wage-
earning or money-making. If doctors and horse-breeders and ship-
captains and teachers benefit financially from practicing their crafts, it 
is because they possess another craft, the craft of wage-earning. Many 
readers will be familiar with chefs and carpenters and doctors who are 
truly expert at their crafts but who lack business sense. At the other end 
of the spectrum are those ‘famous for being famous’ celebrities whose 
only discernible skill is money-making, an ability to monetize their 
otherwise-devoid-of-accomplishment existences. By now the point is 
probably obvious: the craft of money-making is practiced for the benefit 
of the practitioner. While medicine and teaching are other-focused, 
wage-earning is self-focused: it benefits the craftsperson. And it is true 
that you might practice this craft altruistically, as when you want to earn 
more money so you can better provide for your family or community, 
but the craft itself aims to benefit the craftsperson.
So right off the bat, Thrasymachus has grounds to resist the conclusion 
that his definition is false. Of course, the conclusion of an unsound 
argument might still be true. Just as there is nothing inconsistent about 
a juror thinking the defendant actually committed the crime in question 
but voting to acquit because the state did not prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt, there is nothing inconsistent in believing that the 
conclusion of an unsound or invalid argument is true. If Thrasymachus 
were more fair-minded, he might concede that his definition of justice 
might be false but insist that Socrates has not shown that it is. 
Another and perhaps better option for Thrasymachus is to cast doubt 
on P3, the claim that justice is a craft. As noted above, this is an implicit 
assumption of the argument, not an explicit claim—though Socrates did 
assert it earlier, in arguing against Polemarchus: ‘what does the craft 
we call justice give, and to whom or what does it give it?’ (1.332d) This 
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would be a good move for Thrasymachus to make, since we already 
have good reason to think that P3 is false: while crafts and character 
virtues are similar in many ways, crafts are morally neutral whereas 
character virtues are not. If justice is not a craft, then the general claim 
that crafts are other-focused would not apply to it. Now it looks like 
the argument is doubly unsound, since we have good reason to doubt 
both P1 and P3, so Thrasymachus is not rationally compelled to accept 
its conclusion. Socrates might reply that even if justice is not a craft, 
ruling is. But then the Craft Argument’s conclusion needs to be changed 
as well, which stymies Socrates’ attempt to make progress toward 
understanding what justice is by showing what it is not. The argument 
so modified would not be a refutation of Thrasymachus’ definition of 
justice but rather of the view that rulers, in the precise sense, seek not 
their own benefit but rather the benefit of those they rule. We might 
think this is true, at least of good rulers, but Thrasymachus could here 
raise the problems with P1, reminding Socrates that his own example 
of wage-earning is a counterexample to the general claim that crafts are 
not practiced primarily for the benefit of the craftsperson. Why not think 
ruling is analogous to wage-earning, Thrasymachus could ask, and aims 
at the benefit of the ruler? At the very least, Socrates has not given him 
compelling reasons to think that it is not. 
An important lesson here is how interlinked the arguments of the 
Republic are. Earlier I suggested that the important conclusion to draw 
from Socrates’ attempted refutation of Polemarchus was not the one he 
explicitly drew but rather that justice and other moral virtues are not 
crafts. Whether this was the lesson Plato hoped we’d learn is beside the 
point, at least to the extent that one goal in reading the Republic is to do 
philosophy ourselves, to engage in imaginary dialogue with Socrates 
as we try to get at or at least close to the truth of the matter. If the 
assumption that justice is a craft is false, its reappearing as a premise 
here undermines the Craft Argument. 
The Outdoing Argument (1.348b–350d)
Even if the Craft Argument is unsound, it explicitly raises the Republic’s 
second main question of whether the just life is happier than the unjust 
life. This question’s urgency leads Socrates to leap-frog the more 
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theoretical question of the nature of justice in favor of the practical 
question of ‘which whole way of life would make living most worthwhile 
for each of us’ (1.344e). 
Modern moral philosophy often focuses on particular actions, 
especially choices in dilemmas. Sometimes the dilemmas are 
intentionally artificial, to bring out larger moral principles lurking in the 
background. Many readers will be familiar with ‘the trolley problem’ 
and its numerous variations: is it permissible to divert a runaway 
trolley car onto a track where it will kill one worker if doing so will 
save five people working on the track the trolley is on? Other times, the 
dilemmas are more the stuff of everyday life: is aborting a pre-viability 
fetus permissible or not? Socrates’ question is far more general than 
these, as it concerns whole ways of life rather than particular actions. It 
concerns not so much what we ought to do as ‘the way we ought to live’ 
(1.352d). Socrates’ approach focuses on persons rather than actions and 
takes the unit of evaluation to be lives rather than choices and actions. 
This approach, known as Virtue Ethics, has enjoyed a resurgence among 
moral philosophers in recent years, and though virtue ethicists often 
look to Aristotle for inspiration, we see its roots in the ethical thought of 
Plato and Socrates. This virtue-centric concern comes to the fore almost 
immediately in the third of Socrates’ arguments against Thrasymachus, 
the Outdoing Argument, to which we now turn. 
Since Socrates has shifted his attention from the first to the second of 
the Republic’s main questions, his aim now is not to refute Thrasymachus’ 
definition of justice but rather Thrasymachus’ claim that ‘complete 
injustice is more profitable than complete justice’ (1.348c). The question 
of whether a just life is happier than an unjust one has great practical 
implications, given the overwhelmingly plausible assumption that each 
of us wants to be happy. Few of us would dispute that the just life is 
morally better than the unjust life; the issue here is whether the just life 
is prudentially better—whether, as we put it in the Introduction, having a 
good life requires leading a good life. Thrasymachus thinks not, since ‘a 
just man always gets less than an unjust one’ (1.343d). If Thrasymachus 
is right about which life is happier, then each of us has a strong reason to 
act unjustly: if a just or morally good life is always at odds with happiness, 
living a just life will inevitably frustrate a core desire each of us has. 
Socrates argues that, despite its apparent plausibility, Thrasymachus’ 
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view is profoundly mistaken, since morality and happiness are not 
fundamentally at odds with each other. Far from being an impediment 
to happiness, a just life is at least a necessary condition of a happy life, 
on Socrates’ view, since we cannot be happy unless we are just.
Thrasymachus understands happiness in terms of material success, 
in terms of power and its trappings. On his view, the more a person gets, 
the happier they will be. Life is a competition between people striving 
to outdo each other where the winner is the person who is able to bend 
others to their will. Few people, I trust, try to inculcate Thrasymachus’ 
materialism and egoism in their children. Socrates’ last words, nearly, to 
the jury that found him guilty of impiety and sentenced him to death, 
are a request for a favor:
When my sons grow up, gentlemen, if you think they are putting money 
or anything else before goodness, take your revenge by plaguing them as 
I have plagued you; and if they fancy themselves for no reason, you must 
scold them as I scolded you, for neglecting the important things and 
thinking they are good for something when they are good for nothing. 
If you do this, I shall have had justice at your hands, both I myself and 
my children.7
Despite his profound disagreement with Thrasymachus’ materialistic 
conception of human flourishing, Socrates does not argue directly 
against it but instead, in a pattern that by now is familiar, he tries to 
show Thrasymachus that a key premise he believes in—here, that the 
unjust person ‘outdoes everyone else’ (1.344a)—does not support and 
in fact is at odds with the conclusion Thrasymachus holds.
This notion of outdoing is central to the Outdoing Argument. The 
Greek word is πλεονεξία (pleonexia); etymologically it is a combination 
of pleon (more) and echein (to have). Thrasymachus’ unjust person 
wants to have more than anyone else and recognizes no legitimate 
moral constraints on his pursuit of his goal. Fans of classic cinema will 
find a fine example of pleonexia in John Huston’s 1948 film, Key Largo, 
starring Humphrey Bogart, Lauren Bacall, and Edward G. Robinson. 
In a confrontation between Frank McCloud (Bogart) and Johnny Rocco 
7  Plato: Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, trans. by G. M. A. 
Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981), p. 44 (41e–42a).
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(Robinson), McCloud tells captive innkeeper James Temple (Lionel 
Barrymore), that he knows what Rocco wants: 
McCloud: He wants more, don’t you, Rocco?
Rocco: Yeah. That’s it. More. That’s right! I want more!
Temple: Will you ever get enough?
McCloud: Will you, Rocco?
Rocco: Well, I never have. No, I guess I won’t. You, do you 
know what you want?
McCloud: Yes, I had hopes once, but I gave them up.
Rocco: Hopes for what?
McCloud: A world in which there is no place for Johnny 
Rocco.8
Rocco’s insatiable desire for more is the heart of pleonexia. It is almost 
as though the object of this desire is secondary: whatever people want, 
the pleonectic person wants more of it, wants to outdo everyone else. 
The rest of us, not strong enough to bend others to our wills to get what 
we want, live in fear of the Johnny Roccos of the world, those amoral 
creatures who are strong enough to bend us to their will to get what 
they want. Glaucon, playing devil’s advocate, will soon articulate the 
Thrasymachan view that justice is a deal the weak make to protect 
themselves against the caprice of the stronger. ‘Those who reproach 
injustice’, Thrasymachus says, do so not because they are afraid of doing 
it but of suffering it’ (1.344c). If enough of us weak folk band together 
and gain political power, we can make laws that protect us against the 
Thrasymachuses and Roccos of the world. After all, that is all justice is, 
in the conventionalist view Thrasymachus articulated at the outset: the 
rules the politically powerful make to serve their own interests. 
We should note, though, that Thrasymachus shifts gears at the outset 
of the Outdoing Argument and articulates a view that does not square 
with his conventionalism. For he counts injustice not as a vice but as a 
virtue:
Socrates: Do you call one of the two a virtue and the 
other a vice?
8  Key Largo, dir. by John Huston, prod. by Jerry Wald (Warner Bros., 1948).
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Thrasymachus: Of course.
Socrates: That is to say, you call justice a virtue and 
injustice a vice?
Thrasymachus: That is hardly likely, since I say that injustice is 
profitable and justice is not…
Socrates: Do you really include injustice with virtue and 
wisdom, and justice with their opposites?
Thrasymachus: I certainly do. (1.348c–e)
Thrasymachus is here articulating immoralism, the view that what most 
people think of as the wrong way to act is actually the right way: what are 
conventionally thought to be character vices are actually virtues. Unlike 
the conventionalism Thrasymachus expressed earlier, immoralism is 
a realist view: there are mind-independent moral facts that provide 
standards by which to evaluate a society’s conventions and norms. 
Athenian culture takes justice to be a virtue and injustice to be a vice. 
Here, Thrasymachus is saying that Athenian culture get this backwards, 
since injustice is really the virtue and justice the vice.
Thrasymachus’ immoralism makes sense when we pair the last 
chapter’s discussion of what a virtue is with his materialistic conception 
of human flourishing. A virtue is the condition that enables a thing to 
perform its function well. So a knife’s virtue is sharpness, since that is 
what enables the knife to cut well. If our function is to outdo others, to 
get more stuff, then of course injustice is a virtue and justice is a vice, 
since injustice enables and justice prevents our getting more than others: 
‘a just man always gets less than an unjust one’ (1.343d). 
Socrates notices the challenge posed by Thrasymachus’ shift to 
immoralism: ‘it is not easy to know what to say’ (1.348e) in light of 
Thrasymachus’ jettisoning the moral order that would usually serve 
as the background of a conversation like this. But he cannot simply 
presuppose the usual background without begging the question—that 
is, without assuming the truth of what he is trying to prove—against 
Thrasymachus: he needs to argue against Thrasymachus’ immoralism, 
not just assume it is wrong and that the traditional moral order, on which 
justice is a virtue and injustice a vice, is correct. Socrates’ direct target in 
the Outdoing Argument is Thrasymachus’ immoralist view that justice 
is the vice and injustice is the virtue; if he can show this, he will knock 
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out the support for Thrasymachus’ view that the unjust life is happier 
than the just life.
Thrasymachus thinks that an unjust person tries to outdo everyone—
and if they are sufficiently good at being bad, they will succeed. He thinks 
that the just person, by contrast, is a simpleton, easily duped by the 
more crafty and complicated unjust person. Socrates gets Thrasymachus 
to agree that the just person seeks to outdo only unjust people, but 
Thrasymachus is skeptical that the person will succeed at this, being 
so ‘polite and innocent’ (1.349b). Socrates once again appeals to the 
analogy between crafts and virtues: a craftsperson, he argues, tries to 
outperform the person lacking the craft in question, while the craft-
lacking person tries to outdo everyone. Thrasymachus agrees to this, 
and also to Socrates’ claim that a craftsperson is wise and good, which 
makes sense at least with respect to the craft in question. A skilled 
carpenter possesses a kind of technical wisdom, knowing how to build a 
wrap-around deck or a roll-top desk, for example. The person who lacks 
the craft, by contrast, is ignorant and bad: they lack the craftsperson’s 
knowledge and are not, for example, a good carpenter—they are not 
properly called a carpenter at all, if Thrasymachus’ earlier point about 
the precise sense of craft-terms is correct. The craftsperson, Socrates 
thinks, wants to perform the craft in question better than someone who 
lacks it, not someone who possesses it: they want to outdo those unlike 
them, not those like them. The craft-lacking person, by contrast, wants 
to outperform everyone, both those like them and those unlike them. 
Similarly, the just person wants to outdo unjust people, those unlike 
them, while the unjust person wants to outdo everyone, both those like 
and those unlike them. 
If all of this is correct, the just person resembles the craftsperson, 
since each wants to outdo only those unlike them, the unjust and craft-
lacking person, while the unjust person resembles the craft-lacking 
person, wanting to outdo everyone, both those unlike them and those 
like them. Since ‘each of them has the qualities of the people he is like’ 
(1.349d) and Thrasymachus has agreed that the craftsperson is good 
and wise, while the craft-lacking person is neither, it follows that the just 
person is good and wise while the unjust person is neither; from there 
it is a short trip to the conclusion that ‘justice is virtue and wisdom and 
that injustice is vice and ignorance’ (1.350d). 
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Since most of us, I assume, are not immoralists, we will agree 
with Socrates’ conclusion. But as often is the case in Book I, Socrates’ 
argument for his conclusion is problematic. The first problem is that 
the argument relies on the analogy between crafts and virtues, a 
troublesome analogy that bedevils much of Book I. Given the difference 
between character virtues and crafts—the latter are morally neutral 
while the former are not—why should Thrasymachus accept the claim 
that ‘each has the qualities of the one he resembles’ (1.350c)? After all, 
the kinds of knowledge the just and skilled persons require are very 
different. In possessing a skill, the craftsperson possesses a morally 
neutral knowledge of how to do certain things. As Socrates noted in 
his argument with Polemarchus, the craftsperson can use their skills 
for good or ill: a doctor can use their medical expertise to heal or kill. 
Even someone who possesses a skill that seems intrinsically bad—
imagine, say, an assassin—can use that skill for good ends as well as 
bad: assassinating Hitler seems a good thing. The lesson here is that 
arguments from analogy rise and fall on the presence of relevant 
similarities and dissimilarities, respectively, between the things being 
compared. Given the important dissimilarity between crafts and virtues, 
Thrasymachus would be right to push back on this premise.
Another problem with the Outdoing Argument, which many readers 
will have already noticed, is that its very first premise, the claim that 
the skilled person seeks to outdo only the unskilled person rather than 
another skilled person, seems to be not merely false but obviously false. 
Socrates is probably correct that when it comes to tuning the lyre, the 
lyre-player wants to do better than a non-musician. Where there is one 
correct way to do something, genuine experts will do that thing in the 
same way. But when it comes to playing the lyre, for example, rather than 
merely tuning it, a skilled musician does not merely want to play better 
than a non-musician—that is not much of an achievement—they want to 
outperform another lyre-player. Readers might be puzzled by Socrates’ 
confident assertion that ‘a doctor […] when prescribing food and drink 
[…] want[s] to outdo a nondoctor’ (1.350a), given how competitive 
doctors can be. Some doctors are better diagnosticians than others, 
some cellists are better at playing Bach than others, some philosophers 
are better at interpreting Plato than others, some investors are better 
at spotting under-valued companies than others, etc. Developing these 
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skills is often fueled at least in part by competition and a desire to 
outperform—to outdo, as Socrates puts it—other experts: the desire to 
be the best at x-ing, whatever x may be. 
So even setting aside the disanalogy between crafts and virtues, the 
Outdoing Argument flounders because its key premise is false or at 
least highly questionable; at the very least, it needs more defense than 
it gets. 
Even if we agree with Socrates that Thrasymachus’ immoralism is 
mistaken, we can see that the Outdoing Argument is far from conclusive 
against it. Perhaps a lesson here is that being too personally invested 
in one’s views, as Thrasymachus seems to be, can get in the way of 
adequately defending them. If I see your argument as refuting me rather 
than refuting a view I hold, as attacking me as a person rather than a 
premise or principle I subscribe to, I may well react as Thrasymachus 
does. Earlier he responded to the Error Argument with a literally snotty 
put-down of Socrates; here he is tamer in defeat, blushing and producing 
‘a quantity of sweat that was a wonder to behold’ (1.350d). But clearly 
a more dispassionate attitude would serve him better. After all, if the 
goal is to discover the truth about justice, seeing that one’s view was 
mistaken is actually something to welcome, since by clearing away false 
views we get closer to the truth. Such an attitude is a tall order for most 
of us, but even if we think it is not fully achievable, given human nature, 
it does present an ideal to which we can aspire. 
The Common Purpose Argument (1.350d–352d)
There is a discernible change in Thrasymachus’ demeanor after the 
Outdoing Argument, one noted by Glaucon towards the beginning of 
Book II: ‘I think that Thrasymachus gave up before he had to, charmed 
by you as if he were a snake’ (2.358b). Thrasymachus thinks his 
immoralism, a view he regarded as bold and daring, has been refuted, 
and since speech-making has been ruled out, he announces that he will 
just agree with Socrates from here on. In again urging Thrasymachus 
not to answer ‘contrary to his own opinion’ (1.350c), Socrates reminds 
us of the nature of Socratic cross-examination, which is personal in the 
sense of its aiming to help the person being questioned to discover the 
truth by examining how well their views hang together or if they hang 
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together at all. Especially when the topic is an important one like justice, 
being in error can have disastrous consequences. In the conclusion 
of Book I of his Treatise of Human Nature David Hume famously said, 
‘Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in 
philosophy only ridiculous’.9 Socrates could not disagree more, since 
so much hangs on the philosophical question of whether the just life 
is happier than the unjust life. (Hume, in response, would think that 
philosophical questions have far less effect on how we live our lives than 
Socrates thinks; far from being able to govern our conduct, ‘reason is 
and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to 
any office than to serve and obey them’.10) If Thrasymachus is mistaken 
that the unjust life is a happier life, this mistake is not merely theoretical 
or conceptual or abstractly philosophical, for ‘the argument concerns no 
ordinary topic but the way we ought to live’ (1.352d); it is a mistake that 
will have profound implications for the quality of one’s life. If Socrates 
is right about justice, then Thrasymachus’ view is a prescription for a life 
of glittering misery. 
So it is a shame that Thrasymachus gives up, for the final two 
arguments of Book I deserve more scrutiny than they get. The first 
of these is the Common Purpose Argument, which aims to refute 
Thrasymachus’ claim that ‘injustice is stronger and more powerful 
than justice’ (1.351a). This claim is implied by the immoralist view that 
Socrates tried to refute with the Outdoing Argument. Thrasymachus 
thinks that injustice empowers its possessor to outdo everyone, to take 
control of and rule a city-state. Socrates argues that Thrasymachus has 
woefully misidentified injustice’s power: ‘injustice has the power, first, 
to make whatever it arises in—whether it is a city, a family, an army or 
anything else—incapable of achieving anything as a unit, because of the 
civil wars and differences it creates, and, second, it makes that unit an 
enemy to itself’ (1.351e).
Socrates’ idea is that even a criminal gang cannot successfully achieve 
its goals unless some kind of justice regulates the gangsters’ dealings 
with each other. Spelled out in premise-conclusion form, the Common 
Purpose Argument goes something like this:
9  David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., rev. by 
P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 272 [Book I, Part iv, Section 7].
10  Hume, Treatise, p. 415 [II.iii.3]. 
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P1  If x enables successful common action and y prevents this, then x  
    is stronger than y.
P2  Justice enables and injustice prevents successful common action.
C   Therefore, justice is stronger than injustice.
The argument is logically valid—its conclusion must be true if its 
premises are true—and its premises seem in fact true, so it is sound, 
to boot. As the preceding arguments have all been problematic, this 
success almost seems worth celebrating. But before Socrates and 
company start with the ancient Athenian equivalent of high-fiving, they 
would do well to pause and note that even if the argument is sound, 
the conclusion it establishes seems too weak, for it shows that justice is 
merely instrumentally good, useful for any group to achieve its goals, 
be they just or unjust. Socrates thinks that justice (and especially a 
reputation for possessing it) is instrumentally good, but presumably he 
wants to show that justice is also intrinsically good—that its goodness 
is internal and not dependent merely on the external benefits it brings 
about, that all by itself it makes its possessor better off. If justice helps 
a criminal enterprise be more unjust, then it is hard to see how it is a 
moral virtue; instead, it seems to be just another skill or craft and merely 
conditionally good: it is good when aimed at good ends and bad when 
aimed at bad ends. 
So even though the Common Purpose Argument is sound, it does not 
seem to prove what it ought to prove. It is a shame that Thrasymachus’ 
wounded pride prevents him from challenging the Common Purpose 
Argument. If he had, Socrates might have given it up, or perhaps on 
reflection he might have regrouped and responded that the argument 
shows at least that Thrasymachus’ immoralism is incorrect. After all, 
Thrasymachus thinks injustice is a virtue and justice is a vice because 
the former enables and the latter prevents its possessor from achieving 
happiness: immoralism implies that injustice is stronger than justice. So 
in showing that the opposite is true, that justice is stronger than injustice, 
Socrates shows that immoralism is false. So even if the Common Purpose 
Argument comes to the wrong conclusion about the nature of justice, it 
still packs a punch against Thrasymachus’ immoralism. 
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The Function Argument (1.352d–354c)
The last argument in Book I reprises and repurposes some concepts 
employed earlier in Book I and discussed in the last chapter, especially 
the nature of a virtue. Socrates seems to regard it as a knock-down 
argument that the just life is happier than the unjust life, but we will see 
that even he is ultimately dissatisfied with it. 
The ideas of virtue and function came up earlier in Book I, in one of 
Socrates’ arguments against Polemarchus’ view that justice is helping 
friends and harming enemies. A thing’s function is its goal-directed 
purpose, the activity characteristic of things of its kind. So a knife’s 
function is cutting, a heart’s function is pumping blood, etc. Socrates 
‘define[s] the function of a horse or anything else as that which one 
can do only with it or best with it’ (1.352e). So even though one can cut 
with a spoon or a fingernail, cutting is a knife’s function since a knife 
cuts best. A virtue, we have seen, is what enables a thing to perform its 
function well: ‘anything that has a function performs it well by means 
of its own peculiar virtue and badly by means of its vice’ (1.353c). Thus 
a knife’s virtue is sharpness, because sharpness enables a knife to cut 
well. Since we make knives and other tools to perform certain tasks, 
it is easy to see an artifact’s function and virtue. But natural objects 
like hearts, eyes, and kidneys, have functions, too. And indeed, in the 
Function Argument, Socrates is concerned about the function and virtue 
of the soul (ψυχή [psuchê], whence the word ‘psyche’ (the upsilon is 
often transliterated as a ‘y’, so psuchê becomes psyche, for example)). 
Though Socrates will later argue that the soul is immortal, it is best not 
to read any religious beliefs into ‘soul’ here. Instead, think of a soul as 
a life-force. All living things have souls on this view. Indeed, Aristotle 
will distinguish between vegetative souls, which enable metabolic 
processes, sentient souls, which enable feeling and locomotion, and 
rational souls, which enable thought. Humans, he thinks, have all three, 
and non-human animals have the first two. Thus Socrates asks, ‘What 
of living? Is not that a function of a soul?’ (1.353d) He then claims, and 
Thrasymachus half-heartedly agrees, that ‘justice is a soul’s virtue and 
injustice its vice’ (1.353e). He made this claim earlier, in the argument 
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with Polemarchus: ‘But is not justice human virtue?’ (1.335c). Just as a 
sharp knife cuts well, a just soul lives well. And what is happiness but 
living well? Thus Socrates concludes that ‘a just person is happy, and 
an unjust one is wretched’ (1.354a). Spelled out in premise-conclusion 
form, the Function Argument looks like this: 
P1  A thing’s virtue enables its function to be performed well. (1.353c)
P2  Living is a function of the soul. (1.353d)
P3  Justice is a soul’s virtue, injustice a vice. (1.353e)
C1  So, the just person lives well; the unjust person lives poorly.  
   (1.353e)
P4  Happiness is living well; unhappiness is living poorly. (1.354a)
C2  So, the just person is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. (1.354a)
The argument is logically well constructed: if its premises are true its 
conclusions must be true. But even if we agree with Socrates that its 
premises are true, we might wish that Thrasymachus would push back 
a bit, for it is not clear that we are justified in thinking them true. 
P1 is unproblematic: it is just a definition of what a virtue or 
excellence is. But we might worry that P2 is weaker than it needs to be: 
living needs to be the function of the soul, not merely a function of the 
soul, for the argument to work. While one cannot be just—or unjust, for 
that matter—if one is not alive, it is hard to see how mere biological life 
is the issue here. A deeper worry is P3, which Thrasymachus is already 
on record as rejecting: on his immoralist view, injustice is the virtue and 
justice the vice. While we might agree that Socrates was right to reject 
Thrasymachus’ immoralism, if we are fair-minded we should concede 
that his argument for doing so leaves much to be desired, relying on 
both a false equivalence between skills and virtues and on the false 
premise that the skilled person seeks to outdo only the unskilled person. 
The Common Purpose Argument gives an indirect reason for thinking 
P3 is true and thus that Thrasymachus’ immoralism is false, but it is 
overly dependent on the bad analogy between skills and virtues. What 
Thrasymachus should do, but does not do, is to push back and argue 
that Socrates may well be correct that the just life is happier, but the 
Function Argument does not prove it, since two of its key premises may 
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well be false and at the very least Socrates has not given us reasons for 
thinking they are true. Book I would be very different if Thrasymachus 
gave Socrates more of a run for his money. 
Socrates himself is dissatisfied at the end of Book I, and he seems 
to implicitly acknowledge that his arguments—especially the last 
one—rely on premises that Thrasymachus finds doubtful and that 
even sympathetic but fair-minded readers wish were better supported. 
Moreover, Socrates recognizes a flaw in his procedure: he started to 
address the Republic’s second question of which life is happier before 
answering the first question on the nature of justice. It is a moment 
of typical Socratic insight: ‘the result of the discussion, as far as I am 
concerned, is that I know nothing, for when I do not know what justice 
is, I will hardly know whether it is a kind of virtue or not, or whether a 
person who has it is happy or unhappy’ (1.354c).
So Socrates himself realizes that he is not really justified in asserting 
the Function Argument’s key premise, P3. It is not that he thinks it 
is false; he has not gone over to Thrasymachan immoralism. But he 
recognizes that he has not given the immoralist a good reason to change 
their mind, and he has not given himself a good reason to believe what 
he believes. 
Several years ago, Donald Rumsfeld’s talk of ‘the known unknown’ 
was held up to some ridicule or at least befuddlement in the popular 
media. But one need not approve of Rumsfeld’s role in the Second Gulf 
War to appreciate the essentially Socratic nature of the point he was 
making. There are things that we know, and we know that we know 
them: our names, where we live, etc. And there are things that many of 
us do not know—what the capital of Belarus is, Ted Williams’ lifetime 
batting average, how to play the cello—and we probably know that we 
do not know them. But it is those things that we do not even know that 
we do not know that can be a source of trouble, as any student who 
discovers, during an exam, that they now know that they do not know 
something... Had they come to this higher-order awareness before the 
exam, they could have asked their professor or a classmate for help. As 
is so often the case in other areas of life, timing is everything in moving 
from not knowing that we do not know something to knowing that we 
do not know it. 
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Coming to this kind of higher-order knowledge is often an epiphany; 
it certainly was for Socrates when he realized that his wisdom consisted 
in his not thinking he knew what he did not know—in his knowing 
what he did not know (Apology 20d–21e). And the same goes at the end 
of Book I, when he realizes that he does not yet know what justice is, 
and thus that the arguments he is given that the just life is happier rely 
on premises he is really not entitled to assert. He is displaying a kind 
of intellectual humility that is sadly in short supply in our age (as it 
was in his). Even if his interlocutors have not challenged him when they 
could have and should have, Socrates does not let himself get away with 
thinking he knows something he does not know. 
While Book I ends on a down-note, we will see in the next chapter 
that there is reason yet for optimism. 
Some Suggestions for Further Reading
For an excellent discussion of the notion of virtue, interested readers 
should see Heather Battaly, Virtue (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015).
Readers interested in Confucius’ views on the strict senses of terms 
will find them in Book 13, chapter 3 of his Analects. The Analects of 
Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, trans. by Roger Ames and Henry 
Rosemont (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998) is excellent and includes 
a very helpful introduction. The later Confucian Xunzi (aka Hsun Tzu) 
explores the issue in greater depth in chapter 22 of the text that bears his 
name. Interested readers should see Xunzi: The Complete Text, trans. by 
Eric Hutton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), https://doi.
org/10.2307/j.ctt6wq19b 
Readers interested in the historical Thrasymachus will find fragments of 
his work in The Greek Sophists, ed. by J. Dillon and T. Gergel (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2003).
There are many discussions of Socrates’ encounter with Thrasymachus. 
An excellent one to start with is Roslyn Weiss, ‘Wise Guys and Smart 
Alecks in Republic 1 and 2’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s 
‘Republic’, ed. by G. Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 90–115, https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol0521839637.004 
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Readers interested in relativism might start with chapters two and three 
of James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 
8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014). 
Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law, trans. by Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 2000), is the locus classicus for the view that unjust 
laws are not really laws; interested readers will also want to see Martin 
Luther King Jr., ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’, in Why We Can’t Wait 
(New York: Signet Classics, 2000), pp. 76–95, for a modern application 
of that view. 
Readers interested in a scholarly treatment of Socrates’ method might 
start with Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Socratic elenchus—Method Is All’, in 
Vlastos, Socratic Studies, ed. by Myles Burnyeat (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 1–29.
For readers intrigued by the concept of irony, there is no better place to 
begin than the first chapter of Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral 
Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 21–44.
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3. A Fresh Start:  
Book II
Socrates is not the only one who is dissatisfied with the results—the 
non-results, really—of Book I. Glaucon and Adeimantus feel let down, 
too. It is not that they have been convinced by Thrasymachus. Quite 
the contrary. They agree with Socrates that the just life is happier than 
the unjust life, but they do not find Socrates’ arguments persuasive and 
thus they recognize that they cannot defend or justify that belief, to 
themselves or others. We could put their predicament thus: they believe 
that the just life is happier, but they do not know that it is—and they 
know that they do not know this. 
When thinking about knowledge—more precisely, about 
propositional or factual knowledge, the kind of knowledge involved in 
knowing that certain claims are true, in contrast to the knowing how to 
do certain things, the sort of knowledge that is distinctive of the skills 
and crafts discussed in earlier chapters—a good place to start is to think 
of knowledge as a matter of justified true belief. On the JTB conception 
of knowledge, so-called because it defines knowledge as Justified True 
Belief, I know that the White Sox won the 2005 World Series because I 
believe that they won, my belief that they did is justified (since it is based 
on good reasons: I watched (and re-watched) the deciding game, I have 
confirmed their victory on various reliable websites, etc.), and that belief 
is true. We all have various beliefs that are true but unjustified and beliefs 
that are false but justified. For example, looking at the usually reliable and 
accurate clock on my office wall, I form the belief that it is half-past eight 
and thus that I still have time for some last-minute preparation and 
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perhaps another coffee before my nine o’clock class. But unbeknownst 
to me the clock is malfunctioning because of a power surge, and it is 
actually a quarter past nine (and most of my students have given up on 
me). Even though my belief is false, it seems justified, since my evidence 
is a clock that has always been reliable. More on point, though, are cases 
in which my belief is true but unjustified. Suppose that I know that my 
clock is wildly inconsistent, speeding up and slowing down with no 
rhyme or reason. Even so, I come to believe that it is eight o’clock after 
glancing at the clock. Even if it is eight o’clock, I am inclined to think 
that I do not know that it is eight o’clock, because my belief, while true, 
is not justified: it is based on evidence I myself regard as unreliable. 
Similarly, suppose I ‘just have a feeling’ that the White Sox will win 
today, and suppose further that my gut-feelings about the outcomes of 
baseball games are not especially reliable, being wrong at least as often 
as they are right. Even if the Sox win, you would be right to disagree 
when I say, ‘I knew they would win today!’, since a crucial element in 
knowledge, namely justification, is missing. 
Even though the JTB conception of knowledge does not feature in the 
Republic, it has its roots in another of Plato’s dialogues, the Theaetetus, 
where Socrates and Theaetetus consider (among other things) whether 
‘it is true judgment with an account (λόγος [logos]) that is knowledge’ 
(201d).1 They ultimately reject the JTB account because, ironically, 
they cannot come up with a satisfactory account of what an account 
or reason is. We will see in Chapter Eight that Socrates has a very 
different conception of knowledge in the Republic. But even though the 
JTB conception of knowledge lacks Platonic bona fides (not to mention 
contemporary philosophical disagreements about what justifies beliefs 
and indeed about whether knowledge is best thought of as JTB), it is 
helpful in understanding the dynamics of Books II and III. Glaucon 
and Adeimantus, having been raised properly, have (let us assume) a 
true belief about the relation between justice and happiness. But they 
recognize that they lack a justification for this true belief, and they hope 
Socrates can help provide them with one. We saw in the previous chapter 
that Socrates’ arguments in support of this belief leave a great deal to be 
1  As before, ‘201d’ refers to the page in the standard edition of Plato’s works. 
Translations of the Theaetetus are from Plato: Theaetetus, trans. by M. J. Levett, rev. by 
Myles Burnyeat, ed. by Bernard Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992).
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desired, a fact of which Socrates as well as Glaucon and Adeimantus are 
painfully aware. Thrasymachus, for his part, would insist that Glaucon 
and Adeimantus do not know that the just life is happier, not because 
they lack a justification for their true belief, but because their belief is 
false: the just life is not happier than the unjust life, on his view. 
The most striking feature of their request for help is their asking 
Socrates not to proceed as he did in Book I and ‘give us [yet another] 
theoretical argument that justice is stronger than injustice’ (2.367b). Nor 
are they asking Socrates to become more like Thrasymachus and give 
long speeches. But they also do not want him to crank out argument after 
argument, as he did in Book I. They are reasonably bright young men, 
but they are not philosophically sophisticated, and want something that 
is convincing without being too abstract.
Glaucon’s approach in seeking a justification for his belief that the 
just life is happier is twofold. First, he makes a distinction between three 
different kinds of goods, which will help them clarify the kind of good 
Socrates should show justice to be. Second, he articulates three claims 
or theses that he thinks capture the heart of Thrasymachus’ position, 
adopting the role of devil’s advocate. It is not, Glaucon assures Socrates, 
that he believes any of these Thrasymachan claims (2.358c, 2.361e). But 
if Socrates can show him how to refute these theses, Glaucon’s belief 
that the just life is happier will inch closer to being justified. 
Three Kinds of Goods (2.357a–358a) 
There is healthy scholarly disagreement about the details of Glaucon’s 
division of goods, but we can get a good sense of the division without 
getting tripped up in a scholarly tangle. For the sake of clarity, I will 
depart slightly from Glaucon’s ordering, switching the second and third 
categories. 
The first kind of good comprises intrinsic goods, which ‘we welcome 
not because we desire what comes from it, but […] for its own sake—joy, 
for example, and all the harmless pleasures that have no results beyond 
the joy of having them’ (2.357b). The idea is that we value certain 
things, experiences, and activities in and for themselves and not for their 
consequences. This way of putting it is not quite right, though. Possessing 
these goods makes our lives go better, and having one’s life go better 
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because one possesses x seems to be a consequence of possessing x. We 
can get clearer about what Glaucon means if we think of the relation 
between such goods and a good life as a part-whole relation, rather than 
a means-end relation. Enjoying a sunset is not a means to having a good 
life, it is part of a good life. To modify an example from the philosopher 
John Akrill (which he made in a different but related context), driving 
to a golf course is a means to playing a round of golf that is external to 
the game: I drive to the course in order to play a round. I drive the ball 
off the tee and putt in order to play a round of golf, but these activities 
are not external means to playing golf, as driving to the course is; they 
are constituent elements or internal parts of playing a round of golf. So 
Glaucon’s intrinsic goods are constituent parts or elements of a good 
life conceived as a whole; they are not external, instrumental means to 
such a life. 
Where first category goods are best thought of in terms of the part-
whole relation, the second category (which Glaucon takes third) contains 
things, activities, and experiences that are best thought of as means to 
an end external to them. We can think of such goods as instrumental 
rather than intrinsic goods. Glaucon takes them to be ‘onerous but 
beneficial’ (2.357c), valued not in themselves but for ‘the rewards 
and other things that come from them’ (2.357c). Physical training and 
medical treatment (and, it will later turn out, governing) are offered 
as examples of such instrumental goods. There is a certain subjectivity 
here, though, as some people find physical training enjoyable in itself, 
even apart from its instrumental benefits. Some people love running, for 
example, enjoying the activity itself; others loathe it, valuing it only for 
the benefits it brings. We might put the difference this way: the lovers 
enjoy running, while the loathers enjoy having run. Flossing one’s teeth 
seems an everyday example of an ‘onerous but beneficial’—i.e., purely 
instrumental—good: we do it not because it is enjoyable in itself, but 
because of its good results: healthier gums and fewer lectures about 
the importance of flossing from finger-wagging dentists. But a person 
who enjoys the activity itself is not making a mistake; they merely have 
preferences and tastes that are not widely shared. 
The third kind of good (which Glaucon takes second) is mixed, 
comprising intrinsic and instrumental goods: ‘a kind of good we like for 
its own sake and also for the sake of what comes from it’ (2.357c). For 
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some people, physical exercise is completely a second-category good, 
onerous but beneficial: instrumentally good but intrinsically bad. But for 
others it belongs to this third, mixed category: one recognizes the health 
benefits of running five miles every day, but one also enjoys the activity 
itself. And perhaps watching that sunset relaxes you and lowers your 
blood pressure, so it too might be a mixed good. Glaucon and Socrates 
regard goods of this third category as the best kind of goods, since they 
combine both intrinsic and instrumental goodness. It might be that the 
drive to the golf course is lovely and thus valuable both intrinsically, 
since you enjoy it in itself, and also instrumentally, since it is an efficient 
way to get to the golf course. 
Where does justice belong? Most people, Glaucon says on behalf of 
Thrasymachus, place it in the second category of things and acctivities 
that are intrinsically bad but instrumentally good, to be valued not 
for their intrinsic features but for the external benefits they bring—
especially the benefits of having a reputation for being just: ‘most people 
[…] say that justice belongs to the onerous kind, and is to be practiced 
for the sake of the rewards and popularity that come from having a 
reputation for justice, but is to be avoided because of itself as something 
burdensome’ (2.358a). Socrates and Glaucon, by contrast, think justice 
is the best kind of good, belonging in the third, mixed category, ‘to be 
valued […] both because of itself and because of what comes from it’ 
(2.357e). Even though acting justly will not always be easy, its being 
challenging does not make it onerous, something one wishes one did 
not have to do, any more than running a marathon is onerous and to be 
avoided in virtue of its being difficult or challenging. 
The question of justice’s proper categorization shapes the rhetorical 
strategy of the rest of the Republic in an important way. Most people only 
halfway agree with Glaucon’s classification of justice. They concede the 
instrumental value of having a reputation for justice, of seeming to be just, 
but they deny justice’s intrinsic value, holding that being just is not by 
itself good. Thus what Glaucon and Adeimantus want from Socrates is 
to show them that a just life is intrinsically good: all by itself, it makes its 
possessor’s life go well. There is no need to try to show that a reputation 
for it is instrumentally good, since that is conceded on all sides—even 
Thrasymachus could agree with this. To show that justice is intrinsically 
good, they need to find a way to bracket off and ignore its instrumental 
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value; if they do not do this, they cannot be sure that justice is being 
valued intrinsically, in and for itself, rather than for its extrinsic benefits. 
Thus it will not be enough to compare the just and unjust persons. To 
ignore the instrumental benefits a reputation for justice brings, Socrates 
must draw on the distinction between being and seeming and saddle the 
just person with a reputation for injustice. If he can show that the person 
who is just but seems unjust is happier than the person who is unjust but 
seems just, he will have shown that justice is intrinsically good—that all 
by itself it makes its possessor’s life better. 
Glaucon’s Three Thrasymachan Theses (2.358a–362c)
Let us now turn to the second prong of Glaucon’s challenge, his devil’s 
advocacy of Thrasymachus’ view. We should pause to appreciate what 
good intellectual practice Glaucon models here. To understand an 
opponent’s view well enough to be able to state it clearly and forcefully 
and fairly is not easy, but it is a hallmark of intellectual fairness. Most 
of us are more familiar with someone’s arguing against a view by 
presenting and then rejecting a caricature of the view in question. To 
argue this way is to commit what is known as the strawman fallacy 
(so-called because strawmen and -women are so easy to knock over). 
To take an obvious contemporary example, consider arguments about 
the morality of abortion. Most of us have probably heard arguments 
like these: ‘Of course abortion is immoral; those who think it is not 
seem to think it is okay to murder babies’ and ‘Of course abortion is 
permissible; those who think it is not seem to think a woman should 
have no right at all to decide what happens to her body’. Both of these 
arguments commit the strawman fallacy: it is a safe bet that no defender 
of the moral permissibility of abortion takes pleasure at the thought of 
murdering babies; nor does the typical opponent relish the opportunity 
to interfere with a woman’s bodily autonomy. Indeed, the phrase ‘they 
seem to think that…’ is a fairly reliable indicator that a strawman fallacy 
is coming your way. Now it may be that strawman characterizations 
are rhetorically effective; they are no doubt good ways to ‘energize the 
base.’ But they are intellectually debased ways of providing reasons 
in support of one’s view, whatever that view may be. There is nothing 
wrong with arguing for one’s view by arguing against an opponent’s 
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view, but intellectual integrity requires that we characterize the 
opponent’s position fairly and charitably, such that they will recognize it 
as theirs and that it appears to be a view that a reasonable person might 
hold, rather than—as seems sadly typical—a view that only a morally 
corrupt, irrational person would find compelling. 
Thrasymachan Thesis #1: Justice is Conventional, Not 
Natural (2.358e–359b)
The distinction between nature (φύσις [phusis], whence the word 
‘physics’) and convention (νόμος [nomos], whence words like 
‘economics’) is common in the Republic. In one sense, what is natural is 
what is real or true independently of what anyone thinks or does, while 
what is conventional is true or real only in virtue of a decision one or 
one’s culture makes. The difference between rivers and trees is a natural 
difference, not a conventional one; but borders between states are matters 
of convention, even when the border is a natural object such as a river. In 
a different but related sense, a thing’s nature is what makes it the kind of 
thing it is—a knife rather than a fork, a plant rather than an animal, etc. 
In his Physics, Aristotle said that a thing’s nature is its internal principle 
of change and stability, and what is natural to the thing is to follow this 
internal principle.2 Although most acorns will not become oak trees, 
becoming an oak tree is natural to an acorn in this sense. In claiming 
on behalf of Thrasymachus that justice is not natural but a matter of 
convention, Glaucon is suggesting that injustice is what comes naturally 
to us; left to our own devices, we strive to outdo our fellows without 
regard to the propriety of doing so. But since we weak folks fear being 
treated unjustly, we band together and take power, inventing the rules 
of justice to protect ourselves against the more powerful, who are fewer 
and can be subjugated by the many. Thus justice is conventional, not 
natural: it is an invention, imposed upon us from without, existing only 
as the result of intentional human activity and choice. 
The basic picture will be familiar to readers acquainted with the great 
seventeenth-century British philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. Imagine 
a world before law and civilization. In this state of nature, Hobbes 
2  Aristotle, Physics, II.1 192b20–23.
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thought, we have complete freedom to do whatever we want to do; there 
are no moral or legal restrictions on one’s conduct. The good news, then, 
is that you can do whatever you want to do: take someone else’s stuff, 
kill them if you feel so inclined, etc. The bad news, of course, is that 
everyone else can do so as well. Life in the state of nature, Hobbes said, 
is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’. There is no right to life in 
the state of nature, understood as a claim-right or entitlement not to be 
killed, which imposes a duty on others not to kill. But most of us, Hobbes 
plausibly thought, are willing to give up some of the total freedom we 
have in the state of nature in exchange for the sort of security a right to 
life brings. I agree not to kill you and take your stuff but only on the 
condition that you agree to do the same for me. Thus is civil society, and 
indeed morality, born. Justice, on this view, is the result of a bargain; 
it is an invention, and thus conventional rather than natural. Only a 
fool, Thrasymachus and Hobbes think, would altruistically refrain 
from killing and taking from others without getting a corresponding 
guarantee in return. Most of us find it to our advantage ‘to come to 
an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor to suffer it’ 
and thus we ‘make laws and covenants, and what the law commands 
[we] call just and lawful’ (2.359a). (Hobbes takes an additional step not 
mentioned by Thrasymachus or Glaucon, holding that there must be an 
authority to settle disputes and enforce the social contract, but we need 
not linger over this point.)
On this Thrasymachan view, justice is not natural in either sense 
distinguished above. Far from being mind- or culture-independent, 
it is something we invent rather than discover, and there is nothing 
more to it than the rules agreed to. Thrasymachus expressed such a 
view in Premise 2 of the Error Argument back in Book I. Moreover, 
it is injustice, he holds, and not justice, that comes naturally to us. 
Injustice ‘is what anyone’s nature naturally pursues as good’ (2.359c), 
on the Thrasymachan view. The ideal of masculinity implicit in this 
view of justice will seem to many a toxic one: ‘a true man’, Glaucon 
says, wearing his Thrasymachan mask, ‘would not make an agreement 
with anyone not to do injustice in order not to suffer it’ (2.359b). He 
would not make such an agreement because he would not have to: the 
Thrasymachan man is able to impose his will on his fellows in the state 
of nature; he has no need of rules restraining his natural inclinations to 
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outdo others, since he is powerful enough not to fall victim to others’ 
attempts to outdo him. (Later in the Republic Plato will criticize this 
picture of masculinity, but for now it is part of the Thrasymachan 
picture Glaucon is painting.) Even though most of us lack this kind of 
strength and power, if enough of us band together we might be more 
powerful than the Thrasymachan ‘true man’. If so, we can make rules to 
protect ourselves against him, since morality—or, rather, “morality”—
is merely the mechanism by which the powerful protect their interests. 
But if this group of individually weak but collectively strong people 
is driven by self-interest, it is unlikely to extend the protections of 
morality to those whom it can exploit for its own ends. This brings us 
to the second thesis.
Thrasymachan Thesis #2: Those Who Act Justly Do So 
Unwillingly (2.359b–360d)
The second thesis is intimately connected with the first. Since injustice 
comes naturally to us and justice is unnatural and artificial, acting justly 
is contrary to our natural inclinations; it goes against our grain because 
‘the desire to outdo others and get more and more […] is what anyone’s 
nature naturally pursues as good’ (2.359c). On this view, people who 
act justly do so unwillingly; if they could get away with acting unjustly, 
they would. And in fact the artifice of justice does not merely go against 
our nature, it distorts it: ‘nature is forced by law into the perversion of 
treating fairness with respect’ (2.359c). 
This is a pretty bleak view of human nature and of the nature of 
morality, but it has an undeniable plausibility. But Glaucon does not 
rely merely on forceful language to garner agreement, he gives a famous 
argument for it: the Ring of Gyges Argument, important both for its 
content but also for the kind of argument it is. The ring in question 
belongs not to Gyges but to an ancestor of his, so the argument is 
misnamed—but that does not really matter to the point at hand, which 
is Thrasymachan Thesis #2. Gyges’ ancestor happens upon a ring with 
magical powers: when he turns it in a certain direction, he becomes 
invisible. What does he do with his newfound power of invisibility? He 
seduces the queen, kills the king, and takes over the kingdom. The key 
move in the argument happens next: imagine, says Glaucon, that there 
64 Plato’s ‘Republic’: An Introduction
is another such ring; what do you think its wearer would do? Would 
they be so thoroughly, incorruptibly moral that they would not take 
advantage of the situation to enrich themselves at the expense of others? 
If you think the wearer would act unjustly because they can do so with 
impunity, you should agree that the second thesis is true. We act justly 
only because we think we have to, Thrasymachus thinks, not because we 
want to; if we could act immorally and get away with it, we would do 
just what Gyges’ ancestor did.
Glaucon has offered a thought-experiment, which is a very 
common way of doing philosophy: here is a fanciful scenario, what 
do you think about it? What is the right thing to do? Philosophical 
inquiry is rife with thought-experiments: Would you throw the 
switch to divert a runaway trolley car from a track on which it will 
kill five workers to a track on which it will kill only one? If you were 
kidnapped by the Society of Music Lovers and awoke with your 
kidneys connected to those of a famous violinist who will die if you 
disconnect yourself, are you morally permitted to disconnect yourself, 
resulting in the violinist’s death?3 Etc. There is certainly a place for 
thought-experiments in philosophical thinking, and their artificiality 
is no objection to them; they are not intended as realistic situations we 
encounter in our everyday lives but rather bear certain similarities to 
situations we do encounter in ordinary life: if you think disconnecting 
yourself from the violinist is permissible, should not you also think that 
it is permissible for a woman to terminate an involuntary pregnancy? 
Thought-experiments are common in philosophy—and in theoretical 
physics, too (just ask Schrödinger’s cat)—but when fundamental 
claims about human nature are at issue, perhaps thought-experiments 
should yield to fields like evolutionary biology and psychology. That 
the Thrasymachan takes it to be obvious that most people think they 
would act as Gyges did if they had the chance might tell us a lot about 
the culture these Thrasymachans inhabit, even if it does not establish 
any trans-cultural truths about human nature. But that is probably all 
it is intended to do here: Thrasymachan Thesis #2 articulates a widely-
held view of human nature, one that Glaucon thinks is false and that 
he wants Socrates to refute.
3  Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1 (1971), 
47–66 (pp. 48–49).
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Thrasymachan Thesis #3: The Unjust Person is Happier 
than the Just Person (2.360e–362c) 
This of course is Thrasymachus’ answer to the second of the Republic’s 
two main questions, whether the just or unjust life is happier, which 
Socrates realized that he’d tried to answer before answering the first 
one. What is most relevant here are the constraints Glaucon proposes 
for answering it. If the unjust person is really going to outdo everyone, 
they will find that having a reputation for justice will greatly help them 
use the rules of justice to exploit others: they will find that they are 
more effective at being unjust if they seem just. No one who thought that 
Bernard Madoff was a conman running a Ponzi scheme would have 
invested with him; his cheating his investors out of billions of dollars 
was made possible in no small part by his sterling reputation. 
The last third or so of the Republic is devoted to assessing this third 
Thrasymachan thesis; Glaucon is here stating it, not arguing for or 
against it (though we do know that he actually thinks it is false, devil’s 
advocacy aside). Instead, he is setting the parameters for how Socrates 
is to defeat this thesis. Harking back to the distinction between kinds 
of goods, Socrates and company think that most people regard justice 
as onerous but beneficial: bad intrinsically but good instrumentally, 
especially the reputation for justice. Glaucon and Socrates think justice is 
both intrinsically and instrumentally good, but since even skeptics agree 
with them about its instrumental value, what Socrates needs to do is to 
show that justice is intrinsically good: that all by itself, a morally good 
life benefits the person living it, and indeed is better for them than a 
morally bad life, even if they do not get any of the extrinsic, instrumental 
benefits. We need to bracket off the instrumental benefits of having a 
reputation for justice because if we do not find a way to ignore them, we 
cannot be sure that we are valuing justice intrinsically, in and of itself, 
and not for the instrumental benefits a reputation for justice brings: 
we must take away his reputation, for a reputation for justice would 
bring him honor and rewards, so it would not be clear whether he is just 
for the sake of justice itself or for the sake of those honors and rewards. 
We must strip him of everything except justice and make his situation 
the opposite of an unjust person’s. Though he does no injustice, he must 
have the greatest reputation for it, so that his justice may be tested full-
strength and not diluted […] (2.361c)
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So in settling the question of which life is happier, we must draw not 
only on the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value but also 
on the distinction between appearance and reality. Glaucon will regard 
his belief that the just life is happier as justified only if Socrates can show 
him that the person who really is just but seems unjust is happier than 
the person who is unjust but seems just. 
It is quite a tall order, as Socrates recognizes, but it is the only way 
they can think of to separate off the intrinsic goodness of justice from 
its instrumental, reputational benefits. If Socrates can show us that 
the really just but apparently unjust person is happier than the really 
unjust but apparently just person, he will have shown us that justice 
is intrinsically good, since he will have shown that being just in and 
of itself makes one better off. If he can do this, he will have justified 
Glaucon’s presumably true belief that the just life is happier and thereby 
transmute his belief into knowledge. 
Adeimantus Ups the Ante (2.362d–367e)
Glaucon’s brother Adeimantus thinks that Glaucon has left out ‘the 
most important thing’ (2.362d), which he takes to be the way justice is 
treated in Athenian popular culture. Adeimantus’ attention to culture 
shapes the Republic by anchoring Socrates’ focus on education in the 
ideal city that they will soon start constructing, if only in theory. His 
complaint is that Athenian culture and Greek culture more broadly, 
‘don’t praise justice in itself, [but] only the high reputations it leads to 
and the consequences of being thought to be just’ (2.363a). He worries 
about the effect of such a culture ‘on the souls of young people’ (2.365a), 
when they see through their culture’s shallow platitudes to the deeper 
antirealist view that ‘injustice […] [is] shameful only in opinion and 
law’ (2.364a) and not in itself. Agreeing with Thrasymachus about the 
value of being unjust but recognizing the importance of seeming just, they 
will become cynical and hypocritical, desiring to cultivate only ‘a façade 
of illusory virtue’ (2.365c) rather than a genuinely virtuous character. 
The stories Athenian culture tells about the gods, such as the ones 
we find in Homer’s Iliad or Odyssey or Hesiod’s Theogeny, suggest that 
the gods can be influenced by prayers, sacrifices, and offerings. It is 
more profitable, on the Thrasymachan view of individual happiness, 
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to reap the benefits of acting unjustly, and then toward the end of one’s 
life to seek absolution by building a temple or making many sacrifices, 
thus avoiding the just deserts of a life of injustice. Although there will 
be a few people of ‘godlike character who [are] disgusted by injustice’ 
(2.366c), most of us will find the allure of material success too attractive 
to resist. Some of us will feel guilty or ashamed, but others—perhaps 
because we will feel guilty or ashamed—will ‘laugh aloud’ when we hear 
justice praised (2.366b), since, like Thrasymachus, we think ‘justice’ is 
for suckers.
Thus it is vital, Adeimantus thinks, for Socrates to show that justice 
is intrinsically good and to ignore any benefits that might accrue to 
someone with a reputation for justice. He wants Socrates to swim against 
the tide of Athenian culture and show them that ‘injustice is the worst 
thing a soul can have in it and that justice is the greatest good’ (2.366e). 
Only if Socrates does this will Glaucon and Adeimantus be justified in 
their belief that the just life is happier—only then will that belief become 
knowledge. 
Socrates’ Plan: Investigate Personal Justice by 
Investigating Political Justice (2.367e–369a)
Socrates’ way of responding to Glaucon and Adeimantus’ request for 
a fresh defense of the just life will resonate with anyone who needs 
drugstore reading glasses to deal with a restaurant menu. Just as it is 
easier to read larger than smaller letters, Socrates argues (2.368d), it will 
be easier to figure out the nature and value of justice if we see it on a 
larger scale. So the plan is to examine the nature and value of justice 
writ large, in a polis (city-state), in order to see what it tells us about 
justice in a person: ‘let us first find out what sort of thing justice is in a 
city and afterwards look for it in the individual’ (2.369a). This method 
of investigation is apt to strike many readers as odd, since it assumes 
an analogy between persons and cities that will seem a stretch to many. 
The analogy has certainly intrigued philosophical commentators on the 
Republic. Socrates is assuming that justice in individuals and justice in 
city-states do not differ in any relevant ways. A person (more properly, 
their soul) and a polis differ in size and thus so too does the amount 
of justice each contains, but the amount of justice is not relevant to its 
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nature, Socrates assumes, any more than a glass of water differs in 
nature from a gallon of water: water is water, regardless of how much 
of it there is. 
As we move forward, we will want to keep in mind the big if at 
the heart of Socrates’ method: if people and city-states are relevantly 
similar, then what we learn about the nature of justice in the latter can 
be mapped onto the former. We will see in Book IV that Socrates will try 
to do more than just assume they are similar; he will argue that they are. 
But for now, let us grant the analogy and see what Socrates does with it. 
A False Start: Socrates’ Rustic Utopia (2.369b–373a)
Socrates plans to ‘create a city in theory from its beginnings’ (2.369c), 
but of course it cannot be just any city; for the plan of the Republic to 
work, it must be a just city. And this city must not only be just, if they 
are to determine the truth about the nature and value of justice, it must 
also seem just to Glaucon and company, if they are to be persuaded 
that the just life is the happier life. Once all agree that the theoretically 
constructed city is just, the task will be to determine the nature of the 
virtue of justice, or what makes it just. We should note too that since 
Plato wants his readers to imaginatively participate in the dialog, 
readers will have to determine for themselves whether they find the city 
Socrates has created to be just (which, remember, is synonymous with 
being morally good, generally). Readers who do not think the ideal city 
is just or who are not sure can still follow the argument in a hypothetical 
way: ‘Well, if this were a just city, does Socrates plausibly explain what 
makes it just?’. But this will be less than fully satisfying, especially if, like 
Glaucon and Adeimantus, we want Socrates to provide us with reasons 
we find plausible that would justify the belief, if indeed we hold it, that 
the just life is a better and happier life than the unjust life. 
The origin of any community, Socrates thinks, is that ‘none of us is 
self-sufficient’ (2.369b). It is not just that we have needs, but we have needs 
that we cannot ourselves always meet. Thus, he thinks, communities 
are formed: ‘people gather in a single place to live together as partners 
and helpers’ (2.369c). This idea of cities as essentially cooperative is an 
attractive one, and it is at odds with the Thrasymachan view of cities as 
sites of competition rather than cooperation, where citizens are always 
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trying to outdo each other. Perhaps Thrasymachus could agree with 
Socrates about the cooperative origins of any polis while thinking that 
people will strive to outdo each other once a city is up and running. 
People will always strive to exploit others’ neediness for their own 
advantage, and crafty Thrasymachans will be more successful at doing 
so than others. 
Socrates next argues for a division-of-labor principle that will not 
only organize the city’s economic life but will ultimately have profound 
ethical implications, as it will be the basis of the definition of justice he 
arrives at in Book IV. We are all born with different natural aptitudes 
and preferences, he thinks, each of us having a distinctive ἔργον [ergon] 
or natural task or function, a notion we met in Book I, most notably 
in the Function Argument. Since we are born with different aptitudes, 
Socrates advocates a division of labor: ‘more plentiful and better-quality 
goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which 
he is naturally suited […] and is released from having to do any of the 
others’ (2.370c). 
At least two things about the argument for what we will call the 
Specialization Principle are worth attending to. The first is the way 
Socrates appeals to what he takes to be natural facts in arguing for it, 
facts which many readers will find quite plausible. Many readers will 
have known people who have always been good at math, or who can 
quickly master a variety of musical instruments, or who have a knack 
with machines, or who excel at certain sports, etc. Though hard work 
and discipline are necessary for success in such areas, there usually is a 
natural aptitude at the core that can be developed and perhaps perfected 
by diligent practice and education—but without the natural aptitude as 
the raw material which nurture can develop, the chances of high-level 
success seem slim indeed. The second feature is that Socrates advocates 
the Specialization Principle because it benefits the community as a 
whole, not because it enables individual flourishing. This is perhaps 
the first inkling of Socrates’ communitarian inclinations: he is likelier to 
think of the needs and good of the community first, in relatively sharp 
contrast to the tendency many contemporary Westerners—especially 
Americans—have to think individualistically. On this individualistic 
view, individuals are morally primary and communities exist primarily 
to enable individual flourishing or perhaps to protect the natural rights 
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individuals possess. The distinction between communitarian and 
individualistic thinking is a matter of degree and often context: a baseball 
team or string quartet comprising dyed-in-the-wool individualists who 
care more (or only) about their own individual successes will surely 
be less successful than teams or quartets with more group-minded 
members. 
In the riveting opening chapter of his novel, Enduring Love, Ian 
McEwan writes of ‘morality’s ancient, irresolvable dilemma: us, or 
me’.4 If McEwan is right, the fundamental moral question is not us 
versus them or me versus you but rather me versus we: do the needs and 
interests of the community trump the individual’s? Far from regarding 
the dilemma as ‘irresolvable’, Plato and Socrates resolve it in favor 
of we over me. I suspect that many, if not most, readers will often 
find themselves resistant to and put off by Socrates’ communitarian, 
we-favoring impulses. Even so, there is much value in being confronted 
with thinking that is fundamentally different from one’s own, as this not 
only provides alternative perspectives but also might force one to play 
Glaucon and Adeimantus and try to justify deeply-held beliefs that one 
takes for granted. 
There will be many occupations in the ideal city: farmers, builders, 
carpenters, shepherds, weavers, and cobblers, to name a few. There 
will also be importers and exporters, merchants, retailers, and physical 
laborers. Very quickly, in just a couple of pages, we learn that the ideal 
city is complete: ‘our city [has] grown to completeness [… So] where 
are justice and injustice to be found in it?’ (2.371e). As Socrates begins 
to answer this question by examining the sort of lives its citizens lead, 
Glaucon objects—to the surprise of many readers—to the food. The 
food is of ‘the sort they cook in the country’ (2.372c), he complains, 
unsuitable for a young Athenian aristocrat, but perhaps suitable ‘if 
you were founding a city for pigs’ (2.372d). Most readers are apt to 
be misled by this charge, since to modern ears talk of pigs suggests 
gluttony and perhaps uncleanliness. But this is not the connotation for 
ancient Athenians, for whom, Myles Burnyeat points out, ‘the pig was 
an emblem rather of ignorance […] “Any pig would know” was the 
4  Ian McEwan, Enduring Love (New York: Anchor Books, 1998), p. 15.
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saying. What Glaucon means is, “You describe the feasting of people 
who do not know how to live. It is uncivilized.”’5 
Socrates acquiesces and agrees to develop ‘a luxurious city’ (2.372e) 
better suited to his young friends’ expectations about what a good life 
involves. He does not agree with them, as he quickly makes clear: ‘the 
true city […] is the one we have described, the healthy one’ (2.372e). 
But he goes along with them because the plan of the Republic demands 
it. Glaucon and Adeimantus, remember, want Socrates to provide them 
with good reasons for a belief they sincerely hold but recognize to be 
unjustified, the belief that the just life is the happier one. If this requires 
that they give up their conception of what a good life is—if justice 
requires that they live the simple, rustic life Socrates depicts—they are 
unlikely to be convinced by what he has to say. There is some interesting 
scholarly disagreement about whether and how seriously to take 
Socrates’ praise of the first city. Its benign anarchy—there is no mention 
of any political structures or governmental offices—will appeal to many 
readers, as will its simplicity, its communal bonds, and its relative self-
sustainability. But the ideal city they ultimately develop is structured by 
‘three natural classes’ (4.435b (italics added)), which suggests that the 
first city, which lacks them, is not natural after all. 
In any event, Socrates agrees to sketch a luxurious city, replete with 
the sorts of delicacies Glaucon and Adeimantus insist upon and, going 
well beyond the more basic necessities found in the first city, to include 
perfumes, prostitutes, and pastries (2.373a). More striking, though, than 
what the luxurious city includes is what follows in its wake: war. Having 
‘overstepped the limit of their necessities’ (2.373d), the citizens now 
require resources they do not possess, and now possess goods that other 
city-states might envy and seek for themselves. It is striking that Plato 
finds ‘the origins of war’ (2.373e) not in an innately aggressive human 
nature; the explanation is social and economic rather than biological: 
communities come into conflict with each other when they exceed a 
simple, natural life and grasp for luxury (and here pleonexia rears its 
ugly, Thrasymachan head). If the first, rustic city is a real possibility, 
5  Myles Burnyeat, ‘Culture and Society in Plato’s “Republic”’, in The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values, vol. 20 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999), p. 231. 
Italics in the original. (Burnyeat’s lecture and dozens of others can be found online 
at https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lecture-library.php).
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then acquisitive, me-first pleonexia is not what comes naturally to human 
beings. 
Obviously, with warfare comes the need for soldiers, but Socrates 
eschews the idea of citizen-soldiers in favor of a professional army. 
‘Warfare is a profession’ (2.374b), he argues, and according to the 
Specialization Principle only someone with a natural aptitude for 
warfare should become a soldier. But the ideal soldier must naturally 
be ‘both gentle and high-spirited’ (2.375c), tough with foes but gentle 
with friends. Socrates initially despairs of finding such a combination, 
worrying that these traits are so at odds with each other that ‘it seems 
impossible to combine them’ and thus ‘that a good guardian cannot 
exist’ (2.375c). His despair vanishes, though, when he thinks of dogs, 
whom he delightfully regards as ‘truly philosophical’ (2.376b), since 
their conduct is knowledge-based. Dogs treat people differently based 
on whether they know the person or not: friends are proper objects of 
gentleness, while strangers or foes are not. 
Of course, not all dogs make good watchdogs: some are too gentle 
and sweet by nature, others too aggressive, even with family members. 
Since gentleness and high-spiritedness are often at odds with each 
other, proper education will be crucial to the soldier-guardians’ proper 
development and thus to the flourishing of the city. So once we have 
found someone who seems to possess a natural aptitude for guarding 
the city (in the case of soldiers) or the home (in the case of dogs) the 
question is this: ‘how are we to bring him up and educate him?’ (2.376c). 
This is the question to which we turn in the following chapter. 
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4. Blueprints for a Platonic Utopia 
: Education and Culture,  
Books II and III
In having Socrates work out the proper education for the would-be 
guardians—which at least initially must include all the city’s children—
Plato engages in the philosophy of education for the first time in the 
Western philosophical tradition. He is not the first philosopher to do so, 
as readers familiar with non-Western philosophy will know. Confucius’ 
Analects, which predates Plato’s Republic by almost a century, devotes 
considerable attention to the nature and value of education and in fact 
begins by celebrating it; indeed, the first word ‘The Master’ is quoted 
as saying is xue (㷸), which means learning or study. Education is a 
topic of sustained focus in the Republic. In Books II and III Plato sees 
education as a two-pronged endeavor, comprising ‘physical training for 
bodies and music and poetry for the soul’ (2.376e). A little later, he will 
reconsider this way of thinking about education’s objects, holding that 
physical training and poetic education are ‘both chiefly for the sake of 
the soul’ (3.410c). Later in the Republic, while developing the famous 
Allegory of the Cave in Book VII, Plato has Socrates give an account of 
formal education involving arithmetic, geometry, astronomy or physics, 
and dialectic, a sort of philosophical logic, more or less inventing what 
has come to be known as liberal education. In Books II and III, however, 
the focus is on education’s less formal aspects, education in the wider 
sense of the Greek word παιδεία (paideia): upbringing or enculturation. 
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Supervising the Storytellers: Musical and Poetic Content 
(2.376c–3.392c)
Socrates is especially concerned with the effects of popular culture on 
the development of character, both of the would-be soldier-guardians 
and of the citizenry at large. We begin absorbing our culture, which is 
carried by the songs sung in the home and in public, so Socrates first 
focuses on the stories—literally the myths (μῦθοι [muthoi])—children 
hear in the songs sung to and around them. Many readers will shrink 
at Socrates’ insisting that the first thing he and his fellow theoretical 
architects must do is ‘supervise the storytellers’ (2.377b). But even those 
of us who value freedom of speech and artistic expression—two values 
conspicuous by their absence in the Republic—probably do not think 
that all books or movies or television shows or videogames or music are 
appropriate at all ages. But while most readers will likely think this is a 
private matter, to be determined by parents, for Plato it is too important 
to be left to individual discretion (and thus is another of those places 
where his community-mindedness is evident). After all, the explicit 
point of education is to develop good soldier-guardians, which is surely 
a matter of public and not merely private concern. 
At the root of Plato’s educational program is a belief in the malleability 
of the human psyche, especially at young ages: ‘You know, don’t you, 
that the beginning of any process is most important, especially for 
anything young and tender? It’s at that time that it is most malleable 
and takes on any pattern one wishes to impress upon it’ (2.377b). Hence 
the need to regulate the stories children hear, both their content and 
their form. Socrates focuses first on the former, on what the stories say, 
and then in Book III he focuses on how the stories are told, on their form. 
The most important restriction on the content of stories is that they 
must not convey true falsehoods, which are ‘falsehoods […] about the most 
important things’ (2.382a). The phrase ‘true falsehood’ is easy to trip 
over, since it suggests the idea of stories that are literally false but convey 
moral truths. This is emphatically not what Socrates means; ‘true’ here 
means ‘real’ or ‘genuine’; a true falsehood is something that is deeply, 
genuinely false. Socrates is not anti-fiction; he is not opposed to nursery 
rhymes that contain literal falsehoods, or what he calls ‘falsehood in 
words’ (2.382c). That there never was a person who lived in a shoe or a 
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race between a tortoise and a hare is not important, so long as the story’s 
underlying moral message is not radically false. 
There are three categories of stories whose content should be 
regulated: stories about the gods, stories about epic heroes, and stories 
about people. Socrates rightly avoids regulating the last kind of story at 
this stage of the Republic. Presumably, he regards Thrasymachus’ claim 
that the unjust life is happier than a just life as a true falsehood: it is 
deeply, profoundly mistaken and soul-distorting, and it ruins anyone 
who steers their life by it. But to rule out such stories now, before the 
Republic’s two questions have been satisfactorily answered, would beg 
the question—that is, it would assume the truth of what he should be 
trying to prove. It would be intellectually unfair to adopt a regulation 
banning such stories in his ideal city, since he is not yet entitled to claim 
that Thrasymachus is mistaken. 
As the gods are among the most important things, we must be 
on guard against true falsehoods regarding the gods. There are two 
restrictions on stories about the gods: first, that the gods are not the 
cause of everything but only of good things (2.380c); second, that the 
gods are not shape-shifters or deceivers who ‘mislead us by falsehoods 
in words or deeds’ (2.383a). Since a god is by nature good, and what 
is good cannot cause something harmful and bad, a god cannot be the 
cause of bad things. So any story saying otherwise is promoting a true 
falsehood and should be disallowed, even if Homer or Hesiod or any 
canonical Greek poet is its author. The same goes for stories depicting 
gods as deceivers. Since ‘the best things are least liable to […] change’ 
and the gods are among the best things, they would not alter their 
appearances or have any need to speak falsely (2.380e). 
We might question the chains of argument by which Socrates arrives 
at these conclusions. For example, he never considers the possibility 
that there are no gods, or the possibility that a god might lie for good 
reasons. But the real take-aways here are not the particular content of 
any rules he arrives at, but rather three key ideas: first, that one should 
not uncritically accept the norms and values of one’s culture; second, 
that reason provides a perspective from which cultural norms and 
values can be assessed; and third, that if there is a conflict between 
culture or tradition and reason, we should follow the dictates of reason. 
Although his community-first ethos is often associated with a kind of 
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conservatism that prizes tradition and the wisdom embodied therein, 
Socrates is no conservative. Far from it. He is a radical rationalist, 
believing that rationality affords a perspective from which a tradition’s 
practices and values can be assessed. Socrates loves Homer, but he 
thinks that his passion for poetry must give way to what reason tells him 
about it. Hence he goes through Homer and Hesiod with an editor’s 
pen, striking passages that cannot stand up to rational scrutiny, much 
as someone might go through the Bible or Koran striking out passages 
they took to express true falsehoods. (Thomas Jefferson seems to have 
been up to something similar in The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth, in 
which he excised all mention of Jesus’ divinity, his performing miracles, 
resurrection, etc.) 
Much as censoring stories about the gods is designed to foster the 
virtue of piety, censoring stories about epic heroes is meant to foster 
the secular virtues of courage and moderation. If would-be guardians 
are to acquire the courage-grounding belief that there are things that 
are worse than death—slavery and dishonor, to name two—they must 
not be exposed to stories about the horrors of Hades or of heroes 
lamenting the loss of loved ones. The same goes for moderation (also 
known as temperance): if young people are to become temperate, 
they must have exemplars to imitate, which they will not have if they 
are exposed to stories showing heroes over-indulging in food, drink, 
and sex, or desiring money or acting arrogantly or being overcome 
by anger or even laughter. Socrates’ point here is that one’s culture 
provides models of appropriate behavior, models that we internalize 
from a very young age. Although the reasoning is not conscious, the 
process seems to go something like this: we hear stories of gods acting 
dishonestly or heroes wailing about death and infer that these are 
appropriate ways for us to behave. ‘Everyone will be ready to excuse 
himself when he is bad’, Socrates argues, ‘if he is persuaded that 
similar things […] have been done in the past by “close descendants of 
the gods”’ (3.391e).   
Hence it is vitally important that one be exposed to good models 
right from the start, where ‘good models’ does a double duty: good 
models of good people. That Athenian culture fails in this regard, that 
its stories traffic in models of clever people acting unjustly and getting away 
with it, is Adeimantus’ complaint. 
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Supervising the Storytellers: Musical and Poetic Style 
(3.392c–401d)
One of the fascinating features of Socrates’ account of education broadly 
construed is that it attends not merely to the content of stories and songs, 
as we might expect, but to their form or style, as well. The main idea is 
that a song’s musical mode—not exactly equivalent to our notion of key 
but close enough for our purposes—and its meter or rhythm affect us 
independently of its words. This issue is connected to a longstanding 
debate in the philosophy of music about whether music contains 
emotions or merely excites them—whether, for example the second 
movement of Schubert’s Sonata in A major is sad in itself or whether the 
sadness is merely evoked in us by the music, which is itself emotionally 
unladen. How music could encode emotions is a fascinating question, 
but it is one we need not address here, since what Plato has Socrates 
say does not require—though it is consistent with—the view that music 
contains and encodes emotion rather than merely evoking it in listeners. 
While Greek musical modes are not identical to keys in Western music, 
thinking about keys can help us get a sense of how different modes have 
different emotional tones. The internet can be a great help here, since 
YouTube is rife with songs in which the key has been shifted from major 
to minor or minor to major. Consider the Beatles’ classic, ‘Hey Jude’, 
originally written in F major. Transposed to F minor, it is a very different 
song: sad, pensive, almost dour. Upbeat pop songs like Cyndi Lauper’s 
‘Girls Just Want to Have Fun’ or Cheap Trick’s ‘I Want You to Want Me’ 
sound sad and ironic when transposed from their original major to the 
corresponding minor key. Regardless of whether one stands or kneels 
for ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ before a professional football game, it 
seems like a different song when sung in a minor key. It works the other 
way, too: R.E.M.’s ‘Losing My Religion’ sounds happy and optimistic 
when modulated into A major, as does the theme from The Godfather. 
The lesson here is that the key—or, for Plato, mode—in which a song is 
sung matters. 
So in addition to wanting to ‘delete the lamentations and pitiful 
speeches of famous men’ (3.387c), since they cultivate cowardice and 
indulgence rather than courage and temperance, Socrates also wants 
to do away with ‘the lamenting modes’ (3.398e) in his ideal city, since 
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even without lamenting lyrics, these modes will convey or cultivate 
these vices, too. The ‘soft modes suitable for drinking parties’ (3.398e) 
are out, too. What remains are ‘the mode that would suitably imitate 
the tone and rhythm of a courageous person who is active in battle’ 
and ‘another mode, that of someone engaged in a peaceful, unforced 
voluntary action […] acting with moderation and self-control’ (3.399b), 
since these modes will cultivate the emotions and thus virtues proper to 
the would-be guardians. 
Socrates pays similar attention to rhythm and meter, aiming to 
cultivate grace and avoid gracelessness (3.400c). It is important to see 
that the restrictions on form and style are not afterthoughts, secondary 
to the restrictions on content. They are in fact more basic, since we are 
exposed to music well before we can understand the words of the songs 
our families and fellow-citizens sing to and around us. ‘Rhythm and 
harmony’, Socrates says, ‘permeate the inner part of the soul more than 
anything else’ (3.401d). Before we can understand the words of songs, 
we are shaped by their modes and rhythms, and indeed the shaping 
done by rhythm and harmony is even more important, Socrates thinks, 
since it begins to work on us at once. The point of proper aesthetic 
education here is not to come to have knowledge about the beautiful, 
but rather to come to know it directly, to recognize it when we hear and 
later see it. 
The Aesthetically Beautiful and the Morally Beautiful 
(3.401d–403c, 412b–e)
At least three other features of Plato’s account of aesthetic development 
are worthy of our attention. The first is that our aesthetic education 
is in fact the beginning of our moral education. Plato does not draw 
a sharp line, as we moderns tend to, between the beautiful and the 
morally good. While other approaches to ethics focus on duty and 
action (for example, the ethics embodied in the Ten Commandments, 
replete as it is with Shalts and Shalt Nots, and in the modern era Kant’s 
duty-based deontology), Plato’s ethics takes virtue to be central. For a 
virtue-centered ethics, the fundamental question is not ‘What should I 
do?’ but ‘What kind of person should I be?’ Where duty is essentially 
imperative, placing demands upon us, virtue is essentially attractive, 
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expressing ideals of character that we can approach by degrees—and, 
if Plato is right, that we are drawn to precisely because it is beautiful 
(κᾶλον [kalon]). Where Kant thought one should be motivated by duty 
to do one’s duty, Plato—and here I am making the safe bet that he would 
agree with his student Aristotle, who is much more explicit about this 
than his teacher—holds that the proper moral motivation for performing 
a certain action is that the action is fine or noble or beautiful—that it is 
kalon, which seamlessly combines aesthetic and moral notions.
Our moral education begins with our aesthetic education because, 
Plato thinks, proper exposure to beautiful modes, harmonies, and 
rhythms will cultivate ‘the right distastes’ and tastes (3.401e) in young 
people. This is not so they will become cultured aesthetes devoted to 
the aesthetically beautiful, but rather so they will be able to recognize 
and become devoted to the morally beautiful. In learning to recognize 
ugly sounds as ugly we come to learn to recognize shameful actions as 
shameful. It is no accident that the same Greek word αἰσχρός (aischros) 
means both ugly and shameful. Socrates regards doing injustice as 
shameful, but the Thrasymachan strongman—and anyone whose moral 
sensibilities have not been properly cultivated—‘has no scruples about 
doing injustice’ (2.362b), since he does not find the very idea repellant. 
Without radically altering the kind of upbringing and education 
Athenian popular culture will produce, young people will not be 
‘disgusted by injustice’ (2.366d) but will try to get away with it when 
they can.
A second important feature is that proper musical education will 
inculcate correct moral beliefs ‘while [we are] still young and unable 
to grasp the reason’ (3.401a). In other words, we will learn that certain 
traits and actions are admirable while others are not—but this will not 
teach us why the morally admirable traits are admirable. For that, we 
need philosophy. As I have noted already, this is essentially Glaucon’s 
and Adeimantus’ position: they believe that justice trumps convenience 
and self-interest, that the just life is happier than the unjust life, etc., but 
they recognize that they cannot justify these beliefs. But this underlying 
moral substrate of proper tastes and distastes—in a word, proper moral 
sentiments or feelings—is absolutely essential, on Socrates’ view. Children 
who develop in a musically corrupt culture will fail to acquire the correct 
moral beliefs, because of the false models of beauty they will internalize. 
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A third feature, closely related to the second, is that properly educated 
children will love what is beautiful and good. ‘Education in music and 
poetry’, says Socrates, ‘ought to end in the love of the fine and beautiful 
(καλοῦ ἐρωτικά [kalou erôtia])’ (3.403c). It is well worth noting that the 
‘love’ there is erotic love: they are in love with what is noble and fine, with 
what is morally beautiful. So, underlying any cognitive, philosophical 
grasp of justice is a pre-rational, emotional attachment to it. This comes 
to the fore later in Book III when Socrates, in addressing the question 
of who should rule, separates off the guardians from the auxiliaries. 
We will say more about this in a bit, but it is worth bringing out the 
connection between love and governing. ‘The rulers must be the best of 
the guardians’ (3.412c), Socrates thinks. But in the Book I conversation 
with Polemarchus he said that the best guardian of something is also its 
best thief (1.334a). What keeps these guardian-rulers from stealing the 
city—from ‘going Thrasymachan’, so to speak, and using their power to 
benefit themselves—is that they love the city? ‘The right kind of love’ 
(the orthos erôs) that is the product of proper musical education is ‘the 
love of order and beauty’ (3.403a). In loving the city, the guardians 
identify its good with theirs: ‘someone loves something most of all when 
he believes that the same things are advantageous to it as to himself and 
supposes that if it does well, he will do well, and that if it does badly, 
then he will do badly too’ (3.412d). 
Love certainly has an affective or phenomenological dimension: 
it feels a certain way. The variety of poems and pop songs devoted to 
what love feels like attests to the difficulty of describing the feeling in a 
non-metaphorical way: love is like a heatwave, love is a flame, etc. But 
in stressing the belief at the core of love, Plato plays down its affective 
dimension and plays up its cognitive dimension. We should note an 
asymmetry to the belief at the heart of Socratic love. In loving you, I 
identify my wellbeing with yours: I take what is good for you to be good 
for me. Taking what is good for me to be good for you is another way 
of creating an identity between your wellbeing and mine, but it is a 
defective form of love if it is a form of love at all. Many readers know—
sadly, some know through first-hand experience—parents who force or 
at least foist their wellbeing and conceptions of what a good life is onto 
their children, insisting that the child act for the sake of the parent. In 
addition to this asymmetry in belief, we should note that love requires 
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something more than this belief and a feeling of fondness. In addition 
to love’s cognitive and affective dimensions, there is also what we might 
call (for lack of a better word) its conative dimension, for loving another 
involves commitment to the other’s wellbeing and thus taking actions to 
promote it, often actions that seem to go against the lover’s interests. If I 
merely believe that your good is thereby also my good but I do nothing 
to promote your good when I am able to do so, it is hard to take seriously 
my claim that I love you. 
The upshot and real point of proper musical education, then, is that 
the guardians love the city. Where for Thrasymachus there is a clear 
gap between what is good for me as a ruler and what is good for the city, 
Socratic love for the city closes this gap. That a certain course of action 
might benefit me as a ruler at the expense of the city gets no traction 
if I have been properly educated; there just is not any space for such 
considerations to have any pull. The properly educated ruler would be 
baffled at the thought that they could gain from selling out the city, 
since the city’s good is their good, just as no amount of money would 
induce a good parent to sell their child into sex slavery. 
As we will see momentarily, the city’s founders must find ways 
to test the would-be guardians to discover which of them cannot be 
induced to give up their love of the city; they must ‘make sure that 
neither compulsion nor magic spells will get them to discard or forget 
their belief that they must do what is best for the city’ (3.412e). 
Physical Education—and Food (3.403c–405a)
Plato says significantly less about physical education, the other prong 
of the would-be guardians’ education. Given that the Greek word 
here is γυμναστική (gumnastikê, from which we get the English word 
‘gymnastics’), we might expect a discussion of various kinds of exercises, 
but ‘detailed supervision of the body’ (3.403d) is not really necessary, 
Socrates thinks, as a well-cared-for soul will be able to figure out what 
is appropriate for the body. He will return to the topic of physical 
education, especially as it concerns soldiering, in Book V. 
But here Socrates does offer a of bit detail where food is concerned, 
with examples drawn from Homer. The soldier-guardians will eat 
roasted but not boiled meats, presumably because this requires less 
84 Plato’s ‘Republic’: An Introduction
equipment to be lugged around. There will be no fish, which as we noted 
above is a luxury item, no sweet desserts, and no Syracusan or Sicilian 
delicacies (ὄψον [opson]) (3.404d)—though this time Glaucon raises no 
objection. The guardians’ lifestyle should be simple, both musically and 
physically. Simple music conduces to personal in the soul and simple 
food conduces to bodily health. 
Symptoms of Poorly Educated Cities: Too Many 
Lawyers and Doctors (3.405a–408c)
Given how frequently one hears jokes about lawyers and complaints 
that American society is overly litigious (Google’s fascinating Ngram 
Viewer shows a twofold increase in the use of the word ‘litigious’ in 
American English in the last half of the twentieth century), it is likely 
that many readers will agree with Socrates that an overabundance of 
lawyers is a symptom of something amiss, bemoaning those who ‘take 
pride in being clever at […] exploiting every loophole and trick to 
[ensure that their clients] escape conviction’ (3.405c). Fewer, I suspect, 
are likely to bemoan the presence of doctors, as Socrates does. At least 
as regards illness resulting from idleness and dubious dietary choices, 
we may concede that he has a point. But many readers will find what 
Socrates says about disease and disability shocking and indeed morally 
abhorrent. His remarks about those who are chronically, incurably ill 
are apt to make one shudder: ‘as for the ones whose bodies are naturally 
unhealthy or whose souls are incurably evil […] let the former die of 
their own accord and put the latter to death’ (3.410a). 
One reason Socrates’ attitude can seem horrifyingly wrongheaded is 
that it seems driven by the Specialization Principle and his community-
mindedness: ‘everyone in a well-regulated city has his own work to do and 
[…] no one has the leisure to be ill and under treatment all his life’ (3.406c). 
Since the chronically ill cannot contribute to the city, the argument seems 
to go, caring for them would just be a drain on resources. Many readers 
will insist that individuals have a value that transcends their usefulness or 
instrumental worth, and that treating them as dispensable cogs in a great 
machine is profoundly immoral, as it fails to recognize and respect their 
inherent dignity. Here we seem to find the starkest of clashes between 
individualism and communitarianism. Without seeking to defend 
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Socrates’ attitude, it is worth noting that this is only half the story, for he 
also appeals to the perspective of the diseased individual: ‘such a person 
would be of no profit either to himself or to the city’ (3.407e); ‘his life is 
of no profit to him if he does not do his work’ (3.407a). While this might 
blunt the sharp edges of Socrates’ view, it does so in a way that many 
people, informed by contemporary thinking on disability or by their own 
life experiences, will find offensive and profoundly mistaken. For it seems 
to take as its guide not the perspective of those who are chronically ill or 
disabled but rather the perspective of healthy people imagining how they 
would react to permanent disability. Empirical research suggests that 
the perhaps commonsensical assumption that disabilities make the lives 
of the disabled significantly if not disastrously worse is mistaken, and 
many readers will themselves have lives well worth living or will have 
friends and family members whose lives are well worth living despite 
their physical and cognitive limitations. We might share some of Socrates’ 
wariness about ‘excessive care [and attention] to the body’ (3.407b), being 
aware, as he is not, of the corrosive dangers of cultural norms of physical 
perfection, without sharing his attitude toward the disabled. 
And many will regard Socrates’ attitude as not only morally abhorrent, 
but philosophically suspect, as well. On the medical model of disability, 
a disability is thought of as an abnormality, such as an inability to walk 
that in itself significantly impairs its possessor’s chances for a happy, 
flourishing life. But the social model of disability, which is now the 
standard view in the field of disability studies, challenges the medical 
model. It distinguishes impairments from disabilities, regarding the 
inability to walk, for example, as atypical rather than abnormal. It is an 
impairment, but it is a disability only in a society that is inhospitable 
to and stigmatizes those who cannot walk. On the social model, being 
disabled is largely a social fact, turning on the ways in which a society 
is structured with respect to various impairments. While it might seem 
‘obvious’ that deafness, for example, is a disability, many regard it 
instead as a difference, and treasure it as part of their identity. 
This brief discussion is not meant to suggest that the social model 
is correct, but rather that thinking about disability has advanced 
significantly since Socrates’ time, and the medical model he assumes to 
be obviously correct has been called into serious doubt in recent decades.
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Harmony between Musical and Physical Education 
(3.410a–412b)
As we noted above, Socrates initially said that musical education treats 
the soul while physical education treats the body (2.376e) but towards 
the end of Book III he corrects himself, holding that both are ‘chiefly 
for the sake of the soul’ (3.410c). And here he hints at the distinction 
he will make in Book IV between the parts of the soul, suggesting that 
physical training aims at properly arousing ‘the spirited part of one’s 
nature’ while musical education tends ‘the philosophical part’ (3.410d). 
His overriding concern is that the two parts be brought into harmony 
or balance. Remember that guardians must be both gentle and high-
spirited, traits that are typically not found together and that are in 
tension when they are. Too much gumnastikê and one ends up savage 
and harsh rather than spirited; too much mousikê results in softness 
rather than gentleness. As noted earlier, the Republic is written in the 
decades following Athens’ defeat by Sparta in the nearly three-decades-
long Peloponnesian War. It is not a stretch to see Plato here trying to find 
a balance of the best of the Spartan and Athenian temperaments while 
avoiding their excesses. 
Towards the end of Book III, the artistic culture of the ideal city has 
been morally purified, lest citizens be harmed by being exposed to 
‘images of evil’ (3.401b), like cows grazing ‘in a meadow of bad grass’ 
(3.401c). The potential guardians are subjected from youth on to a series 
of tests designed to see whether ‘their belief[s] that they just do what is 
best for the city’ (3.412e) can survive the blandishments of pleasure, the 
pressures of compulsion, and the effects of time and rhetoric. Here and 
elsewhere in Book III Socrates is concerned with changes that escape 
notice. A potential guardian who can be persuaded by a sophist, such as 
Thrasymachus, will not pass muster, since clever rhetoric can ‘take away 
their opinions without their realizing it’ (3.413b). 
After describing the tests employed, Socrates distinguishes ‘complete 
guardians’ from the auxiliaries, resulting in a city with three classes: 
guardians or rulers, auxiliaries, and craftspeople. As will become 
clear, these are not socioeconomic classes but rather political classes, 
distinguished not by wealth but by political authority. The rulers and 
their helpers— that is, the guardians and the auxiliaries—live a spare, 
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communal lifestyle, owning no private property, and living together in 
military-style barracks, as befits ‘warrior athletes’ (3.416e). Though it 
might be tempting to think that those who pass these exacting tests are 
guardians while those who do not are merely auxiliaries, this clearly 
will not do: the auxiliaries must also be ‘guardians of this conviction 
[…] that they must do what is best for the city’ (3.412e). The difference 
is age and experience: the auxiliaries are ‘young people’ (3.414b), while 
presumably the guardians, like good judges, are older and have more 
experience. A good judge, Socrates thinks, ‘has learned late in life what 
injustice is like and who has become aware of it not as something at 
home in his soul, but as something alien and present in others, someone 
who, after a long time, has recognized that injustice is bad by nature, 
not from his own experience of it, but through knowledge’ (3.409b). We 
will soon see that a crucial difference between auxiliaries and guardians 
is that the auxiliaries have unshakable and true beliefs about what is 
best for the city, the guardians have something even firmer: they have 
knowledge of what is best for the city 
The Noble Falsehood (3.414b–417b)
The structure of the ideal city now set, Socrates offers a three-part 
foundational myth for the ideal city, which he calls the ‘noble falsehood’ 
(3.414b). He imagines telling the first-generation citizens of the now-
completed city that they are born from the earth, which is their mother. 
They literally are of the soil—the soil of this place. This presumably will 
make them eager to defend their city-state, as one would be eager to 
defend one’s mother. The second part of the myth follows from the first: 
since they are born of the same soil, they are all related, all brothers and 
sisters. Thinking of one’s fellow citizens as family, he thinks, will bind 
the city together as one, making the citizens love each other as family 
members ideally do. For many of us, family bonds transcend reasons 
in an interesting and important way: whether one’s siblings merit one’s 
love seems beside the point; the basis of family affection is the bare fact 
of being related: that someone is your brother or sister itself provides 
reasons for action. Some philosophers are suspicious of the kind of 
loyalty that is grounded in pure relations rather than reasons, since it 
can lead to immoral or illegal actions, as many a Law & Order episode 
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will attest. While we might expect Socrates to explore and question such 
loyalty, instead he exploits it, finding unifying power in familial love. 
Readers will remember that among the restrictions on stories about 
the gods is that no stories about gods hating or fighting each other will 
be allowed, since ‘we want the guardians of our city to think that it is 
shameful to be easily provoked into hating one another’ (2.378b), which 
is ‘impious’ (2.378c). 
The last element of the Noble Falsehood is the famous Myth of 
the Metals: ‘the god who made you mixed some gold into those who 
are adequately equipped to rule […] He put silver in those who are 
auxiliaries and iron and bronze in the farmers and other craftsmen’ 
(3.415a). So each class of the city is distinguished by the kind of 
metal that dominates the souls of its members. This is one of the most 
interesting as well as objectionable parts of the Republic. Its interest, I 
think, is its indicating Plato’s awareness of the importance of myth in 
public life, especially myths of origin. Though humans are rational, 
we are not entirely rational. Earlier, Socrates appealed to the love the 
guardians have for the city as the glue binding them to it, although 
it is a love more cognitive than affective. And we just saw that the 
primary purpose of the second part of the Noble Falsehood is to cause 
the citizens to love each other. In having Socrates offer the Noble 
Falsehood, Plato is acknowledging the power and importance of myth, 
not just to human self-understanding but to the formation of a people 
of a nation or, here, a city-state. What the Myth of the Metals does is 
to provide a narrative understanding and mythic justification of the 
ideal city’s three-part and decidedly non-egalitarian structure. The 
guardians’ most important task, Socrates says, is to guard against ‘the 
mixture of metals in the souls of the next generation’ (3.415b), for ‘the 
city will be ruined if it ever has an iron or bronze guardian’ (3.415c). 
Oddly, there is no claim that letting the silver-souled auxiliaries rule 
would have this destructive power. 
It is clear that Socrates must think of the Noble Falsehood as a merely 
verbal falsehood, ‘one of those useful falsehoods’ (3.414b) mentioned 
at the end of Book II, rather than a true or genuine falsehood, which is 
a falsehood ‘about the most important things’ (2.382a). Thrasymachus’ 
belief that the unjust life is the happier life would be a true falsehood, 
on Socrates’ view. It is not a true lie, since lying requires intentional 
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deception, trying to get others to belief what you regard as false, and 
there is nothing to suggest that Thrasymachus does not sincerely 
hold the view he espouses. But, on Socrates’ view, anyway, it is a true 
falsehood. It is not just factually false, but morally false and profoundly 
damaging to someone who believes it, since someone who lives their 
life by it cannot be happy (a claim he will try to prove in the last third of 
the Republic). Like the allowable stories about the gods and heroes, the 
Noble Falsehood is factually false—the citizens are not in fact born from 
the soil and are not actually distinguished by the kinds of metals in their 
souls. But its message, Socrates thinks, is deeply true.
This is where the Noble Falsehood is apt to seem most objectionable, 
for the profound claim it expresses, cloaked in mythic garb, is that 
human beings are not created equal. The guardians are simply more 
valuable than the craftspeople, Socrates holds, in the same way that 
the sexist thinks that men are just more valuable than women and 
the racist thinks that white people are just more valuable, possess 
more intrinsic worth, than non-whites. Anyone who subscribes to the 
fundamental moral and political equality of human beings will have 
to regard Socrates’ Noble Falsehood as not merely a verbal falsehood 
but rather a true falsehood, with profoundly harmful consequences to 
those who believe it. If it is a compelling myth, a craftsperson will see 
nothing amiss in not having a voice in how the polis is governed; it is 
just not their place. Much of the power of myth is ideological: making 
what is contingent and constructed seem natural and necessary. In 
a memorable passage from My Bondage and My Freedom, Frederick 
Douglass recalls having been
taught from the pulpit at St. Michael’s, the duty of obedience to our 
masters; to recognize God as the author of our enslavement; to regard 
running away an offense, alike against God and man; to deem our 
enslavement a merciful and beneficial arrangement […] to consider our 
hard hands and dark color as God’s mark of displeasure, and as pointing 
us out as the proper objects of slavery.1 
1  Frederick Douglass, Autobiographies: Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an 
American Slave/ My Bondage and My Freedom/ Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, ed. 
by Henry Louis Gates (New York: Library of America: 1994), p. 306.
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Douglass, being Douglass, is able to pierce the veil of racist ideology in 
which slavery is clothed. He recognizes that, the Bible (or supposedly 
authoritative interpretations of it) notwithstanding, he is not a proper 
object of slavery: no one is. But such is the power of ideology and myth 
to make a contingent institution like slavery seem to be metaphysically 
necessary and ordained by God. 
I suspect that most readers will agree that the Noble Falsehood is in 
fact a true falsehood, rather than the beneficial verbal falsehood Socrates 
takes it to be, since it denies the fundamental equality of all persons. I 
should stress that to believe in human equality is not to believe that all 
humans are equally able to do calculus, hit a curveball, nurture their 
children, etc. It is not a belief in factual equality. It is a belief in moral 
equality, in the equal dignity of all persons. 
There are many places where the Republic butts up against deeply 
held but often implicit and perhaps unjustified beliefs many of us have. 
And though there are times when we are likely to arch our eyebrows 
and wonder if Plato is not really onto something in thinking as he does, 
I do not think this is one of those times. 
Some Suggestions for Further Reading
Readers interested in philosophical issues raised by music will find 
Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2002) well worth their time. 
Less is known about ancient Greek music than one might expect, but 
interested readers should see M. L. West, Ancient Greek Music (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994). 
Readers interested in Jefferson’s Bible can find it at the Smithsonian 
Institute’s webpage: http://americanhistory.si.edu/jeffersonbible/.
Readers interested in issues around disability will find Andrew 
Solomon, Far From the Tree: Parents, Children, and the Search for Identity 
(New York: Scribner, 2012), especially its first chapter, well worth 
reading. For a clear-headed, clearly written contemporary philosophical 
take on disability, see Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of 
Disability (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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Readers interested in exploring conceptual and ethical issues about 
deception and lying might start with Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in 
Public and Private Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1999). 
Josef Abel, Socrates Teaching his Disciples (1807). Photograph by Jarash 
(2015), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Josef_Abel_1807_Socrates_teaching_his_disciples.jpg
5. Starting to Answer the 
First Question:  
The Political Virtues,  
Book IV
In Book IV Socrates answers the Republic’s first question, What is 
justice? Keeping to the plan devised in Book II, he first tells us what 
political justice—justice in the polis or city-state—is and then, arguing 
that the ideal polis and the human soul (psuchê) share the same three-
part structure, he applies his definition of political justice to the psyche, 
arriving at his definition of personal justice. His definition is interesting 
in many ways, not least of which is its accounting for justice not as a 
matter of outward behavior, as Cephalus’ and Polemarchus’ definitions 
did, but rather as an inward matter of psychic harmony. 
Happiness: Parts and Wholes, Individuals and 
Communities (4.419a–421c)
Book IV begins with Adeimantus jumping back into the conversation 
with a concern that brings to the fore the tension between individualism 
and communitarianism. He worries that the guardians and auxiliaries 
will not be especially happy, given the lifestyles Socrates described at 
the close of Book III: communal living, no privacy, not much money, etc. 
‘The city really belongs to them’, Adeimantus says, ‘yet they derive no 
good from it’ since they lack ‘the things that are thought to belong to 
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people who are blessedly happy’ (4.419a). This is certainly a plausible 
view about what the best kind of life is like. The Greek verb translated 
as ‘thought’ is νομίζεται (nomizetai), which is cognate with νόμος (nomos: 
custom or law), and thus indicates what is thought or deemed or 
customarily taken to be the best life—not necessarily what actually is 
the best life. 
Plato has Socrates give a twofold response to Adeimantus. First, 
he suggests that far from being unhappy, the guardians may well be 
the happiest group in the ideal polis. They are performing the task 
or function for which they are best suited, after all, and if they are 
performing it well, they are probably delighting in it. It is another 
reminder that while the good of the community is Socrates’ primary 
concern, it is not his only concern. Socrates then reminds Adeimantus 
of the plan they have adopted, to investigate the nature of personal 
justice and its connection to personal happiness by discovering the 
nature of political justice and its connection to happiness. His focus, 
then, is on political happiness, on ‘making the whole city happy’ 
(4.420c); he does not aim to make ‘any one group outstandingly 
happy, but to make the whole city so’ (4.420b). Even though he seems 
to be doubling down on the holistic or communitarian ethos that is 
regularly contrasted with the individualism which many readers will 
find intuitively more attractive, his communitarianism here is largely 
methodological, a useful device to get to his ultimate concern, which 
is individual happiness. In Book V he will suggest that individual 
wellbeing depends in no small way on whether the polis one lives in is 
just, which suggests a more modest community-first ethos than he has 
been espousing heretofore. 
The Ideal City: Finishing Touches (4.421c–427d)
After giving a warning about the damage economic inequality can 
wreak in a city—a theme to which he will return in Book VIII—Socrates 
reminds Adeimantus of the importance of the guardians’ preserving 
the educational system as they have received it, lest it be corrupted by 
seemingly minor and innocuous changes.
Many readers will have witnessed versions of such cultural 
conservatism in their lifetimes, for example, panicked responses to the 
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threats posed by jazz, Elvis, the Beatles, and rap music. But lest Plato 
seem like just another cranky old fuddy-duddy bemoaning music 
he did not grow up with, we should remember that the ideal city’s 
music was chosen intentionally and with great care, since it is meant to 
cultivate traits of character necessary to the city’s thriving. The worry 
is that ‘lawlessness easily creeps in […] unnoticed’ (4.424d), so, given 
how malleable young people are (a fact of human nature that is highly 
relevant to the educational system developed in Books II and III) it 
is important that music and culture generally provide sustenance to 
young souls. Children will absorb lawfulness or lawlessness—Plato 
mentions no neutral third option—from the games they play and 
the songs they sing and hear, so it is vital that the healthy system be 
preserved. Changes of mode and meter can seem trivial and morally 
neutral, but they are not, on Plato’s moral-aesthetic conception of 
character development. Even if we do not share Plato’s worry that 
‘changing to a new form of music […] threatens the whole system’ 
(4.424c), keeping in mind his beliefs in the malleability of young 
minds and the inseparability of morality and aesthetics should render 
his worry at least less curmudgeonly.
Though there are several other things worth discussing in this part 
of Book IV, I will mention just one, what we might call Plato’s legislative 
minimalism. It is foolish, Socrates says, to think that legislation can 
overcome failures of education. Though some of his examples are 
trivial—regulating hairstyles and clothes—others are not: how the young 
treat the old and how they care for their parents, for example. This brief 
stretch of the Republic might seem little more than harrumphing about 
‘kids today’, but Plato is doing more than mere griping here. He might 
not agree with the details of Ed Tom’s diagnosis in Cormac McCarthy’s 
No Country for Old Men—‘It starts when you begin to overlook bad manners. 
Any time you quit hearin Sir and Mam the end is pretty much in sight. I told 
her, I said: It reaches into ever strata.’1—but in principle they seem to be of 
one mind. Communities are held together by more than rules and laws; 
they are held together by shared values and affections. Education in 
Plato’s broad sense is primarily character education, after all, and there is 
something to his point that legislation cannot repair defective character 
1  Cormac McCarthy, No Country for Old Men (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), p. 304. 
Spelling, syntax, and italics as in original.
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education. Still, we might worry that his view ignores the expressive 
function of law—the law’s power to say something about the shared 
norms and values that bind a community together. If, in addition to 
governing behavior, the law can also shape attitudes and beliefs, then 
it may have a contribution to make to character education, if only an 
ancillary one. 
In my home state of Wisconsin, adultery is a crime—a felony, in 
fact. Prosecutions are extremely rare—there have been none in the last 
thirty years—but presumably that is not because there have been so 
few violations of Wisconsin Statute §944.16. I know of no empirical 
studies of this law’s efficacy in reducing adultery, but it seems unlikely 
that potential adulterers would be deterred by it, especially given its 
non-enforcement. But even if there is no direct causal link between 
criminalizing adultery and reducing extramarital adventuring, its 
criminalization may yet serve an important function: expressing the 
citizenry’s collective disapproval of adultery. If the law plays this 
expressive role, striking the adultery statute from the books might 
seem to signal, if not the community’s approval of adultery, at least its 
non-disapproval, and it is not implausible that this would have negative 
behavioral consequences, by changing attitudes and feelings about the 
importance of marital fidelity, promise-keeping, etc. So there may be a 
dimension to the law that Plato is missing here. On the other hand, a 
law’s remaining on the books because of its expressive function might 
cultivate the sort of cynicism and hypocrisy Adeimantus complains 
about in Book II: many citizens make a great show of the importance 
of the values just mentioned, because it is important to seem just, but in 
practice their conduct suggests a preference for being unjust. 
The Political Virtues (4.427d–434d)
Now that the ideal city is complete, it is time to look for justice in it. But 
before we do that, I bring up a seemingly minor point that, as is so often 
the case with Plato, is surprisingly deep upon examination, carrying 
more philosophical weight than initial appearances suggest. 
In announcing the completion of the ideal city, which paves the way 
for the inquiry into the nature of justice, Socrates says to Adeimantus, 
‘your city might now be said to be established’ (4.427d). This seems 
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innocuous enough, but up to this point, Socrates’ possessive pronoun 
of choice has been the first-person plural: he speaks of ‘our city’ and 
‘our citizens’ (2.370d, 2.371e, 2.373b, 2.378b, 3.387e, 3.394d, 3.397d). At 
the corresponding point in Book II, at the completion of the first city, 
Socrates says, ‘Well, Adeimantus, has our city grown to completeness, 
then?’ (2.371e; emphasis added) Why the shift here from our city to 
your city? Perhaps it is merely stylistic variation on Plato’s part. After 
all, within just a few lines Socrates shifts back to ‘our city’ (4.427e), and 
then it is soon back again to ‘your city’ (4.431c). I suspect that the shift in 
pronouns is Plato’s way of reminding us that Socrates, despite being the 
chief theoretical architect of the just-completed ideal city, still regards 
the first city, the rustic utopia rejected by Glaucon as ‘a city for pigs’ 
(2.372d), as ‘the true city […] the healthy one’ (2.372e). Perhaps Plato 
hopes his readers will pick up on Socrates’ ambivalence and reflect 
further on his allegiance to his rustic utopia. That city, which has been 
all but forgotten by this point in the Republic, was without guardians and 
auxiliaries and indeed without classes of any kind. The just-completed 
city is not only structured by political classes but in fact, we will soon 
see, has the same structure as the human soul. This is a perfect place to 
remind attentive readers of the second-best nature of the ideal city, if 
only to make us think through how seriously to take Socrates’ attitude 
toward it. 
So what seems a matter of mere style may turn out to be really a 
matter of substance, though we will not pursue so fine a point any 
further. Hopefully, though, this brief discussion reminds us of what a 
subtle work the Republic is and why it rewards repeated rereading. 
Cardinal Virtues
If the city is well founded, Socrates argues, it will be ‘completely good’ 
(4.427e) and thus it will not be missing any of the moral virtues. 
For Socrates and Plato, there are four primary virtues: courage, 
moderation, wisdom and justice. Aristotle had a much longer list, 
including friendliness, wit, generosity, and proper pride, among 
others. Philosophers often speak of Plato’s four virtues as ‘the cardinal 
virtues’, which suggests at a minimum that the virtues are important 
or paramount. But in another, stronger sense, to call a virtue a cardinal 
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virtue is to say that it is theoretically basic: there are no virtues more 
basic than it and any non-cardinal virtue is somehow reducible to or a 
version of the cardinal virtue in question. Socrates says that ‘there are 
four virtues’ (4.428a) and that together they make the city ‘completely 
good’ (4.427e), which suggests that these virtues are cardinal in the 
stronger, theoretically basic sense. To see what is at stake here, consider 
the attention paid earlier in the Republic to cultivating the virtue of 
piety by regulating stories about the gods—and consider Plato’s having 
devoted an entire dialogue (the Euthyphro) to investigating the nature 
of piety. If piety is not a cardinal virtue, perhaps it can be subsumed 
under justice, since piety concerns what is owed to the gods and 
justice is plausibly thought of as giving to each what they are owed. 
Viewing piety as a requirement or form of justice would preserve 
the cardinality of Socrates’ four virtues. One problem with this view, 
however, is that in Book I Socrates casts doubt on defining justice in 
terms of what is owed, and we will soon see that the definition of 
justice Socrates proposes is not couched in terms of giving to each what 
they are owed. Another, related, worry is that what goes for piety can 
also go for the other virtues. If courage, for example, can be thought 
of as what soldiers owe the city, then like piety courage is not itself a 
distinct virtue but instead a kind of justice. So by seeking to preserve 
the cardinality of the four cardinal virtues we end up destroying their 
cardinality. 
This concern about piety is in a sense internal to Plato’s moral 
thinking and to the account of virtue he is offering here: he seems 
committed to piety’s being a genuine, stand-alone virtue and yet he 
excludes it from his ‘official’ list. A different kind of concern is external: 
when looking at Plato’s list we might think he is excluding some 
traits we take to be virtues. Many readers will think of kindness and 
generosity, for example, as virtues of character, and thus think Plato’s 
list is mistaken not because of an internal inconsistency or tension but 
because it fails to include traits that belong on the list. When thinking 
about the attitudes Socrates expresses toward the disabled in Book 
III, many readers will think that the virtue of compassion is in short 
supply in his ideal city. It would be difficult to subsume generosity 
under justice, since generosity is at least in part a matter of giving 
which goes beyond what is owed. 
 99Starting to Answer the First Question
Yet another worry concerns the argument Socrates gives for the 
complete goodness of the ideal city:
P1 If our city has been correctly founded, it is completely good. 
(4.427e)
P2 Our city has been correctly founded.
C Therefore, our city is completely good.
While we might question why correctness must imply completeness, 
P1 seems plausible. But many readers, noting the absence of individual 
liberty and equal political rights in the ideal city, will have grave 
doubts about P2. Socrates’ more community-minded interlocutors 
raise no such objections, but as thoughtful readers we will want to 
engage in philosophical dialogue with our author by thinking through 
the issues for ourselves, in both senses of for ourselves. We want to 
think about these issues independently, not merely relying on what 
Plato or Socrates or whoever has to say. And we want to think about 
what Socrates’ claims mean to us. As he reminds his readers at various 
points, Socrates’ method depends upon his interlocutors’ ‘saying 
what [they] really think’ (1.349a). Good philosophical reading often 
requires adopting another’s point of view, examining whether the 
claims an author makes from within that point of view are consistent 
with it. But good philosophical reading also requires scrutinizing that 
point of view itself, not just for its internal consistency but also for its 
substantive correctness. Of course, there is a danger here of taking our 
own points of view as sacrosanct and beyond criticism and rejecting 
points of view at odds with them. But one of the values of reading 
a book like the Republic, which expresses perspectives very different 
from our own, is that they can prod us to think through our deeply-
held but not always carefully, critically scrutinized beliefs. 
As usual, there is more to be said here and by no means am I 
suggesting that Plato has no plausible responses to these worries. But 
in questioning the adequacy of his claim about how many virtues there 
are we honor him by doing the thing he most wants of us: to think 
philosophically and critically. 
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Wisdom (4.428a–429a)
The first virtue discovered in the city, wisdom (σοφία [sophia]), is 
the virtue of a particular class: the guardian-rulers. Wisdom is often 
thought of as an intellectual virtue, rather than a character virtue, as 
it is a kind of knowledge. Aristotle distinguished the intellectual and 
character virtues (although he ultimately thought that some of them 
were mutually dependent). While this is not a distinction Plato explicitly 
makes, it is a helpful one, both in itself and for the light it will shed in 
Book VII of the Republic, when Plato is busy distinguishing philosophers 
from non-philosophers. 
Wisdom is a kind of knowledge, Socrates thinks, but not just any 
old kind of knowledge and certainly not the kind of knowledge that 
craftspeople possess. Nor is it the kind of abstract, theoretical knowledge 
a mathematician might possess. It is more general than the craftsperson’s 
know-how and more practical than the mathematician’s know-that. It is 
knowledge of what is best for the city as a whole (4.428c). Although 
many readers are leery of Socrates’ holism and communitarianism, here 
they seem unproblematic: wisdom is knowledge of what is best for the 
city as a whole, not what is best for any particular group of citizens. If the 
city is to function well, it must be unified, and it can only be unified if 
its rulers aim at the good of the whole, rather than at what is good for 
a particular part of it at the expense of the whole. Socrates has already 
implied that good rulers will strive to minimize economic inequality, 
given its dis-integrating effects. Some economic inequality is to be 
expected and may well be beneficial, but too much leads to there not 
being ‘a city […] [but] two cities at war with one another, that of the 
poor and that of the rich’ (4.422e [italics in the original]). Just as the 
ideal city’s founders aimed not to ‘make any one group outstandingly 
happy but to make the whole so, as far as possible’ (4.420b), its rulers 
must aim at the good of the city as a whole. 
It should make sense that this is the virtue distinctive of the 
guardians, if we remember the earlier account of a virtue as what 
enables its possessor to perform its function well. Since the function 
of the rulers is—unsurprisingly—to rule, they can rule well only if 
they possess wisdom. A ruler who makes only lucky guesses, or even 
educated guesses, about what is best for the city is less likely to rule 
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well than a ruler who knows what is best for the city. Now of course 
we can agree that rulers require wisdom to rule well without agreeing 
with Socrates’ conception of it or with his belief that only a few citizens 
are capable of it. One might be skeptical that knowledge about what is 
best for a city-state or country is really possible, settling instead for 
experience-grounded beliefs. And one might think wisdom is at least in 
principle within the grasp of ordinary citizens. We have already seen, 
and will see in more detail in Books VIII and IX, that Socrates is no fan of 
democracy—presumably because he is skeptical that ordinary citizens 
are capable of the sort of knowledge needed to rule well.
Courage (4.429a–430c)
Courage, like wisdom, is also a virtue distinctive of a particular class: the 
soldiering auxiliaries. It becomes clear that the guardians, who emerge 
from the auxiliaries, will also possess courage, but their distinctive (rather 
than sole) virtue is wisdom, not courage. As above, their possessing 
courage makes sense when we remember that the auxiliaries’ function 
is to protect the city, which they can do well only if they possess courage. 
A surprising way in which courage is similar to wisdom is that courage, 
at least as Socrates characterizes it, is at root a cognitive affair: it is ‘th[e] 
power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated 
belief about what is to be feared and what is not’ (4.430b [emphasis 
added]). Attentive readers will have noticed that the wisdom the 
guardians possess is a kind of knowledge, but the auxiliaries’ courage 
is a matter of belief, not knowledge. Making clear how knowledge and 
belief differ will be a central focus of Books V, VI, and VII. It might be 
helpful to bring the JTB (justified true belief) conception of knowledge 
into play again (reminding ourselves that it is not Plato’s view but rather 
a heuristic to help us make sense of some features of the Republic). The 
auxiliaries believe that certain things are worse than death—slavery and 
dishonor, for example—but the guardians know why these things are 
worse than death: they have, in addition to a true belief, a justification 
for their true belief. While the auxiliaries’ beliefs lack the intellectual 
backing the guardians possess, this in no way prevents their holding it 
firmly and unshakably. Their belief that there are fates worse than death 
must be dyed-in-the-wool, in Socrates’ memorable metaphor: dyed in so 
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deeply that ‘the color is fast—no amount of washing […] can remove it’ 
(4.429b). If the Spartan soldiers holding the pass at Thermopylae against 
Persian invaders—an event that, until the film The 300, was the province 
of classicists and history nerds—valued their own lives over the good 
of the community, they would have thrown down their weapons and 
run for safety. The opening pages of Book III, attentive readers will 
remember, were rife with constraints on stories and poetry designed to 
cultivate courage. Any would-be auxiliary who believes that their death 
would be the worst thing that could happen believes a true falsehood, 
a belief that is radically false and distorts an important dimension of 
reality. The auxiliaries’ education, both poetic and physical, is meant to 
cultivate the virtue of courage.
We should note a subtle but important refinement Socrates makes to 
his definition of courage. He first describes courage as the auxiliaries’ 
‘power to preserve through everything its belief about what things 
are to be feared’ (4.429b), but he quickly adds a qualifier: courage 
is ‘preservation of the belief that has been inculcated by the law through 
education about what things and sorts of things are to be feared’ (4.429c 
[emphasis added]), a qualification he repeats a page later: ‘the correct 
and law-inculcated belief’ (4.430b). He is making a distinction between 
what Aristotle will later call natural virtue and virtue proper. Some people 
and indeed many animals seem by nature courageous, born with correct 
beliefs about what is properly feared and with the power to preserve 
those beliefs in the face of danger. But unless these beliefs are the 
product of education, what is present is not ‘courage but something 
else’ (4.430b). Socrates does not elaborate, but presumably he thinks 
this because proper courage’s natural analog may misfire without 
the guidance of reason and education. We have already seen that too 
much physical education and not enough musical education results in 
a person’s becoming ‘hard and harsh’ (3.410d) rather than courageous. 
Moderation (4.430d–432b)
Unlike courage and wisdom, moderation is not distinctive of any 
particular class in the city; instead, ‘moderation spreads throughout 
the whole’ (4.432a). Socrates starts with the commonsense connection 
between moderation (also called temperance) and self-control. If you 
 103Starting to Answer the First Question
decline and I insist on a third slice of cheesecake, you seem to have and 
I seem to lack the virtue of moderation. But explaining this in terms of 
self-control is puzzling, Socrates thinks, since what does the controlling 
and what is controlled is the very same thing. The puzzle is solved when 
we realize that our souls have better and worse parts, with the better 
part comprising our capacities for reason and choice and the worse part 
our appetite and desires. In the self-controlled person, ‘the naturally 
better part is in control of the naturally worse’ (4.431a), so they decline 
that third slice of cheesecake while I do not. 
There is something problematic about Socrates’ procedure here. 
The plan is to figure out the nature of the political virtues in order to 
discover the nature of the personal virtues. But here he is appealing to the 
structure of the soul or person in trying to understand the nature of the 
political virtue of moderation, so he is building into the polis the psychic 
structure he will soon claim to find there. As a grad school professor 
once wrote in the margins of a paper of mine, ‘if you are going to try to 
pull the rabbit out of the hat, it is best if you are not seen putting it in’. 
But perhaps there is no big problem here. After all, Socrates is simply 
appealing to an ordinary belief about moderation as a kind of self-
control; he is not importing any high-level psychological theory, and he 
may well have been able to arrive at his conclusion—that ‘something in 
which the better rules the worse is properly called moderate and self-
controlled’ (4.431b)—without the appeal to commonsense psychology.
The ideal polis is self-controlled and thus moderate, Socrates thinks, 
because it is ruled by the guardians, who are the best part of the polis. 
But there is more to it than that. A city in which the guardians only 
tenuously hold power over the rebellious craftspeople is not moderate, 
nor would Socrates think it is, for it is lacking the harmony distinctive of 
true self-control. In a moderate or self-controlled polis, the three classes 
‘all sing the same song together’ (4.432a): there is ‘agreement between 
the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which of the two is to 
rule’ (4.432a). 
As with the wisdom and courage, Socrates plays up the cognitive 
nature of this virtue: ‘ruler and ruled […] share the same belief about who 
should rule’ (4.431d [italics added]). They are in agreement, not in the 
way in which a good drawing or measurement agrees with its object 
or in the way in which some food agrees with my finicky stomach but 
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other food does not, but in the way that only rational creatures can be: 
consent. We should tread carefully here, however, for the idea of consent 
can be misleading. Socrates is not offering the modern, liberal view that 
the legitimacy of a government turns on the consent of the governed. 
The consent Socrates has in mind is a symptom of good government, 
not a condition of its legitimacy. Presumably, in a well-governed city, 
the craftspeople consent to being governed by the guardians because 
things are going well for them economically; they are happy with the 
arrangement and are happy to be left alone to their cobbling, baking, 
doctoring, etc., and their family lives. The entitlement of the guardians 
to rule depends not on the consent of those they govern but on their 
possessing the relevant virtue, wisdom. 
A word or two about the ‘spread out’ nature of moderation is in order. 
Unlike wisdom and courage, which are what we might call particular 
virtues, which are virtues distinctive of particular classes, moderation 
is a holistic virtue, a virtue of the whole city, not of any of its particular 
classes. This is a subtle point, easily misunderstood. Although a city 
is wise because its rulers are wise and brave because its auxiliaries are 
brave, Plato is not saying that the city is moderate because every class 
is moderate. Moderation does not work that way. By way of analogy, 
think of a basket containing red balls, green balls, and yellow balls. The 
collection of balls has a property which none of its members has: the 
property of being multi-colored. The collection is multi-colored because 
of the colors of the individual balls: if the basket contained only green 
balls, the collection would not exhibit the property of being multi-
colored. But none of the individual balls in the basket is multi-colored: 
each is either red or green or yellow. (Of course, nothing prevents 
individual balls from being multi-colored: a particular ball might be 
red, green, and yellow—but none of the balls in our example has this 
property.) So the collection’s having this property depends upon the 
members having certain properties—but it is the collection, and not its 
members, that has the property of being multi-colored. Being multi-
colored, in this example, is a holistic property, depending on the nature 
of the individuals but not reducible or equivalent to them. 
The political virtue of moderation, as Socrates conceives of it, is the 
same kind of holistic property, belonging to the whole and not to the 
parts. It is not the case that the city is moderate because each class is 
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moderate; rather, the city is moderate because the different classes agree 
about who should rule, just as the basket of balls is multi-colored even 
though none of the balls are.
Socrates’ talk of better and worse parts may be easier to hear when the 
parts in question are parts of the soul rather than the city. Thinking of the 
guardians as ‘naturally better’ than the craftspeople has a dissonant ring 
to egalitarian ears. As we noted when discussing the Noble Falsehood, 
the kind of equality that most readers will insist on (and which Plato 
has Socrates denying) is not factual equality. Some people can run or 
swim faster than others; some people are better at knitting than others; 
some people are better at differential equations than others. What is at 
issue is political equality, the belief that all citizens have equal rights to 
participating in the political life of their communities. We will see in 
the next chapter that Socrates expresses the view that being a woman 
does not in itself disqualify a person from being a guardian. But he 
certainly does not think that all women, or all men, are capable of being 
guardians, since so very few of us are capable of acquiring the requisite 
virtue, wisdom. 
We will return to this topic in the next chapter and then again when 
discussing Plato’s attitudes toward democracy in Chapter 12, so for now 
the egalitarians among us should merely note our disagreement with 
Plato. But we should also be thinking of how we might go about trying 
to convince him, drawing on premises he himself would accept, that he 
is mistaken to reject political equality. It is not an easy task. But, as I have 
said before, one of the great benefits of carefully reading the Republic 
is that doing so can lead us to wrestle with difficult tasks like this, to 
question and defend propositions that seem self-evident to us but do not 
so appear to others. 
Justice (4.432b–434d)
Since three of the four cardinal virtues have been identified, Socrates 
thinks that justice must be whatever is left. ‘Justice: it’s what is left 
over’ does not exactly inspire confidence, either as a bumper-sticker or 
a philosophical methodology. But Socrates’ point is that the answer to 
the Republic’s first question is staring them in the face, so to speak. They 
have been talking about it without even knowing it, he thinks, because 
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justice is based on, and indeed seems to be a moralized version of the 
Specialization Principle: ‘justice’, he says, ‘is doing one’s own work, and 
not meddling with what is not one’s own’ (4.433a).
Although it is initially stated in terms of individual behavior, justice 
as a virtue of the polis is really a matter of each class doing its work: 
the craftspeople produce and exchange goods, the auxiliaries protect 
the city, and the guardians govern it. If this is indeed what justice is, 
Socrates’ earlier insistence that the guardians’ most important task is to 
protect against the mixing of the metals grows in importance. If their 
task is to ensure justice and prevent its opposite, then they must prevent 
the craftspeople from ruling, since, the Noble Falsehood informed 
us, ‘the city will be ruined if it ever has an iron or a bronze guardian’ 
(3.415c). When cobblers bake and bakers cobble, the city will have 
suboptimal bread and sandals (and not enough of them), since this 
violates the Specialization Principle, which requires specialization as a 
way of producing ‘more plentiful and better-quality goods’ (2.370c). But 
occupation-switching is disastrous, and not merely suboptimal, when 
bakers and guardians switch roles. A baking guardian who lacks the 
baker’s skill will produce bread that is not very good, but a ruling baker 
who lacks the guardian’s wisdom will produce disaster, on Socrates’ 
view.
Justice as non-meddling has intriguing parallels in Confucius’ 
Analects. When asked about good governing, Confucius replies, ‘The 
ruler must rule, the minister minister, the father father, and the son son’ 
(12.11). Underlying Confucius’ somewhat odd way of making his point 
is that roles are not merely descriptive but rather normative, providing 
rules and norms of conduct. (This echoes the discussion of the ‘precise 
sense’ of craft-terms such as ‘ruler’ back in Book I.) A widely heard 
complaint about contemporary American parenting is that too many 
parents seek to be their children’s friend (searching Google or Yahoo for 
‘be a parent not a friend’, for example, yields millions of hits). But even 
without investigating the complaint’s merits, we see its point, which is 
both a Platonic and Confucian one. We each inhabit many roles: citizen, 
friend, neighbor, mother, cousin, customer, boss, etc., and it may not 
always be clear which role is appropriate in a given situation. To a great 
degree, practical wisdom is a matter of seeing which role is appropriate 
in the circumstances so one can then act accordingly. And of course it 
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is not always clear what the role requires, even when one determines 
which role is called for. It may be that in interacting with a particular 
employee on a particular day, being a friend rather than a boss is what 
is called for. But it may be that a different situation calls for just the 
opposite. 
Although this idea of the normative status of roles is plausible and 
intriguing—indeed, Confucianism is often thought of as a kind of role 
ethics—many readers will be understandably uncomfortable with the 
political implications of Plato’s role-based account of justice, rejecting the 
idea of assigning to a fellow citizen ‘the rank appropriate to his nature’ 
(3.415c), for it seems an easy, morally problematic slide from here to 
insisting that others ‘know their place’. Role ethics is a fascinating topic, 
but exploring it in more depth would take us too far afield. So instead, 
let us briefly explore two arguments Socrates makes in support of his 
definition of political justice. 
The first argument is explicitly marked in a way that should garner 
our attention: ‘Look at it this way if you want to be convinced’ (4.433e), 
Socrates says. The argument turns on the proper role of a judge, which 
is not surprising, given the focus on roles. The ideal city’s rulers will 
also be judges, Socrates argues, and a judge’s ‘sole aim’ is that ‘no citizen 
should have what belongs to another or be deprived of what is his own’ 
(4.433e)—because this, intuitively, is just. Therefore, Socrates concludes, 
‘the having and doing of one’s own would be accepted as justice’ (4.434a). 
This seems plausible, and Glaucon finds it so. But a more critically 
disposed reader might question the sudden appearance of ‘doing one’s 
own’ in the conclusion, when the premises have concerned only having 
one’s own. Socrates’ argument is commonsensical and intuitive because 
it concerns property: justice requires that I not be wrongfully deprived 
of my property. Is what one does properly thought of something one 
has? Are one’s roles to be counted among one’s property? Perhaps, but if 
being, doing, and having are distinct metaphysical categories, we should 
be leery of fusing them into each other. 
The second argument is also simple and straightforward. Since 
‘meddling and exchange between these three classes’—that is, the 
mixing of the metals—‘is the greatest harm that can happen to the city’ 
and injustice is the worst thing one can do to one’s city, it follows, Socrates 
argues, that ‘meddling is injustice’ (4.434c). And if meddling is injustice, 
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it must follow that its opposite, not meddling, is justice. A reader who 
suspects that this argument begs the question—that it assumes the truth 
of what it is trying to prove—seems to be on the mark. Only someone 
who already accepts the proposed definition of justice would accept 
the argument’s first premise, that meddling is the worst evil that could 
befall the city. And even waiving that worry, egalitarian-minded readers 
who are friendly to democracy are likely to think that the first premise 
is simply false. They are likelier to think that the hierarchical, elitist 
structure of Socrates’ ideal city is among the worst evils that can befall a 
political community. And sharp-minded readers will wonder whether 
Socrates is confusing cause and effect, thinking that even by Socrates’ 
lights the meddling itself is not the great evil but rather is the cause of 
the evil, which presumably is the disintegration of the city. Many such 
readers will be skeptical that meddling or metals-mixing will cause the 
great harm Socrates claims for it.
In addition to these external worries about Socrates’ definition of 
justice, there is an internal worry about it—that is, a worry from within 
Socrates’ point of view—concerning the cardinality of the cardinal 
virtues. Piety, the reader will remember, is treated elsewhere in the 
Republic (and elsewhere in Plato’s dialogues) as a distinct virtue in its 
own right. But Socrates does not count it as a cardinal virtue (or even 
mention it) in Book IV. Earlier I suggested that attempting to regard 
piety as a form of justice (and thus retaining Socrates’ view that there 
are only four moral virtues) did not pan out. Here, the concern is that 
justice, as Socrates describes it, and moderation are so similar that it is 
difficult to count them as two virtues. A city is moderate when all three 
classes ‘share the same belief about who should rule’ (4.431de) and it is 
just when each class does its own work, but it is hard to see how those 
are really different, since each class doing its own work seems to be the 
embodiment of the agreement. Although making an agreement and 
acting on it are not the same thing—as anyone who has had a contractual 
dispute or, to choose a homier example, anyone who has experienced 
a child not being willing to go to bed at the agreed-upon time, can 
attest—the difference here does not seem sufficient to justify viewing 
moderation and justice as distinct cardinal virtues. If we are tempted to 
insist that the difference between agreement and action is sufficient to 
justify claims of cardinality, we might find our position turned against 
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us. After all, an opponent might argue, could not the same be said about 
courage? Surely a belief that x is an appropriate object of fear and acting 
on that belief are not the same thing, even if they are closely related. If 
so, there would need to be another virtue, related to but distinct from 
courage; and if that is the case, then Socrates is mistaken that ‘there are 
four virtues’ (4.428a). 
While Socrates does not wrestle with this problem directly, his view 
that justice is a sort of meta-virtue might implicitly solve his problem. The 
prefix ‘meta-’ suggests a higher-level or higher-order aboutness. Meta-
cognition is cognition about cognition: thinking about thinking. Though 
it is often more at home in psychological contexts, there is a sense in 
which we are engaged in meta-cognition here: we are thinking about 
Plato’s thinking about justice. So to call justice a meta-virtue is to suggest 
that it is a virtue about the other virtues. Even so, there is a sense in which 
thinking of justice as a meta-virtue can be misleading. Cognition comes 
before meta-cognition: there is no thinking about thinking unless there 
is first some thinking to think about! But on Socrates’ view, justice comes 
before the other virtues: it is the condition of their possibility, ‘the power 
that makes it possible for them to grow in the city and that preserves 
them when they have grown for as long as it remains there itself’ 
(4.433b). It is worth emphasizing the word ‘power’ in this description 
(the Greek word is δύναμις (dunamis), from which the English word 
‘dynamic’ derives). Justice is a power that enables agreement about who 
should rule; it is what makes it possible for there to be an agreement 
in the first place. Justice so conceived is not merely everyone’s doing 
his own work, but is rather ‘the power that consists in everyone’s doing 
his own work’ (4.433d [emphasis added]). Similarly, courage is not 
merely the correct belief about what is appropriately feared, but is ‘the 
power to preserve through everything [the] belief about what things are 
to be feared’ (4.429c). Earlier, I emphasized the belief at the center of 
courage, to draw a contrast with the knowledge that constitutes wisdom. 
Indeed, that is what enabled the imaginary interlocutor above to drive 
a wedge between belief and action. Reminding ourselves that courage is 
not merely a belief, but rather the power to preserve that belief through 
thick and thin, closes that gap. 
Socrates’ idea that justice is what makes the other virtues possible 
certainly makes sense for moderation, especially if we remember that 
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the shared agreement about who should rule is a symptom of a well-
governed city, and not, as we moderns tend to think, the ultimate 
condition of the government’s legitimacy. It seems initially to make less 
sense for courage and wisdom, since they are particular rather than 
holistic virtues (virtues distinctive of particular classes rather than of 
the city as a whole). Would would-be rulers and auxiliaries still possess 
their distinctive virtues even if justice did not prevail in the city? Those 
capable of ruling would still know what is best for the city as a whole 
even if they are not in fact ruling, and the same would seem to go for 
would-be auxiliaries. Indeed, just these sorts of situations arise as the 
ideal city begins to disintegrate, as described by Socrates in Books 
VIII and IX. Perhaps. But the time and attention Socrates has devoted 
to education in the ideal city suggests that while wisdom and courage 
can be defined and understood independently of justice, they cannot 
be manifested or made real in its absence. Much of the program of 
education Socrates spells out in Books II and III is devoted to educating 
the auxiliaries. He will return to education in Book VII, but there his 
focus will be on educating the guardians, sketching out a program 
that will ultimately enable them to grasp the nature of goodness itself, 
which they will need if they are to know what is best for the city as a 
whole and not merely have correct beliefs about this. So even if we can 
understand what courage and wisdom are independently of justice, we 
can imagine Socrates saying, those virtues will never come to be without 
the rigorous educational program of Books II, III, and VII, which is why 
it is so crucial for the guardians to defend it and resist all attempts to 
change it even slightly. In Book III Socrates indicates that the guardians’ 
most important task is to prevent the mixing of the metals described 
in the Noble Falsehood: ‘there is nothing that they must guard better 
or watch more carefully than the mixture of metals in the souls of the 
next generation’ (3.415b). What he says in Book IV initially seems to 
conflict with this, since there he suggests that their most important 
task is to ‘guard the one great thing […] education and upbringing […] 
[that] those in charge must cling to education […] guarding it against 
everything’ (4.423d–24b). It seems that these distinct tasks cannot be the 
one most important task. But indeed, they really are one and the same 
task, since the only way to prevent the mixing of the metals is to preserve 
the educational system. Indeed, as we will see when Socrates describes 
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the disintegration of the ideal city in Books VIII and IX, the decay begins 
when ‘they have less consideration for music and poetry than they 
ought [… and] then they will neglect physical training’ (8.546d). These 
changes to education are quickly followed by ‘[t]he intermixing of iron 
with silver and bronze with gold’ (8.546e). 
So while justice is conceptually distinct from the other cardinal virtues, 
they depend upon it for their coming into being in the city. Justice and 
the other virtues, while conceptually distinct, are not really or existentially 
distinct: justice is the condition of their coming into existence. Thus it is a 
tad misleading to call it a ‘meta-virtue’, since it is about the other virtues 
in a distinct way: it is the condition of their reality. It is their basis—their 
ἀρχή (archê) or foundation. 
Some Suggestions for Further Reading
Readers interested in Plato’s other Socratic dialogues on the virtues will 
want to read the Euthyphro (on piety), the Charmides (on temperance), 
and the Laches (on courage), all of which are available both online and 
in print form. Excellent translations of all of Plato’s dialogues and letters 
can be found in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John Cooper (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1997). 
Readers interested in the ethics of virtue generally and the question of 
the cardinal virtues in particular might start with Rosalind Hursthouse 
and Glenn Pettigrove’s excellent overview in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.
Readers interested in role ethics will find a good overview in John 
Ramsey, ‘Confucian Role Ethics: A Critical Survey’, Philosophy Compass, 
11 (2016), 235–45, https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12324.
Readers interested in the expressive function of law might start with 
Cass Sunstein, ‘Law’s Expressive Function’, The Good Society, 9 (1999), 
55–61.
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6. The Republic’s First Question 
Answered at Last:  
Personal Justice,  
Book IV
Whatever worries or quibbles we might have about Socrates’ definition 
of political justice, Glaucon finds it satisfactory: ‘I agree. Justice is that 
and nothing else’ (4.434d). A reminder about methodology might be 
in order here. Back in Book I, Socrates opted for question-and-answer 
over speechifying as the preferred method for investigating the nature 
of justice. Crucial to this method is ‘seeking agreement with each other’ 
(1.348b), arriving at a conclusion from shared premises, and then in 
turn treating that conclusion as a premise from which to derive new 
conclusions. Sometimes Glaucon and others seem too ready to agree 
with Socrates, and they often fail to critically scrutinize his claims, but 
an important feature of Socrates’ method is its cooperative, agreement-
securing nature. (This is perhaps surprising in light of cinematic and 
televisual depictions of ‘the Socratic method’ as a matter of antagonistic 
intellectual combat between a knowing professor and a terrified first-
year law student.) So before putting the definition of political justice to 
work in order to understand personal justice, Socrates wants to be sure 
that Glaucon accepts the conclusion of their investigation into the nature 
of political justice. Given the focus on theoretical city-building, it is easy 
to forget that the political theorizing is not an end in itself but rather a 
means to grasping what justice is for the individual. Now Socrates must 
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make good on the promissory note he wrote in Book II and justify the 
assumption that city and soul are sufficiently analogous so that what is 
true of the former is also true of the latter. 
Platonic Psychology: The Divided Soul (4.434d–441c)
If Socrates is to ‘apply what has come to light in the city to an individual’ 
(4.434e), he first needs to show that city and soul have the same 
structure. He has been proceeding on the assumption that they do, and 
now it is time to make good on the big if he has been operating with: ‘if 
an individual has these same three parts in his soul’ (4.435b). In a few 
pages, he thinks he has done the job, noting ‘we are pretty much agreed 
that the same number and the same kinds of classes as are in the city 
are also in the soul of each individual’ (4.441c). How does he get there?
Earlier, when discussing personal, Socrates suggested that the 
commonsense idea of self-control was puzzling, for it seems ‘ridiculous’ 
(4.430e) that something could control itself. But he makes sense of this 
intuitive account of moderation by positing that the soul has parts. In 
a moderate person’s soul, a better, rational part is in charge, governing 
by ‘calculation in accordance with understanding and correct belief’ 
(4.431c) the worse part, which contains ‘all kinds of diverse desires, 
pleasures, and pains’ (4.431c). He now makes explicit the principle by 
which he arrived at this distinction, which I will call the Opposition 
Principle: ‘the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites 
in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. 
So, if we ever find this happening in the soul, we will know that we are 
not dealing with one thing but many’ (4.436b).
To get a sense of the Opposition Principle, suppose you have one 
hand in a bucket of hot water and the other in a bucket of cold water. 
It seems that you are both hot and cold—but how could that be, since 
hot and cold are opposites? The Opposition Principle tells us you must 
have parts, which indeed you (obviously) do: one of your parts is hot 
while the other is cold. Another example: if I am standing in one spot, 
but nodding my head, am I moving or not? The answer seems to be 
both yes and no: I am not changing my location, so in that sense I am 
not moving, but in another sense, I am moving, since I am moving my 
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head. The Opposition Principle tells us that I must have parts, since I can 
simultaneously undergo or instantiate incompatible opposites. 
Most of us have had the experience of wanting to do something but 
not doing it, even when we are able. I am really hungry and there is a 
piece of pizza right in front of me, but I do not eat it—perhaps because 
I see that it is your pizza, not mine, and I think that I should not take 
what is not mine. I am really jonesing for a cigarette, yet I do not light 
up—not because there are no cigarettes available, but because I am 
trying to quit. Whatever the details, the question is essentially the same: 
what explains my having a desire or appetite that I am able to fulfill 
but do not? It might be that I have another desire and that both of these 
desires cannot be satisfied at the same time. If I am really, really hungry 
and really, really, really tired, whichever one is stronger—whichever has 
more ‘really’s—will probably determine what I do. A conflict of desires 
shows that I have many desires, but not that my soul is divided. But 
the kinds of cases Socrates discusses are not like that: they are cases 
in which I choose not to act on my desire because I have a reason not to 
do so. In these sorts of cases the Opposition Principle tells me that my 
soul must have at least two parts, one appetitive and one rational. But 
Socrates soon comes to see that there must be a third part, as well:
Do we do these things with the same part of ourselves, or do we do them 
with three different parts? Do we learn with one part, get angry with 
another and with some third part desire the pleasure of food, drink, sex, 
and the others that are closely akin to them? Or, when we set out after 
something, do we act with the whole of our soul, in each case? (4.436a)
Now he suggests there is a third part, spirit, in addition to reason and 
appetite. In contrast to the rational part, which is ‘the part of the soul 
with which it calculates’ (4.439d), and the irrational appetitive part, 
which is ‘the part with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited 
by other appetites’ (4.439d), there is also ‘the spirited part[,] by which we 
get angry’ (4.439e)—both at others, when we have been treated unjustly, 
and also at ourselves, when we have acted unjustly. To illustrate this, 
Socrates offers the rather disturbing example of Leontius’ necrophilia:
He had an appetite to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted 
and turned away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his 
face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide 
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open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, ‘Look for yourselves, you 
evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!’ (4.439e)
Leontius’ spirited element ‘makes war against the appetites’ (4.440a) but 
ultimately loses, giving in to a desire that Leontius himself is disgusted 
by—which results in his self-directed anger. 
Let us pause for a moment and consider the role disgust plays in 
the Republic. Socrates has praised the person ‘of godlike character who 
is disgusted by injustice’ (2.366c), in contrast to the unjust person who 
‘has no scruples about [—i.e., is not disgusted by] doing injustice’ 
(2.362b). The would-be guardians are being educated to ‘disdain to act’ 
(3.388a)—to be disgusted to act—as Thrasymachus would. We have 
already remarked upon the moral point of their aesthetic education, the 
point of which is to acquire ‘the right distastes’ (3.401e). It is the same 
Greek word in all these passages, δυσχεραίνω (duschertainô): to be unable 
to endure, to be disgusted with. Disgust at rotting meat seems to be a 
universal human reaction, one we come to naturally, without learning. 
But moral disgust is a product of education and upbringing. Someone 
raised on the Thrasymachus plan will fail to be appropriately disgusted 
at wrongdoing and other modes of moral ugliness. And unlike its 
physiological counterpart, moral disgust is conceptual. It is not the 
thought of rotting meat that disgusts us, it is the smell of the rotting meat 
itself (although physical revulsion may well arise if I imagine rotting 
meat robustly enough). I should be morally disgusted at witnessing an 
outrageous act of injustice, but—if I have been properly raised—I should 
also feel moral disgust at the thought of injustice and be angry about it.
Leontius was disgusted both by the corpses and by his attraction to 
them, which suggests that his problem is not that he ‘lacks the right 
distastes’ (3.401a). His problem, rather, is that his soul is not properly 
aligned: his spirited part is not strong enough to overcome his appetites 
and thus it sides with them rather than with reason. A conflict between 
reason and desire, between what we think we ought to do and what we 
want to do, is a common feature of the human condition. On Plato’s 
psychology—literally, his logos of the psychê—the conflict requires a 
third party for its resolution: spirit, which sides with reason in a well-
ordered soul, and with appetite in a poorly ordered one. Spirit is ‘by 
nature the helper of the rational part’, Socrates says, but to call the 
arrangement natural is not to say that it will occur all by itself, without 
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outside help, but rather that this is what spirit’s function is. Spirit will 
perform its natural function ‘provided that it has not been corrupted by 
a bad upbringing’ (4.441a).
It is telling that spirit is defined as the part of the soul ‘we get 
angry with’, for anger of a particularly moral type—resentment or 
indignation—can be the appropriate emotional response to injustice 
suffered or witnessed, respectively, just as shame, a kind of moral self-
disgust, is the proper emotional response to having acted unjustly. Spirit, 
like reason but unlike appetite, is evaluative, but its evaluative scope 
is narrower than reason’s. Spirit seeks to protect its distinctive good, 
honor, and views the actions of oneself and others through this lens. 
Many philosophers agree with Jeffrie Murphy’s view that wrongdoing 
can communicate the demeaning message that it is permissible for the 
wrongdoer to treat the victim as they do, and that the victim’s anger, 
which often involves a desire to retaliate, can be seen as a way of denying 
the wrongdoer’s demeaning message.1 While spirit is able to see what is 
good and bad for it and to defend its own turf, it is not able to see what 
is good all things considered—that is reason’s task. When one has been 
wronged, the spirited part of the soul typically burns with anger and a 
desire for revenge, to negate the demeaning message the wrongdoing 
seems to encode. ‘It would be good to harm him in return!’ it seems to 
say. But spirit is ‘the part that is angry without calculation’ (4.441c). 
Where spirit is passionate and hot, reason is detached and cool, seeking 
‘what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul’ (4.442c) 
rather than for any particular part. Reason might offer an alternative 
interpretation of the event that has angered passion, suggesting 
perhaps that the wrongdoer did not mean it that way or that it was an 
accident, etc., and thus that spirit’s anger is unjustified, so retaliation is 
inappropriate in this case. Or reason might reject retaliation altogether 
since ‘it is never just to harm anyone’ (1.335e), as Socrates argued in 
Book I. 
The upshot of all this is that spirit is distinct from appetite and reason, 
though it shares affinities with each. In a well-ordered soul, spirit can be 
‘called to heel by the reason within […] like a dog by a shepherd’ (4.440d). 
Of course, this order must be cultivated from an early age, by the proper 
1 Jeffrie Murphy, ‘Forgiveness and Resentment’, in Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton, 
Forgiveness and Mercy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 25.
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balance of musical and physical training. Overdoing physical training 
results in someone who is under-responsive to the demands of reason 
and who, like a rogue soldier, is unable or unwilling to obey orders. 
Underdoing physical education results in someone unable to subdue the 
appetites and passions. Readers familiar with Freud’s psychology will see 
an intriguing parallel between the roles reason, appetite, and spirit play 
in Plato’s psychology and the roles ego, id, and super-ego play in Freud’s. 
The Personal Virtues (4.441c–444e)
Having secured agreement that the soul has the same three-part structure 
as the ideal city, Socrates has justified to his companions’ satisfaction the 
dangling if at the heart of their method of investigating personal justice. 
If the assumption that city and soul are isomorphic—that they have the 
same three-part structure—were false, then we would have no reason to 
think that anything we have discovered about the nature of the political 
virtues tells us anything about the nature of the personal virtues. But 
having justified the hypothesis that underlies their method—at least to 
the satisfaction of Glaucon and Adeimantus—they can now ‘apply what 
has come to light in the city to an individual’ (4.434e). 
Socrates makes quick work of the first three personal virtues, each of 
which is parallel to the corresponding political virtue. Just as political 
courage involves preserving law-inculcated beliefs about what are 
appropriate objects of fear, personal courage is not the preservation of 
innate or natural or accidentally acquired beliefs about what is to be 
feared but rather ‘the declarations of reason about what is to be feared 
and what is not’ (4.442c). In a well-ordered soul, the rational part is the 
part making these declarations, since it is the part capable of ‘knowledge 
of what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul’ (4.447c), 
which is wisdom. As with political wisdom, personal wisdom requires 
the capacity to see the big picture. 
We encounter a problem when we try to map political moderation 
onto the individual soul. Like political moderation, personal moderation 
involves harmony—the Greek word is συμφωνία (sumphônia), whence the 
English word ‘symphony’—between the rational and appetitive parts of 
the soul. With political moderation, this agreement is not merely practical, 
as when we say things like, ‘cabin life really agrees with him’, or when 
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subject and verb agree in a grammatically coherent sentence. It is also 
cognitive: ‘the ruler and the ruled believe in common that the rational part 
should rule’ (4.442c). But in the soul, the irrational appetites are parties 
to the agreement, and it is hard to see how mere appetites like hunger 
and thirst can agree with anything in the cognitive sense. One implication 
of the otherwise puzzling claim that ‘each appetite itself is only for its 
natural object’ (4.437e) is that the appetites are non-cognitive, non-
evaluative drives incapable of belief, judgment, and agreement. There is 
no corresponding head-scratching about the craftspeople agreeing with 
the guardians that the latter should govern the polis, since the craftspeople 
are people and thus capable of agreeing and disagreeing with claims or 
propositions. Personifying the parts of the soul helps us to make sense 
of Socrates’ account of moderation as a personal virtue, but in addition 
to the weirdness of thinking of appetites as being like persons, capable of 
forming beliefs and of making agreements, personifying the parts of the 
soul puts us on the road to an infinite regress: a person’s soul comprises 
three parts, each of which is itself a miniature person or is like one; but 
then each of these miniature sub-persons would comprise even more 
miniature sub-sub-persons, and on and on. Like the poet Walt Whitman, 
we contain multitudes, apparently.
Perhaps Socrates’ talk of agreement between the rational and 
irrational parts should be taken metaphorically. Socrates regularly 
appeals to metaphors in the Republic, such as the famous Allegory of 
the Cave and the less famous (but no less important) metaphors of the 
Sun and the Divided Line, which we will soon be exploring. But while 
thinking of personification metaphorically staves off the looming infinite 
regress, it leaves unexplained just how the irrational and rational parts 
come to an agreement. Are we letting Socrates off the hook too easily if 
we accept his metaphorical explanation? 
Albert Camus raised a parallel worry about metaphorically 
explaining the atom by appealing to the solar system: 
You tell me of an invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate 
around a nucleus. You explain this world to me with an image. I realize 
that you have been reduced to poetry […] So that science that was to 
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teach me everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in 
metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art.2
Though I understand his complaint, it seems that Camus fails to 
appreciate the cognitive power of metaphor, which is odd, given the 
centrality of the metaphor of Sisyphus to his account of the human 
condition. Are metaphorical explanations intrinsically problematic, as 
Camus seems to suggest? Metaphorical explanations are problematic 
when the metaphor that is offered to clarify the target concept is itself 
unclear or insufficiently understood. If the physics and nature of the solar 
system are well understood, why would appealing to the metaphor of 
the solar system be problematic? Perhaps Plato is here reminding us that 
we have agreed to forgo the ‘longer and fuller road’ that leads to ‘precise 
answer[s]’ (4.435c) in favor of a less demanding path that leads to a 
vantage point from which we see the same truths as we would from the 
more demanding path, but we see them less clearly and distinctly, from 
a distance. Walking the longer road of dialectic requires doing without 
hypotheses and metaphors, Socrates tells us later (6.511ae, 7.533c), but 
we will find them helpful while walking the less demanding trail we 
are on. 
Interestingly enough, Socrates does not exactly go in for 
personification of the soul’s parts in a metaphor he explicitly endorses 
later in the Republic. In the ‘image of the soul in words’ (9.588b) he offers 
in Book IX, the appetitive part is not a person but rather ‘a multicolored 
beast with a ring of many heads that it can grow and change at will’ 
(9.488c). While we might worry about the capacity of such a creature to 
form beliefs and agreements, remember that in distinguishing political 
courage from its natural analogue, which resembles but strictly speaking 
is not courage, Socrates notes that ‘animals and slaves’ can possess 
‘correct belief’ about what is appropriately feared, however such beliefs 
are ‘not the result of education [… nor] inculcated by law’ (4.430b) and 
thus they cannot possess courage proper but only its natural facsimile. 
While the hydra-headed beast representing the appetites can come to 
obey the commands issued by the rational part, as a dog can come to 
2  Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. by Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage 
International, 2018), p. 20. 
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obey its master’s commands, it is a stretch to think the beast or the dog 
agrees in the robust cognitive sense required.
So it seems there is a glitch in the city-soul analogy, but perhaps such 
glitches are to be expected on the less precise path we are treading, since 
an analogy need not be perfect for it to be correct and helpful. 
Personal Justice: Intrapersonal Being versus 
Interpersonal Doing (4.443c–444e)
Finally, we get Plato’s answer to the Republic’s first question. Just as a 
city is just when each class does its own work, a person is just when each 
part of the soul does its own work. A person who possesses a just soul 
will do their own work: bakers will bake, cobblers will cobble, auxiliaries 
will defend, guardians will rule, etc. But the essence of justice is the 
harmony of the soul’s parts, not the individual’s acting in certain ways. 
Socrates’ definition of justice is strikingly different from the 
definitions Polemarchus and Cephalus offered in Book I. To think of 
justice as telling the truth and paying one’s debts or to think of it as 
benefiting one’s friends and harming one’s enemies is to think of justice 
primarily in terms of how one acts toward others. While Socrates thinks 
that the just person will treat others in certain ways, he does not think 
of justice primarily in terms of action: ‘Justice […] is not concerned with 
someone doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with 
what is truly himself and his own’ (4.443c). So where Cephalus and 
Polemarchus, both spokesmen for the commonsense morality of the 
day, think of justice as a matter of what one does, Socrates thinks of it 
as primarily a matter of how one is, of what one is like, internally. The 
essence of justice is not to be found in external, interpersonal doing, but 
rather in internal, intrapersonal being. 
That is quite a shift—so much so that some philosophers think that 
Socrates has changed the subject and indeed has committed the fallacy of 
irrelevance.3 Although I understand the point of this objection, I cannot 
say that I find it compelling. Socrates has not really changed the subject 
3  David Sachs, ‘A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic’, Philosophical Review, 72 (1963), 141–58. 
The first of many responses is Raphael Demos, ‘A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic?’, 
Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), 395–98.
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so much as deepened it. Polemarchus is thinking of justice in terms 
of action, but Socrates argues that it is something more fundamental 
than that, that Polemarchus’ thinking is literally too superficial: it is 
looking at the surface manifestations of justice without understanding 
its underlying essence, just as someone who thinks of water in terms 
of clarity and wetness is missing its molecular essence. It is not that 
Socrates is unconcerned with just actions, but rather than he thinks they 
are really merely expressions of the underlying virtue, to be explained 
in terms of inner character: ‘the action is just and fine that preserves this 
inner harmony and helps achieve it’ (4.443e). 
As we noted earlier, Plato is offering what is nowadays called 
a virtue ethics, which takes the virtues to be morally fundamental. 
Consequentialist moral philosophers like John Stuart Mill think that 
good outcomes are morally basic, explaining right action and virtuous 
character in terms of those outcomes: an action is right if and only if it 
produces the best possible (or a sufficiently good) outcome, and a virtue 
is a reliable disposition to bring about good outcomes. Deontological 
moral philosophers such as Immanuel Kant deny that right action is to 
be explained in terms of good consequences, thinking that certain kinds 
of action are right in themselves; for deontologists like Kant, virtues are 
dispositions to do one’s duty. 
Although this is a bit of a simplification, moral theories can be 
distinguished by which family of moral concepts—virtues, outcomes, 
duties—they take to be explanatorily basic in the sense of explaining 
or defining the other moral concepts. Although deontology and 
consequentialism have dominated modern moral philosophizing in the 
English-speaking world for several centuries, virtue ethics has enjoyed 
a revival in recent decades. The basic idea, really, is that being a certain 
kind of person is morally more fundamental that doing certain kinds of 
actions. While the consequentialists and deontologists focus on actions—
although they differ strenuously in what explains why right actions are 
right—virtue ethicists focus on persons and their characters, thinking 
that someone in whom the virtues have been cultivated (by upbringing, 
education, and individual effort) can be trusted to figure out what 
action to perform in whatever circumstances they find themselves. 
So, for a virtue ethicist such as Plato, an action is just because it is the 
sort of action a just person would perform in the circumstances. Now, 
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merely doing what the just person does is not enough to make one just: 
there is a distinction between doing a just act and being just. If I am doing 
what the just person would do, then I am acting justly, but I might not 
yet possess the virtue of justice. Plato’s student Aristotle insisted that to 
act justly, I must do what the just person does; but to be just, to possess 
the virtue of justice, I must perform just acts as the just person performs 
them. I must be properly motivated, which requires at a minimum that I 
be motivated by what is fine or noble (what is kalon, that crucial concept 
we encountered in Books II and III) rather than by self-interest, and that, 
with a few exceptions we enjoy or at least are not internally resistant to 
performing the action. 
Socrates puts his definition to the test by asking Glaucon what kind 
of acts the just person, as they have defined her or him, will and will not 
perform. Socrates is asking Glaucon whether the proposed definition 
of personal justice squares with commonsense. If the just person, as 
conceived of by Socrates, would rob temples, steal, betray friends, or 
break contracts (4.443a)—a list of unjust actions which Thrasymachus 
earlier specified as parts of injustice (1.344a) and which will be noted later 
as typical of people with tyrannical souls (9.575b)—then the definition 
must be rejected, just as Cephalus’ and Polemarchus’ definitions were 
rejected for having implications that they themselves could not accept. 
If Socrates’ definition implied that a just person would perform such 
actions, it would theoretically be open to Glaucon to still accept the 
definition and change his mind about the moral status of thievery, temple 
robbery, betrayal, etc. But that would sound the death-knell for Socrates’ 
moral theory and would be rhetorically disastrous. Glaucon agrees that 
the just person would not perform these kinds of actions, the kinds of 
actions we can expect of someone wearing Gyges’ ring, of someone who 
thinks they can ‘do injustice with impunity’ (2.360c). Socrates thinks 
his just person is incorruptible: they are ἀδαμάντινος (adamantinos) 
(1.360b): adamantine, made of steel, unshakably committed to justice 
and disgusted by injustice.
As Socrates has defined it, justice (which, we should remember, is 
best thought of as virtue generally) is a kind of inner, psychic health: 
‘Virtue seems, then, to be a kind of health, fine condition, and wellbeing 
of the soul’ (4.444d). This is unsurprising, given Socrates’ moral realism. 
There are facts about what health is and what contributes to it, and we 
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are likely to roll our eyes at someone who says, ‘Who’s to say that a diet 
of potato chips and ice cream is unhealthy?’ ‘Experts and indeed anyone 
who understands nutrition is to say’, we want to respond. As a kind of 
inner health and harmony, virtue is similarly susceptible to this same 
kind of realism. If Socrates is right, there turn out to be moral facts, just 
as there are dietary facts—and what those facts are is not up to us in 
any meaningful way. We may be unaware of these facts, but we discover 
them, we do not invent them.
There is an objection we should address before closing. The objection 
turns on Socrates’ emphasis on inner harmony in his account of justice. 
For example, he says that the just person ‘harmonizes the three parts 
of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high, low, 
and middle’ (4.443d), that ‘he becomes entirely one, moderate and 
harmonious’ (4.443e); moreover, ‘the action is just […] that preserves 
this inner harmony and helps achieve it’ (4.443e). The objection is that 
inner harmony is compatible with injustice. Consider a harmonious 
psychopath in whom reason, with the aid of spirit, rules the appetites. 
The psychopath does not really want to kill and eat other human beings, 
but believes that reason commands him to do so. So, the objection goes, 
if a harmonious soul is a just soul, it follows that a Socratically just 
person could do these awful things. But clearly a just person would not 
murder and cannibalize (let alone rob temples and break promises), so 
Socrates’ account must be rejected. 
Given what he says in Book IX, we can imagine that Socrates might 
respond by insisting that our harmonious psychopath has a tyrannical 
soul, which is highly disordered and unharmonious—that our 
imagined counter-example is not really conceivable. But this seems to 
simply beg the question, to assume the truth of the very thing Socrates 
is supposed to be arguing for. A better response would be to point 
out that while harmony is a necessary condition of a soul’s being just 
(that is, a soul cannot be just without also being harmonious), it is not 
by itself sufficient (that is, it is false that any soul that is harmonious 
is thereby just). It is not that a harmonious soul is a just soul, as the 
objection assumes, but rather that a just soul is a harmonious soul. It 
is not enough that the rational part governs, Socrates should reply; it 
must get things right: wisdom is a kind of knowledge and knowledge 
requires truth—we can only know what is true, and it is not true that 
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murder and cannibalism are morally permissible, other things being 
equal. We can probably imagine circumstances in which they might 
be, but the remorseless, harmonious psychopath we have imagined is 
not in such a situation. 
It should not be surprising that Socrates’ response presupposes 
moral realism. He thinks that moral knowledge, which presupposes 
moral truth, is possible. Such knowledge is rare and limited to 
philosopher-queens and -kings, but it is possible. Readers who are 
more skeptical will take this as a point of weakness—not because 
they themselves reject moral realism (though some surely will) but 
rather because Socrates’ response presupposes moral realism without 
ever arguing for it. Even if we share his belief that there are genuine 
moral truths, we might find ourselves in a situation analogous to the 
situation Glaucon and Adeimantus found themselves in in Book II, 
agreeing with Socrates but seeing that our belief in moral realism is 
not justified. Of course, that does not make it false, but it leaves us in 
an epistemically perilous state. Socrates, we should remember, does 
not claim to know that moral realism is true; he is working with what 
his interlocutors believe, so his assuming the truth of moral realism is 
not problematic from within the framework of the Republic. But from 
outside that framework, as critical readers and thinkers, we should 
find it problematic, if we agree with him but can offer no arguments 
that would justify that agreement.
Many readers will find this account of justice intuitively appealing, 
especially as it places reason at the center—or, perhaps better, at the 
helm—of a well-lived life. Socrates will discuss the varieties of unjust 
souls in Books VIII and IX, but it will be helpful to trace one out here, if 
only briefly, in order to give us a richer sense of this account of justice. A 
clear, illustrative contrast is with a soul (and city) he deems oligarchic, 
one which takes amassing wealth to be life’s ultimate purpose. While 
the just person loves virtue, the oligarch loves wealth. As Socrates 
describes the oligarch, they are still more or less conventionally decent, 
though they are likely to cheat a bit if they can do so with impunity. 
In terms of their soul’s structure, the most distinctive contrast is that 
while reason governs the just person’s soul, appetite—in particular the 
desire for money—governs the money-loving oligarch’s. For Plato, in 
a well-ordered and thus just soul, reason determines which ends and 
126 Plato’s ‘Republic’: An Introduction
goals one ought to pursue. This is its task, a task that requires the 
personal virtue of wisdom in order to be done well. But the oligarchic 
money-lover has appetite setting their ends: ‘He makes the rational 
and spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite, one on either 
side, reducing them to slaves’ (8.553c). In contemporary philosophical 
lingo, the money-lover reduces reason to the purely instrumental role 
of determining the best means to achieve the ends set by appetite. It 
is not that figuring out the most effective means to a given end is not 
a task for reason; it surely is. But that is not all reason is good for, 
and indeed, important as such reasoning is, it is decidedly secondary 
in importance, in Plato’s view, to determining what is good in itself, 
what is worth pursuing as an end. The problem, Plato thinks, is that 
reason has only this instrumental role in the money-lover’s soul and 
that in determining what ends and goals to pursue, appetite is taking 
over a task that does not properly belong to it. Appetite is meddling 
and not doing its own work, as the Specialization Principle and justice 
require. Reason, not appetite, is supposed to determine which things 
are good, so a soul in which appetite is doing reason’s work is unjust. 
If we are reluctant to label as unjust souls whose possessors adhere 
to conventional morality despite being governed by appetite rather 
than reason—the example of Cephalus immediately comes to mind—
we can at least regard them as non-just, reserving ‘unjust’ for more 
obviously bad folk. 
Though many of us are no doubt inclined to agree with Plato about 
the centrality of reason to a well-lived life, we would do well to remember 
that great eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume 
disagrees strenuously with Plato about the role reason should (and 
indeed can) play in a well-lived life. Hume famously says, ‘Reason is and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions’,4 but Hume is emphatically not 
suggesting that we should give ourselves over to a passion for money; 
instead, he is making a point about human psychology that plays up the 
affective, emotional side of our nature and downplays the rational. We 
regularly mistake the ‘calm passions’—such as benevolence, kindness to 
children, and the general appetite for good—for reason, since they lack 
the force of ‘violent passions’ such as anger and romantic love. We will 
4  Hume, Treatise, p. 415 (II.iii.3).
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not settle Hume’s disagreement with Plato here, but I raise it to remind 
readers that, despite the prominence of reason in the history of Western 
philosophy, the issue is, like most fundamental philosophical issues, not 
settled. 
Hopefully this brief foray into the oligarchic soul helps to illustrate 
Plato’s definition of justice. 
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7. Questions about the Ideal Polis:  
The Three Waves,  
Book V
Having answered the Republic’s first question, Plato has Socrates 
immediately start in on its second: ‘whether it is more profitable to 
act justly, live in a fine way, and be just, whether one is known to be 
so or not’ (4.445a). Since his method is to work with claims that his 
interlocutors believe, we might have expected Socrates to pause and 
ask if anyone has any questions about the definition of justice they 
have arrived at, but instead he immediately starts in on the Republic’s 
second question on the final page of Book IV. But as Book V begins, 
Polemarchus, who has been silent since Book I, jumps back into the 
fray, piping up with some questions which will lead to a ‘digression’ 
(8.543c), as Socrates later puts it, that comprises Books V, VI, and VII, 
taking up about one hundred pages of the Greek text. 
Literary Artistry as a Way of Doing Philosophy 
(5.449b–d)
The opening of Book V is subtly but strikingly similar to the opening 
of Book I, and it is worth pausing to consider Plato’s literary way of 
making a philosophical point. Book I, readers will remember, begins 
with Socrates and Glaucon returning to Athens proper from its port, 
the Piraeus. Polemarchus’ unnamed slave bids them to wait for his 
master, after the slave ‘caught hold of [Socrates’] cloak’ (1.327b). In 
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the banter that follows, Socrates playfully asks if Polemarchus will let 
them go (1.327c). It is striking and clearly no accident that this scene 
is more or less repeated with the same vocabulary at the beginning of 
Book V: Polemarchus ‘took hold of [Adeimantus’] cloak’ asking, ‘Shall 
we let it go?’. When Adeimantus replies in the negative, Socrates asks, 
‘What is it that you will not let go?’, to which Adeimantus replies, ‘You’ 
(5.449b). What is Plato up to here? Why does he reprise the beginning 
of Book I here at the outset of Book V, with the same vocabulary? 
Although it may be just pleasing literary symmetry enjoyable for its 
own sake, I suspect there is more to it than that. I think that Plato 
is using literary form to make a substantive point about the nature 
of philosophy: philosophy is always starting over, always examining 
its foundations. Though we have travelled quite a distance from the 
opening scene, the conclusions it ultimately led to, especially the 
account of justice as each part of the soul doing its own work, need 
to be scrutinized. Doing so is important given the method Socrates 
and company have adopted, which relies on shared agreement about 
premises to derive conclusions. Plato might have made this point 
more directly, but making the point so subtly as almost certainly to 
be missed the first time around seems not just a more elegant but a 
more effective way of making the point that doing philosophy well 
invariably involves examining one’s conclusions and starting points. 
It is more effective, I think, since he lets his readers make this point 
for themselves, by prompting us to ask why he rhymes the beginnings 
of Books I and V. And indeed the conclusion I have drawn, that he 
is making a point about the nature of philosophy, is one that should 
itself be revisited, as there may be more going on than that—or he 
might be making a different point altogether. We will not pursue it 
any further, but I hope at least that this discussion helps readers to 
appreciate not just the literary quality of the Republic but also the 
way in which Plato seamlessly joins literary form and philosophical 
content. It is one of the reasons that the Republic is a treasure that 
bears repeated re-reading.
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The Three Waves (5.450a–451c)
Adeimantus and Polemarchus are prompted by the implications 
of a nugget of commonsense Greek wisdom that Socrates utters in 
Book IV after giving the rulers of the ideal city their charge to guard 
above everything else the program of education and upbringing they 
worked out in Books II and III: ‘all the other things we are omitting, 
for example, that marriage, the having of wives and the procreation of 
children must be governed as far as possible by the old proverb: Friends 
possess everything in common’ (4.424a). While Socrates wants to avoid 
exploring such details, Adeimantus and Polemarchus insist that he do 
so. It is not that they disagree with the proverb Socrates has appealed 
to, but rather that it ‘requires an explanation (λόγος [logos])’ (5.449c): 
they want its implications explained and justified, since they run so 
contrary to Athenian social arrangements and customs. When even 
Thrasymachus agrees, Socrates has little choice but to accede to their 
wishes, even though he would prefer to avoid this ‘swarm of arguments’ 
his friends have stirred up. As at the beginning of Book II, Glaucon and 
Adeimantus agree with Socrates, but they are sufficiently self-aware to 
see that their belief is unjustified; hence their insistence that Socrates 
provide an explanation—a logos. 
The social arrangements proposed or implied in the design of the 
ideal city will be scrutinized by two questions: ‘Is it possible?’ and ‘Is it 
optimal?’ The kind of possibility in question here is not logical possibility 
but rather something more along the lines of practicality: could this 
arrangement be realized in an actual city? If the answer is ‘yes’, they 
turn to the second question, which asks whether this arrangement 
would be optimal or at least beneficial. In a nutshell, the questions can 
be collapsed into one: Could we really live this way, and if so, should 
we—would it be good for us if we did? 
In one of his not infrequent confessions of pessimism or trepidation, 
Socrates is leery of the line of inquiry Adeimantus and company are 
insisting on, since mistakes about what is the best way for humans to 
live—and here it is good to remember that their discussion ‘concerns no 
ordinary topic but the way we ought to live’ (1.352d)—can be disastrous. 
A mistake here will likely lead to a true falsehood, the very worst thing to 
believe. But Socrates fares forward, facing each of the Three Waves. The 
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metaphor of the wave is a powerful one for the residents of a sea-faring 
polis, especially as the discussion that constitutes the Republic takes place 
in the Piraeus, the port of Athens. The waves come in order of increasing 
severity: the first concerns whether women can be guardians; the second 
concerns the abolition or de-privatization of the traditional family; the 
third concerns the ideal city itself. We will look at the first two in this 
chapter and explore the third in the next, since Socrates takes the end of 
Book V and the whole of Books VI and VII to address it. 
The First Wave: Can Women Be Guardians? 
(5.451c–457c)
Since friends have all things in common and the citizens of the ideal polis 
are friends—bringing about this friendship should be one of the fruits of 
the Noble Falsehood—the citizens will share the same upbringing and 
education, as well as the same jobs. There is no reason, Socrates thinks, 
why being female is by itself a disqualifier. Like the people listening 
to Socrates, many readers will be surprised by this, though probably 
for different reasons. Indeed, Glaucon and company find the very idea 
‘ridiculous’, a complaint one encounters at least half a dozen times in one 
page of the Greek text (5.452). Physical education is an important part 
of the would-be guardians’ education, and by Athenian custom much of 
this, especially wrestling, occurs when the participants are naked. Thus 
they find it difficult to take Socrates’ proposal seriously.
As is often the case in the Republic, in addition to the issue immediately 
at hand—here, whether women can participate in the education required 
of would-be guardians—there are deeper issues which transcend the 
boundaries of the Republic and which should be of interest even to those 
who regard the ideal polis as decidedly dystopic. One, of course, is the 
status of women; another is the status of societal norms. As Socrates 
diagnoses Glaucon’s reasoning, the idea of women wrestling naked 
is ridiculous because ‘it is contrary to custom (παρὰ τὸ ἔθος [para to 
ethos])’ (5.452a). But why, Socrates asks, adhere to local custom? After 
all, at one point it was contrary to custom for men to wrestle naked, and 
that probably incited ridicule then, too. Since customs can change over 
time, perhaps we will give up the custom barring women from wrestling 
naked, too. 
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But Socrates has a deeper point to make than that, one that challenges 
the normative force of cultural customs, and one that should not surprise 
us, given his commitment to philosophical reflection. A cultural relativist 
holds that an action is right (and, alternatively, wrong) if and only if 
one’s culture approves (or, alternatively, disapproves) of it. That is all 
there is to rightness and wrongness; there is no culture-transcending 
standard by which to assess the norms of one’s own culture or those 
of another. One problematic consequence of cultural relativism—and 
remember that one way to test a claim is to consider its implications—
is that it makes the idea of moral progress nonsensical. Sure, we now 
disapprove of slavery and thus regard it as wrong, but that is not an 
improvement on the earlier standard; it is just a different standard. And 
what goes for one culture viewed over time goes for different cultures 
viewed at the same time: your culture holds that women should not 
vote, mine holds that they should. One is not better than another, on 
the relativist’s view: they are different, not better or worse—because to 
hold that anti-slavery or pro-female suffrage norms are better than their 
opposites requires a higher, culture-transcending standard by which to 
assess those cultural standards, and these are the very things denied by 
the cultural relativist. The argument pattern here should be familiar: 
A implies B, and B is false—or, at least, the person we are talking with 
regards it as false—so A must also be false. Consider this argument:
P1 If (A) cultural relativism is true then (B) the idea of moral 
progress is incoherent.
P2 (not-B) The idea of moral progress is not incoherent.
C Therefore, (not-A) cultural relativism is not true.
The argument is logically valid, so a die-hard relativist wishing 
to deny its conclusion must either reject P1, holding that cultural 
relativism does not imply that moral progress is incoherent, or reject 
P2, conceding that the idea of moral progress is not coherent, after 
all. These are both tall orders, for relativism, holding that what one’s 
culture approves of is right, implies that there is no standard by which 
to judge one culture’s standards to be better than another culture’s—
and there is no standard by which to assess my culture’s former 
standards and its current standards. No standard is better; they are just 
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different. Since progress means change for the better, it is difficult to 
see how a cultural relativist could regard moral progress as coherent, 
given their insistence that there are no standards by which to assess a 
culture’s standards. 
Socrates does not make the moral progress argument, but it is 
presumably something he would endorse, since he rejects the cultural 
relativism that takes one’s culture’s standards as sound just because 
they are one’s culture’s standards. ‘It is foolish’, he thinks, turning 
Glaucon’s objection back on him by employing the same word (γέλοιος 
[geloios]), ‘to think that anything besides the bad is ridiculous […] and 
it is foolish to take seriously any standard of what is fine and beautiful 
other than the good’ (5.452de). Socrates is not a nihilist or anarchist; 
he is not opposed to cultural norms and standards per se—it would be 
odd if he were, given the amount of time he has so far devoted in the 
Republic to an educational program designed to cultivate the right ones. 
What he is opposed to is uncritical acceptance of one’s culture’s norms, 
to regarding them as correct or beyond question merely because they 
are the norms of one’s culture. That fact that one’s culture approves of x 
and y and disapproves of z is one thing; whether one’s culture ought to 
do so is a different matter entirely. The subsequent books in the Republic 
will reveal something of what Socrates takes the good to be, but even 
if we find ourselves disagreeing down the road with his particular 
version of moral realism, we can agree with him about the role that 
critical reflection and reasoned argument ought to play in determining 
which norms a culture ought to possess. ‘What was ridiculous to the 
eyes’, Socrates says, ‘faded away in the face of what argument showed 
to be the best’ (5.452d). Women wrestling naked seems ridiculous to 
Glaucon and his friends, but until one has scrutinized one’s culture’s 
standards, it is not clear that it really is ridiculous. 
Socrates’ critique of Glaucon’s appeal to what seems ridiculous 
echoes his earlier remarks on disgust and cultivating the right distastes. 
Finding something ridiculous differs from finding it disgusting: 
laughing at something is a much weaker form of disapproval than 
being nauseated by it. But they are both modes of disapproval, ways 
of registering that something is improper. These modes of disapproval 
are typically not rational: we are raised to find certain things ridiculous 
and certain things disgusting while we are ‘young and unable to grasp 
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the reason’ (3.401a). Socrates calls on reason to help determine whether 
what seems absurd or disgusting really is absurd or disgusting, and if 
so, why. If we cannot justify our tastes and distastes, perhaps we ought 
to give them up. In his ideal polis, no one needs to give up the norms 
they have absorbed from their culture, because the educational system 
is supposed to guarantee that the only norms and values available 
for absorption are correct. But those of us not raised in utopias will 
need to scrutinize our culture’s norms and values, since we cannot 
be sure those norms and values are correct. To my mind, the value 
of liberal education, and especially philosophical education, is to be 
found in their enabling us to better scrutinize and evaluate the norms, 
values, and beliefs we were raised to have, so that we are in a position 
to endorse some and reject others, thereby making our norms, beliefs, 
and values truly our own. Without critical scrutiny, these norms, 
values, and beliefs are not really our own, and we are not fully free: 
we might be free of interference, but we lack the freedom that comes 
from genuine, deep self-direction. (We will return to this distinction 
between negative and positive freedom below, in Chapter Twelve.)
Having made his general point about cultural norms, Socrates 
brings the argument back to the question of whether having women as 
guardians is possible. In a move that is a model of intellectual fairness, 
Socrates decides to ‘give the argument against ourselves’ (5.453a). That 
is, he articulates what he takes to be the best argument against the view 
he holds. It is worth pausing to admire this kind of intellectual fairness, 
especially as it seems in such short supply these days. How many of 
us, after all, are willing or able to give a fair hearing to political and 
moral arguments we disagree with, let alone give them a reasonable 
reconstruction? As we noted earlier, much political and moral debate 
traffics in the production and consumption of strawmen: we caricature 
the views of our opponents and then think we have refuted our 
opponents by knocking down these caricatures. A quick glance at the 
‘comments’ section of most online newspapers should provide ample 
evidence for the prevalence of strawmen.
The argument Socrates considers is a powerful one, since it appeals 
to the Specialization Principle, which structures the economic life in the 
ideal polis and indeed is the basis of the definition of justice, in arguing 
against the view that women can be guardians. The Specialization 
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Principle implies that ‘each must do his own work in accordance with 
his nature’ (5.453b). But of course, ‘the natures of men and women are 
different’ (5.453e), so how can Socrates hold that men and women may 
perform the same tasks? Socrates’ position is self-contradictory, argues 
the imagined opponent: he can’t endorse the Specialization Principle 
and hold that women can be guardians, since the former implies that the 
latter is false. 
It is a powerful argument, of just the sort that Socrates regularly 
gives against others. Although he acknowledges the argument’s 
rhetorical force, he finds it philosophically unsatisfying, since it is an 
example of eristic, which was discussed briefly in Chapter Two. The 
opponent, perhaps unwittingly, is quarrelling or wrangling (ἐρίζειν 
[erizein]), aiming to win the argument, rather than to get at the truth of 
the matter. The argument’s main fault is that it fails to make a relevant 
distinction and so arrives at its conclusion illegitimately. Although it 
gets the Separation Principle right, it fails to distinguish different kinds 
of nature and employ the one that is relevant to the argument. Consider 
bald and long-haired men, for example Seinfeld’s George Costanza and 
the supermodel Fabio. Clearly their natures are different, but from that 
it does not follow that George cannot be a cobbler if Fabio is, because 
whether one is bald or has a full head of lustrous hair is irrelevant to 
the craft of cobbling. It is not that the bald and the tricho-luscious are 
not different, but rather that the difference between them—between 
their natures—is not relevant to the issue at hand. Thinking otherwise, 
Socrates says, is ‘ridiculous’ (5.454d). 
What is distinctive of a guardian-ruler is the kind of soul they 
have, a soul capable of wisdom, of knowledge of what is best for the 
city as a whole. The primary difference between men and women is 
biological or physical (‘somatic’ might be more precise): ‘they differ 
only in this respect, that the females bear children while the males 
beget them’ (5.454d). There is no reason to think, Socrates insists, that 
this physical difference must make for a psychic difference. Consider 
a female doctor, a male doctor, and a male cobbler. If asked, ‘Which 
two are more similar to each other than to the other?’, you would 
rightly respond that you cannot answer the question until you know 
the relevant parameter of comparison. Physically, the male doctor and 
male cobbler are more similar to each other than either is to the female 
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doctor. Psychologically, the male doctor and female doctor are more 
similar to each other than either is to the male cobbler. The souls of 
cobblers differ in nature from the souls of doctors, being susceptible 
of acquiring a different kind of skill—perhaps this is a difference 
between iron and bronze souls. But as naturally different as cobblers’ 
and doctors’ souls are from each other, they are more like each other 
than they are like the souls of guardians, who, rather than possessing 
a skill or craft, possess a virtue. All three possess knowledge, but the 
objects of knowledge—how to make shoes, how to cure the sick, what 
is best for the city as a whole—are strikingly different, and, as we saw 
earlier, skills are fundamentally different from virtues, insofar as skills 
are morally neutral while virtues are not. 
The upshot of all this is that men and women having all tasks in 
common, and especially the task of guardianship, is possible: it is not 
contrary to nature. While men may on average be physically stronger 
than women, this difference in physical strength is not relevant to 
ruling or soldiering, since it may well not hold in particular cases. As I 
write this, the world record for the marathon for men is roughly twelve 
and a half minutes faster than the world record for women (2:01:39 
versus 2:14:04), but the fastest women’s time is really fast, and is much, 
much faster than the overwhelming majority of men can run. It was 
the twenty-third fastest time run that day (13 October 2019) in the 
Chicago Marathon, faster than 24,604 of the men who completed the 
race. That men on average run or swim faster or lift more weight than 
women is irrelevant to what this particular woman and that particular 
man can do, and it is the particular person’s qualifications that are 
relevant, not the average qualifications of groups they belong to.
Having shown that it is possible for women to be guardians and to 
receive the same education as their male counterparts, Socrates makes 
short work of the other question, whether it is optimal. Given that the 
only thing standing in its way is unreasoned cultural prejudice, it is no 
wonder that Socrates regards this arrangement as for the best. After 
all, he reasons, why would you not have golden-souled guardians in 
charge, whatever their sex, given that physical difference is irrelevant 
to the task of ruling? 
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Is Plato a Feminist? 
Plato’s perhaps surprising insistence that women can be guardians 
prompts us to ask, ‘Is Plato a feminist?’ To answer this question, we 
need to know what it is to be a feminist, a thornier task than it might at 
first seem. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (an excellent, free, 
online resource) has half a dozen entries for different kinds of feminism 
and half a dozen again for feminist approaches to various philosophical 
topics such as knowledge, the self, science, ethics, etc. I am going to 
make the simplifying assumption—hopefully not an over-simplifying 
one—that at feminism’s root is a belief in and commitment to gender 
equality. The idea here is that men and woman are morally equal, that 
being a woman is never in itself a reason to give a woman’s interests 
less weight. We know that Plato is not an egalitarian, but importing a 
contemporary moral principle (one animating the work of Peter Singer, 
among others) can shed helpful light on this section’s question.
The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests (PECI, for short) 
holds that the interests of all parties affected by an action or decision 
ought to be given equal consideration unless there is a morally relevant 
fact or difference that justifies unequal consideration. The first thing to 
notice about the PECI is that it is a moral principle; it is not attempting 
to describe how people actually act and decide; rather, it is a principle 
about how we ought to act. A second thing to notice is that its currency 
is consideration, which is different than treatment. A teacher who gives 
every student the same grade treats the students equally, but this is 
not what the PECI demands. Instead, it demands that the teacher give 
equal consideration to all: they use the same standards to evaluate their 
work, do not play favorites, etc. There is a clear sense in which such a 
teacher is also treating their students equally, but it is worth noting how 
consideration and treatment differ. If there are 200 applicants for a job, the 
only way to treat all applicants equally in the strict sense is to hire all of 
them or none of them. What the PECI requires is that the prospective 
employer use fair standards and apply those standards equally. That is 
what I take a commitment to equal consideration to require. 
A third point worth mentioning is that the PECI mandates 
presumptive rather than absolute equality of consideration. It recognizes 
that there may be times when unequal consideration is called for—but 
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as the fourth point makes clear, unequal consideration is permissible 
only if there is a morally relevant difference between parties or a morally 
relevant fact that would justify unequal consideration. Psychologists 
are adept at discovering the factors that decision-makers take to be 
psychologically relevant and which explain why we often do not give equal 
consideration to all parties affected by our actions. But the PECI is a 
normative principle, not a descriptive one: it requires a morally relevant 
fact that justifies unequal consideration, not a psychologically relevant 
fact that explains it. 
A racist violates the PECI by taking racial difference to justify giving 
unequal consideration to the interests of those affected by their actions. 
They violate the PECI because, with very few exceptions, racial difference 
is not a morally relevant difference. Racial difference is clearly—and 
sadly—psychologically relevant to racists, since it helps to explain why 
they act and think as they do. But it is rarely morally relevant: other 
things being equal it does not justify giving unequal consideration based 
on race. In parallel fashion, a sexist takes sex-difference to be a morally 
relevant difference when it presumptively is not. This is not to say that 
race- and sex-differences are never relevant. If Brad Pitt complains to 
Variety that the director of an upcoming film about the life of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. is racist because they would not even consider him for 
the part, we might think he is joking, since in this instance racial identity 
seems quite morally relevant, not least because it would be offensive to 
have a white actor appear in blackface to play Dr King. More seriously, 
this is not to say that race- and sex-based affirmative action policies 
cannot be justified, but rather that they stand in need of justification: 
since the presumption is that race and sex are not morally relevant, the 
burden of justification falls on the person or policy appealing to them.
Although Plato is no egalitarian, there is a sense in which he accepts 
the PECI. He takes the kind of soul one has—gold, silver, bronze, iron—
to be relevant to whether one is eligible to participate in governing 
the polis and indeed whether one’s thoughts about governing the 
city should be given any consideration. Readers who are egalitarian 
democrats—and that is ‘democrat’ with a small d, implying not party 
affiliation but rather a view about who is entitled to have a say in 
how one’s community is governed—will think that Plato is mistaken 
about this: every competent adult should have equal rights to political 
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participation. But that point aside, it is clear, I think, that Plato certainly 
accepts the PECI with respect to sex-difference: ‘there is no way of life 
concerned with the management of the city that belongs to a woman 
because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man, but the various 
natures are distributed in the same way in both creatures. Women share 
by nature in every way of life just as men do’ (5.455d). In the lingo of 
the PECI, for Plato sex-difference is not a morally relevant difference 
that would justify giving unequal consideration to the interests of men 
and women.
We should note that the attitude that Plato has Socrates express here 
is deeply at odds with Athenian attitudes of their day. Women played no 
role in governing Athens, and well-to-do women would never be seen 
by themselves outside the home. His attitude would have seemed less 
radical in Sparta, where women were sufficiently engaged in public life 
for Plutarch to be able to compile a volume entitled Sayings of Spartan 
Women.
That certainly inclines us toward a ‘yes’ answer to the question of 
whether Plato is a feminist. Affirmative support can also be found in the 
Second Wave, which we will get to shortly. Put briefly, Plato de-privatizes 
and indeed abolishes the traditional nuclear family, doing away with 
traditional marriage and child-rearing, and instead having children 
raised communally by people with a natural aptitude for it. To the 
extent that the traditional family can be a site of patriarchal oppression, 
limiting which roles and opportunities are available to women, Plato’s 
doing away with it lends support to the judgment that he is a feminist.
But this very same point also provides a reason to doubt that 
Plato is a feminist. In addition to its commitment to gender-equality, 
feminism is plausibly characterized as committed to recognizing 
and overcoming gender-based oppression, where oppression is the 
systematic disadvantaging of one group for the benefit of another. 
Although Plato has Socrates argue that it is both possible and optimal 
for suitable women to be guardians in the ideal polis, there is no hint 
that he recognizes that his culture oppresses women; nor does he aim 
to liberate the women of the ideal polis from oppression: his motivation 
in advocating gender equality is that it benefits the polis, not that doing 
so is a matter of social justice or fairness. If women are liberated from 
oppression, it is accidental rather than intentional, which is a point in 
favor of a negative answer to the question of whether Plato is a feminist.
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Another Second Wave issue that counts against Plato’s being a 
feminist is what we can call the asymmetry of possession. Possession is 
an asymmetrical relation: except in a metaphorical sense, I possess my 
possessions: they belong to me, I do not belong to them. Some relations, 
such as being siblings, are symmetrical: if Mary is my sibling, I am her 
sibling. But other relations, such as being a sister of, are asymmetrical: if 
Mary is my sister, it does not necessarily follow that I am Mary’s sister. 
Given that possession is asymmetrical, Socrates’ saying that ‘all these 
women are to belong in common to all the men’ (5.457c [literally, they 
are to be κοινάς (koinas): shared in common]) is problematic for thinking 
him a feminist. If Plato really were committed to gender equality, we 
would expect Socrates to then say something like, ‘and of course all 
the men belong in common to all the women.’ But he does not, which 
suggests that women are not after all to be thought of as fully equal to 
men.
The last reason against thinking that Plato (or at least Socrates, if 
I can depart for a moment from my practice of not worrying about 
distinguishing them) is not a feminist is one that many readers will 
already have noticed for themselves: the Republic is sprinkled with 
misogynistic remarks. For example, when discussing the irrational, 
appetitive part of the soul, Socrates says, ‘one finds all kinds of diverse 
desires, pleasures, and pains, mostly in children, women, household 
slaves, and in those of the inferior majority who are called free’ (4.431c). 
Later in Book V he will characterize stripping corpses on the battlefield 
as ‘small minded and womanish’ (5.469d). In both cases (and many 
others) he seems to be operating with a male-female binary in which 
the female pole is decidedly negative. This is perhaps the kicker: in Book 
VIII when disparaging democracy he bemoans ‘the extent of the legal 
equality of men and women and of the freedom in the relations between 
them’ (8.563b). Could a real feminist regard equality before the law as a 
bad thing? It is hard to see how this could be the case.
The conclusion, I think, is that although there are good points to be 
made on the other side, Plato is not, all things considered, a feminist. 
Given his time and place, his insistence that there can be philosopher-
queens as well as philosopher-kings (7.540c) is surprising and laudatory, 
even if it falls short of what those of us today who are committed to 
gender equality and equity would hope for. 
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The Second Wave: Extending the Household to the 
Polis (5.457c–471b)
When discussing whether Plato was a feminist, I described the Second 
Wave as the abolition of the family. This is not quite accurate, since the 
operative notion for Plato is the notion of the household (οἰκία [oikia]), a 
wider notion than our notion of the family, though they are clearly related. 
Plato’s plan is to obliterate the boundaries between households so that 
the polis becomes one large oikia or household. There is some scholarly 
controversy about whether the extension of the household applies to 
everyone in the polis or just the auxiliaries and guardians. Much of what 
Socrates says suggests the latter, but since bronze and iron parents can 
have gold or silver children, it is hard to see how de-privatizing the 
family could work unless the city is one large household. Similarly, the 
seriousness with which he takes the city-soul analogy, when coupled 
with his view that the best city is most like a single person (5.462c), 
suggests the ideal of the polis as one big household. This is an interesting 
question, though perhaps of interest mainly to specialists, so, having 
raised it, I will set it to one side. 
We saw above that the women are ‘to belong in common to all the 
men’ and, a related point which we did not mention above, ‘none are to 
live privately with any man’ (5.457c). We met this absence of privacy 
earlier, when toward the very end of Book III Socrates described what 
life is like for guardians and auxiliaries in the ideal polis: they live 
a barracks life, ‘like soldiers in a camp’ (3.416d), having no private 
property ‘beyond what is wholly necessary’ (a qualification that 
allows a guardian to say things like, ‘hey, that’s my toothbrush’) and 
no private dwellings. The end is nigh when guardians possess ‘private 
land, houses, and currency’ (3.417a), since this will distract their focus 
away from what is good for the community and toward what is good 
for them individually. The Greek phrase being translated as ‘private’ is a 
form of ἴδιος (idios), from which the English word ‘idiot’ derives. But the 
implication is individuality in opposition to what is common or shared 
(κοινός [koinos]) or public, rather than some sort of mental thickness or 
incapacity, though even our word retains a bit of this when we think of 
an idiot as ‘living in his own world.’ We should try to avoid reading our 
modern notion of privacy into the text here; ‘individual property’ would 
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do just as well as a translation, especially as idios often means simply 
‘individual’ elsewhere in the Republic (e.g., Thrasymachus argues 
that injustice is beneficial to the individual (ἰδίᾳ [idia(i)] (1.344a)) or 
‘unique or peculiar’ (e.g., Socrates insists that ‘each craft benefits us in 
its own peculiar (ἰδίαν [idian] way’ (1.346a), though ‘peculiar’ has its 
own misdirecting connotations). 
The children too will be ‘possessed in common’ (5.457c), though 
here the rationale is quite surprising: they are possessed in common 
‘so that no parent will know his own offspring or any child his parent’ 
(5.457d). Socrates thinks that it is obvious that de-privatizing the family 
would be beneficial, thinking he need only address whether it is possible 
to put this arrangement into practice. In an all-too-rare expression of 
disagreement, Glaucon thinks that Socrates is mistaken on this score 
and insists that he justify his claim that doing away with the family is a 
good thing.
Given the centrality of family to everyday, commonsense, moral 
thinking and to many readers’ conceptions of what a happy, well-lived 
life centers on, Socrates faces an uphill battle. Few readers, I suspect, 
will find what he says fully convincing and follow him all the way to 
the community pole of the individual-community duality we have seen 
at play in the Republic, but many will be willing to move the arrow a bit 
more in that direction if they give Socrates a fair hearing. There is a lot 
to dislike in what Socrates says here. Talk of eugenics and racial purity 
(5.460c) is beyond being merely creepy in a post-Holocaust world, and 
raising children in rearing pens (5.460c) seems to fail to do justice to 
human dignity, just as reducing marriage to state-sanctioned sexual 
hook-ups for the purposes of producing citizens fails to do justice to 
the dignity of marriage. The amount of deception guardians will use to 
rig the procreation lotteries (which determine who will have sex with 
whom, and when) will probably seem to most readers to be not merely 
innocuous verbal falsehoods, but rather indicative of governmental 
moral depravity. One need not think lying is absolutely forbidden—few 
of us do, really—to be troubled by lies that might even be beneficial. 
And many readers will doubt that the guardians’ lies will be beneficial, 
even if they are efficient. 
But there are also things to like in what Socrates says. He is concerned 
with civic unity, with the integrity of the ideal polis. The worst thing that 
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can happen to a city, he argues, is for it to be divided rather than united; 
whatever divides and dis-integrates a city is the greatest evil, he says 
at 5.462a, reprising and modifying a point he made when he defined 
political justice (4.434bc). We might disagree that this is the worst 
thing that can happen while conceding that Socrates has a point, that 
a fragmented, divided city or nation is in bad shape, not functioning 
well, not politically healthy. His concern with faction and internal strife 
was certainly shared by America’s founders, as for example one finds 
in Federalist #10, by James Madison (though readers familiar with the 
history of the early United States know how strife- and faction-ridden 
political life then was). A polis in which citizens say ‘mine’ about the 
same things is a polis that is unified: if all the children are my children, I 
am unlikely to favor some over others; I will want all of the city’s children 
to flourish and succeed, since I think of all of them as mine. 
It is because Socrates thinks that ‘the best-governed city is one in 
which most people say ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ about the same things in 
the same way’ (5.462c) that he thinks that an arrangement in which 
‘no mother [or father] knows her own child’ (5.460c) is optimal: it 
unifies the city, making it ‘most like a single person’ (5.462c). In my 
state of Wisconsin, about 15% of the children live in poverty (there are 
disputes about the correct number, since there are disputes about the 
proper way to measure poverty). If everyone in Wisconsin thought of 
these children as their children, I doubt that we would find it tolerable. 
We would be less likely to think it is someone else’s problem to solve 
or to donate a few canned goods to the local food pantry and be done 
with it. This, it seems to me, is the viable, contemporary take-way from 
Socrates’ communitarianism. Many readers will look upon the familial 
arrangements in the ideal polis with horror, regarding them as dystopic 
rather than utopic. But one can be a bit more community-minded and a 
bit less individualistic without following Socrates all the way. If thinking 
about the Second Wave leads readers to reflect on where they land on 
the community–individual spectrum, and if that landing spot is where 
they think they ought to be landing, then we are doing what Plato really 
wants us to be doing: thinking for ourselves. We might find ourselves 
agreeing with Socrates that a life or culture too far to the individual side 
of the spectrum embodies ‘a silly, adolescent idea of happiness’ (5.466b).
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Having argued that converting the polis into one large household 
is beneficial, Socrates then starts to argue for its possibility. He focuses 
on warfare, which we will discuss briefly in a moment, but we might 
hope for more argument about whether dissolving the private family or 
household is psychologically possible for creatures like us. The worry is 
that Plato’s plan assumes that the intense affection parents typically feel 
for their children can be spread to all the children of the community. If 
this affection and instinct to protect one’s offspring is a matter of biology, 
a cultural arrangement that does away with it might have trouble 
gaining traction. From a certain evolutionary perspective, parents love 
their children and seek to protect them because those children carry 
their DNA; we might well wonder whether this strong parental love can 
be extended to those with a different genetic make-up. While this is a 
question that Plato cannot be faulted for not answering, it is a question 
we might want an answer to as we reflect upon the meaning Plato’s 
proposal might have for us. Though Plato stressed human malleability in 
his account of education and enculturation, it is doubtful that humans 
are infinitely malleable, and our biology might put the brakes on his 
plan to household the polis, so to speak. There is more to be said about 
this, but for now we will just note it and move on to Socrates’ remarks 
on the ethics of warfare. 
Crucial to this discussion is a distinction between war (πόλεμός 
[polemos]) and civil war or faction (στάσις [stasis]). War occurs between 
parties that are naturally enemies, while faction occurs between natural 
friends. Greeks and non-Greeks—barbarians—are natural enemies; 
non-Greeks are fundamentally different and other, being ‘foreign and 
strange’ (5.470b). Greeks, by contrast, are ‘one’s own and akin’ (5.470b) 
and thus natural friends. Greekness does not seem to be a racial notion in 
the modern sense; Greeks are united by a shared language, cosmological 
mythology, and poetic tradition rather than biology. When Greek city-
states fight each other, Socrates thinks, they should do so knowing that 
they will one day be reconciled. They should not, for example, burn 
houses or ravage fields. The trouble, as Plato sees it, is that Greeks fail to 
distinguish between Greeks and non-Greeks in warfare, fighting against 
each other the way they should fight only against non-Greeks. There is 
a moral distinction they need to make: ‘they must treat barbarians the 
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way [they] currently treat each other’ (5.471b), and stop treating other 
Greeks as they currently do.
We saw in the First Wave that, in the language of the PECI, sex was 
not a morally relevant difference that would justify giving unequal 
weights to the interests of men and women. Here, in the Second Wave, 
however, Socrates insists that race or ethnicity is morally relevant to the 
weighting of interests while engaging in warfare. The trouble, Socrates 
argues, is that Greeks are acting as though Greekness is not a morally 
relevant difference. They weigh the interests of Greeks and non-Greeks 
equally, but they should not be doing this: Greeks should give Greek 
interests greater weight than non-Greek interests, and thus change the 
ways in which they conduct the warfare that seems so inevitable in their 
world. 
It would be interesting to explore why for Plato race or ethnicity is 
a morally relevant difference while gender is not, but in the interest of 
moving forward we will set that issue aside and move on to the Third 
Wave. 
Some Suggestions for Further Reading
Readers interested in the status of women and the nature of the family 
in classical Athens should see Sarah Pomeroy, Godesses, Whores, Wives, 
and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (New York: Schocken Books, 
1975) and Pomeroy, Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). Plutarch’s Sayings of Spartan Women 
can be found in Plutarch, Moralia, vol. 3, trans. by Frank Cole Babbitt 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press [Loeb Classical Library], 
1931), pp. 453–69. 
There has been much discussion of the question of Plato and feminism. 
Interested readers might start with Julia Annas, ‘Plato’s Republic and 
Feminism’, Philosophy, 51 (1976), 307–21 (reprinted in Plato: Ethics, 
Politics, Religion, and the Soul, ed. by Gail Fine (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) and C.D.C Reeve, ‘The Naked Old Women in 
the Palaestra’, in Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays, ed. by Richard Kraut 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 129–41, which is 
written as a dialogue. 
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Readers interested in the ethics of war might start with the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article by Seth Lazar (https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/war/), which gives an excellent overview and 
a full bibliography. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations, 5th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 
2015), is a contemporary classic.
The philosophical literature on equality is vast, but Peter Singer’s 
Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), https://
doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511975950, is an excellent starting place. 
Though some of Singer’s views are controversial, he is philosophically 
astute and a very clear writer.
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8. Surfing the Third Wave:  
Plato’s Metaphysical Elevator, the 
Powers Argument, and the Infallibility of 
Knowledge,  
Book V
Socrates regards the last of the Three Waves, ‘whether it is possible for 
this constitution to come into being’ (5.471c), as ‘the biggest and most 
difficult one’ (5.472a). The constitution he refers to is not a written 
document as in the US or even a collection of documents as in the UK; 
it is the conceptual organization of the ideal city itself. ‘Constitution’ 
translates the Greek word πολιτεία (politeia, whence the English word 
‘politics’), which is in fact the Greek title of the Republic. Socrates thinks 
that the ideal polis is indeed possible, but the condition of its being made 
real is as bold as it is famous and controversial:
Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings 
and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until 
political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures 
who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from 
doing so, cities will have no rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will 
the human race. And, until this happens, the constitution we have been 
describing in theory will never be born to the fullest extent possible or 
see the light of the sun. It is because I saw how very paradoxical this 
statement would be that I hesitated to make it for so long, for it is hard 
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to face up to the fact that there can be no happiness, either public, or 
private, in any other city. (5.473c–e) 
Glaucon’s reaction to Socrates’ inspirational little speech might not be 
what Socrates was hoping for: he thinks people will think that Socrates 
is either crazy or dangerous. So Socrates has his work cut out for him.
Philosopher-Kings and Political Animals (5.471c–474c)
There is a lot going on in this famous paragraph. One crucial point is 
that political power and political wisdom are not merely separated in 
the non-ideal city that Socrates and company inhabit but are in fact at 
odds with each other. If those with political power lack political wisdom, 
they will lack the virtue necessary to perform well their function, 
governing. Even if those in power reject Thrasymachus’ self-interested 
conception of ruling and aim to act for the city’s benefit rather than 
their own, they are likely to get things wrong as often as they get them 
right if they merely have beliefs about what is best for the city; what 
they need is knowledge. And those who possess this knowledge—true 
philosophers—have little interest in getting their hands dirty in politics, 
preferring a life of intellectual inquiry over political activity. Socrates 
thinks that this division between political power and political wisdom 
must be overcome, perhaps even by force, if the ideal city is to be made 
real. But the force in question will turn out to be the force of rational 
persuasion, rather than physical compulsion (thus reprising the force–
persuasion theme raised in the Republic’s opening scene.)
Socrates doubles down on the importance of marrying political 
power and philosophy. Not only is their union the necessary condition 
for realizing this ‘theoretical model of a good city’ (5.472e), but it is also 
required for human happiness itself: ‘there can be no happiness, either 
public, or private, in any other city.’ It is this claim, Glaucon thinks, that 
people will find ridiculous or worse. But Socrates’ claim has more going 
for it than Glaucon first thinks. Socrates is suggesting that humans, 
being essentially social creatures, cannot fully flourish in defective cities 
or when living in Thoreau-like solitude. When Aristotle says early in his 
Politics that ‘a human is by nature a political animal’,1 he is not saying 
1  Aristotle, Politics, I.2 1253a2–3. 
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that humans love to argue about politics or anything like that but rather 
that we are the kind of animal that lives in a polis, a view that Socrates 
surely agrees with. And many readers who are uncomfortable with 
Plato’s community-first ethos might find that their own conceptions of a 
good human life involve active engagement in a community, even if only 
one made up of their family and friends. Socrates will have something to 
say in Book VI about how one can live reasonably happily in an unjust 
and thus unhappy city, but only in a just city can a person fully flourish 
and be as happy as it is possible for a human being to be. 
Socrates’ solution to the Third Wave prompts the issue which 
will organize the remainder of Book V as well as Books VI and VII: 
‘we need to define […] who the philosophers are that we dare to say 
must rule’ (5.474b). This project of distinguishing philosopher from 
non-philosopher will take us into the deep end of the philosophical 
pool, so to speak, since the distinction will be twofold, drawing on 
Plato’s metaphysics (his account of the ultimate nature, structure, and 
constituents of reality, which will involve the famous theory of the 
Forms) and epistemology (his theory of knowledge). Metaphysics and 
epistemology are intimately related in Plato’s thought, as we will soon 
see when we examine the marquee argument of Book V, the Powers 
Argument. It is fair to say that this is the most intellectually challenging 
part of the Republic, but also the most intellectually rewarding, I think. 
Philosophers and Non-Philosophers 
The epistemological distinction between philosophers, who should 
govern, and non-philosophers, who should not, is that philosophers 
have knowledge of what is best for the city, while non-philosophers 
have belief or opinion (δόξα [doxa, whence our word ‘orthodoxy’: 
correct belief]). Indeed, at the end of Book V, Socrates distinguishes 
between φιλόσοφος (philosophoi), lovers of wisdom, and φιλόδοξοι 
(philodoxai), lovers of belief. We met the distinction between knowledge 
and belief back in Book IV, where it was put to use in explaining the 
cardinal virtues of wisdom and courage. The distinctive virtue of the 
guardian-rulers is wisdom, which is knowledge of what is best for the 
city as a whole. Courage, the distinctive virtue of the auxiliaries, is a 
matter not of knowledge but of belief—unshakably true belief about what 
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is appropriately feared, but something falling short of knowledge. An 
auxiliary will believe without doubt that dishonor and enslavement are 
worse than death, but they need not know why this is the case in order to 
perform their function well (although they may have true beliefs about 
why). Plato will have more to say about how knowledge differs from 
belief in Books VI and VII, especially in the analogies of the Divided 
Line and the Cave. For now, it is enough to note that the distinction is 
at the heart of Socrates’ response to the Third Wave: philosophers have 
knowledge while non-philosophers only have belief.
The metaphysical distinction between philosopher and non-
philosopher will turn out to be intimately related to this first, 
epistemological distinction, since it is a distinction between the objects 
of knowledge and belief. The word ‘metaphysics’ often conjures up 
thoughts of crystals, incense, New Age healing, etc., but this is not the 
philosophical sense. Philosophically speaking, metaphysics concerns 
the ultimate nature, structure, and constituents of reality. Where natural 
scientists try to discover and explain causal connections between events, 
metaphysically minded philosophers want to understand what causation 
itself is. They want to know what kinds of things exist: is everything 
that exists physical, or do non-physical things exist? For example, is the 
human mind something fully physical, reducible without remainder to 
the brain? Or is it something non-physical? If minds are non-physical, 
how do they interact with the body, which is decidedly physical? 
These are not the kinds of metaphysical questions that Plato asks; they 
assumed a central place in Western metaphysics with the thought of 
René Descartes (1596–1650). But hopefully they give the reader a sense 
of what sorts of concerns are addressed by metaphysics. 
We have beliefs about the particular things that make up our 
everyday world, on Plato’s view, but we have knowledge of the Forms—
the timeless essences of the particulars.2 
A brief jump ahead to the beginning of Book X will be helpful in 
getting clearer about what the Forms are. There, Socrates reminds 
Glaucon that their ‘usual procedure […] [is to] hypothesize a single Form 
in connection with each of the many things to which we apply the same 
name’ (10.596a). There must be something, Plato thinks, that all just 
2  As is often done, I will use ‘Form’ with a capital F when talking of these distinctively 
Platonic entities.
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actions have in common, that all courageous actions have in common, 
that all red things have in common. Grasping this common feature—the 
essence or the Form, the real definition—is the task of philosophy, for 
Plato. His example in Book X is rather mundane: beds. ‘The form’, he 
says, ‘is our term for the being of a bed’ (10.597a), where ‘being’ means 
what the thing is: its essence, what it is to be a bed. So far, assuming a 
common feature seems like a reasonable, innocuous assumption. While 
there are many particular beds and many particular just actions, there 
is a single, unifying Form or essence of bedness and one of justice. So 
where particulars are many, Forms are one. 
Another crucial difference between Forms and particulars is that 
particulars are ever-changing. ‘Of all the many beautiful things’, Socrates 
asks, ‘is there one that will not also appear ugly? Or is there any one of 
those just things that will not also appear unjust? Or one of those pious 
things that will not also appear impious?’ (5.479a) Although Plato does 
not share the subjectivist view that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, 
the beauty example is a helpful one. The sky to the west is beautiful 
right now, but in an hour, after the sun has set, it no longer is. Nor is it 
beautiful to my color-blind friend. The bouquet of flowers on the dining 
room table will not evoke ‘oohs’ and ‘ahs’ in two weeks. Thus, beauty 
seems both temporal and perspectival. As we saw in Book I, returning 
the weapon you have borrowed is usually just, but in a particular set of 
circumstances (say, its owner is deranged) it is not. Telling the truth is 
usually the right thing to do but sometimes the demands of kindness 
trump the demands of honesty. That fox seems big when standing next 
to the squirrel, but small when standing next to the bear. And so on. 
Being ever-changing and unstable are hallmarks of concrete particulars. 
Bob Dylan captures something of Plato’s point when he sings, ‘He not 
busy born is busy dying.’ I hope my non-existence is a long way off in 
the future, but every day I live I am one day closer to my death—hence, 
I seem to be both living and dying, just as every beautiful thing seems 
both beautiful and not beautiful. 
The Forms are altogether different, on Plato’s view. Unlike the many 
particular beautiful things, the Form of beauty is permanent, stable, 
unchanging: ‘the beautiful itself’, Socrates says, ‘remains always the same 
in all respects’ (5.479a). It is the only thing that is always and everywhere 
beautiful. The same goes for the Forms of justice, piety, redness, bigness, 
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whatever. While the world of particulars is in constant flux, the world 
of the Forms is stable and unchanging. We experience particular things 
and events via our senses, but the Forms ‘are intelligible but not visible’ 
(6.507b): we perceive them with our minds, not our senses. 
One of Plato’s ways of referring to the Form of something drives 
this point home: the Form of a thing is the ἰδέα—literally, the idea—of 
the thing. We cannot see or taste or touch or smell or hear ideas; we 
can only think them. But the word ‘idea’ can be misleading, since for 
Plato the Forms are not psychological entities like thoughts or feelings, 
which depend for their existence on someone having them, as ‘idea’ 
might suggest. Unlike ordinary thoughts and ideas, which cannot exist 
without thinkers thinking and having them, Plato’s Forms are mind-
independently real, not depending for their existence upon thinkers 
thinking them. This is one of the most distinctive features of the Forms. 
It is one thing to claim that there is a common essence shared by 
particular things; it is another to claim that these common essences or 
Forms are not dependent, psychological entities but are instead mind-
independently real. While the shadow my hand casts is real, it seems 
somehow less real than my hand, since its existence depends on the 
presence of the hand. Ideas and thoughts and feelings and moods seem 
similar to shadows in this regard: they are dependent entities, depending 
on conscious subjects for their existence. Plato does not deny this. But 
the Forms are not dependent psychological entities. It turns out that the 
Forms depend upon the Form of the good—goodness itself—but they 
are decisively unlike our ordinary ideas and thoughts. If this all sounds 
a bit weird, thinking about numbers can be helpful. Although the two 
coffee cups on the table are concrete particular objects, the number two 
is an abstract object, capable of being instantiated in space and time by 
infinitely many pairs of concrete particular objects but it is not itself a 
concrete particular—at least on a plausible philosophy of mathematics 
known, perhaps unsurprisingly, as Platonism. One reason for thinking of 
mathematical objects as mind-independently real is that doing so helps 
us make sense of other beliefs many of us have about these objects. It 
will seem to many readers, for example, that the Pythagorean Theorem 
is timelessly true and would still be true even if no person ever thought 
of it. We should resist the temptation to say that numbers and the Forms 
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have always existed, because ‘always existed’ is a temporal notion, and 
the idea here is that such entities are outside of time. 
Plato’s Metaphysical Elevator
We can think of Plato’s metaphysics via the metaphor of an elevator, as 
in this diagram.
Level 4 
The Form of F is more real  
than the many particular Fs.
↑
Level 3
The Form of F is real: it is a non-spatiotemporal, 
mind-independent entity.
↑
Level 2
There is a form of F (the real definition of F), 
 which all particular F things have in common.
↑
Level 1
The many particular F things are real: 
 they are spatiotemporal,  
mind-independent entities.
At Level One we find the everyday objects making up the world we 
experience through our five senses: trees, squirrels, rocks, picnic tables, 
etc. Most readers, I assume, think these objects are metaphysically real, 
existing independently of our minds and still there when we close our 
eyes or when we no longer exist. This is a plausible, commonsense 
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philosophical view, though of course not all philosophers hold it. The 
great Irish philosopher George Berkeley (1685–1753), for one, thought 
that what we ordinarily take to be mind-independently real things are 
in reality mind-dependent ideas. We are tempted to think of them as 
mind-independently real because they seem to persist in our absence, 
but, he thought, this is only because God continues to think them when 
we do not. Berkeley’s motto was esse est percipi: to exist is to be perceived. 
This seems right for headaches, for example, which require someone to 
perceive them; they are not floating around in space, waiting to land on 
an unfortunate victim. So while some philosophers will not even get on 
Plato’s elevator at the first floor, most of us will. 
At Level Two we find those real definitions or essences that Socrates 
is forever seeking, the trait or property that all F things have in common: 
chairness, justice itself, etc. Most readers, I suspect, will take Plato’s 
elevator to Level Two. We think that the many particular things we 
experience through our senses come in clusters unified by common 
properties: there are red things, round things, beautiful things, just 
and unjust actions and social arrangements, etc. Ascending to Level 
Two results from agreeing with Socrates that there is ‘a single form 
in connection with each of the many things to which we apply the 
same name’ (10.596a). Indeed, the Republic is the search for the Form 
of justice, as many of Plato’s dialogues are searches for the Forms or 
essences of various virtues such as piety, courage, temperance, etc. But 
at level two, we find forms, rather than Forms, since they are not mind-
independently real, existing in their own right. 
Not everyone will follow Plato to Level Two, however. The great 
twentieth-century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), for 
one, declined the invitation, thinking that the search for one commonality 
was misguided and inevitably futile. If we consider the wide variety of 
games—card games, board games, ball games, party games, computer 
games, etc.—we will see, Wittgenstein thought, that there need not be 
features common to everything we call a game: 
Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? 
Think of solitaire. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when 
a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has 
disappeared […] Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the 
element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have 
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disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of 
games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.3 
Instead of an essence shared by all games, Wittgenstein finds ‘a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing’, which 
he dubs a family resemblance. Not everyone accepts Wittgenstein’s view; 
Bernard Suits, for one, thought he had found the essence of game. But 
it is worth noting that contemporary psychology and cognitive science 
seem to side with Wittgenstein over Plato. According to prototype theory, 
first articulated by the cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch in the early 
1970s, our concept of, say, bird, involves a cluster of features, some more 
important than others, with certain examples serving as prototypes.4 If 
you want to give someone an example of a bird, you are likelier to offer a 
robin or cardinal as an example than you are to offer a penguin, because 
penguins lack one of the prototypical—but not necessary—traits of we 
associate with birds, namely the ability to fly. 
Even though Wittgenstein would not ascend to Level Two, preferring 
family resemblances to essences, many readers will follow Socrates there. 
It is at Level Three, though, where Platonism really starts to kick in, 
for Level Three involves a commitment to the real, mind-independent 
existence of these Forms or common properties. At Level Three, we 
discover essences and Forms; we do not invent them. It is one thing 
to regard the Form or essence of justice or kindness or chairness as a 
psychological entity, a conceptual construct having no mind-independent 
existence in its own right. It is another thing entirely to regard the Form 
as mind-independently real, something that is to be discovered rather 
than invented. You can ascend to Level Two while thinking that the 
Forms are like ordinary ideas and thoughts, not real in themselves but 
rather depending for their existence on thinkers thinking them. But 
ascending from Level Two to Level Three requires a considerable jump 
in what philosophers call ‘ontological commitment’, a fancy-sounding 
but precise phrase indicating which kinds of things one is prepared to 
say exist in their own right. Few people, for example, are ontologically 
committed to unicorns or the tooth fairy: most of us do not regard 
3  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd. ed., trans. by G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), §66, p. 32.
4  Eleanor Rosch, ‘Natural categories’, Cognitive Psychology, 4 (1973), 328–50.
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them as mind-independently real. And while most of us think that 
our thoughts and feelings are ‘real’ in an everyday sense—the sense 
which contrasts ‘real’ with ‘imaginary’ or ‘hallucinatory’—we do 
not regard them as real in the sense of existing in their own right, 
mind-independently. Many people who find the ascent to Level Two 
unproblematic and obvious will balk at ascending to Level Three. Why 
go there, after all? It seems needlessly complicated or metaphysically 
profligate to posit the real, mind-independent existence of Socrates’ 
real definitions. 
Many readers are familiar with Ockham’s Razor, which in one 
formulation tells us that the simplest explanation of a phenomenon is 
usually correct. Perhaps less familiar is the ontological formulation of the 
Razor, which bids us not to multiply entities beyond necessity: non sunt 
multiplicanda entia sine necessitate. In short, if you do not need to posit the 
existence of certain things or kinds to make sense of your experience, 
then don’t; be metaphysically frugal and parsimonious. No doubt 
this metaphysical or ontological simplicity is related to explanatory 
simplicity: explanations involving fewer kinds of entities will probably 
be simpler. It is as though there is an ontology tax that philosophers 
are keen to avoid paying. Most of us find ontological commitment to 
ships and shoes and sealing wax unproblematic because it is difficult 
to make sense of our everyday experiences without a commitment to 
the real existence of the spatiotemporal objects that we sit on, stub our 
toes on, eat, etc. But many readers will resist ontological realism about 
Plato’s Forms, feeling they can understand and explain their experiences 
without appeal to them. 
The journalist Hunter S. Thompson once wrote, ‘When the going 
gets weird, the weird turn pro’.5 If so, then Level Four is where one loses 
one’s amateur standing. For those ascending to Level Four go beyond 
ontological commitment to the real, mind-independent existence of the 
Forms that typified Level Three. On Level Four, the Forms are not merely 
mind-independently real but are more real than the spatiotemporal 
particulars that are instances of them. The idea that the essence of 
chairness is more real than the chair one is sitting on is, well, pretty 
weird. Many people will get off the Platonic elevator at Level Two, being 
5  Hunter S. Thompson, The Great Shark Hunt: Strange Tales from a Strange Time (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), p. 36.
 161Surfing the Third Wave
philosophically unwilling, perhaps for Ockham-inspired reasons, to 
ascend to Level Three. But of those who go to Level Three, few, I suspect, 
will be willing to go all the way to Level Four, and readers might be 
forgiven for thinking that Socrates has gotten into the drugs reserved for 
the rulers of the city (5.459c). But—bad jokes aside: the drugs are not 
those kinds of drugs, anyway—his reasons for ascending to Levels Three 
and Four are philosophical rather than psychedelic, and it is to those 
philosophical reasons that we now turn. 
Marrying Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Powers 
Argument (5.476d–480a)
The metaphysical and epistemological distinctions are intimately 
related, for Plato. In what I call the Powers Argument, he starts with 
epistemology and ends up at metaphysics, arguing that the distinction 
between knowledge and belief requires allegiance to the Forms, since 
knowledge and belief, being different powers, must have distinct kinds 
of objects. The Powers Argument is crucial to addressing the Third 
Wave, since it will help ‘define […] who the philosophers are that we 
dare to say must rule’ (5.474b), but its implications go beyond this, as it 
attempts to give good reasons to ride the Metaphysical Elevator all the 
way up. 
The epistemological and metaphysical distinctions fit together this 
way: concrete particular things are the objects of belief, while the Forms 
are the objects of knowledge. A non-philosopher has beliefs about the 
many particular things and activities that make up the furniture of our 
everyday world: chairs, just actions, cats, sunsets. They ‘believe[] in 
beautiful things, but do[] not believe in the beautiful itself’ (5.476c). 
The philosopher, by contrast, is ‘able to see and embrace the nature of 
the beautiful itself’ (5.476b), the Form or essence in virtue of which all 
particular beautiful things are beautiful. A non-philosopher can have a 
true belief that a sunset is beautiful but never knowledge of this. Indeed, 
‘there is no knowledge of such things’ (7.529b), as the Forms and not 
particulars are the proper objects of knowledge, on Plato’s view. But 
perhaps something that falls short of knowledge but is more than true 
belief—knowledge with an asterisk—is possible where particulars are 
concerned. If so, a philosopher might know* that this particular sunset 
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or that particular painting is beautiful by grasping the Form of beauty 
and seeing that the painting or sunset is an instance of—participates in, 
as Plato often puts it—the Form, if only temporarily. Such a philosopher 
would know why the sunset is beautiful, which is beyond the cognitive 
capacities of a non-philosopher, who lacks access to the Form of beauty 
and thus never ascends above true belief.
The Powers Argument’s crucial concept, which gives it its name, 
is the concept of a power (δύναμις [dunamis, whence the word 
‘dynamic’]). Sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell are ordinary 
examples of powers, which we might also call ‘capacities’ or ‘faculties’. 
Animals typically have the power of sight; rocks do not. Even though 
powers are what enable us to see, hear, touch, taste, and smell the 
world, powers themselves are not the kinds of things we can see, hear, 
touch, taste, and smell. We distinguish them, Socrates says, by what 
they do and what they are ‘set over’ (5.477d)—by their functions and 
their objects: ‘What is set over the same things and does the same I 
call the same power; what is set over something different and does 
something different I call a different one’ (5.477d). Talk of knowledge 
and belief as powers, analogous to sight and hearing, might make 
this first premise sound odd to modern ears, but this is how Socrates 
conceives of them. The second premise is the claim that knowledge 
and belief are different powers, which Glaucon regards as obviously 
true to ‘a person with any understanding’ (5.477e). From these two 
premises Socrates concludes that knowledge and belief must have 
different objects. This conclusion seems innocuous enough, but we 
will soon see that it is anything but. 
Having established, he thinks, that knowledge and belief must have 
different objects, Socrates then tries to determine what these different 
objects are. Knowledge’s object, Glaucon agrees, is ‘what is’ (5.478a). 
There is a trifold ambiguity here that we should be aware of. In the 
existential sense, ‘what is’ means what exists, what is real. Someone who 
asks, ‘Is there a god?’, is using ‘is’ in the existential sense. In the epistemic 
sense, ‘what is’ means what is true, what is the case. News anchor Walter 
Cronkite’s signature sign-off, ‘And that’s the way it is’, employed ‘is’ in 
the epistemic sense. In the predicative sense, ‘is’ serves to link subject 
and predicate: the sky is blue, Jonas Starker is a great cellist, etc. So ‘what 
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is’ means what is …, where the dots are filled in with some predicate: 
what is red, what is beautiful, what is just, etc. 
Plato does not make explicit which sense of ‘is’ Glaucon has in mind 
when he says that knowledge’s object is ‘what is.’ To get a sense of the 
argument without becoming ensnared in scholarly controversy, I propose 
that we read ‘what is’ in the existential sense, given the metaphysical 
implications of the argument. Taken this way, when Socrates says that 
‘knowledge is set over what is’ (5.478a), he is saying that the objects of 
knowledge—what we know when we know something—exist: they are 
real. And the Forms exist, so they are objects of knowledge. Ignorance, 
by contrast, has as its object ‘what is not’ (5.477a, 478c): what does not 
exist. (It is odd to think of ignorance as a power or capacity, since it does 
not enable its possessor to do anything, as powers usually do, but let us 
set aside this minor point.) Since belief is in between knowledge and 
ignorance, ‘darker than knowledge but clearer than ignorance’ (5.478c), 
its objects will be intermediate between what is and what is not. Thus the 
objects of belief ‘participate in both being and not-being’ (5.478e): they 
straddle both existence and nonexistence, not fully real but not unreal, 
either. In short, the objects of belief are the particulars of everyday 
experience. 
To summarize: knowledge and belief, being different powers, must 
have different objects. Indeed, they have very different kinds of objects: 
knowledge’s objects are the timeless Forms, while belief’s objects are the 
spatiotemporal particulars that make up our everyday world. So there 
are two metaphysically different worlds: the world of the Forms and the 
world of particulars. The world of the Forms is the world of reality while 
the world of particulars is the world of appearance—but not, I hasten 
to add, a world of illusion. Plato is very careful with his language here, 
emphasizing that those things we think of as being beautiful really only 
appear beautiful, since they also appear ugly. ‘Is there any one of those 
just things’, Socrates asks, ‘that will not also appear unjust? Or one of 
those pious things that will not also appear impious?’ (5.479a) Plato is 
not claiming that our everyday world is illusory in the sense of not being 
real. It is just not as real as the world of the Forms. It is smack dab in the 
middle, metaphysically, more real than complete non-existence, but less 
real than complete existence. 
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Problems with the Powers Argument
That is a lot to take in, so let us pause and restate the argument in 
premise-conclusion form, in order to grasp its structure more clearly, 
which should help us analyze it:
P1 x and y are the same power if and only if
(a) x and y have the same objects and
(b) x and y have the same function. (5.477d)
P2 Knowledge and belief are different powers. (5.477b,e)
C1 So, knowledge and belief have different objects and different 
functions. (5.478a)
C2 So, knowledge and belief have different objects.
P3 Knowledge’s object is what is. (5.478a,c)
P4 Belief is intermediate between knowledge and ignorance. 
(5.478d)
P5 Ignorance’s object is what is not. (5.478c)
C3 So, belief’s object is what is and what is not. (5.478d)
(A minor detail regarding C1: Grube’s translation does not quite square 
with the Greek text here, which is better captured by C2—which logically 
follows from C1. I do not think anything rides on Grube’s addition, but 
some readers, especially brave souls wrestling with the Greek text, will 
want to know this.) Let us work backwards, starting with C3. We have 
already noted that for Plato particular things are bundles of opposites, 
simultaneously beautiful and not beautiful, just and not just, etc.: ‘each 
of them always participates in both opposites’ (5.479b). But Socrates 
now takes this to imply that these particular things are ‘intermediates 
between what is not and what purely is’ (5.479d). This is something 
new. It is one thing to claim that predicates like ‘…is beautiful’ both 
apply and do not apply to one and the same particular object—that the 
particular thing participates in both beauty and non-beauty. But why 
would this imply that any particular ‘participates in both being and non-
being’ (5.478d), that it somehow both exists and does not exist? There 
seems to be something a little fishy here. Socrates seems to slide from 
 165Surfing the Third Wave
the predicative sense of ‘is’, where it links subjects and predicates, to its 
existential, existence-asserting sense. That is, he seems to slide from
(Predicative) Any particular thing both is beautiful and is not beautiful
to
(Existential) Any particular thing both is and is not,
as if he simply crossed out the occurrences of ‘beautiful’ in (Predicative). 
Bertrand Russell once wrote that employing the same word to express 
such different senses was ‘a disgrace to the human race’.6 Russell’s 
hyperbole is no doubt tongue-in-cheek, but there is a serious point 
in the background: philosophy often requires attention to linguistic 
subtleties like the distinction between the senses of ‘is’. In this portion 
of the argument, Socrates seems to elide the distinction between the 
predicative and existential senses, drawing a conclusion employing the 
latter from a premise employing the former. I stress that he seems to 
me to be doing this; I am not insisting that he actually does so. Such 
insistence would violate the principle of charity, which requires us to 
interpret texts and utterances in ways that maximize their truth and 
reasonableness and logical validity. But sometimes even very smart 
people make logical blunders, and the principle of charity does not 
require us to pretend otherwise. If this were a different book, aimed at a 
different audience, we would explore this question in depth and detail. 
Some people are sufficiently fascinated by issues like this as to become 
Plato scholars, and no doubt some of those scholars are rolling their eyes 
or at least arching their eyebrows at what I have said here. But—and 
here I am on firm logical ground—this is not a different book than it is, 
so I tentatively suggest that we view this apparent equivocation between 
senses of ‘is’ as a heuristic device to help us think critically about the 
argument and move on. 
These concerns about whether Socrates makes this predicative-to-
existential slide fade into the background when we see how problematic 
the first part of the argument is, the derivation of C1 from P1 and P2. 
Glaucon thinks that C1 ‘necessarily’ (5.478a) follows from P1 and P2, 
6  Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (New York: MacMillan, 
1919), p. 172.
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but his confidence is misplaced, since the conclusion does not follow 
necessarily at all. Since the conclusion could still be false even if we 
assume that the premises are true, the argument is invalid. To see this, 
consider a parallel example. Two Constitutional conditions of eligibility 
to be President of the United States are (a) that one be at least thirty-five 
years old and (b) that one be a natural-born citizen. From the fact that 
my friend Geoff is not eligible to be President, it does not follow that he 
is not at least thirty-five and that he is not a natural born citizen; what 
follows is that either Geoff is not at least thirty-five years old or Geoff 
is not a natural-born citizen. Both negative conclusions might follow, as 
they do in the case for my cat Frobisher, who, despite having been born 
here, is not a citizen of the US and is well shy of thirty-five. But all we—
and Socrates—are entitled to is the or. If I know that Geoff is well past 
thirty-five, I can then conclude that he is not a natural-born citizen (he 
is, in fact, Canadian). But until I know that, I am jumping to a conclusion 
I am not entitled to draw. What Socrates should conclude from P1 and 
P2 is that either knowledge and belief have different objects or they 
have different tasks. It might be that both their objects and tasks differ, 
but Socrates is not entitled to conclude that. To get to C2, the conclusion 
that knowledge and belief have different objects, from C1, which now 
functions as the premise that they either have different tasks or different 
objects, he has to show that knowledge and belief do not have different 
tasks. But without doing this, he is jumping to a conclusion—C2—that 
he is not entitled to. 
So Plato, in the person of Socrates, has committed one of the gravest 
of philosophical sins: he has given a logically invalid argument. But 
even if we could fix the logical invalidity, switching the ‘and’ in C1 to an 
‘or’, it is difficult to see how Socrates can get to C2. Powers differ more 
often by having different tasks or functions than by having different 
objects. Shepherds and butchers, for example, share a common object, 
sheep, but they have different tasks in relation to that object: shepherds 
seek to nurture sheep while butchers seek to turn them into lamb chops. 
On a common conception of education (though one we will see Plato 
calling into question in Book VII), teaching and learning have the same 
object, knowledge, but have different tasks or functions with respect to 
that object: teaching seeks to impart or instill knowledge while learning 
seeks to acquire it. And so on. 
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Perhaps the trouble is thinking of knowledge and belief as powers 
or capacities. Plato thinks that each of the senses has a distinct object: 
sight’s object is color, hearing’s is sound, etc. In the Theaetetus, a 
dialogue roughly contemporary with the Republic, Socrates says, ‘what 
you perceive through one power, you cannot perceive through another’ 
(185a). Cases of synesthesia aside, this has the ring of truth, though it 
seems to have the odd implication that we cannot see and smell and 
taste the same object, when it seems clear that we can: I see the coffee, 
smell it, taste it, etc. But Socrates could respond that we see the coffee’s 
color, smell its aroma, feel its heat, etc. These various sensations are 
synthesized or integrated into a unified sensory impression, but the 
various senses are modular, operating independently. We perceive 
the coffee by or through perceiving its sensible qualities. But, a critic 
might insist, it is not the case that these powers ultimately have different 
objects; instead, they have a common object: the coffee. It is true that 
their intermediary objects are different properties or qualities of that 
object—we see color, smell aroma, etc.—but there is a common object 
that those various sensory qualities belong to. So we have reason to be 
skeptical of the first premise of the Powers Argument. And even if we 
give Socrates the benefit of the doubt and take him to be talking of the 
various intermediate objects of these powers, not the ultimate object, we 
might wonder what reason we have to think of knowledge and belief as 
analogous to powers in having unique objects.
Most contemporary philosophers would agree with the spirit of 
P2, since they think that knowledge and belief are different cognitive 
or epistemic states, though they would be unlikely to think of them 
as ‘powers’. Few, though, would agree with Plato’s conclusion that 
knowledge and belief have different kinds of objects. As discussed 
earlier, on the JTB (Justified True Belief) conception of knowledge, 
to know something is to have a belief that is not only true but is also 
justified, which (on a plausible account of what it is to be justified in 
believing something) requires good reasons for having the belief. Most 
contemporary philosophers would regard C2 as false, since knowledge 
and belief, though different, have the same objects: propositions. In 
the first sentence of the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln speaks of the 
Founders’ dedication to ‘the proposition that all men are created equal.’ 
If he had said it in French (‘la proposition que tous les hommes sont créés 
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égaux’) he would have expressed the same proposition. Even though we 
express propositions in language, at heart propositions are conceptual 
entities rather than linguistic ones, and the same proposition can be 
expressed in different languages. Lincoln believed in the proposition 
of fundamental human equality, while Plato, we have seen, did not. 
Both Anna, who grew up in Wisconsin and has looked at her share of 
roadmaps and atlases, and Bryce, a ‘Coastie’ with a vague picture of the 
geography of North America who has trouble locating Wisconsin on a 
map (for him the Midwest is a vague ‘blobject’), believe the proposition 
that Wisconsin is east of the Mississippi River. On the JTB conception, 
Anna knows this while Bryce does not. Though Bryce’s belief is true, he 
does not have good reasons for it, since when pressed the only reason 
he offers is, ‘I just think it is’. Though Anna and Bryce are in different 
cognitive and epistemic states, their objects are the same, the proposition 
that Wisconsin is east of the Mississippi River. 
Or so say most contemporary epistemologists. That most 
contemporary philosophers think C2 is false does not make it false, 
of course, but in the next section we will see reason to think they are 
probably right about this. 
Plato’s Fallible Conception of Infallibility
So why does Plato have someone as smart as Socrates make such a 
logically flawed argument? It may be that the argument accurately 
reflects Socrates’ reasoning, which Plato faithfully reproduces, though 
that seems unlikely. Perhaps this is one of those instances of Plato’s 
intentionally having Socrates make a bad argument in hopes of engaging 
the reader in philosophical dialogue, since the yes-men Socrates is talking 
with do not seem up to the task. That is certainly possible, but here it 
does not ring true—at least to me. In those instances in Book I when 
the bad arguments seem intentional—e.g., in Socrates’ first refutation 
of Polemarchus—there was a substantive philosophical point that Plato 
seemed to want his readers to work out for themselves (that virtues are 
not crafts or skills). But given how much is at stake here—reasons for 
believing in Plato’s Forms, for taking Plato’s Elevator to the Third and 
Fourth Levels—it is an odd time for such a lesson. Perhaps Plato has 
independent reasons for believing C2, that knowledge and belief have 
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different objects, and this makes him less attentive than he should be to 
the quality of the reasons he offers here in support of this belief. It is a 
common enough human failing, but it is surprising to see Plato falling 
victim to it here. 
Those independent reasons for thinking C2 is true can be found in 
the discussion Socrates and Glaucon have about P2. Glaucon agrees—as 
we all should—that knowledge and belief are different. ‘How could a 
person with any understanding’, he asks, ‘think that a fallible power 
is the same as an infallible one?’ (5.477e) The idea that belief is fallible 
should ring true: we regularly believe things that are not true. We think 
they are true, of course, and sometimes insist that they are. After all, we 
probably would not believe them if we knew they were false, since to 
believe something is, at least in part, to take it to be true. But while I can 
believe things that are false, I cannot know things that are false. I might 
believe that Orson Welles directed The Third Man or that Edward Albee 
wrote Desert Solitaire, but I cannot know these things, since they are 
false. On the JTB conception, remember, my beliefs count as knowledge 
only if they are true (though being true is not enough: those true beliefs 
also have to be justified). For contemporary philosophers, that is the 
sense in which knowledge is infallible and belief is fallible: I can believe 
things that are false but I cannot know things that are false.
Plato seems to have a different understanding of the infallibility of 
knowledge, one that goes beyond the view that we cannot know things 
that are false and holds that we cannot know things that could be false. 
In other words, the objects of knowledge must not only be true, they 
must be necessarily true. While a contingent truth could be false, a 
necessary truth cannot possibly be false: it must be true. The candidates 
for such things are few, but the truths of mathematics offer the most 
intuitively plausible examples of necessary truths. Although it is not 
completely uncontroversial, I think that the Pythagorean Theorem is 
necessarily true, that it was true even before anyone thought of it and 
would be true even if no one ever thought of it, even if no creatures 
capable of understanding geometry had ever existed. That the square of 
the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of 
the other two sides is not merely a mind-independent truth, it is a mind-
independent truth that could not be false. Given the nature of right 
triangles, there is no way the square of the hypotenuse could not equal 
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the sum of the squares of the other two sides. If there are two mittens 
and one stocking cap on the table, it is mind-independently true there 
are three things on the table: it does not matter whether I am looking 
at them or not; there are three things on the table. But it is merely a 
contingent truth that there are three things on the table; I could have just 
as easily kept my stocking cap on (it is cold in here!), in which case there 
would only be two items on the table. So while it is true that there are 
three items on the table, it is a contingent truth. But that three is the sum 
of one and two is a necessary truth: it cannot be otherwise. And here it is 
important not to confuse numbers with numerals, which are our names 
for numbers. We could use the word ‘two’ to name the number three 
and the word ‘three’ to name the number two—heck, we could call two 
‘Ethel’ and three ‘Fred’. The English sentence ‘two plus one is three’ is 
only contingently true, since which words attach to which objects is a 
contingent fact of English. But the proposition it expresses, that the sum 
of two and one is three, is necessarily true, regardless of which names or 
numerals we use to designate the numbers. 
The crucial difference between these two conceptions of the 
infallibility of knowledge is that the contemporary conception of 
infallibility is a claim about the nature of knowledge, while for Plato it is 
a claim about the objects of knowledge:
Contemporary: Necessarily, if someone knows that p, then p is true.
Plato: If someone knows that p, then p is necessarily true.
A lot rides on where ‘necessarily’ appears—or as linguists and 
philosophers would say, on its scope. There is a world of difference 
between
Not Trying  I am not trying to hear what they are saying
and
Trying Not  I am trying not to hear what they are saying.
Not Trying is true so long as I am not making an effort to hear what they 
are saying (e.g., I am not leaning in, putting my ear to the wall, etc.); 
if I hear what they are saying, perhaps the fault is theirs and not mine, 
since I was not eavesdropping. But Trying Not requires that I make an 
effort to not hear them (e.g., I cover my ears, change locations, etc.).; 
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if I hear what they are saying, I have failed in my attempt to not hear 
them—perhaps I should have tried harder. Similarly, the difference 
between the contemporary and Platonic conceptions of the infallibility 
of knowledge is a difference in the scope of the adverb ‘necessarily’. On 
the contemporary account, what is necessarily true is a claim about the 
nature of knowledge, that if I know that p, then p is true—so I can have 
knowledge only of things that are true. On the account I am attributing 
to Plato, it is the proposition known that is necessarily true: if I know that 
p, then p is necessarily true—so I can have knowledge only of necessary 
truths, never of merely contingent truths. 
If Plato understands the infallibility of knowledge as I have 
suggested, it is no wonder that he thinks that knowledge and belief 
must have different objects. Only the Forms, Plato thinks, have the 
necessity required of objects of knowledge, since only the Form of 
beauty is completely beautiful; particular beautiful things are too awash 
in contingency and opposition to make the grade. (The self-predication 
of the Forms—the view that the Form of beauty is beautiful, the Form of 
justice is just—is of great interest to Plato scholars, but it is an issue we 
need not tangle with here. Suffice it to say that there are problems with 
this view: if the Forms are self-predicating, then the Form of beauty is 
beautiful and the Form of justice is just. That might seem just fine, but 
then the Form of bigness is big and the Form of smallness is small, the 
Form of redness is red and the Form of squareness is square—all of 
which are odd implications for entities that are not spatiotemporal.) 
Most of the truths of our everyday lives—our names, where we 
parked the car, our favorite flavor of ice cream, how many (if any) 
children we have—are contingent truths, not necessary truths: they 
could have been otherwise. My parents could have named me Ivan 
instead of Sean; I parked the car in the street but I could have parked it 
in the driveway or in the garage, etc. Things could be different than they 
are. On the ordinary conception of knowledge, I know that my name is 
Sean and that I have two cats. But on the stronger understanding of the 
infallibility of knowledge that Plato seems to have, I do not know these 
things, since they are only contingently and not necessarily true and 
thus not proper objects of knowledge. This will strike many readers as 
quite counter-intuitive; most of us feel quite confident that we know our 
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names (though where we parked the car might be a different matter 
entirely, especially for garageless city-dwellers). 
So it is plausible that Plato’s view about the infallibility of knowledge 
is what accounts for his belief that knowledge and belief must have 
different objects. And it might help explain why he does not seem aware 
of the weaknesses of the actual argument he gives to support that belief. 
But there are still the facts that the Powers Argument is logically invalid 
and its key first premise is false. It is certainly the marquee argument of 
Book V, intended to provide good reasons to accept Plato’s distinctive 
metaphysics. Of course, Plato’s metaphysics might still be correct: the 
conclusion of an invalid argument can still be true. But as things stand, 
there is a gaping hole in the middle of the Republic.
Some Suggestions for Further Reading
Readers looking for an excellent introduction to metaphysics by one of 
the best contemporary philosophers will find it in Peter Van Inwagen, 
Metaphysics (4th ed.) (Boulder: Westview Press, 2014).
Readers interested in a good, brief introduction to epistemology 
should see Jennifer Nagel, Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/
actrade/9780199661268.001.0001.
For an overview of Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology, interested 
readers should see Allan Silverman, ‘Plato’s Middle Period Metaphysics 
and Epistemology’, in the ever-helpful Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-metaphysics/).
For an advanced discussion of some of the issues treated in this chapter, 
interested readers might start with Gail Fine, ‘Knowledge and Belief in 
Republic V’, in Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. by Gail Fine (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 215–46. Gregory Vlastos, ‘A 
Metaphysical Paradox’, in Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays, ed. by Richard 
Kraut (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 181–95, is an 
accessible discussion of Plato’s two-worlds metaphysics by one of the 
twentieth century’s leading Plato scholars. 
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For readers interested in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, his Philosophical 
Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1973) is a good place to start. Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: 
Games, Life, and Utopia, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 
2014) is of great interest in itself and also for its anti-Wittgensteinian 
analysis of the concept of a game.
Readers interested in Berkeley’s philosophy might start with George 
Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between 
Hylas and Philonous, ed. by Roger Woolhouse (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Classics, 1988). Jonathan Bennett’s helpful modernization can be found 
at Early Modern Texts (http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/).
Readers interested in the philosophy of mathematics might start with 
Stewart Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Philosophy of Mathematics: 
Selected Readings, ed. by Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, 2nd ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) is a classic collection of 
essays on this fascinating and difficult area of philosophy.
Plato’s Theaetetus is a Socratic dialogue especially focused on 
epistemology. The Parmenides explores the complexities of the theory 
of the Forms, among other things. There are excellent translations of 
both in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1997). Hackett also offers stand-alone translations along 
with informative, detailed introductions.
B-side of bell krater with scene of three young men with himatia in an 
arena. Photograph by Ángel M. Felicísimo (2016), Wikimedia, Public 
Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cr%C3%A1tera_
(38877852382).jpg
9. The Philosopher’s Virtues:  
Book VI
Although there are serious problems with the Powers Argument, its 
invalidity and unsoundness do not entail that the ideal city will get washed 
away by the Third Wave. For even if we reject the mind-independent 
reality of the Forms or, more cautiously, regard belief in their mind-
independence as unjustified, we can still agree with Plato that ideal 
rulers will possess knowledge of what is best for the city. Although the 
distinction between knowledge and belief is crucial to Plato’s distinction 
between philosopher and non-philosopher, knowledge and belief can 
be different epistemic states even if they do not have different objects. 
So the distinction between knowledge and belief, and the distinction 
between philosopher and non-philosopher that it underlies, can survive 
the failures of the Powers Argument, since the distinction itself does not 
depend on Plato’s particular way of making it. 
In this chapter, we will look at another way in which Plato tries to 
distinguish between ‘a true philosopher and […] a counterfeit one’ 
(6.485d). He is especially keen to distinguish genuine philosophers 
from sophists, the professional teachers of rhetoric whom the public 
mistakenly takes to be philosophers. In doing so, Plato will not only 
shore up his response to the Third Wave by further ‘defin[ing] who the 
philosophers are that we dare to say must rule’ (5.474b), but he will also 
exonerate Socrates, who, as many readers know, was tried and convicted 
of impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens and put to death for those 
alleged crimes in bce 399. Sophists, and not philosophers, Plato insists, 
are guilty of corrupting the youth (6.492a). In a phrase that will recall 
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his Book I exchange with Thrasymachus, Socrates wants to discover 
who the philosophers are ‘in the most exact sense of the term’ (6.503b).
In asking ‘whether a soul is philosophic or not’ (6.486b), Plato 
indicates that being a philosopher is a matter of nature as well as 
nurture. All the education and nurture in the world will not produce 
a philosopher if the underlying philosophic nature is not present, and 
improperly educating someone with a philosophic nature will not just 
fail to produce a philosopher, it is likely to produce moral depravity: 
‘the best natures become outstandingly bad when they receive a bad 
upbringing’ (6.491e). Those who naturally possess the intellectual 
wherewithal to be philosophers but who do not receive the right kind of 
education can do far more harm than their less intellectually endowed 
fellows. Plato seems to have in mind here the historical Alcibiades, a 
beautiful, brilliant young Athenian who proved a traitor, switching 
sides to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. Fans of the television drama 
Breaking Bad will not be far off the mark in taking Walter White as an 
example of Plato’s point, since his intellectual prowess makes him far 
worse, morally, than his partner and former student, Jesse.
Socrates’ task is to describe the philosophic nature, to show what 
philosophers are like in contrast with non-philosophers. In Book VII 
he will discuss their nurture, expanding on the program of education 
already spelled out in Books II and III. In Book V the distinction between 
philosopher and non-philosopher rested on the distinction between 
knowledge and belief, which led us to the metaphysical distinction 
between Forms and particulars. Here the focus is on the virtues that 
true philosophers can and do possess.
Loving the Truth
The most important of these virtues is love for the truth. Not only must 
philosophers ‘be without falsehood, they must refuse to accept what 
is false, hate it, and have a love for the truth’ (6.485c). This will strike 
many readers as surprising in light of Socrates’ earlier insistence that 
the rulers will have to employ falsehood in governing, for example in 
rigging the lotteries determining the ‘sacred marriages.’ In addressing 
the Second Wave, Socrates conceded that ‘our rulers will have to make 
considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit of those 
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they rule’ (5.459c). Is Plato being inconsistent here? It may look that 
way at first, but on closer examination it seems not. After all, rulers 
can employ falsehoods even though they hate them and reluctantly use 
them only when something important is at stake, when the falsehood 
is beneficial to those it is being told to, and when it is the only or 
perhaps the most effective means to bringing about the benefit. And 
the distinction between true or genuine falsehoods and merely verbal 
falsehoods, which we met toward the end of Book II, blunts the charge 
of inconsistency as well. While rulers will find employing verbal 
falsehoods useful, presumably they will never employ the radically 
false and soul-distorting true or genuine falsehoods. The rulers can 
hate what is most truly or genuinely false but reluctantly employ mere 
verbal falsehoods, which are ‘useful and so not deserving of hatred’ 
(2.382c). Verbal falsehoods are like medicine (2.382c, 3.389b), after all, 
and medical treatment is one of Glaucon’s main examples of goods 
that are ‘onerous but beneficial’ (2.357c), not intrinsically desirable 
(and perhaps intrinsically undesirable) but useful. While there may 
be a tension in Plato’s view, upon reflection it seems to fall far short of 
inconsistency. 
That this crucial philosophical virtue involves love should not be 
surprising, given the centrality of truth to the philosophical enterprise 
and indeed that philosophy is, etymologically, the love (philein) of 
wisdom (sophia). Love of truth pairs well with the role played by 
the guardian-rulers’ love for the city back in Book III, which Socrates 
reminds us of here in Book VI: the rulers must be ‘lovers of their city 
(φιλόπολις [philopolis])’ (6.503a). We noted earlier Plato’s playing up 
the cognitive dimension of love, focusing on the lover’s belief that their 
beloved’s flourishing is an essential part of their own flourishing. 
This is not to say that their love is merely cognitive, involving no 
feelings for the beloved or commitment to it. Perhaps Plato focuses 
on love’s cognitive dimension because its affective dimension—how 
it feels—is so obvious and potent that it is likely to lead us to think 
of love as exclusively a matter of feeling. Plato, committed as he is to 
the centrality of reason in a well-lived life, wishes to remedy this by 
highlighting love’s rational, cognitive side. Back in Book III Socrates 
claimed that ‘the right kind of love (ὁ ὀρθὸς ἔρως [ho orthos erôs]) has 
nothing mad or licentious about it’ and instead is ‘the love of order 
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and beauty that has been moderated by education’ (3.403a). Although 
we tend to think of erôs—erotic or romantic love—in terms of sexual 
passion, Plato argues in the Symposium that its proper object is the 
Form of or essence of beauty. The goal of the musical education, after 
all, is ‘love of the fine and beautiful’ (3.403c). 
The love philosophers have and feel for the truth is στέργειν (stergein) 
rather than ἔρως or φιλία, but perhaps we should not read too much 
into this, as Plato does not here draw hard-and-fast distinctions between 
kinds of love as later authors are wont to do, e.g., between philia, eros, 
and agapê (friendly love, erotic or romantic love, and neighborly love). 
But it is telling that stergein typically refers to parental love, which clearly 
involves the parent’s identifying their child’s wellbeing with their own, 
and which involves a distinctive kind of affection. 
Love of truth may well be the Socratic virtue par excellence, 
though when we first meet Thrasymachus, he insists that Socrates is 
φιλότιμος (philotimos), a lover of honor and victory (rather than truth) 
who just wants to win arguments. This seems an ironic projection on 
Thrasymachus’ part, since he aims to persuade his audience of a pre-
determined conclusion by the power of his rhetorical skill, rather than to 
investigate the matter and accept whatever conclusions reason leads us 
to. Knowing how to win arguments is the skill the sophist teaches, and 
it is the skill most at home in the law-court. Philosophical investigation 
also requires skill, and we have attended to some places where logical 
skill is not as developed as it should be. But philosophy requires more 
than skill, Plato suggests. It requires the virtue of loving the truth, which 
in turn implies a respect for rigor well expressed by Socrates’ dictum 
that ‘whatever direction the argument blows us, that is where we must 
go’ (3.394d). 
In addition to respect for rigor, another sub-virtue is open-mindedness, 
which we might think of as openness to rational persuasion. We noted 
earlier how the Republic’s opening exchange raises the opposition 
between force and persuasion. When Polemarchus jokingly asks, ‘But 
could you persuade us, if we will not listen?’ (1.327c), he is making the 
serious point that philosophical inquiry requires that we do not have a 
pre-determined outcome, as a lawyer trying a case might, or at least that 
we are open to countervailing reasons and evidence. 
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Intellectual Virtues and Character Virtues
An interesting feature of this leading philosophical virtue is that loving 
the truth seems to straddle two distinct kinds of virtues, intellectual 
virtue and character virtue. Perhaps because he was by nature less 
taxonomically inclined than his student Aristotle (whose inclinations 
in this regard were no doubt shaped by his biological investigations), 
Plato does not explicitly distinguish between these kinds of virtue, as 
Aristotle does in his seminal work in moral philosophy, the Nicomachean 
Ethics. Readers will recall that a virtue is the state or condition that 
enables its possessor to perform its function well, where its function 
is its purpose or characteristic activity. A knife’s function is to cut, 
so sharpness is its virtue, since a knife must be sharp if it is to cut 
well. Where character virtues such as moderation and courage enable 
morally correct behavior, intellectual virtues such as wisdom are traits 
that enable their possessors to gain knowledge. The function or goal 
they enable is knowledge. So genuine philosophers, Socrates tells us, 
must possess intellectual virtues such as quickness or ease in learning 
(6.486c, 6.487a, 6.490c, 6.494b, 6.503c) and a good memory (6.490c, 
6.494b, 6.503c). The absence of the latter trait allows Plato a few jokes 
along the way: Glaucon, in admitting that he has forgotten that they 
aim to make the city as a whole happy and just (7.519e), thereby 
implicitly concedes that he lacks a philosophical nature, at least to 
some degree. Even Socrates himself admits that he cannot remember 
whose question prompted his articulating this principle (5.465e). And 
clearly a good memory will be important to the agreement-based, 
question-and-answer method they have adopted to investigate the 
Republic’s two main questions.
Loving truth enables knowledge, since loving wealth or honor 
more than or instead of truth will hamper rather than enable learning. 
Thus love of truth seems, like being a quick learner or having a good 
memory, to be an intellectual virtue. But love of truth tells us not just 
about a person’s intellect but also about their character, since it tells us 
about what they value. Thus it seems as much a virtue of character as 
an intellectual virtue. The person who loves the truth can be counted 
on to act well and rightly when for example truth and self-interest 
conflict. Moreover, some intellectual virtues such as quickness and 
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ease in learning are like skills in so far as they are morally neutral, 
depending for their moral status on the subjects learned and the end 
to which the knowledge gained is put. A quick learner with a good 
memory will master the mechanics of terrorism more quickly than a 
forgetful, slow learner will. Love of truth, by contrast, seems to lack 
this moral neutrality, as does wisdom—at least on Plato’s conception of 
moral knowledge. If one really knows what is good, Plato has Socrates 
argue in the Protagoras, one would act on that knowledge if one were 
able to. The idea of knowing what is good or right but not acting on 
that knowledge—the problem of weakness of will—is not a genuine 
possibility. Exploring whether Plato was right about this will take us 
too far afield, and unsurprisingly there is much scholarly debate on 
the topic. But this melding of moral knowledge and moral conduct 
helps us see why love of truth has a foot on each side of the divide 
between intellectual and character virtues. 
Another philosophic virtue worthy of our attention is high-
mindedness (μεγαλοπρέπεια [megaloprepeia], which is sometimes 
translated as ‘magnificence’). Like many of the virtues discussed in 
Book VI, we first met high-mindedness in Book III (e.g., 3.402c), where 
it was implicit in the musical-poetic cultivation of courage: ‘a decent 
man does not think that death is a terrible thing for someone to suffer’ 
(3.387d) and thus must be ‘told stories that will make them least afraid 
of death’ (3.386a). High-mindedness is a virtue of knowing what 
really matters, what is worth taking seriously. Socrates suggests that 
a high-minded person will not ‘consider human life to be something 
important’ (6.486a), but this is best taken as a point about life’s relative 
importance. It is not valueless, something to be thrown away on a 
whim, but it is not as important as the good of the city. Living is not 
itself an intrinsic good, though living well is. And if living well, which 
for Plato requires living justly, requires sacrificing one’s life for the 
good of one’s city, then the high-minded person will (ideally) have 
no hesitation in doing so. High-mindedness looms in the background 
of Plato’s deepest criticisms of poetry in Book X. ‘Human affairs are 
not worth taking very seriously’, Socrates insists in Book X (10.604b), 
and poetry is dangerously corrupting because it leads us to ‘take [our] 
sufferings seriously’ (10.605d). Readers familiar with Stoicism will see 
its Socratic roots in the virtue of high-mindedness.
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Virtues of Personal Style 
In addition to virtues of character and intellect, Socrates proposes another 
family of virtues as distinctive of the philosophical nature. Gracefulness, 
which we met back in Book III when discussing poetic meter or rhythm 
(e.g., 3.400c, 3.400d, 3.401a, 3.401d), is not a matter of character or 
intellect so much as a matter of personal, aesthetic style. Would-be 
philosopher-kings must be graceful (εὔχαρις [eucharis]) (5.487a), and 
indeed they approach the divine as they absorb gracefulness from 
studying the Forms (6.500c). 
We meet a similar group of personal-aesthetic virtues in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, where traits such as wit and sociability are on 
Aristotle’s official list of virtues, on a par with canonical, cardinal virtues 
such as courage and moderation. The way Plato and Aristotle treat such 
traits suggests that they did not draw a sharp line between character and 
personality, between moral and non-moral traits, as we moderns tend 
to do. Their attitudes toward the personal-aesthetic virtues suggests a 
more holistic, integrated picture of human goodness on which calling 
someone ‘a good person’ is not an exclusively moral evaluation. There is 
a lively scholarly debate about whether our modern notion of morality 
is even to be found in ancient Greek philosophical thought. At the very 
least, it seems safe to say that beauty and goodness are more intimately 
connected for Plato and Aristotle than they are for us. Proper aesthetic 
sensibility is the basis for morality; and the crucial notion of what is 
kalon—fine or noble or beautiful—is inescapably aesthetic. 
A Game of Checkers (6.487b–d)
It is perhaps surprising that a willingness to speak up and challenge 
assertions that others accept does not make Socrates’ list of 
philosophical virtues. It is certainly an admirable trait, and one that 
Adeimantus displays with some frequency throughout the Republic. 
In Book II, after Glaucon raises the issues he want Socrates to address, 
Adeimantus insists that ‘the most important thing’ (which he takes 
to be the hypocritical way Athenian culture praises justice) ‘has not 
been said yet’ (2.362d). Book IV begins with Adeimantus questioning 
how ideal the ideal polis can be, given that the guardian-rulers’ austere 
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lifestyle will leave them unhappy (4.419a). And Book V begins with 
Adeimantus (prompted by Polemarchus) interrupting Socrates’ 
immediately moving to consider the Republic’s second question, when 
he still has questions about the way Socrates has answered the first, 
which prompts the Three Waves. Adeimantus shows that interrupting 
a speaker is not always rude, and he models a willingness to not be 
cowed by an intellectual superior.
Here in Book VI Adeimantus jumps in to answer a question 
Socrates has posed to Glaucon—not the first such interruption in the 
Republic—about whether he would be willing to ‘entrust the city’ to 
the philosopher-kings whose nature he has been describing (6.487a). 
Adeimantus does not object to particular claims Socrates has made; he 
does not deny that philosophers must be courageous or quick learners, 
nor does he challenge the status of the personal-aesthetic virtues. Instead, 
he offers a broader objection, suggesting that Socrates’ whole procedure 
is unlikely to persuade anyone to ‘entrust the city to [philosophers] and 
to them alone’ (6.487a). He articulates the perspective of people who 
are not convinced by the Socratic chain or reasoning, feeling merely 
outmaneuvered and not persuaded:
Just as inexperienced checkers players are trapped by the experts in 
the end and cannot make a move, so too they [i.e., your vanquished 
interlocutors] are trapped in the end and have nothing to say in this 
different kind of checkers, which is played not with disks but with 
words. Yet the truth is not affected by this outcome. I say this with a 
view to the present case, for someone might well say that he is unable 
to oppose you as you ask each of your questions, yet he sees that of all 
those who take up philosophy […] the greatest number become cranks, 
not to say completely vicious, while those who seem completely decent 
are rendered useless to the city because of the studies you recommend. 
(6.487b–d) 
Polemarchus, for one, knows whereof Adeimantus speaks: Socrates 
argued in Book I that defining justice as benefiting friends and harming 
enemies led to the conclusion that the just person is a kind of thief and 
justice itself is a craft of stealing. When asked if this is what he meant, 
Polemarchus insists, ‘No, by god, it is not. I do not know any more what 
I did mean, but I still believe that to benefit one’s friends and harm one’s 
enemies is justice’ (1.334b). There were good reasons for him to resist 
the conclusion Socrates has led him to, but even though he did not see 
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what these reasons were and thus how he could resist the conclusion, 
Polemarchus hung on to his definition of justice, feeling outmaneuvered 
by Socrates rather than persuaded by him. 
Adeimantus is not accusing Socrates of acting in bad faith but rather 
is pointing out that Socrates is perceived by many of his fellow citizens 
not as better at arriving at moral truth but simply better at intellectual 
checkers than they are. They can and will persist in believing their 
seemingly refuted views, since Socrates’ philosophical argumentation 
seems to be nothing more than ‘a kind of game of contradiction’ (7.539b). 
In short, to Socrates’ question about entrusting the city to philosopher-
kings, the solution to the Third Wave—Adeimantus seems to be saying, 
‘Well, I might entrust the city to them, Socrates, but most people will 
not. Why would they, when they think of philosophers as useless at best 
and vicious at worse? They will nod in seeming agreement with you, 
but nothing you have said so far will change their minds: they think you 
are just playing word-games.’
It is no accident that it is Adeimantus who in Book II insists—twice 
(2.367b–e)—that Socrates not merely give yet another ‘theoretical 
argument’ that the just life is happier. Here he is doing much the same 
thing, asking not for a reworked version of the Powers Argument 
but for something less abstract and more accessible. Socrates obliged 
Adeimantus’ request in Book II by offering the city-soul analogy, which 
of course structures the rest of the Republic, and here in Book VI he 
responds in a similar but even more procedurally transparent vein: ‘The 
question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image or simile’ 
(6.487e). So Socrates will meet Adeimantus’ checkers metaphor with one 
of his own, meant to show why his fellow citizens regard philosophers 
as useless.
Analogical thinking is at the heart of the Republic. Its very method 
is analogical, asking us to think about the nature and value of justice 
as a virtue of persons by first thinking about it as a virtue of city-states. 
Here in Book VI, Socrates explicitly appeals to similes (6.487e, 6.488a, 
6.489a) and analogies (the Greek terms are εἰκών [eikôn: likeness, image, 
reflection], from which we get the English word ‘icon’, and ἀνάλογον 
[analogon: proportionate to, resembling], from which we get the English 
word ‘analogy’). Socrates, who describes himself as ‘greedy for images’ 
(6.488a), is forgoing the ‘longer and fuller road’ that leads to ‘precise 
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answer[s]’ (4.435c) in favor of a less demanding path that offers a view 
of the same truths the more demanding path leads to, but the view is less 
clear and distinct. The road of dialectic, which requires doing without 
hypotheses and metaphors (6.511ae, 7.533c), is not just longer; it is a 
‘rough, steep path’ (7.515e) that only those few who are blessed with a 
philosophical nature are capable of following. The rest of us—most of 
us, given that ‘the majority cannot be philosophic’ (6.494a)—will have 
to be content with an easier, less rigorous path. In the next chapter we 
will explore the major metaphors of Books VI and VII—the analogies of 
the Sun, Line, and Cave. Here we will look briefly at Socrates’ analogical 
response to Adeimantus’ challenge. Given the critique of painting, 
poetry, and the other imitative arts that awaits us in Book X, it is striking 
that here Socrates embraces the role of painter (γραφής [graphês] 
(6.488a)) as he constructs his analogies. 
The Ship of State Sails the Third Wave (6.487e–490e)
Socrates’ surprising response to Adeimantus’ suggestion that most 
people think that philosophers are useless at best and vicious at worst 
is that ‘they seem to me to speak the truth’ (6.487d). The ‘seem’ will 
turn out to be important: Socrates does not think genuine philosophers 
really are useless or vicious, but he understands that people who do 
not distinguish the genuine philosophers from the pretenders will think 
they are. It is in this spirit that he offers the Ship of State analogy, hoping 
to explain ‘what the most decent people experience in relation to their 
city’ (6.488a) and why they think philosophers are useless. 
Think of the city as a ship, he suggests. Whom should the owner 
select as its captain? Obviously, the owner should select the person 
who possesses ‘the art of navigation’ (6.488b), since only a person 
possessing the relevant nautical skills has sufficient knowledge to chart 
the appropriate course to get the ship safely to its destination. But the 
owner, who knows nothing of navigation and is near-sighted and hard 
of hearing, to boot, will not choose ‘the true captain’ (6.488e), alas. 
The sailors clamor for the job, but while each of them understands his 
particular role on the ship and can follow the captain’s orders, none of 
them is qualified to give such orders, despite thinking they are. (This is 
an early instance of the Dunning-Kruger Effect, a cognitive bias leading 
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people to overestimate their abilities and fail to recognize their lack of 
competence in certain areas.) The owner chooses not the person skilled in 
navigation but rather ‘the person who is clever at persuading or forcing 
the shipowner’ (6.488d), with predictably bad results. And analogously 
the citizens choose for their ruler not the person who possesses wisdom 
and knows what is best for the city as a whole, but rather someone who 
charms and flatters them. ‘But why blame the philosophers and regard 
them as useless?’, Socrates seems to ask. That they are not in fact chosen 
for the job for which they are qualified tells us more about their fellow 
citizens than it does about them. Just as genuine captains do not beg 
ship owners for jobs or doctors do not beg the sick to be allowed to treat 
them, ‘it is not for the ruler, if he is truly any use, to beg the others to 
accept his rule’ (6.489c). 
Rulers, doctors, and captains are entitled to maintain their self-
respect, which presumably entitles them to refuse to sing along to the 
Temptations’ ‘Ain’t Too Proud to Beg’ as they go about their business. 
But given that what is at stake is the wellbeing of the city, perhaps this 
seemingly legitimate pride is a vice, not a virtue. We will see in Book 
VII that Socrates thinks that possessing political wisdom does not in 
itself entail an obligation to seek to govern; only a philosopher-king 
or -queen raised by the ideal city would be under such an obligation. 
One might think that those who possess political wisdom should be 
sufficiently interested in the wellbeing of their city for a bit of begging 
to be in order. This might seem to go against Plato’s dictum that ‘it 
is those who are not lovers of ruling who must rule’ (7.521b), but 
one can be willing to rule without loving ruling, if only to avoid the 
punishment of being ‘ruled by someone worse than oneself’ (1.347c). 
The historian Gordon Wood remarks that at least early in American 
political life, ‘Gentlemen generally stood, not ran, for election, and 
canvassing for an office, as [Aaron] Burr was said to have done for the 
vice-presidency in 1792, was widely thought to be improper’.1 Perhaps 
Socrates shares something like this view and thus regards actively 
seeking office as unseemly. 
1  Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 160. 
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Tending the Beast (6.490e–495a) 
Against those genuine, wisdom-possessing philosophers are people who 
seem to possess wisdom but actually do not: sophists. If we think of the 
citizens of Athens as ‘a huge, strong beast’ (6.493a), these sophists have 
a knack for learning how best to placate the beast, how to take advantage 
of its moods and satisfy its appetites. But the pseudo-philosophical 
sophist ‘knows nothing about which of [the beast’s] convictions is 
fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, but he applies all these 
names in accordance with how the beast reacts—calling what it enjoys 
good, and what angers it bad. He has no other account to give of these 
terms’ (6.493b). The sophist’s ‘wisdom’ consists in telling the beast 
what it wants to hear, which echoes a point Socrates made earlier: ‘The 
person who is honored and considered clever and wise in importance 
matters by such badly governed cities is the one who serves them most 
pleasantly, indulges them, flatters them, anticipates their wishes, and is 
clever at fulfilling them’ (4.426c). Sophists, mere pretenders to wisdom, 
are adept at ‘tending the beast’ (6.493b), but their skill lies in persuasion, 
not truth-seeking. (In the dialogue the Gorgias, Plato has Socrates suggest 
that the sophists fall short of possessing skill or craft (τέχνη [technê]) 
and instead merely have a ‘knack’ (ἐμπειρία [empeiria], whence the word 
‘empirical’) but we can safely ignore that interesting issue here.) What 
they possess is not wisdom, but it is not really surprising that it passes 
for wisdom. After all, most of us are prey to flattery, and for Socrates 
and Plato, ‘the majority cannot be philosophic’ (6.494a)—hence the 
anti-democratic nature of the ideal polis. For Plato, it is not merely the 
case that most of us do not possess wisdom, but rather that most of us 
cannot possess it. Given his conception of knowledge, we can see why he 
holds this strongly anti-democratic view. Wisdom is knowledge of what 
is best for the city as a whole, and to possess such knowledge one must 
grasp the Form of the good. Only someone with this stable, true model 
of goodness will be able to ‘establish here on earth conventions of what 
is fine or just or good’ (6.484d). Readers who do not share Socrates’ 
austere conception of knowledge will likely think that genuine wisdom, 
while still rare and very different from the focus-group politicking of 
modern sophists, is more common than Socrates allows. 
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Shelter from the Storm (6.496a–497c)
Suppose that Socrates is right that no one can be happy in a polis not 
governed by philosophers. Given ‘the madness of the majority’ and 
the fact that ‘hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs’ (6.496c), 
a person trying to live well—which requires living justly—is ‘like a 
man who has fallen among wild animals and is neither willing to 
join them in doing injustice nor sufficiently strong to oppose the 
general savagery alone’ (6.496d). What should such a person do? I 
suspect that many readers will be disappointed by Socrates’ answer. 
For rather than urging political engagement to reform and improve a 
polis that falls short of their ideals of justice or advocating revolution 
to overthrow a polis that is not merely non-just but is positively unjust, 
Socrates instead counsels withdrawal from public affairs, urging 
those who want to live justly in unjust city-states to ‘lead a quiet life 
and do their own work […] like someone who takes refuge under a 
little wall from a storm […] [and] is satisfied if he can somehow lead 
his present life free from injustice and impious acts and depart from 
it with good hope, blameless and content’ (6.496d). 
Many politically inclined readers will reject this approach, seeing 
it as acquiescent to injustice, but the fair-minded among them should 
be able to appreciate why some will find it attractive. While Socrates’ 
preferred path seems apolitical, its defenders might reply that he is 
actually offering a different kind of politics, one that is interior rather 
than exterior: keep the constitution of the ideal city firmly in mind 
and ‘make oneself its citizen’ (9.592b). As with the virtue of high-
mindedness discussed earlier, we can see here the seeds of the stoic 
idea of cosmopolitanism: one is not primarily a citizen of the city-state 
one inhabits in space and time but rather a universal polis. And surely 
high-mindedness is at work as one seeks shelter from the storm: if 
indeed ‘Human affairs are not worth taking very seriously’ (10.604b), 
why not tend to one’s inner polis rather than muck about in the outer 
one, especially since that outer polis will be genuinely habitable only 
by a remarkable stroke of luck or by divine intervention: 
no city, constitution, or individual man will ever become perfect until 
either some chance event compels those few philosophers who are not 
vicious (the ones who are now called useless) to take charge of a city, 
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whether they want to or not, and compels the city to obey them, or until 
a god inspires the present rulers and kings or their offspring with a true 
erotic love for true philosophy. (6.499b) 
Many readers will share Socrates’ pessimism about the likelihood that 
the—or an—ideal polis can be realized in the actual world, but many will 
be troubled at his seeming to reject political action as well as what seems 
to be his focus on the ideal world rather than the admittedly imperfect 
actual world. 
Looking at how Socrates himself lived in Athens, a polis that fell 
far short of the ideal that Plato sketches in the Republic, might be 
instructive here. Did Socrates follow his own advice? He did not pack 
up and leave, even after being convicted of impiety and corrupting the 
youth in a trial that, however procedurally fair it was, yielded what 
seems a substantively unjust verdict. He refuses to leave, because the 
best arguments lead him to conclude that leaving would be unjust. 
Socrates did not ‘lead a quiet life’; if he had, it is unlikely that we 
would ever have heard of him or that Athens would have treated him 
as it did. But he ‘did his own work’, as he conceived of it. His God-
given work, he tells us in the Apology, was to be a gadfly, questioning 
and exhorting Athenians to virtue (30e). In his final words to the 
jurors, he asks them to do for his sons what he tried to do for them: 
to correct them ‘if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more 
than about virtue’ (41e). 
So it seems that Socrates did not live the quiet life he counsels. But 
when the so-called Thirty Tyrants, installed by Sparta to govern Athens 
after the end of the Peloponnesian War, demanded that Socrates bring 
them Leon of Salamis for execution, he refused, regarding the act as 
unjust and impious. So his eschewing politics did not entail complicity 
in injustice or collaboration with the unjust. Alas, though, he did not 
try to prevent others from doing so, nor did he try to warn Leon. While 
the others went to Salamis to fetch Leon, Socrates ‘went quietly home’ 
(32d).
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Some Suggestions for Further Reading
For an excellent discussion of virtue and the virtues, interested readers 
should see Heather Battaly, Virtue (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015).
The philosophical literature on truth is vast. A good place to start is 
Michael P. Lynch, True to Life: Why Truth Matters (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/6919.001.0001 
Readers interested in the question of morality and the ancient Greeks 
will benefit from Richard Kraut, ‘Doing without Morality’, Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 30 (2006), 159–200, although his focus is 
explicitly on Aristotle. Bernard Williams famously claims that ‘Greek 
ethical thought […] basically lacks the concept of morality altogether’, in 
the chapter ‘Philosophy’, in The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal, ed. by 
M.I. Finley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 202–55.
Readers interested in the personal-aesthetic virtues will find much of 
interest in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, excellently translated by Terence 
Irwin (2nd ed., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999), especially Book 
IV, which discusses virtues such as friendliness, wit, and magnificence. 
Readers interested in the trial and death of Socrates will want to read 
at least the Apology and Crito, available (among other places) in Five 
Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, trans. by G. M. A. 
Grube, ed. by John Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), 
which contains other dialogues of great interest. Thomas Brickhouse and 
Nicholas Smith, Socrates on Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990) is an excellent discussion, and I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1989) offers an interesting and very unsympathetic 
take on Socrates. Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, trans. by Robin 
Waterfield (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), presents an interestingly 
different picture of Socrates than Plato does, though both are Socrates’ 
contemporaries.
Achilles and Ajax playing a board game overseen by Athena (c. 510 
BCE). Photograph by Aisha Abdel (2018), Wikimedia, Public Domain, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Black-figure_pottery#/
media/File:Attic_Black-Figure_Neck_Amphora_-_Achilles_and_Ajax_
playing_a_board_game_overseen_by_Athena.jpg
10. Metaphors to Think by:  
The Sun and Divided Line Analogies,  
Book VI
The analogies we looked at in the last chapter are interesting, but they 
are merely appetizers to the metaphorical feast Socrates soon serves, 
which features the Sun, Line, and Cave analogies (the last of which we 
will cover in the next chapter). It is philosophical fare of the highest 
order, since the topic is ‘the most important subject’ which is ‘even more 
important than justice and the other virtues’ (6.504d)—the Form of 
goodness itself: ‘the form of the good is the most important thing to 
learn about [… since] it is by their relation to it that just things and 
the others become useful and beneficial […] [but] we have no adequate 
knowledge of it’ (6.505a).
The Greek rendered by ‘the form of the good’ is ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα (hê 
tou agatou idea)—literally, the idea of the good. As noted earlier, for Plato 
an ἰδέα is not an idea in our ordinary sense but rather something that 
is not only mind-independently real but is actually more real than the 
many particular instances of it. The metaphysical elevator goes all the 
way up to Level Four, though here Plato implies that there is yet another 
floor, where a very special Form, the Form of the good, resides. 
To get a sense of the importance of the Form of the good, consider 
first the distinctive virtue of the philosopher-rulers, political wisdom. 
Political wisdom is knowledge of what is best for the city, but one cannot 
know what is superlatively good for the city without understanding 
what goodness itself is: ‘I do not suppose that just and fine things will 
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have acquired much of a guardian in someone who does not even know 
in what way they are good. And I divine that no one will have adequate 
knowledge of them until he knows this’ (6.506a).
Although one can believe that something is good without grasping 
why it is, one cannot know that something is good without knowing why 
that thing is good—and one cannot know this, Socrates thinks, without 
knowing what goodness itself is. A ruler who does not understand what 
goodness itself is will at best have true beliefs about what is good for 
the city, but that falls far short of the knowledge required for genuine 
wisdom. 
So what is the Form of the good, goodness itself?
What the Good Is Not (6.505a-d)
Socrates does not claim to know what the good is, but he does think 
he knows what it is not. Narrowing the field by excluding unworkable 
options is a kind of intellectual progress, and so he begins with two 
untenable accounts of the nature of the good. The first view, held by 
‘the majority’ is the view that ‘pleasure is the good’ (6.505b). This is 
hedonism, the view that pleasure is the only thing that is good in itself. 
Any other thing that is good is good extrinsically, by being a means to 
the one intrinsically good thing, pleasure. Although they often run in 
the same harness, hedonism is distinct from egoism, the view that one’s 
interests count for more than the interests of others (perhaps because 
others’ interests do not count at all). Classical utilitarians such as Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill were hedonists but not egoists. They 
regarded total net pleasure, the result of subtracting the pain an action 
produces from the pleasure it produces, as the standard of right action, 
where the interests of all parties affected by the action are given equal 
weight. 
Socrates immediately locates a problem for hedonism: ‘there are bad 
pleasures’ (6.505c), which even hedonism’s advocates will concede. 
Although he does not give any examples, they are not hard to come by. 
Imagine a peeping Tom who is very careful not to be seen; he derives a 
great deal of pleasure from spying on his neighbors through his high-
powered (and well-hidden) telescope, and they are none wiser, so there 
is no pain he is inflicting to offset the pleasure he produces for himself. 
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But his action still seems wrong, and his pleasure is an evil pleasure, as 
almost anyone would think. Even though philosophical questions are 
not best settled by majority vote, anyone who concedes that the peeping 
Tom’s pleasure is bad should reject hedonism, for how can pleasure be 
what is good in itself if there are pleasures that are bad in themselves? 
The second view Socrates considers has a bit more going for it than 
hedonism; if nothing else, it is held by ‘more sophisticated’ folks. It is 
the view that ‘the good […] is knowledge’ (6.505b), which we might 
awkwardly dub ‘Epistemicism’ (from the Greek word for knowledge, 
epistemê). This seems like a view that Socrates would find attractive, 
given the centrality of knowledge to philosophy, but he quickly 
dismisses it—not, as with hedonism, because there are instances of bad 
knowledge (though presumably there are) but because Epistemicism 
leads to an infinite regress (or, more properly, an infinite progress). 
Knowledge always has an object, he reminds Glaucon. If I have 
knowledge, I have knowledge of or about something; there is no such 
thing as mere, objectless knowledge. The various crafts are similar in 
being knowledge of how to do certain things, but they are distinguished 
by their objects: farmers know how to farm, doctors know how to heal, 
etc. Similarly, the grammarian and mathematician both possess the same 
kind of knowledge—theoretical or propositional knowledge that certain 
propositions are true, as opposed to knowledge of how to do things—but 
they too are distinguished by their objects. If we ask the sophisticates 
who hold that the good is knowledge what that knowledge’s object 
is, they will reply, Socrates thinks, that ‘it is knowledge of the good’ 
(6.505b). This is highly problematic, and not just because it is circular. 
If the good is identical to knowledge, then for every occurrence of ‘the 
good’ we can substitute ‘knowledge’, just as we can substitute ‘2+1’ for 
any instance of ‘3’ in a mathematical formula (e.g., since 32 = 9, it follows 
that (2+1)2 = 9). But if the knowledge in question is knowledge of the 
good, then the Epistemicist’s core claim,
(E)   The good = knowledge.
becomes
(E*)   The good = knowledge of the good.
But by substituting ‘knowledge of the good’ for ‘the good’, (E*) generates
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(E**)   The good = knowledge of the good knowledge of the good,
which in turn generates
(E***)   The good = knowledge of knowledge of knowledge of the 
good,
and so on, with no end in sight!
Clearly, Socrates thinks knowledge is good. But it is a good, not the 
good. It is one of philosophy’s distinctive goods, but knowledge is not 
the good—it is not what goodness is. But even if we do not know what 
the good is, Socrates thinks we know two things it is not, and that is at 
least a start. So what does Socrates think the good is? 
The Analogy of the Sun (6.506d–509d)
Socrates does not answer this question directly, but not because he 
is being cagey, as Thrasymachus might suggest. And not (at least 
not explicitly) because he thinks the good cannot be defined in any 
non-circular way. The eighteenth-century philosopher Joseph Butler 
remarked that ‘Everything is what it is, and not another thing’, which 
the twentieth-century philosopher G.E. Moore quoted at the outset of his 
Principia Ethica before arguing that any attempt to give a real definition 
of goodness was doomed to fail. Cinema lovers may recall a memorable 
exchange in the film The Deer Hunter between Mike (Robert De Niro) 
and Stanley (John Cazale), in which Mike, holding up a bullet, says, 
‘Stanley, see this? This is this. This ain’t something else. This is this’.1 
Stanley does not understand the lesson, but I suspect Socrates, Butler, 
and Moore would all be sympathetic to Mike’s point, since the good is 
what it is and not some other thing. 
So why does Socrates not provide a value for x in the philosophical 
equation the good = x? Why does he choose to ‘abandon the quest 
for what the good itself is for the time being’ (6.506d)? Although 
antagonists like Thrasymachus will scoff, I believe it is because Socrates 
possesses the virtue of epistemic humility: he claims not to know what 
the good is and insists that one should not ‘talk about things one does 
not know as if one does know them’ (6.506c), which is what he’d be 
1  The Deer Hunter, dir. by Michael Cimino (Universal Pictures, 1978).
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doing if he responded directly to Adeimantus’ request for an account 
of the good. But while he cannot say what the good is, he thinks he can 
say something about what it is like, which brings us to the Sun Analogy. 
In Book VII Socrates will suggest that dialectic—rigorous, Forms-based 
philosophical reflection—is the only avenue to genuine knowledge. As 
he did earlier in Book VI, he reminds Glaucon and company that they 
will be avoiding this ‘longer road’ (6.504c) and proceeding in a less 
exact, hypothetical way which will give them a sense of what the good 
is, but which will fall well short of full-blown philosophical knowledge 
of it. 
Socrates’ plan is to explain the Form of the good in terms of something 
more readily understandable: the sun. He suggests that the good—the 
Form or essence of goodness itself—plays the same role in the intelligible 
realm that the sun plays in the visible realm. Strictly speaking, the focus 
is the sun’s role in the sensible realm, the world of sense-experience, but 
we will follow Socrates in using ‘visible’ to designate this realm, which 
also includes what he can hear, touch, taste, and smell as well as what 
we can see. While he cannot say what the good is, he can say what he 
thinks the good does. His idea is that the sun: the visible world :: the 
good: the intelligible world—the roles the sun and the good play in 
their respective worlds are analogous. In the visible world, the sun by 
its light enables us to see the many particular things—and also enables 
their existence. In the intelligible world, the good by its truth enables us 
to know the Forms—and also enables the existence of the Forms. Seeing 
something requires both a visible object and the power of sight. But it 
also requires ‘a third kind of thing’ (6.507d)—light. Without light to 
illuminate the object, the power of sight will not reveal that object to us. 
The sun is the main and most obvious source of light, so the sun enables 
us see visible objects. But it does more than enable their being seen, 
Socrates thinks; it enables their very existence. This is certainly true of 
living things, which depend for their existence on the light of the sun. (It 
is less clear that this is true of rocks, but we need not be sticklers about 
this.) The same goes for the Form of the good: 
what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the 
knower is the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge 
and truth, it is also an object of knowledge […] not only do the objects 
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of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their being is also 
due to it. (6.508e–9b) 
So, just as the sun provides the light that enables us to see visible 
objects, the Form of the good provides the truth that enables us to know 
intelligible objects, which of course are the forms: ‘the many beautiful 
things and the rest are visible but not intelligible, while the [F]orms are 
intelligible but not visible’ (6.507b). Beautiful things owe not only their 
being seen but also their very existence to the sun. Similarly, the Form 
of beauty depends for both its knowability and its very existence on the 
Form of the good. 
Thus the Form of the good plays a foundational role in Plato’s 
epistemology, since it is the condition of all knowledge, and also in 
his metaphysics, since it is the condition of the existence of the other 
Forms and in turn the existence of concrete particular objects. Particular 
beautiful things are beautiful because they partake, if only temporarily, 
in the Form of beauty; they are temporary, spatiotemporal images or 
copies of the Form of beauty itself. Similarly, a particular just action or 
soul is just because it participates in the Form of justice, and so on. And 
since beautiful things and just actions are good and useful, they must 
also participate in the Form of the good: ‘it is by their relation to [the 
Form of the good] that just things and the others become useful and 
beneficial’ (6.505a). Thus the Form of the good subsumes the Forms of 
justice, wisdom, courage, etc.; not only would they not be good without 
it, they would not exist without it. So goodness is at the core of Plato’s 
conception of the universe, both epistemologically and metaphysically. 
The Divided Line (6.509e–511e)
Socrates follows the Sun Analogy with a linear perspective on how 
the visible and intelligible worlds differ. His focus here is largely 
epistemological, though as we might expect metaphysics looms in the 
background. Having already said a bit about how knowledge and belief 
differ, here Plato goes into more detail, saying more about their distinct 
objects (thus drawing on the ill-fated Powers Argument) and also 
making distinctions between different kinds of knowledge and belief. 
We can think of the line as a sort of epistemological companion to the 
Metaphysical Elevator, in which one ascends epistemologically from 
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belief to knowledge and metaphysically from concrete particular objects 
to the Form of the good. 
Start a line segment and divide it unevenly, as below, into two sub-
segments. Let one segment represent the visible world and the other the 
intelligible world:
Fig. 1. The Visible World and the Intelligible World
Belief is the epistemic state (or, as Socrates would have it, the power) that 
operates in the visible world, while knowledge governs the intelligible 
world. Since length corresponds to ‘relative clarity and opacity’ (6.509d), 
the line segment representing the intelligible realm will be longer than the 
segment representing the visible realm. This should make sense, given 
Plato’s view that the Forms, which are at home in the intelligible realm, 
are both more real than the particulars and are epistemically clearer: 
the Forms are objects of knowledge, while the particulars are objects of 
belief. Belief, while clearer than ignorance, is darker and opaquer than 
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knowledge, as Socrates claimed earlier (5.478c). So, even though there 
are more objects in the visible world than in the intelligible world, since 
the relation between particulars and their Forms is a relation of many to 
one, the segment representing the intelligible realm is longer than the 
segment representing the visible realm. 
Now here comes a slightly tricky part: divide each sub-segment 
again by the same ratio as the entire line was divided: 
Fig. 2. The Visible World (a and b) and the Intelligible World (c and d)
So now the visible world comprises sub-segments a and b and the 
intelligible world comprises c and d, and with the ratios of both a to 
b and c to d identical to the original ratio of Visible to Intelligible. An 
obvious consequence of this is that a:b :: c:d. A less obvious consequence, 
which Socrates either does not notice or notices but does not mention, 
is that b and c turn out to be the same length. Given that the line is 
arranged in terms of ‘relative clarity and opacity’ (6.509d), the equality 
of b and c suggests an epistemic and metaphysical parity between the 
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highest visible and lowest intelligible sub-sections of the line, and it is 
hard to see Socrates endorsing such a view. This is at least a wrinkle in 
the Divided Line analogy, but let us assume that it is a wrinkle that can 
be ironed out and move on. 
Now we will see the parallel between metaphysics and epistemology. 
Plato further divides the main epistemic states or powers, Belief and 
Knowledge, which appear on the line’s right side in Fig. 3:
Fig. 3. The Visible World and the Intelligible World: Belief and 
Knowledge
The two bottom sub-segments of the line, a and b, which together make 
up the visible realm, have different objects. The lowest level, a, has 
images (εἰκόνες [eikones]) for its objects—shadows and reflections and, 
presumably, the analogies and metaphors of the sort that Socrates is so 
‘greedy for’ in Book VI, as well as the paintings, sculptures, and poems 
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that he will criticize in Book X. The second lowest level, b, comprises 
the original items of which those images are copies. The bed in which 
Van Gogh slept in his room at Arles, which served as the model for his 
famous paintings of it, would be an object appropriate to b, while the 
paintings of the bed, being copies of that spatiotemporal object, belong in 
a. In addition, we might think the second-hand opinions that many of us 
have, opinions we merely parrot from our favorite news source, belong 
here in a. Many readers active on Facebook or Twitter will be familiar 
with someone whose social media mission seems to be reposting or 
re-tweeting stories and memes that express the views they have gotten 
from others. (When someone says, ‘I have thought about this a lot’, one 
hopes they mean this literally, where ‘thought’ is a verb, and they have 
scrutinized and analyzed and seen implications of the point in question. 
What we are often saying, alas, is ‘I have a thought about this, and I 
think that thought a lot’, where ‘thought’ is a noun, and thinking that 
thought does not require critical examination of the idea’s merits and 
demerits, etc.) In addition to their different objects, a and b also differ in 
terms of the epistemic or cognitive states operating in them. While Plato 
generally talks of belief (δόξα [doxa]) as operating in the visible realm, 
here he distinguishes between εἰκασία [eikasia], imagining (or merely 
imaging) and πίστις [pistis], which is translatable as ‘belief’ but which 
suggests credence, trust, and sincerity as well. 
The intelligible realm is where the Forms live. While the sub-segments 
of Visible had different kinds of objects, here the objects are the same: 
Forms (although the Form of the good operates in d, the highest level). 
Segments c and d—Thought (διάνοια [dianoia]) and Understanding 
(νόησις [noêsis]), respectively—are distinguished by how knowers are 
related to the Forms that populate the intelligible world. 
Hypotheses and First Principles in the Divided Line
A crucial difference between Thought (c) and Understanding (d) is the 
role that hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις [hypothesis], literally, what is placed or 
set under something) plays. Mathematicians, who occupy themselves 
in Thought, employ hypotheses in their thinking: they ‘hypothesize the 
odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles’ (6.510c), 
etc. But, Socrates thinks, they ‘do not think it is necessary to give any 
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account (λόγος [logos]) of them’ (6.510c), presumably because these 
hypotheses seem so obviously true that no justification is needed. Just as 
mathematicians take it for granted that there are numbers and triangles, 
physicists assume the existence of an external world of spatiotemporal 
objects, whose properties and behavior they study without feeling 
the need to justify this assumption. They treat their hypotheses as 
‘first principles (ἀρχή [archê]))’ (6.510d)—as foundations—and draw 
conclusions from them. The mathematicians’ conclusions are not about 
the particular triangle or circle drawn on the blackboard; the physicists’ 
are not about the particular electrons in this particular cloud chamber; 
rather, they are about triangles and circles in themselves, or about 
electrons in themselves. Both try to prove things about the Forms, on 
the model of inquiry depicted by the Divided Line. 
By contrast, the philosopher, who roams the realm of Understanding, 
recognizes hypotheses as hypotheses; they do not think of their 
hypotheses and assumptions as self-evidently true first principles 
requiring no justification. Unlike their mathematical and scientific 
cousins, the philosopher does not treat a hypothesis as an unassailable 
foundation or ‘first principle’ but rather as something that stands 
in need of a logos, a justification or rationale. The hardest part of 
philosophy, Socrates says, ‘has to do with giving a rational account’ 
(6.498a). It is not that mathematicians and scientists are too lazy to 
justify their hypotheses, but rather that they do not feel the need to do 
so, since their assumptions seem so obviously true. But so long as the 
foundational hypothesis is unaccounted for, what follows cannot fully 
count as knowledge, on Socrates’ view, even though it involves grasping 
mathematical Forms: ‘What mechanism could possibly turn any 
agreement into knowledge when it begins with something unknown 
and puts together the conclusion and steps in between from what is 
unknown?’ (7.533c)
Socrates implies here that mathematicians can give valid arguments 
(arguments whose conclusions must be true if their premises are true), 
but that the conclusions of their arguments are merely conditionally 
and not absolutely true. That is a far cry from giving an argument 
whose conclusion must be true, period, which would require showing 
that the hypotheses in question are true and do not merely seem to be 
true. While the mathematician’s valid arguments might be sound, the 
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mathematician is never in a position to know whether their arguments 
are sound or not until they justify the hypothesis—the if—on which the 
conclusion ultimately rests. 
To get a sense of what is at stake, consider a hypothesis that many 
readers encountered in high school geometry class, Euclid’s parallel 
postulate. That parallel lines extended indefinitely in space will never 
meet seems so intuitively obvious as to be axiomatic. No wonder 
geometers do not try to ‘give an account’ of this hypothesis. Doing 
so seems a waste of time, and developing a geometry that rejects 
that postulate seems a fool’s errand. But, as many readers know, the 
geometry required for Einstein’s general theory of relativity is non-
Euclidean, geometry that rejects the parallel postulate. Space, on 
Einstein’s view, is curved, so Euclidean geometry misdescribes it. The 
assumption that parallel lines indefinitely extended in space would 
never touch seemed too obvious to need a justification, but it turns out 
to be false. That is the kind of worry Socrates has about the realm of 
Thought. 
Dialectic and Understanding 
It is not that hypotheses are dispensed within the realm of Understanding. 
Instead, they are treated as hypotheses, as needing justification, rather 
than as first principles requiring no justification:
It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as 
hypotheses—stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach 
the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this 
principle, it reverses itself, and, keeping hold of what follows from it, 
comes down to conclusion without making use of anything visible at 
all, but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and 
ending in forms. (6.511b) 
Understanding is the result of what Socrates calls ‘dialectic’—that 
is what the initial ‘it’ in the quotation just above refers to. Dialectic 
is the longer, harder road that Socrates chooses not to travel in the 
Republic, opting instead for a discussion relying on analogies and 
metaphors. Dialectic is like mathematical thinking in having the 
Forms for its objects, but, as we just noted, dialectic treats hypotheses 
and assumptions differently than mathematical thinking. Here are 
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some of dialectic’s distinctive features, which ground ways in which 
Understanding differs from Thought:
1. Giving an account. The dialectician—i.e., the genuine 
philosopher—‘is able to give an account of the being of each thing’ 
(7.534b). In addition to being able to grasp the essence of the thing under 
discussion, the philosopher is also able to explain that essence, to give 
an account of it. ‘Someone who is able to give an account of the being 
of each thing [is] dialectical’, Socrates says. ‘But insofar as he is unable 
to give an account of something, either to himself or to another […] he 
has [no] understanding of it’ (7.534b). Book V’s lovers of sights and 
sounds may have many true beliefs about which objects are beautiful, 
but being unable to grasp the Form of beauty, they are unable to explain 
why a beautiful thing is beautiful, and thus lack knowledge. Similarly, 
the geometer who assumes that the parallel postulate is true but who is 
unable to justify that assumption lacks Understanding: they think with 
concepts they do not fully understand.
2. Integrated knowledge. Presumably, the mathematician is able 
to give an account of the various mathematical objects she concerns 
herself with. But the dialectician is also able to see connections between 
the individual Forms: she sees ‘their association and relationship 
with one another’ (7.531c) and so achieves a unified intellectual 
vision. ‘Anyone who can achieve a unified vision is dialectical’, 
Socrates says, ‘and anyone who cannot is not’ (7.537c). A geometer 
is probably able to achieve a unified grasp of the various geometric 
Forms; it is hard to imagine someone specializing in, say, rectangles 
who knows nothing about circles or spheres or trapezoids. But the 
philosopher—the dialectician—is able to unify different domains of 
study, understanding not just geometry and physics or game theory 
and biology in themselves, but grasping how these disciplines and the 
Forms they study are interrelated. In short, the philosopher sees and 
makes connections between disparate domains.
3. Purely formal reasoning. Thought relies on visual aids: the 
geometer’s object in trying to prove a theorem about the nature of 
triangles is the Form of triangularity, but they draw particular triangles 
on particular chalkboards as an aid for grasping the triangle’s essence. 
Those drawings are aids borrowed from the visible realm. Understanding, 
by contrast, proceeds ‘without making use of anything visible at all, but 
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only of Forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending 
in forms’ (6.511b). The dialectician is able to think with the Forms alone: 
her seeing is purely intellectual, and does not involve any objects from 
the visible realm at all, or the kinds of metaphors Socrates employs to 
make sense of the Form of the good. Dialectic ‘tries through argument 
and apart from all sense perceptions to find the being of things and does 
not give up until he grasps the good itself with understanding itself’ 
(7.532a). 
4. The Form of the good. Perhaps dialectic’s most distinctive feature, 
and thus the most important difference between Understanding 
and Thought, is that dialectic involves seeing how the various Forms 
are related to the Form of the good. Thus dialectic requires the most 
complete kind of intellectual integration possible. This integration is 
both horizontal, so to speak, understanding how Forms are related to 
each other, and also vertical, understanding how these Forms are related 
the Form of the good, which, as the condition of both the knowability 
and existence of the Forms, is at a level higher than them—Level 
Five, so to speak, on Plato’s Metaphysical Elevator. Plato’s universe is 
fundamentally ordained toward the good: the Form of the good is ‘the 
unhypothetical first principle of everything’ (6.511b), and one does not 
fully grasp a thing’s essence until one grasps the end it aims at, as well. 
Dialectical understanding is thus a very tall order. 
5. Foundationalism. The contemporary epistemological distinction 
between foundationalism and coherentism sheds light on the difference 
between Thought and Understanding. Even though Plato does not 
think of knowledge as justified true belief, his concern with giving an 
account implies that a discussion of justification is not completely out of 
order. A coherentist holds that a belief’s being justified is a matter of its 
being properly related to other beliefs: one’s beliefs hang together in a 
coherent way, with minimal inconsistency between beliefs. Presumably 
some inconsistency has to be allowed; otherwise no one’s beliefs would 
be justified, since we all unknowingly have beliefs that are at odds 
with each other. The foundationalist, by contrast, thinks that at least 
one belief must be justified in a non-inferential way, not getting its 
justification from another belief. Such a belief is the foundation—the 
archê—of the justification of all other beliefs.
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The realm of Thought is coherentist: the mathematician’s 
conclusions are ‘in full agreement’ with the hypotheses they treat 
as first principles. The realm of Understanding, by contrast, is 
foundationalist: it rests ultimately on the Form of the good, which 
is the source of the intelligibility (and indeed the existence) of the 
other Forms. Ironically, the procedure for determining whether one 
grasps this foundation seems itself coherentist: ‘Unless someone can 
distinguish in an account the form of the good from everything else, 
can survive all refutation, as if in a battle […] and can come through 
all of this with his account still intact, you’ll say that he does not know 
the good itself’ (7.534bc). We have witnessed this procedure, elenchus, 
throughout the Republic, starting with Cephalus’ and Polemarchus’ 
and Thrasymachus’ accounts of justice. We saw it most recently in 
the two accounts of the good that Socrates rejected earlier in Book VI. 
Socrates seems to suggest that what makes an account of x true is that 
it can survive the sort of cross-examination we have seen so far in the 
Republic. But his actual view, I think, is not that coherence constitutes the 
correctness of an account, but rather that coherence is the best criterion 
of correctness: an account is not made true by its having no internal 
inconsistencies and no false implications or entailments; instead, its 
consistency and coherence are good evidence—and perhaps the best 
evidence—that it is true. 
Readers familiar with Plato’s Euthyphro will find there a helpful 
example of this distinction between constitution and criterion. One of the 
Euthyphro’s main questions is whether the gods love holiness because it 
is holy or whether holiness is holy because the gods love it. That is, do 
the gods’ loving x make x holy or constitute x’s holiness, so x’s holiness 
is due to the external fact that the gods love it rather than some of its 
internal features? Or is the gods’ loving x simply good evidence that x 
is holy, their love for x being a criterion of x’s being holy, but not what 
constitutes x’s holiness? In short, is x loved because it is holy, or holy 
because it is loved?
That an account of the good or any important concept is maximally 
coherent suggests that it is correct, but coherence is criterial rather 
than constitutive of its being true. What makes an account true is its 
connection to the Form of the good.
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Socrates’ Hypothetical Method
Before moving on, we should note how transparent Socrates has 
been in employing hypotheses in the Republic, reminding Glaucon 
and company of the conditional nature of any conclusions they draw 
from their hypotheses. For example, when offering the Opposition 
Principle as the basis for dividing the soul (4.436b), he remarks, ‘let us 
hypothesize (ὑποθέμενοι [hypothemenoi) that this is correct and carry 
on. But if we agree that it should ever be shown to be incorrect, all the 
consequences we have drawn from it will also be lost’ (4.437a). Socrates 
is reminding us that by employing hypotheses and analogies we are 
travelling on a less rigorous path, one that will give us a sense of what 
the good is but will not let us look on it directly. This should make sense, 
for even if Socrates is a genuine philosopher-king (though he claims 
otherwise), the rest of us—Glaucon, Polemarchus, you, me—are not, 
and we would be blinded by trying to look directly at the good, just as 
we would be blinded if we looked directly at the sun. So Socrates opts 
for the hypothetical, analogical method, which allows us to think about 
the good without understanding it. For that, dialectic is needed.
Dialectic: It’s No Game
Socrates appeals to dialectic to distinguish genuine from counterfeit 
philosophers, as his response to the Third Wave requires of him. It also 
enriches his explanation of the negative view of philosophers so many 
Athenians have. The trouble is that ‘a great evil comes from dialectic 
as it is currently practiced’ (7.537e), since the young people who 
practice it imitate Socrates’ method of intellectual cross-examination but 
‘misuse it by treating it as a kind of game of contradiction’ (7.539b). A 
genuine philosopher, who loves and reveres the truth, regards dialectic 
as the best means of getting at the truth and employs it in that spirit. 
But without reverence for the truth, dialectic becomes merely a game 
aimed at humiliating the bloviating pretender to knowledge and thus 
showing how clever its practitioner is. It is no wonder, then, that his 
fellow citizens regard Socrates as a bad influence on the young people 
who flock to him.
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Unsurprisingly, Socrates employs yet another metaphor to address 
the dangers of dialectic when it is not practiced with the love of truth. 
Imagine a bright young person ‘brought up surrounded by much wealth 
and many flatterers […] who finds out, when he has become a man, that 
he is not the child of his professed parents and that he cannot discover 
his real ones’ (7.538a). This turns the young person’s world upside 
down: core beliefs about who they are turn out to be false, they regard 
their adoptive parents as liars and no longer live as they were raised to 
do. This is what it is like to be a young person whose core moral beliefs 
are challenged. A person who is properly raised will, like Glaucon and 
Adeimantus, believe that the just life is happier, that they ought to be 
motivated by what is fine and noble rather than by narrow self-interest, 
but they do not know why the just life is happier or what the fine and 
noble really is. Dialectic as practiced by counterfeit philosophers ‘shakes 
him from his convictions, and makes him believe that the fine is no more 
fine than shameful, and the same with the just, the good, and the things 
he honored most’ (7.538d). It induces a kind of intellectual and moral 
vertigo: values and ways of life that seemed so certain now seem flimsy 
and evanescent. Improperly deployed, dialectic turns young people into 
relativists or nihilists who think of traditional moral virtues such as justice 
as shams in much the same way Thrasymachus did back in Book I: as 
tools clever people use to dupe simpletons like the unknowing orphan 
until the scales fall from their eyes. That so many of Plato’s dialogues end 
without discovering the nature of the virtue in question—that is, in aporia: 
difficulty or befuddlement—probably does not help, either. Rather than 
thinking that eliminating wrong accounts is a kind of progress, the clever 
game-player thinks he is shown that there is no answer.
Socrates thinks that few young people are sufficiently ‘orderly and 
steady by nature’ (7.539d) to practice dialectic properly; instead of 
being ‘willing to engage in discussion in order to look for the truth’, 
the bright young person ‘plays at contradiction for sport.’ (7.539c) They 
will imitate and thus internalize the wrong models (7.539bc), which 
echoes the concerns Socrates raised when discussing how and why ‘the 
storytellers’ needed to be ‘supervised.’ Thus in the advanced education 
for would-be philosopher-queens and -kings that we will look at after 
discussing the Cave Analogy, students are not trained in dialectic until 
they reach the age of thirty (7.537d).
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So dialectic is no game. It is dangerous if practiced without a love 
of truth, capable of doing real damage to both its practitioner and its 
victims. But it also promises great cognitive benefit, as it is the genuine 
philosopher’s tool par excellence, a tool enabling full understanding. 
This understanding goes far beyond the kind of understanding Socrates’ 
analogies can yield, which Glaucon claims at the close of Book VI. 
He understands (μανθάνω) Understanding (νόησις), but he does not 
Understand it.
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11. The Allegory of the Cave:  
Book VII
The Allegory of the Cave is arguably the most famous part of the Republic. 
Although it is clearly related to the Sun and Divided Line analogies 
(indeed, Socrates explicitly connects the Cave and the Sun at 7.517bc), 
Plato marks its special status by opening Book VII with it, emphasizing 
its importance typographically, so to speak (he will do much the same 
thing in Book IX with the discussion of the tyrannical soul). Although 
an allegory is sometimes defined as a symbolic narrative that can be 
interpreted as having a hidden meaning, Plato is not cagey about the 
Cave Allegory’s meaning: it is about ‘the effect of education (παιδεία 
[paideia]) and the lack of it on our nature’ (7.514a). Given how visual 
the allegory is, many readers will find it helpful to draw themselves a 
diagram of it. 
Education, the Allegory’s topic, is not what most people think it is, 
says Plato: it is not ‘putting knowledge into souls that lack it’ (7.518b). 
Though education sometimes requires that kind of transmission of 
knowledge from teacher to student, this is not its essence, which instead 
is ‘turning the whole soul’ (7.518d)—turning it around, ultimately 
toward the Form of the good. Education as turning around is a powerful 
metaphor, capturing the way in which learning involves gaining new 
perspectives, seeing everyday things and events from new points of view. 
Everyone, Plato insists, is capable of education in this sense (7.518c). But 
not everyone is capable of making it out of the Cave into the intelligible 
world of the Forms, just as not everyone is capable of winning a Nobel 
Prize in Physics or an Olympic medal in Figure Skating. Nonetheless, 
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everyone has the capacity to be educated, to turn their soul from what is 
less real toward what is more real.
Stages in the Cave Allegory
I count six distinct stages in the Cave Allegory. While such divisions are 
always prey to arbitrariness and subjective preference, I hope that the 
division I offer sheds light on what Plato is up to here. 
In the first stage, the cave’s residents are prisoners, chained to their 
seats and unable to move not only their bodies but—crucially—their 
heads. They can only look straight ahead, and thus have only one 
perspective on what they see on the cave’s wall. What they see are 
the shadows of a sort of puppet show taking place behind them, with 
shadows cast by the light of a fire. The puppets are various artifacts: 
‘statues of people and other animals, made out of stone, wood, and 
every material’ (7.514b). The prisoners watch the shadow-play, ignorant 
of the true nature of what they see: they ‘believe that the truth is nothing 
other than the shadows of those artifacts’ (7.515c). They take for reality 
what is a mere image of it. Some readers will have already noticed that 
Stage One is parallel to the lowest section of the Divided Line (segment 
a), the objects of which are images and shadows. 
In the second stage, one of the prisoners is freed from their bonds. 
Plato does not tell us by whom or how; we are left to wonder whether 
the prisoner was saved by human agency or by the natural decay of 
their fetters. There is reason to think it is the former, since the freed 
prisoner is ‘suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and 
look up toward the light’ (7.515c), and somebody else seems to be 
doing the compelling. This is not the only time Plato connects education 
with compulsion, with being forced to turn one’s head and gain a new 
perspective. Nor is it the only time when the head-turning that constitutes 
education will be painful. When the freed prisoner is forced to look at 
the shadow-casting fire that until this moment they were unaware of, 
they will be ‘pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose 
shadows they had seen before’ (7.515c). They will probably not like 
the experience at all, even though in being freed from their fetters they 
are thereby ‘cured of [their] ignorance’ (7.515c)—not merely freed but 
cured, as if ignorance is a disease. It is a comfortable disease, to borrow a 
 213The Allegory of the Cave
phrase from e. e. cummings, for it is a world the cave-dweller is familiar 
with and comfortable in. Turned around and out of their comfort zone, 
they are unable to recognize the shadow-casting puppets, despite their 
skill at recognizing the shadows the puppets cast on the wall. Although 
the artifacts are, like any sensible particulars, not fully real, they are more 
real than the shadows they cast. Thus in looking at the shadow-casting 
artifacts the freed prisoner is ‘a bit closer to the things that are and is 
turned towards things that are more’ (7.515d); this is the existential sense 
of the verb ‘to be’ that we distinguished earlier: the prisoner is closer to 
the things that are real—that exist—and indeed is coming closer to the 
things that are fully real: the Forms. While not everyone is capable of 
making it out of the Cave, Plato thinks that everyone is capable of being 
turned from the shadows to the shadow-casting artifacts—of moving 
from the lowest segment (segment a) of the Divided Line to the next 
highest (segment b), the realm of belief proper. 
Screens—television screens, phone screens, computer screens—are 
the Cave walls of today. When we uncritically accept the words and 
images we see there, we are like the chained prisoners. But if we turn 
and look at the sources of the information flickering before us, we might 
recognize that the information is distorted by bias and ulterior motive. 
Unlike the Cave’s puppeteers, who do not seem to derive any benefit 
from their shadow-casting, the shadow-casters of our age typically do 
derive some benefit, and frequently their power depends upon our 
remaining chained, accepting the images they project before us, and 
believing that ‘the truth is nothing other than the shadows’ (7.515e). 
While being turned around is good for us, we often do not initially like 
it. But there is also a danger that in being turned around we will reject 
information we disagree with and take its source to be biased. Clearly, 
many sources are biased, but if we reject every artifact that comes from 
a puppeteer we do not like, it is not clear that we are any better off than 
we were before we turned to look. In fact, we might be worse off if we 
fall prey to the belief that critical thinking involves (merely) rejecting—
perhaps as ‘fake news’—anything emanating from sources we identify 
as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ or whatever. Education, in the end, is not 
just any kind of turning around; it requires that the student be ‘turned 
the right way’ (7.518).
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In the third stage we again see the role that compulsion plays in 
the Cave Allegory, for an unnamed, unidentified someone will ‘drag 
[the freed prisoner] away from there by force, up the rough, steep 
path’ (7.515e). Although Socrates devotes just one sentence to the third 
stage, what he says later in Book VII indicates that this rough, steep 
path symbolizes the formal education that potential philosopher-
rulers receive. This four-subject education is the basis of the quadrivium 
of classical liberal education, the sort of education suitable to a free 
person. It is education centered on number: arithmetic (number itself), 
geometry (number in space), harmonics or music theory (number in 
time), and physics or astronomy (number in space and time). All these 
number-based subjects ‘lead the soul and turn it around towards the 
study of that which is’ (7.524e), which ultimately is the Form of the 
good. While there are certainly practical applications of these subjects, 
the would-be philosopher-queens and -kings study them ‘not like 
tradesmen and retailers [… but] for ease in turning the soul around, 
away from becoming and towards truth and being’ (7.525c). These 
disciplines prepare would-be philosophers not for craft-based careers 
in the sensible world, where they might be bakers or cobblers or doctors 
(although it will prepare them to be generals, as they are the city’s 
guardians), but rather for citizenship in the intelligible world. They will 
learn to think abstractly, grasping essences and integrating Forms, which 
is presumably why studying geometry ‘tends to make it easier to see the 
Form of the good’ (7.526d). As the way out of the Cave, these subjects 
are ‘merely preludes to […] the song that dialectic sings’ (7.531d–32a), 
and that is a tune that is sung only in the intellectual sunlight of the 
intelligible world outside of the Cave. 
In stage four, the prisoner is not just freed from their fetters but 
has made it out of the Cave into the intelligible world above, which 
corresponds to the top half of the Divided Line (segments c and d). 
Looking at the fire in the cave hurt their eyes, and they find emerging 
into the sunlight painful, just as a mid-afternoon moviegoer who leaves 
a dark theater is pained by the bright parking lot outside. At first, they 
will only be able to look at shadows of the objects in the world above, 
here cast by the light of the sun rather than the fire, or their reflections in 
water, or look at the objects at night. Just as the shadows on the cave wall 
were mere copies of the artifacts held before the fire, those artifacts are 
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mere copies of the Forms, which are ‘the things themselves’ (7.516a). 
Although Socrates does not say, we can assume that there is one Form 
for each of the many particular objects in the cave. Whether there is one 
tree—the Form of treeness itself—or one oak tree, one maple tree, one 
white pine, one yellow pine, etc. is an interesting question to ponder, but 
it is not one we need to answer to understand the Cave Allegory or the 
Republic as a whole. 
At stage five, the former cave dweller is able to look directly at the 
sun, ‘not images of it in water or some alien place, but the sun itself, in 
its own place, and be able to study it’ (7.516b). Presumably not everyone 
who makes it out of the Cave is able to do this. Mathematicians and 
scientists study the Forms relevant to their disciplines, but they do 
not see other Forms or how the Forms they contemplate are related 
to these other Forms, and they certainly do not see the Form of the 
good—that vision is reserved for genuine philosophers, and there are 
very few of them. So presumably the fourth stage in the Cave Allegory 
corresponds to Thought on the Divided Line, while the fifth stage is 
where Understanding operates. 
In stage six, the sun-contemplating philosopher first thinks back on 
his life in the cave, and reflecting on ‘what passed for wisdom there’ 
(7.516c), smiles ruefully and feels pity for the others still trapped in their 
ignorance, who ‘know’ only the shadows on the wall or the artifacts 
casting them. What would happen if the enlightened philosopher 
descended into the cave? They will not be greeted as a returning, 
liberating hero, Socrates thinks. The denizens of the dark world below 
will first think the returning philosopher a fool: until their eyes, used to 
the bright light of the intelligible world, have adjusted to the darkness of 
the cave, they will be unable to recognize the shadows or the puppets. 
Like the ship owner who thinks the true captain is a useless stargazer 
(6.489c), the cave dwellers will think the enlightened philosopher a fool 
who has ruined their eyesight (not to mention his economic prospects) 
by looking too long at the sun. But if they persist and try to free the 
prisoners and turn them toward the firelight or drag those who are able 
out of the cave, they will think their ‘liberator’ is worse than useless: 
they will think them dangerous, and ‘if they could somehow get their 
hands on him […] they [would] kill him’ (7.517a).
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Plato does his readers a good turn by having Socrates explicitly 
connect the Sun and Cave metaphors (7.5157bc), but he leaves the 
task of fitting together the Divided Line and Cave to us. Fortunately, 
connecting them is fairly straightforward, as we have already seen. 
The shadows on the Cave’s wall correspond to the images seen at the 
Divided Line’s lowest section (segment a), the realm of Imaging. The 
shadow-casting puppets held before the fire correspond to ‘the originals 
of [the Line’s] images’ (6.510a), in segment b. Just as the shadows are 
copies of the originating artifacts, these artifacts, which are at home 
in the Visible World, are in turn copies of the Forms, which of course 
reside in the Intelligible World (section c). Plato is not suggesting that 
the images, shadows, and reflections are not real, but rather that they 
are less real than the originals they are images of. This has a lot of 
intuitive appeal: I can create a shadow of my hand by interposing it 
between my desk and lamp, but the shadow cast seems less real than 
my hand in at least a couple of ways. First, while my hand is a three-
dimensional object, the shadow is only two-dimensional, lacking the 
dimension of depth. Second, the shadow depends for its existence on 
the presence of my hand (and on the presence of the ‘third thing’ that 
features in the Sun Analogy: light). My hand still exists when I turn 
off my desk lamp or move it out of the lamp’s range, but the shadow 
no longer exists. Shadows, reflections in mirrors and water, etc.—the 
stuff of segment a of the Line—are ephemeral. They are not unreal—
my seeing the shadow is not an optical illusion: there is something 
there, just something whose existence is thinner and flimsier than the 
objects at the Line’s second section (segment b). Now—and here’s the 
metaphysically important point—just as the shadows and reflections 
are copies of what seem to be independently existing objects, these 
objects themselves are copies of the Forms they instantiate. The bed 
the carpenter makes, Socrates argues in Book X, is ‘something which 
is like that which is’ (10.597a). The second ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of existence: 
the built bed is like what is real, what fully exists. Its resembling the 
Form of bedness is what makes it a bed and not a table, but, just as Van 
Gogh’s paintings of his bed at Arles are copies of the bed he slept in, so 
too is that bed a copy of the Form. Thus Plato’s metaphysical point can 
be put as a ratio, image: original :: original: Form.
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There is much that Plato leaves unsaid about the Cave. Who first 
frees the prisoner? Who drags them up and out of the cave? Who are 
the puppeteers? What, if any, benefit do they derive from keeping the 
prisoners occupied with shadows? Glaucon says toward the outset that 
these are ‘strange prisoners’, to which Socrates replies, ‘they are like us’ 
(7.515a), so with a bit of imagination we can fill in some of these blank 
spots. 
Trouble in Paradise: The Powers Argument Casts a 
Shadow on the Cave Allegory
There is a problem lurking in the background of the Cave Allegory that 
should be brought to the forefront and addressed. Indeed, all three 
of the key analogies—the Sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave—are 
analogical or metaphorical accounts of two distinct worlds or realms: the 
intelligible world, where the Forms reside, and the visible world, home 
to spatiotemporal particulars. The Powers Argument was supposed to 
provide some reason for believing in Plato’s two-worlds metaphysics 
and indeed for taking the Metaphysical Elevator to the fourth floor, 
where the Forms are not just real but are more real than the particulars 
that instantiate them. But we have seen that that the Powers Argument is 
logically invalid, since its conclusions could be false even if its premises 
are true, and even if its logical problems could be fixed, it would still 
not provide a good reason to accept Plato’s two-worlds metaphysics, 
given the implausibility of belief and knowledge having distinct objects. 
Presumably what Socrates says about agreed-to hypotheses that prove 
to be false goes for arguments, as well: ‘that if it should ever be shown 
to be incorrect, all the consequences we have drawn from it will also 
be lost’ (4.437a). Since the Sun, Divided Line, and Cave Analogies all 
require the distinction between the Visible and the Intelligible Worlds, 
they are infected, perhaps fatally, by the failure of the Powers Argument. 
Of course, Plato’s two-world metaphysics could still be correct, since 
the conclusion of an unsound argument can still be true. But unsound 
arguments do not justify belief in their conclusions. What should we 
make of the major analogies of Books VI and VII in light of the failure 
of the Powers Argument? One option is to proceed in a hypothetical or 
conditional way: if these are the two worlds, then here is how they differ. 
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Given the hypothetical nature of Socrates’ procedure in the Republic, this 
is not a bad way to go. Another option is to interpret the two worlds 
non-literally but metaphorically, which fits well with the prevalence 
of metaphor in the Republic. On this view, the two worlds are ways of 
thinking about or conceptualizing reality rather than assertions about 
the nature of reality itself. And perhaps this is how the two-worlds 
metaphysics should be interpreted even if the Powers Argument were 
sound: think of the Forms populating the intelligible realm (and that 
realm itself) as useful fictions. This metaphysically more cautious view 
would appeal to fans of Ockham’s Razor. 
A problem with the metaphorical interpretation, however, is that 
Plato himself seems to take the two worlds literally: ‘there are these 
two things [i.e., the Form of the good and the sun], one sovereign of 
the intelligible kind and place, the other of the visible’ (6.509d). Plato 
thinks of these as places, which suggests their reality. Although the word 
being translated as ‘place’ (τόπος [topos], whence the English word 
‘topographical’) could mean realm in a non-physical sense, it is difficult 
to think that Plato intends his talk of the Forms and the intelligible 
realm to be taken only metaphorically. Still, for readers bothered by the 
failure of the Powers Argument, this may be the best interpretation, 
even if it is not Plato’s. After all, we can still distinguish Understanding 
from Thought, the two kinds of cognition at work in the intelligible 
realm, without being realists about the Forms. Even if we take Plato’s 
Metaphysical Elevator only to the second floor, we can still distinguish 
people who grasp the essence of a perhaps narrow range of things from 
people who do not merely grasp more essences but also see connections 
between them. Integrative thinking is one of the hallmarks of dialectic, 
and one can prize that capacity while at the same time denying that the 
Forms existent mind-independently. Even Socrates himself is agnostic—
in the literal sense of not knowing—about the metaphysical status of the 
Forms and the intelligible realm: ‘Whether it’s true or not, only the god 
knows’ (7.517b). He seems to believe that the Forms are real, but perhaps 
this remark is Plato’s way of indicating that he is aware of the Powers 
Argument’s shortcomings: Socrates himself does not think he has 
proven the argument’s conclusion. Early in Book X he recounts his ‘usual 
procedure’, which is to ‘hypothesize a single form in connection with 
each of the many things to which we apply the same name’ (10.596a). 
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So he seems aware of the hypothetical, mathematician-like nature of his 
investigation. If Socrates can live with this sort of uncertainty, perhaps 
readers can as well. 
Food for thought. But it is now time to turn to another worry about 
the Cave Allegory, the enlightened philosopher’s return to the world 
below. 
Going Back Down into the Cave (7.519b–520b)
Having been fully liberated from the dark, smoky world of the Cave, 
the enlightened philosophers are in no hurry to return. Readers will 
remember that the problem Socrates faces in responding to the Third 
Wave—and it is worth remembering that the Sun, Divided Line, and 
Cave analogies are all part of that response—is that in the actual world, 
‘political power and philosophy’ are separated, with philosophers 
as uninterested in participating in the messy world of politics and 
government as those in power are in studying metaphysics and 
epistemology. The solution, both to the ideal city’s real possibility and 
to individual and communal happiness, is that these philosophers 
and political leaders be ‘forcibly prevented’ from pursuing their own 
interests exclusively. Somehow, ‘political power and philosophy [must 
be made to] entirely coincide’ (5.473cd). The philosophers would prefer 
to remain in the sunlit world above, contemplating the Forms. But 
possessing knowledge of the good, they and they alone are capable of 
governing. They have been compelled to ascend to the sunlit, intelligible 
world above; is it fair to compel them to go back down to the dark, smoky 
cave, the visible world below? 
There is a substantive philosophical problem for Socrates’ view that 
the just life is happier than the unjust life, an issue that Plato does not 
notice or at least does not remark upon. But before investigating that, 
we should attend briefly to one of the Republic’s most gratifying literary 
delights. The issue before us is compelling the enlightened philosophers 
to go back down into the cave to govern it. The Greek word at issue 
is καταβαίνειν (katabainein), to go down. If you turn to the Republic’s 
first page, you will see that Socrates’ first words, the very first words 
of the Republic, are ‘I went down’ (1.327a). The Greek there is κατέβην 
(katebên), the first-person singular form of καταβαίνειν in the aorist 
220 Plato’s ‘Republic’: An Introduction
(past) tense. The implication is that we are all cave-dwellers and that 
Socrates’ going down to the Piraeus is like the enlightened philosopher’s 
going back down into the cave, where we muck about in the dark as we 
look for justice. It is no wonder that, having discovered the other three 
political virtues (wisdom, courage, moderation), Socrates finds justice 
hard to locate at first: ‘the place seems to be impenetrable and full of 
shadows […] dark and hard to search’ (4.432c). The conversation that 
is the Republic, then, takes place in the Cave, where ‘we contend about 
the shadows of justice or the statues of which they are the shadows’ 
(7.517d). Although Plato could have had Socrates just say this simply 
and directly, it is more powerful and more aesthetically pleasing for 
readers to see this for themselves. Although some readers will yawn, 
others will be delighted at Plato’s literary artistry, and perhaps will be 
able to understand more fully why some people devote their lives to 
understanding and appreciating his philosophical thought and literary 
craft and the way he integrates them.
Now on to the substantive philosophical question of the enlightened 
philosopher’s return to the cave. An important point to grasp is that 
the liberated philosopher is not on a mission of liberation, at least not 
complete liberation, since on Plato’s view not everyone is capable of 
making it out of the cave. As we have noted several times already, he 
thinks that ‘the majority cannot be philosophic’ (6.494a). The returning 
enlightened philosopher will free whom he can, dragging those who are 
able to follow ‘up the rough, steep path’ (7.515e), but their main task 
is to govern in the Cave—‘to guard and care for the others’ (7.520a). 
We know they will not be received well, but if through ‘some chance 
event’ or divine intervention (6.499b) they are able to take charge of 
the cave, they will govern well, since they have the virtue needed to do 
so: political wisdom. Even so, the philosophers do not want to return 
to the Cave, and interestingly enough, Plato takes this as a plus: ‘A city 
whose prospective rulers are least eager to rule must of necessity be 
most free from civil war, whereas a city with the opposite kind of rulers 
is governed in the opposite way’ (7.520d). Since ‘it is those who are not 
lovers of ruling who must rule’ (7.521b), the returning philosophers’ 
reluctance counts in favor of their doing so.
So why do the philosophers descend into the cave and do what they 
do not really want to do? Just as they were compelled to ascend out of the 
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cave, they are compelled to descend into it, but the compulsion in the two 
cases is different. They were physically dragged up, at least metaphorically 
speaking, but they are not physically dragged back down. It is no accident 
that their being compelled upward would be metaphorically physical, since 
our particular individual bodies belong in the visible realm of particulars, 
while our souls, by contrast, are not physical, so there is nothing to drag. 
Their being compelled downward is mental or psychic, but it is not the 
irrational or non-rational compulsion that consists in brainwashing or 
advertising by people who seek to cause us to pursue ends they have 
chosen for us. Instead, the enlightened philosopher is compelled to return 
by rational persuasion. If one recognizes that an argument is sound—that 
its conclusion must be true if its premises are true and that its premises 
are in fact true—one is rationally compelled to accept the conclusion. This 
is not as a matter of internal or external causation, but rather of rational 
compulsion: the force of rational persuasion. So what is the argument that 
the enlightened philosophers should find so compelling?
As I hinted earlier, Socrates does not argue that any enlightened 
philosopher has a duty to descend to the cave and govern. Instead, only 
those whose enlightenment results from the city’s having educated 
them have that duty. ‘What grows of its own accord and owes no debt 
for its upbringing’, he argues, ‘has justice on its side when it is not 
keen to pay anyone for that upbringing’ (7.520b), where the currency 
of repayment is governing. It might be noble of an accidentally- or 
divinely-self-enlightened philosopher to do what they do not really 
want to do and descend into the cave, but this is not a requirement of 
justice: they would not act wrongly were they to remain above, pursuing 
their philosophical interests. But a philosopher educated by the city has 
a duty of reciprocity and gratitude to descend and govern. 
We should note that Plato here shows that he is not a consequentialist 
about morality. We can assume that the consequences of the philosopher’s 
descending would be better, all things considered, than the consequences 
of their remaining in the intelligible world above. If we take the good 
they would do by governing, which is presumably substantial, since 
there can be no real happiness for the citizens if philosophers do not rule 
(5.473e), and subtract from it the personal cost to them of sacrificing 
their own preferences for the good of the group, the net consequences 
of descending would still be overall better than those of not descending. 
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But this fact alone is not sufficient to generate a duty for the enlightened 
philosopher to descend and govern. Were they to go down into the 
cave, they would be going beyond the call of duty—going down 
would be supererogatory, as philosophers say. Supererogatory actions 
are praiseworthy to perform, but not blameworthy to omit. Donating 
a kidney to a stranger is, other things being equal, praiseworthy, but 
my not doing this is not blameworthy: I do not act unjustly if I keep 
both of my kidneys. (Of course, if I have promised to donate the kidney 
and the stranger has relied on my promise, then ‘other things’ are not 
equal, and the moral situation has changed considerably.) Actions 
required by justice are different: failure to perform them is blameworthy, 
and, other things being equal, performing them is not praiseworthy. 
Special circumstances are required for refraining from violence to be 
praiseworthy, as envisioned in a Sopranos episode when Tony, a violence-
prone mafioso, forgoes killing his daughter’s sexually predatory soccer 
coach and lets the police deal with it. ‘I didn’t hurt nobody today’, Tony 
drunkenly tells his wife, and for him, this is suitably praiseworthy.1 For 
the rest of us, not killing people who bother us or whom we regard as 
moral reprobates is what is minimally expected, and there is no praise 
for doing what we ought to be doing. 
So not just any enlightened philosopher, but only the enlightened 
philosopher who owes their enlightenment to the education that the city 
has provided for them, has a duty to go down into the cave and govern. 
Here is the argument Socrates gives them: 
We have made you kings in our city and leaders of the swarm, as it were, 
both for yourselves and for the rest of the city. You are better and more 
completely educated than the others and are better able to share in both 
types of life. Therefore each of you must go down to live in the common 
dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. 
When you are used to it, you’ll see vastly better than the people there. 
And because you have seen the truth about fine, just, and good things, 
you’ll know each image for what it is and also that of which it is the 
image. Thus, for you and for us, the city will be governed, not like the 
majority of cities nowadays, by people who fight over shadows and 
struggle against one another in order to rule […] but by people who are 
awake rather than dreaming (7.520bc)
1  The Sopranos, Season 1, Episode 9, ‘Boca’, dir. by Andy Wolk (HBO, 1999).
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This is an interesting argument, and it certainly has a lot of intuitive 
appeal. There is something compelling, after all, about obligations of 
gratitude: if you have gone out of your way to benefit me, I seem to 
incur a debt of gratitude. What it takes to repay that debt varies with 
the circumstances: often, a simple ‘thank you!’ is all that is required, but 
other times—as in the present case—more is required. Here, Socrates 
argues that, as a matter of justice, the enlightened philosophers must 
(temporarily, at least) give up the life they prefer—a philosophical life 
devoted to contemplating the Forms—for a life of political action. (These 
are the ‘both types of life’ referred to in the quotation above.) 
Plausible though the argument is, there is something troubling 
about duties of gratitude, even when the benefit to be reciprocated was 
bestowed intentionally, for the sake of the beneficiary. The worry is that 
one can go around obligating others to do good turns for oneself by 
doing good turns for them. If I show up unbidden and start harvesting 
your wheat for you, does my supererogatory act really bind you to do 
the same for me? Many of us would feel obligated to reciprocate, but 
the issue is not the psychological one about our feelings but rather the 
philosophical, normative one about our duties. Consider how your views 
would change if the helpful harvester helped not primarily because he 
wanted to benefit you, but because he needed your help harvesting 
his large wheat field, and, knowing you to be a ‘nice’ person but not 
wanting to ask for your help, decided that the best way to get you to help 
him was to help you. I suspect you would feel a bit manipulated. And 
suppose that your neighbor harvested your wheat when you were away 
in town on Saturday, without asking if you needed or wanted their help. 
They would have imposed this benefit on you, without your consent. 
Your supposed duty to return the favor would look flimsier and flimsier. 
The trouble with Socrates’ argument is that the city’s actions in 
educating the philosopher too closely resemble the ‘helpful’ neighbor 
harvesting your wheat. Remember that the would-be rulers are compelled 
to leave the cave: ‘someone dragged him away from there by force, up 
the rough, steep path, and did not let him go until he had dragged him 
into the sunlight’ (7.515e). The benefit has been bestowed and received 
non-voluntarily, which surely makes a difference to whether there is a 
duty of gratitude to reciprocate. In addition, Socrates misspeaks when 
he claims that the philosophers were educated ‘both for [them]selves 
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and for the rest of the city’ (7.520b). Any benefit the philosophers 
personally receive is foreseen, but not intended. Given the strong 
communitarian thrust of the ideal city, it is clear that the education is 
not primarily intended for the philosopher’s benefit but rather for the 
city’s; any benefit the individual philosopher receives is a side effect or 
by-product.
But even if Socrates’ argument for a duty to return is sound, there 
are disquieting implications for his view that the just life is happier 
than the unjust life, that justice benefits its possessor. Thrasymachus 
insisted that while justice benefits others it is always bad for its 
possessor: being just and acting justly makes one worse off in the 
long run. Thus Thrasymachus sees a wedge between what is good (or 
right) and what is good for me. Consider the situation of the enlightened 
philosopher. They would strongly prefer to remain in the Intelligible 
World, basking in its sunlight and contemplating the Forms. They 
will return because, being just, they will do what justice requires of 
them, even when they do not want to do it. But make no mistake about 
it, they do not want to return, and ruling is ‘something compulsory’ 
(7.520e), not enjoyable in itself as doing philosophy is. And notice that 
ruling does not really fit into any of the three categories of goodness 
that Glaucon articulates at the beginning of Book II. While ruling 
seems at first to belong to the category of goods that are ‘onerous but 
beneficial’ (2.357c), upon reflection we can see that it does not really 
fit there, since this mixed category contains goods that are ‘onerous 
but beneficial to us’ (my emphasis). Few people enjoy flossing their 
teeth, but those who do this regularly derive a benefit and presumably 
decide that on the whole flossing is worth it: but its value is extrinsic 
and instrumental, not intrinsic. But imagine if flossing benefited not 
the flosser but someone else. This seems to be the position of the 
enlightened philosopher. They return to the cave to govern, but they 
would rather not, since they would be personally better off ignoring 
the demands of justice. When Glaucon worries that justice is ‘making 
them live a worse life when they could live a better one’ (7.519d), 
Socrates does not reply that they are better off acting justly; instead, 
he reprises the response he made to Adeimantus at the beginning of 
Book IV: his concern is not ‘to make any class [or particular citizens] 
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in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness 
throughout the city’ (7.519e; compare 4.419a and 5.466a), which 
concedes the assessment underlying Glaucon’s question. 
The philosopher’s return benefits the cave’s residents, since ‘there 
can be no happiness, either public or private’ in any city not governed 
by a philosopher-king or -queen (5.473e). But returning does not 
benefit them personally, and that is the real issue here. Socrates seems 
to be conceding that Thrasymachus is right after all: justice benefits 
someone else, not its possessor. Even if the overall consequences of 
the philosopher’s returning were better than the consequences of their 
remaining above, their return would not benefit them. So it looks like 
justice does not benefit its possessor: leading a good life seems to come 
at the cost of having a good life.
Thus it seems that the philosopher’s situation is analogous to the 
far-fetched scenario in which flossing does not benefit the flosser but 
somehow benefits others. It would be a mistake to think that even in this 
scenario I would have no self-interested reasons for flossing. If there 
is a community norm that everyone should floss, my flossing would 
help sustain and promote this norm (and thus indirectly contribute 
to the benefit adherence to the norm produces) and encourage others 
to do so as well. If this is the case, then my flossing would benefit 
me indirectly. In doing my part to uphold norms that benefit the 
community, the burden of compliance might be counter-balanced 
by the benefit received. The same might be said for the returning 
philosopher, who lives a better life in a well-governed city than they 
do in the poorly governed city of the Shelter from the Storm analogy, 
which we considered in the last chapter. Although they would rather 
not descend, perhaps the philosopher’s doing so really does benefit 
them when we look at the big picture. So perhaps Socrates does 
not give away the game to Thrasymachus after all. Even though the 
philosopher’s return seems altruistic—they return to ‘labor in politics 
and rule for the city’s sake’ (7.540b) rather than their own, they might 
in fact benefit by their return. Though the city’s good is the outcome 
they intend, they can perhaps foresee that they will benefit too. 
A worry remains, though: in the imaginary scenario in which flossing 
benefits others, it seems unlikely that my not flossing will have bad 
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consequences so long as enough of my fellow citizens floss regularly. 
Or, to take a less far-fetched example, I might reason that while I enjoy 
National Public Radio, I can still receive this benefit without bearing 
my share of the burden, since NPR’s not receiving $100 from me will 
not cause them to close up shop. It seems to be in my self-interest to 
be a free-rider, benefiting from the good behavior of others while not 
burdening myself with doing my share. The ethics of Immanuel Kant 
rules out such free-riding behavior: if everyone’s acting on the maxim 
or principle I plan to act on would make it impossible for me to act on 
it, then my acting on it is wrong. But Kant did not share Socrates’ view 
that doing the right thing makes me better off all things considered: the 
demands of morality are frequently at odds with those of self-interest 
and happiness. 
Now perhaps free-riding would not even tempt the fully just 
philosopher, who takes their turn at ruling without complaint. But the 
self-interested Thrasymachan, who is ‘vicious but clever’ (7.519a), is 
unlikely to be persuaded: the philosopher would clearly be better off 
if they missed a turn every once in a while, if they called in sick when 
they really wanted a day of metaphysical sun-bathing. And things look 
even worse for the view that the just life is happier if we bear in mind the 
lives Socrates is to compare to settle the question of which life is happier: 
a just person who appears unjust versus an unjust person who appears 
just. The philosopher who does not go back down to the cave would 
be unjust, but under the terms agreed to they would not appear to be 
so: their free-riding would have to go unnoticed and thus would not 
undermine the norms governing the small community of philosophers, 
so their not going back down to the cave to rule benefits them without 
the negative effect on norms of justice. 
These are some of the issues readers will want to keep in mind as we 
explore Books VIII and IX, where Socrates resumes his investigation of 
the Republic’s second question. In Book VII, though, he does not seem to 
notice them—or if he does, he gives no explicit indication of this.
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Some Suggestions for Further Reading
There is a large literature on Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. Readers 
interested in the thought of Martin Heidegger will want to see The 
Essence of Truth, trans. by Ted Sadler (New York: Contiuum Books, 
2002). For an account more in keeping with the style and concerns of 
contemporary Anglophone philosophy, readers might turn to Chapter 
10 (Understanding the Good: Sun, Line, and Cave’) of Julia Annas, 
An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1981), pp. 243–71, reprinted in Plato’s Republic: Critical Essays, ed. by 
Richard Kraut (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 143–68. 
Readers with a taste for serious cinema and an interest in the Cave 
Allegory will certainly want to watch The Conformist, dir. by Bernardo 
Bertolucci (Paramount Pictures, 1970), about a young fascist tasked 
with assassinating his former philosophy professor. The film is rife with 
Platonic imagery as well as a cinematically brilliant discussion of the 
Cave. 
Interested readers can find an animated version of the Cave Allegory on 
YouTube, narrated by the great Orson Welles, at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=_jmJGBJRlUQ.
Readers interested in the enlightened philosopher’s descent back 
into the Cave should see Richard Kraut, ‘Return to the Cave: Republic 
519–521’, in Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul, ed. by Gail Fine 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 235–54. 
Readers interested in gratitude as a basis for duties of justice might 
start with Chapter 7 of A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political 
Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 156–90. 
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12. The Decline and Fall of the 
Ideal City-Soul:  
Books VIII–IX
Having addressed the Three Waves to the satisfaction of Glaucon and 
company, Socrates picks up where he left off at the end of Book IV, 
‘enquir[ing] whether it is more profitable to act justly, live in a fine 
way, and be just […] or to act unjustly and be unjust’ (4.444e–45a). To 
settle this question, he plans to trace the decay of the ideal, just city 
and soul into their unjust opposites. This is as we should expect, given 
the city-soul (polis-psychê) analogy that guides him in answering the 
Republic’s two main questions, What is justice? and Is the just life happier 
than the unjust life? There are five mirroring pairs here, with each city 
corresponding to a kind of soul, both organized and governed in the 
same way and having a distinctive good that it pursues. This is a story of 
decay, of psychic and political disease rather than mere change. Matters 
go from best to worst as the aristocratic soul and city—so called because 
the best (ariston) part of the city and the soul has power (kratos)—gives 
way to the honor-loving timocracy, which in turn degenerates into the 
money-loving oligarchy, and this to freedom-loving democracy until the 
worst psychic and political arrangement is reached: tyranny. Ultimately, 
Socrates will compare the aristocratic and the tyrannical souls as he 
answers the Republic’s second question. 
There is a lot going on here, so our discussion will be selective. Of 
course we will want to attend to which part of the city or soul is in 
charge and what end or goal each pursues as good in itself. We will 
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also attend to the transvaluation of values—to the ways in which virtues 
become vices and vices virtues—in this long, dark night of the soul and 
city, noting both the internal and external causes of decay. A common 
thread throughout the discussion is the role played by changes to the 
educational program developed earlier in Books II and III. 
The Aristocratic City and Soul (8.543a–547c)
Philosophers govern the aristocratic city and reason governs the 
aristocratic soul. The former is the paradigm of political justice, the 
latter of personal justice—which is what Plato most cares about in the 
Republic, a fact that is easy to forget, given the attention lavished on city-
building. It is interesting that Socrates does not make explicit what the 
best and the worst cities and souls take the good to be—here by ‘the 
good’ he means not the Form of the good but rather ‘[the] single goal 
at which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim’ (7.519c). It 
is their telos, their end or overarching aim, the goal that organizes their 
thought and action. It is by reference to this good that their activities 
make sense. There are a few plausible candidates for the aristocratic 
city’s and soul’s good, and I suggest that we take justice, the outstanding 
virtue in the Republic, to be their good. With each part of the city or soul 
performing its role well, the city and soul will function well and flourish 
and thrive: it will be happy. 
By this point we have a pretty good idea of what the aristocratic city 
and soul are like, given the care with which Socrates has described them. 
So what causes the decay of these ideals? Why does aristocracy decay 
into the second-best arrangement, timocracy? Socrates’ answer is a bit 
of a downer. It is not that aristocracy does decay but rather that it must: 
‘everything that comes into being must decay’ (8.546a). Perhaps this 
is a prescient nod to a moral analog of the law of entropy. Depressing 
though it is, it should come as no surprise, for if the ideal, aristocratic 
polis were ever realized, it would be realized in the visible, sensible 
world. This is the world of coming-to-be and passing-away, the world of 
becoming rather than the world of being, where the changeless Forms 
reside. Decay is inescapable in the sensible world of concrete particulars, 
which are ceaselessly coming to be and passing away.
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The initial cause is somewhat surprising, though: the guardians, as 
wise and mathematically gifted as they are, miscalculate the ‘perfect 
number’ (8.546b) that should govern the reproductive schedule of the 
guardians. It is not their fault, really. They are bringing ‘calculation 
(λογισμός [logismos])’, the heart of the first subject of advanced study 
for would-be rulers, to bear upon ‘sense perception’ (8.546b), and one 
of the abiding lessons of the Third Wave is that while we can have 
beliefs, even true beliefs, about the objects that populate the visible 
world, ‘there is no knowledge of such things’ (7.529b). It is not a defect 
in the philosopher-rulers so much as a defect in the world: they lack 
knowledge of the correct number because such things are by their very 
natures not knowable: one can have beliefs about particulars, but not 
knowledge. Even if the philosopher-queens and -kings get it right most 
of the time (which we can assume they will), they will miss the mark 
often enough to make a difference: they will ‘join brides and grooms at 
the wrong time, the children will be neither good natured nor fortunate’ 
(8.546d). In short, non-gold children will be born to gold parents—
but, like lawlessness and other evils, this will go unnoticed (4.424d). 
The problem posed by these defective natures is exacerbated by their 
being nurtured badly, as the program of education that was laid out 
in such detail in Books II and III begins to go awry: ‘they will have less 
consideration for music and poetry than they ought’ (8.546d). Thus the 
rulers will fail in their great duty, that they guard against ‘the mixture of 
the metals in the souls of the next generation’ (3.415b). 
The rulers whose golden souls are infected with bronze and iron 
begin to see a gap between the city’s good and their own. They question 
the prohibition on possessing private property, required by the city’s 
foundational myth. They expect ruling to pay and so begin to drive a 
wedge into the ever-widening gap, hastening the aristocratic city toward 
the ruin prophesized at the end of Book III. The city is not unified—
literally, it has dis-integrated—being no longer ‘of one mind’ (8.545d) 
about who should rule and what is best for the city. As false rulers pull 
the city toward money-making, the true rulers and auxiliaries, whose 
souls are still pure gold and silver, pull in the other direction, ‘towards 
virtue and the old order’ (8.547b). To end the strife, a deal is struck, 
settling on a middle way, between rational, aristocratic virtue and 
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appetitive, oligarchic wealth: timocracy, in which the good is honor and 
in which spirit rules the soul and the auxiliaries rule the city.
The Timocratic City and Soul (8.547c–550c)
The timocratic city and soul do not exhibit justice. They cannot, as they 
are governed by the honor-loving spirited element, which is supposed 
to be reason’s ally and helper (4.441a), not governor of soul and city. 
Only a soul and city in which each part performs its proper task can be 
just. Still, calling them unjust seems too strong. People for whom honor 
is the good will regard shame as bad—perhaps as the bad, the thing most 
to be avoided—and thus will avoid conventionally unjust conduct. This 
love of honor is fueled by their ‘valu[ing] physical training more than 
music and poetry’ (8.548b), which also fuels a change for the worse in 
fundamental values. Justice, we know, ‘is doing one’s own work and not 
meddling with what is not one’s own’ (4.433a), but in a timocracy those 
‘who do their work are called fools and held to be of little account, while 
those who meddle in other people’s affairs are honored and praised’ 
(8.550a). Thus justice begins to be regarded as the kind of simple-
minded foolishness that Thrasymachus mocked in Book I. 
In accounting for the rise of the timocratic person, Socrates seems to 
give more evidence that he is not really a feminist, as he lays the blame 
for its rise at the feet of a carping, status-hungry wife who complains 
to her son about his father’s shortcomings. The aristocratic father, who 
is reminiscent of Book VI’s shelter-seeker who wants to ‘lead a quiet 
life and do [his] own work’ (6.496d), is not interested in ruling as his 
city degenerates, and this negatively affects his wife’s status among the 
other wives. He is uninterested in money and ‘does not fight back when 
he is insulted’ (8.549c). In short, his wife complains to their son that his 
father is ‘unmanly [and] too easy-going’ (8.549d), since, presumably, 
he subscribes to Socrates’ proto-Stoic view that ‘human affairs are not 
worth taking very seriously’ (10.604b) and thus is among those who 
are ‘unwilling to occupy themselves in human affairs’ (7.517c). At 
his mother’s urging, their son wants ‘to be more of a man than his 
father’ (8.550a). It clear that Plato is criticizing a kind of masculinity 
that typifies and would be ascendant in an honor-driven, competitive 
culture. The timocratic son is not bad by nature, Socrates insists, but he 
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is surrounded by people who value honor and victory more than virtue 
and truth, so it is no wonder, given how readily children absorb values 
from their culture, that he turns out as he does. 
Honor is a fine thing, as it can lead one to have a soul that is kalon, 
fine and noble and beautiful, and thus worthy of being honored. Kant 
thought it a facsimile of virtue, as it provides a nobler motive than self-
interest. Aristotle writes of a healthy competition in which people strive 
to emulate and even outdo each other in virtue.1 But honor as an internal 
good can easily give way to the external good of being honored, especially 
in a competitive, victory-loving culture. Being honored should be 
merely a foreseeable consequence of acting well, but it becomes instead 
the intended outcome, the goal aimed at. 
The Oligarchic City and Soul (8.550c–555b)
Changes to education and changes in value are again part of the story 
as timocracy degenerates into oligarchy. The most momentous change 
is wealth’s replacing honor as the over-arching goal of city and soul, 
as the competition for honor that drove the timocratic person finds a 
new object. It is no accident that Plato twice appeals to the notion of 
emulation in explaining this transition (the Greek term is ζῆλος (zêlos), 
which is the root of the words ‘zealous’ and ‘jealous’). Iron- and bronze-
souled rulers see their fellows stretching and then disregarding the 
rules against private property; they emulate and compete with each 
other, which ultimately leads them to formally establish wealth as a 
qualification for ruling. Wealth is the criterion by which they choose the 
captain of the ship of state, ‘refusing to entrust the ship to a poor person 
even if he was a better captain’ (8.551c). As wealthy craftspeople govern 
the oligarchic city, appetite—in particular the desire to make money—
governs the soul. Thus appetite and the craftspeople operate in areas 
beyond their expertise, ‘meddling in other people’s affairs’ (8.551e)—
the affairs of the guardians and auxiliaries. 
Plato’s psychology of the oligarchic person is subtle and fascinating. 
The oligarchic person subordinates reason to appetite, reducing reason 
to the merely instrumental role of determining the best means to the end 
1  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX.8 1169a6–10.
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which appetite sets for him—and thus embodies the Humean picture on 
which ‘Reason is and ought only be the slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office but than to serve and obey them’.2 This 
is not to say that Hume endorses the oligarch’s substantive goal: he does 
not think our primary aim is or should be the pursuit of wealth. Hume’s 
point is structural, concerning the relation of reason and passion, not the 
substantive ends we pursue: passion, not reason, provides us with our 
goals and ends; reason’s job is merely to determine the best means to 
achieve those ends. Although Plato regards wealth and virtue as polar 
opposites (8.550e), he implies that there is something about the desire for 
wealth that gives the oligarch’s life order and discipline. The oligarch is 
unwilling to indulge what Socrates calls ‘his dronish appetites’ (8.554c) 
for sensual gratification but instead is ‘a thrifty worker, who satisfies 
only his necessary appetites’ (8.554a). Since reason does not govern his 
soul, he is not just, but he is not quite unjust—at least his conduct is not 
reliably unjust. His baser appetites are kept in check, not by reason, as 
they are in the just, aristocratic soul, nor by a healthy sense of shame, as 
they are in the spirit-governed timocratic soul, but instead by fear. The 
oligarch fears that indulging his other appetites will be financially too 
costly. The contest between force and persuasion, raised in the opening 
scene of the Republic, is decisively settled in favor of force by the time 
oligarchy arrives. The oligarch’s dronish appetites are ‘forcibly held 
in check by his carefulness’ (8.554c) and thus ‘his better desires are in 
control of his worse’ (8.554d). 
Carefulness is a fine quality; indeed, it is a trait the guardians must 
possess, given the importance of their task to the city’s wellbeing 
(2.374e). Caution keeps the oligarchic person on the straight and narrow, 
more or less, but ‘where they have ample opportunity to do justice with 
impunity’ (8.554c), they will probably take it. After all, what is needed 
for success in business, they will reason, is a reputation for justice: not 
being just but merely seeming just. Despite the oligarch’s devotion to 
financial gain, Socrates insists that ‘the true virtue of a single-minded 
and harmonious soul far escapes him’ (8.554e). This may seem an odd 
remark for Socrates to make, given the oligarch’s focus on wealth, which 
certainly seems single-minded. But as is so often the case in the Republic, 
2  Hume, Treatise, p. 415 (II.iii.3).
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the way things seem is not the way they are. I take Socrates’ point to 
be that while the oligarch’s devotion to wealth is indeed single, it is 
not single-minded: it is not a product of rational reflection but rather of 
appetite. The tune his soul sings must be dissonant at times, since its 
parts are not playing their proper roles—reason should govern but here 
is subordinated to appetite—and the soul is ordered not by reason and 
persuasion but by force, and fear does not make for harmony. This lack 
of single-mindedness is also a feature of the timocratic city and soul, 
which, like the oligarchic city and soul, is in tension with itself. 
Toward the beginning of Book IV, Socrates worried about the 
corruptive and corrosive powers of wealth, fearing their ‘slipping 
into the city unnoticed’ (4.421e). The changes all seem minor and 
inconsequential. What harm, for example, could allowing flutes and the 
Lydian mode do? But it is precisely their seeming innocuousness that 
makes changes to education and relaxing the Specialization Principle so 
dangerous. We can imagine the processes of rationalization at work as 
values such as justice and nobility are replaced by the drive for wealth. 
The oligarch is not someone who ‘pays any attention to education’ 
(8.554b), at least not education in music and poetry! What a waste of 
time, we can imagine the oligarchs complaining. Education—especially 
if it is publicly funded—should be practical, teaching marketable skills to 
people regarded primarily as consumers and only secondarily if at all as 
citizens. If we listen closely, we can almost hear Dickens’ Mr Gradgrind 
weighing in: ‘Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone 
are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else’.3 
While the oligarch will perhaps embrace the pre-dialectic mathematical 
education spelled out in Book VII, they will re-purpose it in an anti-
Socratic way, insisting that number be studied by ‘tradesmen and 
retailers, for the sake of buying and selling’ (7.525c), that its aim be 
practical, never theoretical. 
The careful and hard-working oligarch ‘has a good reputation and is 
thought to be just’ (8.554c), but whatever his reputation, we know that 
his soul is not in fact just. He is the midpoint in the decay of the ideal 
city and soul. He is not good, but he is not thoroughly bad, either. He 
is someone like Cephalus, whom Socrates clearly respects. Cephalus is 
3  Charles Dickens, Hard Times (London: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 10.
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wealthy, and while he is fond of money, he is not too fond of it (1.330bc). 
He does not use his considerable wealth to indulge his sensuous 
appetites; instead, it has given him a moral cushion of sorts: because 
he is (and was born) wealthy, he is not tempted to act unjustly in in the 
pursuit of wealth. Cephalus has enough self-awareness to admit that his 
moral decency is not a consequence of unshakable inner virtue but owes 
a great deal to luck and external circumstance. 
The oligarchic city is really two cities, rich and poor, at war with each 
other, and it is relatively stable, but as its stability is born of fear and 
power rather than justice, it is not a stability that can last. And it does not 
last, Socrates thinks: it inevitably decays into democracy. 
The Democratic City and Soul (8.555b–562a)
Etymologically, ‘democracy’ means rule (-cracy) of the demes—the 
people. Readers are often taken aback at the dim view Plato has of 
democracy, but it really should not be a surprise. Plato thinks that ‘the 
majority cannot be philosophic’ (6.494a), so most people are incapable 
of possessing wisdom, knowledge of what is best for the city as a 
whole, which is the virtue required to govern well. I trust that we can 
understand why he takes this view, even if we disagree with him. 
The good in a democracy is freedom, which for Plato is not 
unambiguously good. He quickly associates it with ‘license to do what 
[one] wants’ and to ‘arrange [one’s] own life in whatever manner pleases 
him’ (8.557b). License carries with it a hint of arrogance, and perhaps 
immaturity, reminiscent of the ‘silly, adolescent idea of happiness’ 
(5.466b) condemned earlier. One way to think about Plato’s discomfort 
with this sort of freedom is that it is ungrounded in any rational principle 
and that it underwrites choices based on whim. The Specialization 
Principle has long since given way to the impulse of the moment. ‘There 
is neither order nor necessity in his life’ (8.561d), Socrates says of the 
democratic person. He is unfocused, with the attention span of a golden 
retriever. Today he gives himself over to drinking and debauchery; next 
week he drinks only water and becomes an exercise addict; he tries 
business, he then dabbles in philosophy, etc. He lacks the discipline his 
oligarchic father had, and indeed his lifestyle is a reaction to parental 
frugality and austerity. 
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Following the late Isaiah Berlin, philosophers often distinguish 
between positive and negative freedom. Freedom conceived negatively 
is the absence of constraint. The freedom of speech guaranteed in the 
First Amendment of the US Constitution, for example, is a guarantee 
against state interference with expressing one’s views. But conceived 
positively, freedom is genuine autonomy and self-direction. As Berlin 
puts it, ‘I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on 
external forces […] I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by 
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which 
affect me, as it were, from outside’.4 The democratic person’s freedom is 
largely negative; they are not prevented from doing as they like (subject, 
of course, to various reasonable constraints, e.g., that their conduct does 
not harm others). But the democrat seems too impulsive and reactive, 
too susceptible to external influences to count as positively free. They 
do not scrutinize their values or plans or adopt only those endorsed 
after a period of reflection, as the positively free person does. There is a 
deep sense in which the democrat’s reasons and purposes are not really 
their own. At the very least, they are ephemeral and shifting, and do not 
reflect the presence of a well-thought-out life-plan. 
So, we know what the democratic city and soul take the good to be. 
And in place of oligarchy’s wealth requirement, in the democratic city 
all citizens—or, at least, all male citizens—have political rights: the city 
is ruled not by the wealthy craftspeople but by all the craftspeople. The 
political classes of the aristocratic city are a thing of the past, and the 
army comprises citizen-soldiers, rather than the professionals that Plato 
envisioned. But what governs the democratic soul? There are five kinds 
of constitutional arrangement, Socrates insists, but only three parts of the 
soul—so by the time we arrive at democracy, we seem to have run out of 
parts. So what governs?
4  Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Berlin, Liberty: Four Essays on Liberty, ed. 
by Henry Hardy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), https://doi.org/10.10
93/019924989x.001.0001, p. 178. 
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Interlude: Necessary versus Unnecessary Appetites
Appetite governs the democratic soul, as it does in the oligarchic 
soul, but here Socrates makes a philosophically interesting distinction 
between kinds of appetites or desires. The democratic soul is governed 
by unnecessary desires, the sort the oligarch steadfastly and cautiously 
refused to indulge, while necessary desires govern the oligarchic 
soul. Socrates alluded to the distinction (without explaining it) when 
describing the oligarch, whom he called ‘a thrifty worker who satisfies 
only his necessary appetites’ (8.554a). And indeed, the distinction 
between necessary and unnecessary desires is implicit in the difference 
between the rustic and the luxurious ideal cities. The latter comes about 
because the citizens have ‘overstepped the limit of their necessities’ 
(2.373d), which suggests that in the rustic city, which Socrates regards 
as ‘the true city […] the healthy one’ (2.372e), the citizens satisfy only 
their necessary appetites, whereas satisfying the unnecessary appetites 
fuels the luxurious city. So how do necessary and unnecessary desires 
differ?
Plato gives a two-pronged definition of necessary desires: ‘those 
we cannot desist from and those whose satisfaction benefits us [are] 
rightly called necessary for we are by nature compelled to satisfy them’ 
(8.558e). This ‘and’ should be an ‘or’, however, since a desire that meets 
either criterion will count as necessary. Consider bread. As a basic 
element in the Greek diet, we can think of it as proxy for food generally. 
A desire for bread is necessary on both counts: first, we cannot desist 
from it—we cannot not want it, as a desire for food comes with our 
animal nature. Someone without this desire—e.g., someone suffering 
from anorexia, which etymologically is the absence (the privative 
an-) of desire (orexis)—would be very badly off and in an unnatural, 
unhealthy state. Second, satisfying a desire for bread is good for us, and 
indeed we enjoy it. While bread makes life possible, good bread makes 
life enjoyable. So, too, do the delicacies we put on the bread make life 
more enjoyable, but we can learn to do without them. Remember that 
it was the absence of delicacies that Glaucon decried in the first, rustic 
ideal city back in Book II (2.372c), claiming the city was fit only for pigs. 
So a desire for delicacies will also count as a necessary desire, since it is 
natural for us to desire something to put on the bread. Only an appetite 
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that fails both counts will be unnecessary. Though Socrates does not say 
so, presumably this will vary from person to person: you may be able 
to enjoy a cocktail before and a glass or two of wine with dinner, but 
for an alcoholic, even a couple of drinks starts them on the road to self-
destructive drunkenness. So wine—also a Greek staple—is necessary 
for some of us but unnecessary for others. 
Though the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires 
is needed for Socrates to distinguish between the oligarchic and 
democratic souls, the democratic person rejects it, taking all desires to 
be equally worthy of pursuit: the democrat ‘puts all his pleasures on 
an equal footing’ (8.561b). The democratic person does not deny the 
distinction in a conceptual way, holding it to be incoherent or non-
existent. Instead, they deny that the distinction is a suitable basis for 
action and choice, ‘declar[ing] that all pleasures are equal and must be 
valued equally’ (8.561c). They do not think that necessary desires are 
better than unnecessary desires or that there is any reason to blush at 
pursuing what those frugal oligarchs regard as ‘unnecessary [desires] 
that aim at frivolity and display’ (9.572c). Where their fathers pursued 
only necessary desires, the young democrats reject this frugal austerity 
(and thus the order and discipline their focus on necessary desires gave 
rise to) and seek to indulge the desires that characterize the ne’er-do-
well drones. 
Although the democrat seems uninterested in thinking 
philosophically about Plato’s way of distinguishing necessary and 
unnecessary desires, we might find it worthwhile to do so, to see if there 
are independent reasons to reject it or at least to reformulate it, as it 
seems awkward to regard a desire for delicacies as necessary, since, as 
Socrates himself points out, we can learn to give them up. So we do 
not get too far afield, let us consider briefly the taxonomy of desires 
Epicurus (bce 341–270) proposed. First, a word of warning: though 
the word ‘epicurean’ has some resonance with ancient Epicureanism 
(which took pleasure alone to be good in itself, the view we identified 
in an earlier chapter as hedonism), Epicurus actually took the absence of 
pain and disturbance to be what pleasure truly is. For him, the pleasure 
that constitutes the good is not a full belly but a tranquil mind. 
Where Plato fuses necessary and natural desires, calling some desires 
necessary because they are natural, Epicurus distinguishes between 
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what is natural and what is necessary. For Epicurus, a necessary desire 
is one whose non-satisfaction causes physical pain. When we do not eat, 
we experience the pangs of hunger. Thus a desire for food—for bread, 
as Socrates put it—counts as necessary. While every necessary desire is 
natural, for Epicurus, not all natural desires are necessary. The desire 
for bread is both natural and necessary. But desires for relishes, while 
natural, are not necessary. Think of a favorite dish. I love the Pha Ram Long 
Song at Ruam Mit Thai in downtown St Paul; its deliciousness makes my 
life better, but I can clearly live without it: it is a natural but unnecessary 
desire. If I show up only to find that the restaurant is no longer open 
on Sundays, I should react with mild disappointment: ‘Oh, dang it! I 
was really looking forward to that. Oh well.’ I will ask my companions 
where we should go instead. If, on the other hand, I am not disappointed 
but really angry that the restaurant is closed and am still muttering ‘I 
cannot fricking believe it!’ hours later, sulking and ruining dinner for 
everyone because I did not get what I wanted, then my desire is not 
only unnecessary, it is also unnatural. Excessive psychological distress 
at a desire’s not being satisfied is not natural: there is something wrong 
with me. So the difference between natural but unnecessary desires and 
unnatural and unnecessary desires is not a difference in objects desired 
but rather in the desirer themself. I should be able to eliminate my desire 
for x when x is difficult to obtain—or if x is bad for me. Epicurus thinks 
that the source is usually ‘a groundless opinion’—some false belief that 
I cannot be happy unless I have this particular Thai dish or that flavor of 
ice cream or that I get a promotion, etc. In fact, for Epicurus eliminating 
such desires is one of the keys to happiness. No gourmand himself, 
Epicurus thought that 
Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain 
of want has been removed, while bread and water confer the highest 
possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate 
oneself, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is 
needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements 
of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we 
approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.5
5  Epicurus, ‘Letter to Menoeceus’, in The Art of Happiness, ed. by George Strodach 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2012), p. 159 [DL 10.130–31].
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Epicurus’ taxonomy of desire seems an improvement on Plato’s largely 
because he separates naturalness and necessity, which Plato conflates. 
Plato’s way of distinguishing necessary and unnecessary seems awkward 
and even mistaken—but if so, it is not a fatal mistake but rather one that 
is easily repairable. 
Democracy, Continued
Equality comes a close second to freedom as democracy’s defining 
good. Not only are all pleasures and desires equal, but so too are men 
and women (8.563b) (which is yet another point against the view that 
Socrates is a feminist, given the disdain he has for democracy), slave 
and owner, citizen and non-citizen (8.562e), and even humans and non-
human animals (8.563c). Where the oligarchic father ‘satisfies only his 
necessary appetites […] and enslaves his other desires as vain’ (8.554a), 
his democratic son celebrates ‘the liberation and release of useless and 
unnecessary pleasures’ (8.561a). 
Plato stresses how attractive the democratic polity appears: it is 
‘multicolored’ (8.559d, 561e) and ‘embroidered with every kind of 
character type’ (8.557c). But it is a specious beauty. The democratic 
children of oligarchic parents seem to suffer from what is sometimes 
called affluenza: they are ‘fond of luxury, incapable of effort either 
mental or physical, too soft to stand up to pleasures or pains, and 
idle besides’ (8.556b). Their teachers, perhaps afraid of low scores on 
student surveys, fear and flatter them (8.563a), and their parents want 
most of all to be their friends. It is a prescription for disaster, Plato 
thinks. Despite its obvious shortcomings, taking the good to be wealth 
has its benefits, because it is a value with content and moreover one 
that imposes discipline and order. Freedom, on the other hand, is formal 
rather than contentful, and indeed it is perhaps too formal and too open-
textured to guide one’s life. Aristotle wrote that ‘not to have one’s life 
organized in view of some end is a mark of much folly’.6 Plato surely 
agrees; he seems to be arguing that freedom is ill suited to play the role 
the democrat has cast it in. Do whatever you want is, technically, a life-
guiding principle, but so long as there are few or no restrictions on what 
6  Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, I.2 1214b10. 
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one should want or desire, it is going to lead to chaos. So what we have 
is not so much democracy as anarchy—ἀναρχία (anarchia): the absence 
of a leader or leading principle (8.562e). 
We see this most clearly in the way the correct, aristocratic scheme of 
values is turned on its head in the democratic city and soul. Reverence, 
the proper sense of respect and shame that proper stories about the 
gods were meant to cultivate, is thought of as foolishness. The cardinal 
virtue of moderation is regarded as the cardinal vice of cowardice, and 
the vice of shamelessness is now become courage. Insolence—literally, 
ὕβρις (hubris)—is regarded as good breeding and anarchy is freedom. 
They mistake prodigality or wastefulness as the public-spirited virtue 
of magnificence (private spending for public goods such as producing 
a tragedy, outfitting a trireme, etc.). Where the oligarchic father was not 
willing to spend on such matters, the democratic son goes wrong in 
the other direction, spending wildly. It is an upside-down world, but of 
course the democratic person thinks it is the best of all worlds, free of 
stuffy conventions and old-fashioned thinking. 
The Tyrannical City and Soul (8.562a–9.576b)
Plato’s explanation of the transformation from democracy to oligarchy 
has the elegance of Newton’s third law of motion, which states that for 
every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. For Plato, ‘excessive 
action in one direction usually sets up a reaction in the opposite 
direction’ (8.563e), so the extreme freedom found in democracies 
leads inexorably to the total lack of freedom found in tyrannies. Plato 
thinks his proto-Newtonian principle is not merely political—it explains 
changes in seasons, plants, and bodies, too—but alas we do not have 
space to pursue this fascinating line of thought. 
It is no accident that Plato appeals to a principle of physics here. 
Nor should it be a surprise; after all, it is something like entropy 
that explains why the ideal state begins to decay in the first place. In 
addition to physical explanations of political events and changes—and 
it is helpful to keep in mind that our word ‘physics’ derives from the 
ancient Greek word φύσις [phusis], which means nature more broadly—
he also appeals to economic factors. Consider first the change from 
oligarchy to democracy. Having exploited existing sources of wealth, 
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the oligarchs need new sources, new markets, so they hit upon one 
with great contemporary relevance: they find young people to be a 
potentially lucrative market to lend money to. More interested in profit 
than people, ‘they are unwilling to enact laws to prevent young people 
who have had no discipline from spending and wasting their wealth, so 
that by making loans to them, secured by the young people’s property, 
and then calling those loans in, they themselves become ever richer and 
more honored’ (8.555c).
Although the details differ, something similar is afoot in the US, 
where student loan debt now tops one trillion dollars, exceeding even 
credit card debt. Though the cause is massive state disinvestment in 
higher education rather than predatory lending, the results seem the 
same: indebted young people. While indebtedness in the US seems to 
push us away from democracy and toward oligarchy, in Plato’s world 
things go in the opposite direction: as the rich become fewer but richer 
and the poor become poorer but grow in number, an actual and not 
merely metaphorical civil war breaks out and the people are victorious. 
In true Thrasymachan fashion, the holders of political power pass 
laws that benefit themselves rather than the citizenry at large or the 
state as a whole. They resist suggestions that ‘the majority of voluntary 
contracts be entered into at the lender’s own risk’ (8.556b), much as 
contemporary bankers resist calls to eliminate the moral hazards of a 
system that privatizes profit but socializes loss by having the citizenry 
bail out the ‘too big to fail’ banks and investment firms that crashed 
the world economy in 2008. The transition to tyranny is fueled by the 
would-be tyrant’s ‘making all sorts of promises both in public and 
private, freeing the people from debt [and] redistributing the land to 
them’ (8.566e). Thus economic factors are at work here, as well. Many 
readers will note eerie similarities with today’s global political climate, 
which seems to feature the emergence of the ‘strongman’ whom ‘the 
people’ have set up ‘as their special champion’ (8.565c). I will leave it 
to more economically and politically sophisticated readers to pursue 
this for themselves; there is plenty of food for thought here, where—as 
elsewhere—the Republic is surprisingly contemporarily relevant.
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Interlude: Lawless versus Lawful Desires
Earlier it seemed that Socrates had run out of parts of the soul, there 
being five kinds of souls (and cities) but only three parts in the soul. To 
distinguish oligarch and democrat he distinguished between necessary 
and unnecessary desires. Here a similar problem arises: what governs 
the tyrannical soul? And so, at the beginning of Book IX Socrates makes 
a distinction between kinds of unnecessary desires: some are lawless, 
and some are law-abiding or at least law-amenable. In an account that 
rings some Freudian bells, Plato indicates that the lawless, unnecessary 
appetites are most apparent in our dreams, for it is there that our 
‘beastly and savage part’ (8.571c) emerges—as anyone who has had not 
just a weird but a genuinely creepy dream can attest. There is nothing 
that is off-limits for the lawless, unnecessary desires; in their grip a 
person ‘does not shrink from trying to have sex with a mother […] or 
with anyone else at all, whether man, god, or beast. It will commit any 
foul murder, and there is no food it refuses to eat’ (9.572d). Whom one 
has sex with, whom one kills, and what one eats form an unholy trinity 
indeed. The role played here and elsewhere in the Republic is intriguing; 
it was pivotal in the rejection of the first ideal city and in understanding 
the lawless unnecessary desires which define the tyrant. (It may be 
helpful to note that the Greek word translated as ‘lawless’ is παράνομος 
[paranomos], which connotes not the absence of law so much as going 
beyond it.) 
It is not that only the tyrant has lawless unnecessary appetites; 
they are present in almost everyone, Plato thinks, but they govern 
the tyrannical soul. In most of us they are kept at bay by constraints 
internal (reason, in the best of us; shame or fear, in the rest of us) 
or external (the law). Indeed, Plato’s account of psychic and political 
degeneration is an account of how these constraints change. In the 
aristocratic, philosophical soul, it is reason—rational persuasion—
that keeps the beastly desires at bay. They are tamed by arguments 
(8.554d) and by the meditative practice Plato counsels undertaking 
before one goes to bed at night (9.571e–2a). The spirit-governed 
timocrat, more responsive to honor than to reason, is motivated by 
a healthy sense of shame, honor’s opposite. Remember that much 
of the point of musical-poetic education is cultivating ‘the right 
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distastes’ (3.401e)—of being properly disgusted. The timocrat should 
be disgusted at the thought of ignoble or dishonorable thoughts and 
deeds and presumably would not even be tempted to embezzle from 
or cheat a widow or orphan, though the oligarch probably is. For the 
oligarch’s dronish, unnecessary desires are not held in check by reason 
or shame but rather by fear; and if the oligarch believes they can ‘do 
injustice with impunity’ (8.554c), they probably will, just as Gyges 
did back in Book II (2.360c). The democratic person wavers between 
fear and shame, being too unsettled to have a constant, characteristic 
motivation: sometimes their disordered soul is ordered by ‘a kind of 
shame’ (8.560a), which overcomes some of their base appetites and 
expels others. But at other times they ‘feel neither shame nor fear in 
front of [their] parents’ (8.562e), thinking themself their parents’ 
equal and taking shamelessness to be a form of courage (8.560e). The 
tyrannical soul is ‘free of all control by shame or reason’ (9.571c). As 
the tyrannical city long ago abandoned proper education in music and 
poetry, the main bulwark against lawlessness (4.424d), this should 
come as no surprise. 
Tyranny, Continued
Although Plato is less explicit about the tyrannical soul’s good than he 
is with the defining goods of the timocratic, oligarchic, and democratic 
souls, it seems that the tyrant’s good is erotic love and desire: ἔρως 
[erôs]. But this is not really erotic love, as opposed to familial or 
friendly love. It is mad, addictive, erotic desire for everything. Plato told 
us back in Book III that the right kind of erotic love—ὁ ὀρθὸς ἔρως: the 
orthos erôs— is ‘the love of order and beauty that has been moderated 
by education in music and poetry [… which] has nothing mad or 
licentious about it’ (3.403a). The tyrant’s erotic love, by contrast, is 
a kind of ‘madness (μανία [mania])’ (9.573b) that leads not merely 
to house-breaking, purse-snatching, temple-robbing and the like 
(9.575b), a cluster of unjust acts that pop up elsewhere in the Republic 
(1.344a, 4.443a, 8.552d), but to ‘complete anarchy and lawlessness’ 
(9.575a). It is outdoing—pleonxia—gone mad. 
Thus the tyrant when awake is what most of us are when we sleep 
and have dark dreams of fulfilling lawless unnecessary desires (9.574e). 
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The tyrant is the inversion of the philosopher, who, in contrast to lovers 
of opinion and the cave-dwellers, is awake (5.476d, 7.520c). The tyrant’s 
‘waking life is like the nightmare we described earlier’ (9.576b). Their 
desires are not merely many but are insatiable, for they are ‘like a vessel 
full of holes’ (9.586b): no sooner has one appetite or lust been satisfied 
than another makes its demands. Always wanting more, nothing is ever 
enough. Epicurus seems to have diagnosed him exactly: ‘Nothing is 
enough for the man for whom enough is too little’.7
The portrait of the tyrant is interesting, but some readers may 
feel that it misses the mark. It does not seem to fit tyrants most of 
us are familiar with—for example, Hitler and Stalin, neither of whom 
seemed to be a bubbling cauldron of lust, unable to control himself. 
Plato seems to have captured the essence of an addict running wild, 
manic and disordered and undisciplined. But he seems not to have 
captured the cold, calculating tyrant that Thrasymachus praises. The 
tyrant, after all, is supposed to be like a wolf (8.566a), preying upon 
the flock that the guardian-shepherds try to protect with the help of 
the sheepdog-auxiliaries, to bring the metaphor full circle. While the 
wolf as portrayed by Plato poses a threat to the flock, it is hard to see 
how this undisciplined, manic, deeply disturbed person can appear a 
paragon of justice, as the argument of the Republic requires. Someone 
more ordered and calculating seems needed, someone possessing 
the oligarch’s singular focus and discipline, someone whose soul is 
as ordered and reason-governed as the just person’s—but someone 
who possesses cleverness rather than wisdom: that is, someone who 
knows what best serves their interests rather than the city’s. In short, 
the tyrant should be a ‘wise villain’ (3.409c). 
No doubt there are people with dark secret lives who manage to 
convey an ordered, mild façade. But it is difficult to imagine how 
someone whose inner life is as deranged and insane as Plato’s tyrant is 
could manage to appear completely respectable. Readers might wish 
that Adeimantus would push back here, as he has done elsewhere in 
the Republic. It is a shame that Adeimantus does not resist Glaucon’s 
‘taking over the argument’ (9.576b) at the conclusion of the account 
of the tyrant and raise some of these objections to Socrates. Because 
7  Epicurus, ‘Vatican Sayings’ #68, in The Art of Happiness, p. 183.
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he does not, we will want to keep them in mind as we look at the 
arguments that the just life is happier than the unjust life, to which we 
now turn. 
Some Suggestions for Further Reading
Readers interested in the philosophical thought of Epicurus will find 
his extant writings along with a helpful introductory essay in The Art 
of Happiness, trans. by George Strodach (New York: Penguin Classics, 
2012). Epicurus’ thought is expressed vividly in one of the great poems 
of world literature, Lucretius, The Nature of Things, trans. by Alicia 
Stallings (New York: Penguin Books, 2007). The story of the fifteenth-
century rediscovery of it is the subject of Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: 
How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2012), which won both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award. 
In presenting Epicurus’ taxonomy of desire, I draw on an excellent essay, 
Raphael Woolf, ‘Pleasure and Desire’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Epicureanism, ed. by James Warren (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol9780521873475, pp. 158–78.
Readers interested in an accessible, erudite discussion of the decay of 
the city and soul will profit from G.R.F. Ferrari, City and Soul in Plato’s 
Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
As many readers will have noticed for themselves, there has been 
a revival of popular interest in Plato’s conception of tyranny in light 
of recent electoral events in America. There are many interesting 
opinion pieces online. For a scholarly take, interested readers might 
see the essays collected in Trump and Political Philosophy: Patriotism, 
Cosmopolitanism, and Civic Virtue, ed. by Marc Benjamin Sable and 
Angel Jaramillo Torres (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), https://
doi.org/10.1007/978–3-319–74427–8, or in Trump and Political Philosophy: 
Leadership, Statesmanship, and Tyranny, ed. by Angel Jaramillo Torres and 
Marc Benjamin Sable (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), https://doi.
org/10.1007/978–3-319–74445–2. 
Readers interested in a brief, wise, and oddly hopeful look at tyranny 
from one of the world’s leading historians of modern Europe will 
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certainly want to read Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from 
the Twentieth Century (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017).
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13. The Republic’s Second  
Question Answered:  
Three and a Half Arguments that  
the Just Life is Happier,  
Book IX
At long last, in Book IX Socrates is ready to address the Republic’s second 
question, Is a just life happier than an unjust life? There is a lot at stake 
here, as ‘the argument concerns no ordinary topic but the way we ought 
to live’ (1.352d). It is important to bear in mind that the ‘ought’ here is 
not necessarily a moral ought. Indeed, it seems trivially true that one 
morally ought to live a morally good life. Socrates is asking a question 
that does not presuppose a moral answer.1 He is asking what is the best 
sort of life for a human being: is it a life of acting justly, or am I personally 
better off acting unjustly when it pays to do so, all things considered? If 
I cannot be happy without being just, then I have a good, self-regarding 
reason to live justly. Socrates initially thought that he had answered 
this question with Book I’s Function Argument, but he quickly realized 
that he jumped the gun in concluding that the just life is happier before 
determining what justice itself is. But now, having determined what 
1  This is a point driven home forcefully in the opening chapter (‘Socrates’ Question’) 
of Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 5–6.
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justice is to the satisfaction of Glaucon and Adeimantus and the rest, 
Socrates is ready to deliver.
Argument #1: Comparing Characters (9.576b–580c)
‘It is clear to everyone’, Socrates says, ‘that there is no city more wretched 
than one ruled by a tyrant and none more happy than one ruled by kings’ 
(9.576e). So much for political happiness. As for personal happiness, 
settling the question requires us to compare the just and unjust lives—the 
lives of the aristocratic philosopher and the tyrant, respectively. Actually, 
it does not require us to do this; it requires someone ‘who is competent 
to judge’ (9.577a) to do so. Their verdict will decide the case. So, ‘who is 
fit to judge’? (9.576e) The person, Socrates answers, who ‘in thought can 
go down into a person’s character and examine it thoroughly, someone 
who does not judge from outside’ (9.577a). After my making so much of 
the enlightened philosopher’s going down into the Cave, readers might 
be deflated at learning that a different verb, ἐνδύειν [enduein] is being 
translated ‘go down’. Its primary meaning is ‘to try on’, as clothes; it 
can also mean ‘to go into’. Though it lacks literary razzle-dazzle, the 
crucial point is that this is something that the fit judge can do in thought: 
they need not actually (i.e., in body) become a drug addict to assess the 
addict’s life, for example; they can understand this life without having 
lived it because a philosopher grasps the relevant Form and its relation 
to the Form of the good. This squares with Socrates’ earlier observation 
that a good judge is aware of injustice ‘not as something at home in 
his own soul, but as something present in others [… he] recognize[s] 
injustice as bad by nature, not from his own experience of it, but through 
knowledge’ (3.409b).
Another crucial point, related to the first, is that the fit judge does not 
judge from the outside; they are not ‘dazzled by the façade that tyrants 
adopt […] but [are] able to see through that sort of thing’ (9.577a). This 
echoes and indeed answers Adeimantus’ earlier complaint that the way 
justice is praised in Athenian culture leads young people to cynically 
conclude that they ‘should create a façade of illusory virtue around 
[them] to deceive those who come near’ (2.365c). The Greek being 
translated ‘a façade of illusory virtue’ (σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς [skiagraphian 
arêtes]) should remind us of the shadow-filled world of the Cave, as 
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it literally means ‘a shadow-painting of virtue.’ What the competent 
judge finds is that the tyrannical soul is ‘full of disorder and regret’ and 
indeed is ‘least likely to do what it wants’ (9.577e). The tyrannical soul 
lacks self-control (9.579c) and its desires are not merely unsustainable 
but are unfulfillable: the tyrannical addict always wants more. 
One especially striking feature is the tyrant’s friendlessness: 
‘someone with a tyrannical nature lives his whole life without being 
friends with anyone, always a master to one man or a slave to another 
and never getting a taste of either freedom or true friendship’ (9.576a). 
For most readers, friendship is an important component of a happy 
life, and Plato would agree. His student Aristotle regarded friendship 
as one of life’s greatest goods, one we cannot lack and still flourish. 
It seems a general—but not exceptionless—truth that friendship is 
necessary for happiness. It is not too difficult to see why the tyrant 
is incapable of friendship. First, friendship is typically a relationship 
between equals, which the contemporary philosopher Laurence 
Thomas takes to mean that neither party is under the authority of the 
other or entitled to the deference of the other.2 One friend might be 
wiser and the other might frequently heed their advice, but the other 
friend is not obligated to do so: a friend can make suggestions but 
not issue commands. This is one reason that workplace friendships 
can be problematic: there may come a time when my friend has to 
switch roles, from friend to boss, which puts us in a relationship of 
inequality—and to that extent, at that moment, our friendship recedes 
into the background. ‘I thought you were my friend’, I pout. ‘I am’, 
she replies. But I am also your supervisor, and you need to clean up 
that spill in aisle six right now or we’re going to have a real problem’. 
The tyrannical soul is bent on outdoing everyone; life is a constant 
competition in which one dominates or is dominated, and that does 
not leave much room for friendship, as the tyrant cannot abide anyone 
being their equal, let alone their superior. 
A second reason that friendship is unavailable to the tyrant is that 
friendship requires—and indeed is a kind of—love. Even if we think 
Plato’s conception of love is overly cognitive and insufficiently affective, 
we can agree with him that love involves a commitment to the other’s 
2  Laurence Thomas, ‘Friendship and Other Loves’, Synthese, 72.2 (1987), 217–36 (pp. 
217, 221–23). 
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wellbeing, for the other’s own sake. This seems like an impossibility 
for the tyrant, who always seeks to further their own interests and sees 
others merely as a means to their own ends. The tyrant might cultivate 
what seem to be friendships, but insofar as they seek their own and 
not their would-be friend’s wellbeing, they are cultivating an ally, not 
a friend. So when it is in the tyrant’s interest to turn on the ally—or 
the ally’s interest to turn on the tyrant—they will do just that. It is no 
accident that The Godfather, Part Two ends with Michael Corleone alone 
and brooding, isolated and friendless.
Argument #2: The Soul’s Distinct Pleasures 
(9.580d–583a)
The second argument subtly shifts the terms of the argument from 
happiness to pleasure. Despite Socrates’ earlier rejection of hedonism, 
there is nothing problematic about the shift to talk of pleasure here. 
Indeed, it makes perfect sense for Socrates to do so, given that he is 
trying to show that everyone has good reasons to live justly rather than 
unjustly. Thus it makes sense to focus on happiness in terms of pleasure, 
since how pleasant or enjoyable a life is takes up the individual’s own 
perspective, as the argument requires.
Each of the soul’s three parts has its own distinctive pleasure, so 
the question becomes which part’s pleasures are most pleasant—the 
pleasures of the rational part or the spirited part or the appetitive 
part? In other words, is the just life, in which reason governs, more 
first-personally pleasant than the life in which appetite rules? There 
is a wrinkle in Socrates’ approach here: he insists that ‘there are three 
primary kinds of people: philosophic, victory-loving, and profit-loving’ 
(9.581c). Offering three possibilities may be an improvement upon 
thinking that ‘there are two kinds of people in this world’, but even here 
readers may rightly object that this division is far from exhaustive, as it 
omits people who are peace-loving or family-loving. Indeed, Socrates 
himself earlier suggested another option toward the end of Book V: 
lovers of beautiful things. Such people (and many others) do not seem 
to fit any of Socrates’ three types, so we might rightly resist Socrates’ 
attempt at shoehorning here. But the wrinkle becomes difficult to iron 
out if we recall that Socrates has just finished a detailed account of five 
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kinds of people. His distinction between three kinds of people accounts 
for the aristocratic, timocratic, and oligarchic souls, but what about the 
democratic and tyrannical? It is puzzling, especially since he is supposed 
to show that the really just but apparently unjust person is happier than 
the really unjust but apparently just person, which requires that he 
compare the aristocrat and the tyrant. Socrates might respond that the 
third, appetitive kind of life includes the democrat and tyrant as well as 
the oligarch, but given the way the oligarch’s desire for wealth tempered 
their other desires and bestowed order in their soul, this seems less 
than satisfactory. This might be a significant problem if this were the 
only argument given by Socrates that the just life is happier, but as the 
argument that will follow is ‘the greatest and most decisive’ (9.583b), 
all is not lost. Still, though, this is another place where the reader might 
wish Glaucon or Adeimantus or someone might notice the issue and 
speak up.
Now, if we ask each representative of the kinds of life which is the 
happiest, each will insist that their own is. We have no reason to doubt the 
sincerity of their testimony: each believes their life is more pleasant than 
the others. It is crucial here to appreciate Socrates’ caveat: the dispute 
is ‘not about which way of living is finer or more shameful or better 
or worse, but about which is more pleasant and less painful’ (9.581e). 
That is, the dispute is not a moral or normative one: the philosopher 
is not arguing that while the money-lover’s life is more pleasant the 
philosopher’s own pleasures are better, higher quality pleasures (as 
John Stuart Mill suggests in Utilitarianism); the philosopher asserts the 
descriptive, quantitative claim that the pleasures of reason are more 
pleasant than those of spirit or appetite. 
A relativist or subjectivist will suggest that the dispute cannot be 
settled, shrugging and rhetorically asking, ‘Who’s to say?’ Socrates, 
though, does not think that the relativist’s question is rhetorical and 
offers an answer: the competent judge is to say. While it is true that 
each of the three offers testimony that their life is most pleasant, 
only the philosopher offers expert testimony, so to speak, since only 
the philosopher is really competent to judge the issue. Judging 
competently and indeed judging well is a matter of ‘experience, 
reason, and argument’ (9.582a), Socrates tells us. The philosopher 
clearly has the advantage as regards reason, since reason governs their 
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soul. And they clearly have the edge as regards argument: argument 
is the instrument by which we judge, and ‘argument is a philosopher’s 
instrument most of all’ (9.582d). As for experience, Socrates argues 
that the philosopher alone has experienced all three kinds of pleasure: 
the philosopher has enjoyed the pleasures that come with having one’s 
desires and appetites satisfied and with being honored, but neither 
the honor-lover nor the appetitive money-lover has any experience 
of the pleasure of knowing the Forms. Thus, Socrates argues, since 
the philosopher alone is a competent judge, we should accept their 
verdict: the philosophical, aristocratic life, which is the just life, is the 
happiest of the three.
Many readers will be less confident about this than Socrates seems 
to be. First, some will doubt that grasping the Forms exhausts the 
possibilities for intellectual pleasure. It is not as though investment 
bankers and plumbers do not find their work intellectually challenging 
and rewarding. While they no doubt enjoy being well compensated, 
many also enjoy the challenges of putting together complex financial 
instruments and solving construction problems. Although one would 
hope that intellectual snobbery is not at work here, one might well fear 
that it is, leading Plato to downgrade not only the manual arts but also 
intellectual arts not aimed at abstract knowing. 
A second concern focuses on that claim that the philosopher has 
experienced the pleasure of being honored and thus is a better judge 
than the honor-lover. This is difficult to square with the attitudes towards 
philosophy that Socrates dealt with in Book VI, where he conceded that 
people who think that philosophers are vicious or useless ‘seem […] 
to speak the truth’ (6.487d). It turned out, of course, that the public 
mistakenly takes sophists to be philosophers and thus that the ‘slander 
[against] philosophy is unjust’ (6.497a). But even so, in the very act of 
defending philosophy against this slander Socrates gives evidence that 
slander is afoot and thus that philosophers know very little of being 
honored. Remember that Glaucon imagined the idea of philosopher-
kings would be met not with relief but with people ‘snatch[ing] any 
available weapon, and mak[ing] a determined rush at you, ready to do 
terrible things’ (5.474a), so it is not difficult to doubt Socrates’ claim that 
philosophers are well acquainted with being honored. Nor does his claim 
that ‘honor comes to each of them, provided that he accomplishes his 
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aim’ (9.582c) encourage confidence. In the last chapter we discussed the 
difference between the external good of being honored and the internal 
good of being honorable or worthy of honor. Indeed, in defending 
philosophy against slander, Socrates argues that philosophers—the 
genuine philosophers he tries to distinguish from the frauds in Books 
V, VI, and VII—are honorable, but he does not (and seemingly cannot) 
show that they have in fact been honored. He needs to establish the 
latter, descriptive claim that philosophers are actually regarded, not the 
former, normative claim about what sort of treatment they deserve or 
are entitled to. 
So there is reason to doubt the cogency of the second argument. As 
usual, we might agree with its conclusion—that the just life is happier 
and preferable—but regard this argument as failing to justify it. That is 
the bad news. The good news is that, as noted above, Socrates regards 
the next argument as ‘the greatest and most decisive’ (9.583b) of the 
three. Let us see what it has to offer.
Argument #3: The Metaphysics of Pleasure 
(9.583b–588a)
The third argument, which I call ‘the Metaphysics of Pleasure 
Argument’, is the philosophically most interesting of the three, arguing 
that the pleasures of reason are more pleasant than the pleasures of 
spirit or appetite because they are more real; the latter seem the result 
of ‘shadow-painting (ἐσκιαγραφημένη [eskiagraphêmenê])’ (9.583b) by 
comparison, the sorts of things we expect to encounter on the wall of the 
Cave. It is also the philosophically most precarious, since it presumes the 
reality of the Platonic Forms. I will go a little out of order in presenting 
the argument and make the existential sense of the verb ‘to be’ more 
apparent. Here is the heart of the argument, as Socrates makes it (with 
a little help from Glaucon):
And isn’t that which is more [real], and is filled with things that are 
more [real], really more filled than that which is less [real], and is filled 
with things that are less [real]?
Of course.
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Therefore, if being filled with what is appropriate to our nature is 
pleasure, that which is more filled with things that are more [real] enjoys 
more really and truly a more true pleasure, while that which partakes of 
things that are less [real] is less truly and surely filled and partakes of a 
less trustworthy and less true pleasure. 
That is absolutely inevitable. (9.585d-e)
At the heart of the argument is an understanding of pleasure as 
the result of being appropriately filled. Think of the pleasure a 
good, simple meal affords when you are hungry, or the pleasure of 
enjoying—i.e., being filled with—good music. Too much filling, be 
it too much food or music that is too loud, does not yield pleasure, 
since pleasure requires appropriate filling. Since what is more real is 
more filling and what is more filling is more pleasant, it follows that 
what is more real is more pleasant. But since the Forms are more real 
than any particulars, they are more filling, and thus the pleasure of 
knowing the Forms—which is the distinctive pleasure of the reason-
governed, just person—is greater than the pleasures of being honored 
or having one’s appetites satisfied. Stated in premise-conclusion form, 
the argument looks like this:
P1 What is more real is more filling.
P2 What is more filling is more pleasant.
P3 The objects of the rational pleasures are more real than the 
objects of the spirited pleasures and the appetitive pleasures.
C1 Therefore, rational pleasures are more filling than spirited and 
appetitive pleasures. (From P1, P3)
C2 Therefore, rational pleasures are more pleasant than spirited 
and appetitive pleasures. (From P2, C1)
P4 Each kind of life has a distinctive pleasure, determined by 
which part of the soul rules: the just person’s pleasures are 
rational pleasures; the unjust person’s pleasures are appetitive 
pleasures.
C3 Therefore, the just life is more pleasant than the unjust life. 
(From C2, P4)
C4 Therefore, the just life is happier than the unjust life. (From C3)
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As with the previous argument, it is important to bear in mind Socrates’ 
caveat that the argument concerns quantity, not quality: it is not an 
argument ‘about which way of living is finer […]  or better […] but 
about which is more pleasant’ (9.581e). The argument concerns which 
life contains the most pleasure, not a ranking of the pleasures in terms 
of quality, where, for example, intellectual pleasures are superior to 
appetitive pleasures. It would not be unreasonable for Socrates to insist 
that the just person’s pleasures, being pleasures of the best part of the 
soul, are better, higher quality pleasures, but to concede that rational 
pleasures are not as pleasant as appetitive pleasures. But Socrates does 
not make this argument. Instead, he argues that rational pleasures are 
more pleasant than appetitive pleasures. So the Metaphysics of Pleasure 
Argument implies that the pleasures of doing philosophy or solving a 
calculus problem are more pleasant than the pleasure of sex. And that is 
going to strike many readers as preposterous.
I think Plato is fully aware of how preposterous this seems, and he 
has a response ready. This response actually comes before the argument 
as I have stated it, hence the ‘going out of order’ I mentioned above. 
Plato’s response is that while it seems that appetitive pleasures are more 
pleasant than rational pleasures, this is an illusion and not how things 
really are. 
Contrary versus Contradictory Opposites
This is the point, I think, of the analogy he draws between pleasure 
and space. There is an up, a down, and a middle in space (Plato seems 
to be thinking of space as place, as a large container or room). If I am 
down and start ascending, I might mistakenly think I am at up when 
in fact I am merely at middle. Someone who is at up and then descends 
might think they are at down when they are at middle. If we meet, 
we might disagree about where we are, neither of us realizing that 
we at middle. Just as there is an up, a down, and a middle in space, 
Socrates suggests that there is pleasure, pain, and a neutral state of 
calm. And we regularly, wrongly take up/down and pleasure/pain to 
be contradictory opposites when in fact they are contrary opposites. 
A pair of opposites is contradictory when at least and at most one of 
them must be true or apply in a given situation; a pair is contrary when 
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at most one must be true, but it might be that neither is true or applies. 
Consider hot and cold. They are clearly opposites, but they are contrary 
opposites: while at most one of them applies to a given object, it may 
be that neither does. The place where you are reading this book might 
be hot or it might be cold, but it might be neither: it might be cool, 
warm, tepid, chilly, balmy—even room temperature. (Here we should 
remember the Opposition Principle from Book IV: if both of a pair of 
opposites applies, this suggests that the thing they apply to has parts. 
If I am both hot and cold, part of me is hot and part is cold, or I am hot 
now and then cold in an instant, etc.) While hot and cold are contrary 
opposites, cold and not-cold are contradictory opposites: everything is 
either cold or not-cold. Tucson in July? Not cold. Eau Claire in January? 
Cold. The number twelve? Not cold: numbers have no temperature, so 
they go in the not-cold column. On a well-written true-false question, 
‘true’ and ‘false’ are contradictory opposites: at least and at most one 
of them is correct. But, other things being equal, ‘true’ and ‘false’ are 
contrary opposites: many things are neither true nor false. Questions 
are neither true nor false (although the answers to them might be 
true or false); exclamations (‘dang!’) are neither true nor false; and 
of course non-linguistic items—picnic tables, peanut butter, pencils, 
etc.—are neither true nor false, since they make no assertions (though 
of course they can be what assertions are about).
Many of us make mistakes when it comes to opposites. We think 
that ‘helping’ and ‘harming’ are contradictory opposites when in fact 
they are contrary: action can make a thing better off (helping) or worse 
off (harming) or leave it neutral. The good-hearted but dim-witted 
Ricky Bobby of Talladega Nights lives his life mistakenly thinking that 
first and last are contradictory opposites: ‘If you ain’t first, you’re last!’ 
he insists.3 With the help of his father (his confusion’s source), Ricky 
later comes to see the folly of this “wisdom”. Plato’s suggestion, I think, 
is that most of us take pleasure and pain to be contradictory opposites 
when in fact they are contraries. After a week in bed with the flu, the 
first day of feeling normal again seems pleasant, but it is really only not 
painful: I am mistaking the neutral state of calm for pleasure. After an 
exhilarating, inspiring vacation a return to normal is a real downer, but 
3  Talladega Nights: The Ballad of Ricky Bobby, dir. by Adam McKay (Sony Pictures, 
2006).
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I am probably just mistaking the neutral state of calm for pain, having 
been experiencing so much pleasure. 
Optical and Hedonic Illusions
A person who is ‘inexperienced in what is really and truly up, down, and 
in the middle’ (9.584e) will regularly make mistakes about where they 
are since they will mistake up and down to be contradictory opposites. 
And similarly, ‘those who are inexperienced in the truth [and] have 
unsound opinions’ (9.584e) will regularly make mistakes about what 
they are experiencing. Here’s the catch: becoming experienced in the 
truth and having sound opinions will not ensure that we are no longer 
subject to illusions about where we are or what we are feeling: it still 
feels like I am at up when I am only at middle, and this still feels like 
pleasure when in fact it is only non-pain. But being experienced in the 
truth and having sound opinions I can now know that things are not as 
they appear to me. Consider the famous Müller-Lyer illusion, below in 
Fig. 4: 
Fig. 4. Müller-Lyer illusion. Photograph by Fibonacci (2007), 
Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.
php?curid=1792612)
It seems to be psychologically impossible to see the line segments as 
the same length: try as we might, the lower one just looks longer. If we 
measure the lines, as in Fig. 5, we can see that they are the same length:
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Fig. 5. Müller-Lyer illusion. Photograph by Fibonacci (2007), 
Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.
php?curid=1792612)
Even so, when I look back at Fig. 4, I cannot see them as being the same 
length—I assume readers have the same experience. Our senses deceive 
us: what seems to be the case is not what is the case: This deception is 
persistent and not correctable by reasoning and measurement in that we 
see the lines as having different lengths even when we know that they 
are the same length. That is what makes it an optical illusion. 
The philosopher Jessica Moss argues that Plato is suggesting that just 
as we are prone to optical illusions, we are also prey to hedonic illusions: 
illusions about pleasure.4 Of course sexual pleasure seems more pleasant 
than rational pleasure, just as the bottom line seems longer than the top 
line: there is no way to perceive the comparative lengths of the lines 
accurately, just as there is no way to perceive the comparative amounts 
of the pleasures accurately. Measuring the lines tells us that our visual 
perception tricks us, just as rational argument tells us that our hedonic 
perception tricks us. ‘Calculating, measuring, and weighting are the 
work of the rational part of the soul’ (10.602d), Socrates will tell us in 
Book X. And of course, ‘argument is a philosopher’s instrument most 
of all’ (9.582d), since it is the rational instrument par excellence. Reason 
cannot alter our visual experience of the lines, making us see them as 
having the same length—but it can remind us that our perception is 
faulty and that they are in fact the same length. And similarly, reason 
cannot make us experience rational pleasures as more pleasant than 
appetitive pleasures, it can tell us that they are. Reason cannot make us 
experientially immune to optical or hedonic illusions: we will continue 
to experience them. But it can render us rationally immune to them: 
4  Jessica Moss, ‘Pleasure and Illusion in Plato’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 72 (2006), 503–35, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933–1592.2006.tb00582.x
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we can know that they are systematically misleading and that the way 
things appear is not the way things really are. 
The upshot of all this is that, appearances to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the just person’s life is happier than the unjust 
person’s—in fact, it is 729 times happier, if Socrates’ geometric ‘proof’ is 
to be believed. The tyrant, he reasons, is, counting himself, ‘three times 
removed’ from the oligarch: tyrant–democrat–oligarch. And the oligarch 
is three times removed from the aristocrat. Three times three is nine, 
which cubed—that is, three-dimensionalized—makes the aristocrat 729 
times happier than the tyrant. As with the ‘perfect number’ at the start 
of Book VIII, I am not sure that Plato intends this to be taken seriously; 
I am inclined to take it as a joke, and, like most philosophical jokes it 
is not especially funny. I suggest that we think of it as Plato’s way of 
suggesting that the contest between the just and unjust lives is not even 
close: the just life is way happier than the unjust life.
The Metaphysical Elevator and the Metaphysics of 
Pleasure
As many readers will expect, there is a major worry about the 
Metaphysics of Pleasure Argument. It is not a logical worry, since the 
Metaphysics of Pleasure Argument is valid: its conclusion must be 
true if its premises are true. But its soundness—that is, the question of 
whether its premises are actually true, given that it is valid—is another 
matter. P3, that the objects of the rational pleasures—the Forms—are 
more real than the objects of the spirited pleasures and the appetitive 
pleasures—concrete particulars—is not obviously true, and indeed 
for many readers it is obviously not true. P3 is true only if Plato’s 
Metaphysical Elevator goes all the way to Level Four, where the Forms 
are not only mind-independently real but are more real than the many 
particular things that are instances of them. Even going to Level Three, 
where the Forms are mind-independently real, is not enough to make 
P3 true, and many readers will balk at going even to this level. More 
readers, I suspect, will get off the Elevator at the second floor, insisting 
that the Forms are human constructs and that the concrete particular 
things are more real than the Forms so conceived, since the Forms so 
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conceived are mind-dependent entities while the particulars are not. For 
these readers, P3 should be replaced with:
P3* The objects of the appetitive pleasures are more real than the  
objects of the spirited pleasures and the rational pleasures.
This yields these conclusions:
C1* Therefore, appetitive pleasures are more filling than spirited 
and rational pleasures. (From P1, P3*)
C2* Therefore, appetitive pleasures are more pleasant than spirited 
and rational pleasures. (From P2, C1*)
This better fits with the commonsensical views that eating a donut is 
more pleasurable, because more filling, than grasping the Form of the 
donut and thus understanding the essence of donut-ness, and that sexual 
pleasure is more pleasant than philosophical pleasure. Perhaps Socrates 
was wrong to focus on quantity rather than quality. Many readers might 
concede that while appetitive pleasures are more pleasant than rational 
pleasures, rational pleasures are better, higher quality pleasures than 
appetitive pleasures, as they appeal to our higher nature as rational 
creatures. But this is expressly not what Socrates is arguing.
Even readers inclined to think that Plato’s theory of the Forms is 
right and thus to take the Metaphysical Elevator all the way to the fourth 
floor should concede that, at least in the Republic, Plato has not provided 
good reasons to believe in the Forms. The argument that supports his 
two-worlds metaphysics, the Powers Argument, is logically invalid, 
and even if this invalidity can be fixed, we have good reason to doubt 
that knowledge and belief have different objects. This casts a long, dark 
shadow across the Republic. 
Socrates regards the Metaphysics of Pleasure Argument as ‘the 
greatest and most decisive’ (9.583b) in answering the Republic’s 
second question, but it depends for its soundness on the problematic 
Powers Argument. So even if we agree with Socrates that the just life is 
happier—perhaps even 729 times happier—than the unjust life, we will 
have to concede that he has not really given Glaucon and Adeimantus 
what they asked of him, a justification for this belief.
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Argument #3½: ‘an image of the soul in words’ 
(9.588b–590e)
Given the dependence of the Metaphysics of Pleasure Argument on the 
Powers Argument, things look bleak for Socrates’ view that the just life 
is happier than the unjust life. But Plato follows up the philosophically 
abstract Metaphysics of Pleasure Argument with an intuitive metaphor 
that he does not officially count as an argument—hence the ‘½’—but 
which seems more powerful than the supposedly ‘decisive’ argument 
he just gave, and not merely because it does not depend in any way on 
the contentious metaphysics of the Forms. To argue against the view that 
the unjust but seemingly just life is happier, Socrates offers ‘an image 
of the soul in words’ (9.588b). Perhaps this is Plato’s way of indicating 
that he understands that the Metaphysics of Pleasure Argument will not 
persuade skeptics unconvinced of the reality of the Forms. Or perhaps 
it is a subtle way of reminding us that we are in the Cave, where images 
and shadows are the cognitive coin of the realm. 
Imagine first a ‘multicolored beast’ (9.588c) with many heads, some 
the heads of gentle animals, others more savage. ‘Multicolored’ translates 
ποικίλος [poikilos], a nod to the multicolored garment that is worn by 
the defective democratic polis in Book VIII. Then imagine a lion, smaller 
than the beast, and last a human being, smallest of the three. Then join 
these three so that they ‘grow together naturally’ (9.588d): the resulting 
creature is not mere artifice, a jumble of separate parts having nothing 
to do with each other, but something that functions as an integrated 
organism. Finally, cloak them in a human exterior, so anyone aware only 
of the exterior will think the creature a human being. 
The analogy is fairly straightforward: the multiform beast represents 
the appetites, the lion represents the spirited part of the soul, and the 
inner human being represents reason. Now, Socrates argues, when 
someone who maintains that injustice is more profitable, better for 
you than justice, what they are telling you, is that you are better off 
feeding the beast, starving the human, and getting the lion to do the 
beast’s bidding. But no one would think that is prudent. To claim that 
the unjust life is happier implies something false—namely, that you are 
better off feeding the voracious, multiform beast and starving reason—
so it follows that the unjust life is not happier than the just life.
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It is perhaps surprising that Socrates argues that one should not 
starve the beast, but earlier he indicated that the philosopher ‘neither 
starves nor feasts his appetites’ (9.571e) in his nighttime ritual to keep 
his dreams free of lawless, unnecessary appetites. Nor should we let 
the beast’s different parts attack and kill each other. Though Plato 
would likely agree with Immanuel Kant’s view that ‘it must be […] the 
universal wish of every rational being to be altogether free of them’5 our 
appetites are not going anywhere, at least not as long as we inhabit a 
body. The beast is part of us. So we should bring our parts into harmony 
with each other, as much as possible, ‘accustoming them to each other 
and making them friendly’ (9.589a). In living a just life we tend the beast 
as a farmer cares for their animals, domesticating some and separating 
and containing the feral ones. 
It is a compelling picture in many ways, but Socrates takes it even 
further. Someone who lives unjustly is enslaving the best part of himself, 
reason, to feed the worst, appetite. When the financial rewards are great 
enough, that might seem a bargain worth striking. But no one, Socrates 
argues, would enslave his children to ‘savage and evil men’ (9.589d); there 
is no amount of money that would make that a good deal: ‘it would not 
profit him, no matter how much gold he got’ (9.589e). Why, then, are we 
willing to treat ourselves so poorly, in ways we cannot imagine treating 
those we love? It is a fascinating insight. What philosophers sometimes 
call ‘self-other asymmetry’ usually involves our problematically treating 
ourselves better than we treat others. Virtues and moral reasons are often 
correctives to this egoistic tendency to think our interests count for more 
than the interests of others. While some advocate altruism, the view that 
our interests count for less than the interests of others, correcting egoism 
requires only the egalitarian view that everyone’s interests have the 
same weight—that self and other are symmetric. What is so interesting 
about Plato’s point here is the suggestion that the self-other asymmetry 
at work when we are trying ‘to determine which whole way of life would 
make living most worthwhile for each of us’ (1.344e) is one in which we 
give our interests, at least our true interests, less weight than we should.
I suspect that this will resonate with many readers. If I have promised 
a friend to meet for an early morning bike ride, it is extremely unlikely 
5  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 40 [Ak. 4:428]. 
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that I will roll over and go back to sleep when the alarm wakes me. 
But if it is a promise I have made only to myself, well, if it is a cold 
and dark morning there is a decent chance that I will turn the alarm off 
and stay in bed. If I would never casually blow off a commitment made 
to a friend, why would I do so when it is one I have made to myself? 
If reason fully governed my soul, my appetites for sloth and comfort 
would have been tamed by reason and its ally, spirit. Readers tempted to 
judge themselves harshly on this issue should take some comfort from 
the fact that Marcus Aurelius, the great Stoic and indeed the Emperor of 
Rome, often wanted to stay in bed, too, and tried to have arguments at 
the ready to rouse himself (Meditations 5.1).
One great advantage of Socrates’ analogy is that it does not presuppose 
the problematic theory of the Forms. It is simple and intuitive, as the 
best analogies are. It is not without objection, however. As mentioned 
much earlier, the great eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David 
Hume thought that philosophers regularly overstated the claims of 
reason; Hume thought that reason was but the slave of the passions, 
so he would be skeptical of the ideal person Plato has sketched here. 
So too would Epicurus, whose taxonomy of desire we explored in 
the last chapter. Neither of these philosophers advocated egoism and 
injustice, but neither had the lofty view of reason that one finds in Plato 
in particular and in the Western philosophical tradition in general. It is 
worth noting that much contemporary psychology sides with Hume and 
Epicurus against Plato and most of the Western philosophical tradition. 
Reason, the eminent social psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues, is like 
someone riding an elephant; only a fool could think they are in charge of 
the elephant. But they can learn the elephant’s ways, learn that there is 
wisdom in the emotions, and use their rationality to guide the elephant 
toward the goals it naturally has. 
So even if we are skeptical of the role Plato assigns to reason, we 
might find a modified version of this analogical argument plausible, one 
in which the inner human being is constituted not by pure reason but by 
emotions such as compassion, care, and love. And we might well wonder, 
too, if what Hume called a sensible knave—someone who generally acts 
justly but cheats when they can do so without detection—would be 
persuaded, and indeed if we should be persuaded, that the just person’s 
life is more pleasant than the sensible knave’s. Socrates’ argument seems 
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plausible against the tyrant but perhaps this is only because a reason-
governed philosopher-king will always fare better than the manic 
basket of addictions, neuroses, and psychoses that is the tyrant. But 
how a philosopher-king would fare against someone who is decent but 
cuts corners (perhaps when the harm he does is not significant and the 
gain to him vastly outweighs it) is another matter. Socrates insists that 
the unjust person’s injustice can remain undiscovered only for so long, 
and while we can think of examples confirming this claim—off the top 
of my head, I offer Lance Armstrong, Bernie Madoff, and any number 
of politicians who are brought down by scandals—it is worth noting 
that this is spurious evidence for Socrates’ claim. That we can list unjust 
people whose injustice has been discovered does not provide reasons 
for thinking that there cannot be unjust people whose injustice remains 
undiscovered. It may well be that the just person and the sensible knave 
have incompatible conceptions of happiness. 
Paternalism (9.590d)
So the just life, which for Plato is the life in which reason governs the 
soul, is significantly happier than the unjust life. It may not always be 
the happiest possible life, since, as we have seen, living in an unjust or 
a non-just polis precludes full happiness. So justice, while necessary for 
happiness, is not by itself sufficient for it (something Stoicism, which 
began around 300 bce and which is currently enjoying a renaissance 
in our troubled age, disagrees with, taking virtue to be sufficient for 
happiness). 
We have noted on several occasions Plato’s insistence that ‘the 
majority cannot be philosophic’ (6.494a). Most of us are not capable 
of grasping the Form of the good, Plato thinks, so most of us are not 
capable of acquiring the personal virtue of wisdom. We may have true 
beliefs about what is best for our souls, but by our natures we lack the 
capacity for knowledge in this area. But if that is the case, how can the 
non-philosophers among us be happy? It seems that most of us are 
doomed to live unhappy lives. Is there any way to escape this pessimistic 
conclusion? 
There is, Plato thinks—though his solution is unlikely to be attractive 
to most readers. Since most of us cannot be ruled by our own power 
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of reason, it is best that we be ruled by the philosopher-king’s (and 
-queen’s) reason: 
Therefore, to insure that someone like that is ruled by something similar 
to what rules the best person, we say that he ought to be the slave of 
that best person who has a divine ruler within himself. It is not to harm 
the slave that we say he must be ruled […] but because it is better for 
everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within himself and his 
own, otherwise imposed from without, so that as far as possible all will 
be alike and friends, governed by the same thing. (9.590c–d) 
Even if Plato means ‘slave’ (δοῦλος [doulos]) only metaphorically, many 
if not most readers will reject this out of hand. Most readers, I suspect, 
are liberals—not in the contemporary American political sense of voting 
Democratic instead of Republican, but in the philosophical sense of 
valuing liberty over wellbeing. Paternalists prioritize wellbeing over 
liberty where the two conflict, holding that interfering with another 
person’s liberty or autonomy is justified if the interference benefits the 
person being interfered with. Philosophical liberals, by contrast, typically 
hold that the only justification for interfering with someone’s liberty is 
to prevent harm to another person; if my conduct harms only me or is 
harmless but regarded as immoral, the liberal argues, neither the state 
nor another person is justified in interfering. Of course, if I am not in 
my right mind or if I am lacking vital information, most liberals will 
countenance temporary interference. If I do not know that the bridge 
ahead is out, the liberal might try to stop me from bicycling across it—
but only to make sure that I am aware of this materially relevant fact 
or that my judgment is not impaired. If I know that the bridge is out—
for me, the whole point is to try to jump across the missing span—the 
liberal will not think interfering is justified.
It is not surprising that Plato endorses paternalism. But most 
Americans, I think, take liberalism (in the philosophical sense) for 
granted, at least to a significant degree. Most of us, I suspect, share 
John Stuart Mill’s view that ‘the only purpose for which power can 
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others’.6 One of Mill’s arguments 
6  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. by Elizabeth Rappaport (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1978), p. 9.
270 Plato’s ‘Republic’: An Introduction
for this view is that paternalism does not work: given the centrality of 
autonomy and spontaneity to the conception of happiness many of us 
share, outside interference for our own good will likely backfire, since 
the resentment we feel at being interfered with will outweigh the good 
that the interference does. We can probably think of cases where Mill 
is mistaken, especially where the benefit done is significant and the 
interference is minimal, as in seatbelt laws. Many readers will think 
Mill’s argument is beside the point, holding that interfering with a 
competent adult for that adult’s benefit is wrong in itself, regardless of 
any beneficial consequences, since paternalism manifests a failure of 
respect. We interfere with our and even others’ children when doing 
so is required to protect the children from themselves. But adults are 
another matter entirely. 
We will not adjudicate this dispute between liberalism and 
paternalism here; I raise it largely to give readers a framework and 
vocabulary with which to agree or disagree with Plato. To justify the 
belief that, fundamentally, liberty trumps wellbeing, may prove more 
difficult than even die-hard liberals imagine. And it may be that our shared 
ideology shapes our views on questions like this in a non-rational way. 
Many readers are familiar with Patrick Henry’s saying ‘Give me liberty 
or give me death!’, and many of us know that New Hampshire’s license 
plate reads ‘Live Free or Die’ (which, admittedly, makes Wisconsin’s 
motto, ‘America’s Dairyland’, sound pretty tame). But, like Glaucon and 
Adeimantus, our task as rational creatures is to think through these core 
values and to try to find good reasons to justify what we already believe. 
Of course, we may fail, or we may change our minds, perhaps thinking 
that the liberal, individualistic conception of happiness that grounds 
our objections to Plato’s paternalism is, if not ‘a silly, adolescent idea 
of happiness’ (5.466b), one we no longer fully endorse after reflection. 
Plato’s paternalism is fueled by, among other things, his anti-
egalitarian belief that most people are incapable of wisdom as well as 
his highly demanding conception of what counts as knowledge. Some 
readers will be skeptical that we can ever know what is best, in Plato’s 
sense, insisting that the best we can do is to have justified beliefs about 
how to live, and that views very much at odds with each other might 
be justified. Such readers may insist that the intellectual virtues of 
humility and open-mindedness are crucial to thinking about how to 
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live well, and that while Plato has challenged them to think through 
some of their fundamental values and presuppositions, he has not 
succeeded in convincing them that those values are mistaken and those 
presuppositions are false. 
At best, Plato’s arguments seem to provide a reason for those who 
already find themselves in agreement with their conclusion—but 
that does not render wrestling with the Republic a worthless, circular 
enterprise. Even if one’s reasons for living justly will not convince the 
Thrasymachuses of the world, it is valuable to ensure that our beliefs 
form as consistent a set as possible. Most of us, I suspect, are more like 
Glaucon and Adeimantus than we are like Thrasymachus (though we 
probably all have a bit of him in us), who want Socrates to show them 
that their belief that the just life is happier is justified or at the very 
least not foolish, wishful thinking. It would be nice if egoists found these 
reasons persuasive, but that may be asking too much of philosophy. 
Plato and Socrates thought philosophy could do this, but we have seen 
over and over that their arguments fall well short of the mark and that 
only people who share their fundamental assumptions (e.g., about the 
Forms) will find their arguments persuasive. 
Even so, those of us who do not share those fundamental assumptions 
can find their arguments intriguing and worthy of the time and attention 
of reflective people who take seriously the question of how to live their 
lives. 
Some Suggestions for Further Reading
Readers interested in exploring the philosophy of friendship will find no 
better place to start than with Books 8 and 9 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, which they will find, along with other excellent readings, in Other 
Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. by Michael Pakaluk (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1991). Readers will find Laurence Thomas’ 
excellent essay, ‘Friendship and Other Loves’ and others in Friendship: 
A Philosophical Reader, ed. by Neera Badhwar (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1993).
Readers interested in Mill’s distinction between higher and lower 
pleasures will find it discussed in Chapter Two of John Stuart Mill, 
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Utilitarianism, 2nd ed., ed. by George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 2002), pp. 8–11.
Matthew Crawford, Shop Class as Soulcraft (New York: Penguin Books, 
2010) is an excellent discussion of, among other things, the role reason 
plays in the ‘manual arts’, offering a powerful antidote to Plato’s views 
from a Ph.D. philosopher who repairs vintage motorcycles for a living.
Readers interested in a leading psychologist’s take on the role reason 
plays in a happy life should start with Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness 
Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom (New York: Basic 
Books, 2006).
Readers interested in philosophical or legal liberalism would do well 
to start with John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. by Elizabeth Rappaport 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978). For an interesting collection 
of essays on paternalism, readers might have a look at Paternalism, ed. 
by Rolf Sartorius (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
Readers interested in a brief musical exploration of the multicolored 
beast who dwells within should listen to Nick Lowe, ‘The Beast in Me’, 
on Quiet Please... The New Best of Nick Lowe (Yep Roc Records, 2009).

Muse tuning two kitharai. Detail of the interior from an Attic 
white-ground cup (c. 470–460 BCE). Photograph by Jastrow (2006), 
Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Muse_lyre_Louvre_CA482.jpg#/media/File:Muse_lyre_Louvre_
CA482.jpg
14. Are We There Yet?:  
Tying up Loose Ends in Book X
Book IX ends with Socrates telling Glaucon that if the polis one lives in 
is far from ideal, even if the ideal polis exists only in theory but not in 
reality, one can still ‘make himself its citizen’ (9.592b), and thus learn to 
live justly in an unjust or a non-just world. It would be a fine place to end 
the Republic, but Plato has other ideas. Three of them, in fact.
The ‘Ancient Quarrel’ between Poetry and Philosophy 
(10.595a–608b)
The first of these is tying up a loose end regarding poetry in the ideal 
polis. Since the restrictions on poetic form and content developed in 
Books II and III preceded the division of the soul in Book IV, Socrates 
thinks it would now be fruitful to revisit the status of poetry, armed 
with an account (logos) of the soul (psuché)—a psychology—he lacked 
earlier. He argues that the three-part soul further confirms the earlier 
conclusion that ‘imitative […] poetry should be altogether excluded’ 
(10.595a) from the ideal polis. 
Readers who think they have misremembered the earlier discussion 
should feel free to indulge in an ‘it’s not me, it’s you’ moment, for it is 
Socrates whose memory seems faulty. Earlier, Socrates allowed imitations 
of ‘the words or actions of a good man’ (3.396c) and of ‘someone engaged 
in peaceful, unforced, voluntary action […] acting with moderation and 
self-control’ (3.399ab), not to mention modes and rhythms ‘that would 
suitably imitate the tone and rhythm of a courageous person who is 
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active in battle’ (3.399a). A lot has happened in the Republic since Book 
III, so perhaps we can forgive Socrates’ misremembering his earlier view. 
It may be that Plato is poking a little fun at Socrates here, for at least half 
a dozen times in Book VI we are told one must possess the intellectual 
virtue of having a good memory to be a true philosopher. 
Socrates’ target is narrower than is frequently claimed. He is not 
arguing against poetry (or, even more broadly, art) in general but rather 
against imitative poetry—and indeed it is even narrower than this: he 
wants to exclude ‘poetry that aims at pleasure and imitation’ (10.607c) 
from the ideal polis, which would leave room for imitative poetry that 
aims not at pleasure but at moral improvement. The ideal city can, then, 
‘employ a more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller, one 
who would imitate the speech of a decent person’ (3.398a). In arguing 
that would-be guardians should not be imitative (μιμητικός [mimêtikos]) 
(3.394e), Socrates is really arguing that guardians should not be 
imitatively promiscuous: they should not be able, willing, or disposed to 
imitate any and every type of character, since this would prevent them 
from cultivating the sense of shame and disgust at dishonorable action 
that is the basis of good character. Since ‘imitations practiced from youth 
become part of [one’s] nature and settle into habits of gesture, voice, 
and thought’ (3.395d), Socrates is very leery of imitative promiscuity. 
That all poetry inspired by ‘the pleasure-seeking Muse’ (10.607a) 
must be excluded from the ideal polis is a conclusion that Socrates comes 
to reluctantly. He loves poetry, especially Homer, and is loath to live 
without it. There is no Homer or Hesiod, no Aeschylus or Sophocles or 
Euripides in the ideal polis. Instead, ‘hymns to the gods and eulogies to 
good people are the only poetry we can admit into our city’ (10.607a)—
which, interestingly, is the only kind of poetry one encounters in the 
first, rustic city (2.372b). It is as though Socrates looks longingly at a 
copy of the Iliad, weepily confessing, ‘I can’t quit you’. But quit it he must, 
for his commitment to philosophy is a commitment to going ‘whatever 
direction the argument blows us’ (3.394d), even when we do not like the 
destination or find the winds too strong. We might expect Glaucon, who 
objected to life in the rustic first city because the food was too simple, to 
object to the absence of a key cultural and aesthetic staple, but he finds 
Socrates’ arguments so compelling that he makes no objections to the 
restricted poetic diet Socrates prescribes.
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Our task as readers is to determine if we find Socrates’ arguments 
as compelling as he and his audience do. Since the arguments are 
overlapping and interrelated, separating them into distinct arguments 
is somewhat artificial, but doing so aids in clarity, so I will divide the 
arguments into three. 
The Metaphysical Argument: Art Merely Makes Copies 
of Copies, and Thus is not Worth Taking Seriously 
I have dubbed the first argument ‘metaphysical’ since the Forms play 
a significant role in it. Perhaps surprisingly for an argument meant 
to support a conclusion about imitative poetry, Socrates focuses on 
painting more than poetry in the metaphysical argument. But we will 
see that painting more clearly makes the point he wants to establish 
against poetry.
All beds, Socrates argues, have in common the Form of the bed itself: 
that essence that makes them beds rather than chairs or knives or sheep. 
Any particular bed that one might sleep in is a spatio-temporal copy of 
this Form, just as the shadows on the Cave wall are copies of the artifacts 
held before the fire, and just as those artifacts are ultimately themselves 
copies of the Forms that inhabit the sunlit intelligible world above. So 
someone who paints a bed is making a copy of something that is itself a 
copy. The painter is imitating the appearance of a bed, and indeed how 
it appears from a particular vantage point, not the reality or being of 
the bed: ‘painting […] is an imitation of appearances […] [not] of truth’ 
(10.598b). 
Where the painter represents objects, the poet represents actions, 
but the argument is the same for both: paintings and poems are too 
metaphysically thin, too much like the shadows and reflections one 
sees on the wall of the Cave. ‘Imitation is a kind of game’, Socrates 
says, ‘and not something to be taken seriously’ (10.602b). There is 
no hint here of the danger lurking in the games we play, as there is 
elsewhere in the Republic (e.g., 4.424d, 7.539b, 8.558b). His point is 
that anyone who could construct a bed would spend his or her time 
on these metaphysically more substantial objects; and anyone who 
could philosophically understand the Form of bedness would spend 
their time on this metaphysically more substantial task. Only someone 
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insufficiently skilled in either would waste their time on something so 
trivial as making art. 
Two recurring themes in Socrates’ animadversions against imitative 
art are worth bringing out here. The first is that he shows little if any 
interest in artistic skill. On the one hand, this makes sense, given 
his metaphysical views. But on the other, he simply ignores the skill 
required to make copies of copies. Whatever one’s metaphysics, trompe 
l’oeil paintings and modern photo-realism are impressive in and of 
themselves; they need not be written off as ‘trickery’ (10.602d) and 
bogus magic. A second, related theme is his lack of interest in the joy of 
artistic creation. This is perhaps a particular instance of a more general 
disregard for the importance of play in a well-lived and happy life. It 
is ironic, given the artistic care and skill with which Plato constructed 
the Republic, that its protagonist would be so uninterested in artistic 
creation. Earlier we criticized Socrates’ narrowness in asserting that 
there are three primary kinds of people (‘philosophic, victory-loving, 
and profit-loving’ (9.581c)), and here we can see yet another type 
to add to the list: artists, who devote their lives to artistic creation. 
Perhaps some of this emanates from a contempt for ‘those who work 
with their own hands’ (8.565a), itself an odd thought from someone 
who is himself a stonemason. But this may be Plato’s upper-class 
snobbery more than anything. Artistic readers who have made it this 
far in the Republic often get righteously—and rightfully—indignant or 
shake their heads in pity at this foolishness. It is not just that Socrates 
is not interested in and does not revere the products of artistic creation, 
but that he is not interested in the process of artistic creation and indeed 
denigrates it by likening it to walking around with a mirror (10.596d). 
Thus it is no surprise that he dismisses most painting and poetry 
as trivial wastes of time. One need not fully agree with Schiller’s 
dictum that one is fully human only in play to think Plato is missing 
something important here.1 Play’s value is thoroughly instrumental 
for Plato, useful as a means of moral education, but in itself possessing 
no intrinsic value. Schiller—and many readers, I suspect—would 
disagree. 
1  Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. by Keith Tribe, ed. by 
Alexander Schmidt (New York: Penguin Books, 2016), p. 45 [Letter 15].
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The Epistemological Argument: Artists Literally Do 
Not Know What They Are Talking and Painting about 
Given the way metaphysics and epistemology are fused in the Republic, 
it should be no surprise that the next argument is intertwined with the 
metaphysical argument. Here, the worry is epistemological: that artists 
do not need knowledge of what they are imitating in order to imitate 
it. While it is true that the imitator needs to know how to imitate that 
appearance, such know-how is rather trivial, Socrates thinks, given the 
metaphysical thinness of what it results in. 
To make his epistemological point, Socrates contrasts the user, the 
maker, and the imitator of a flute. An expert flute-player knows what 
a good flute should sound like and what makes it play well. (Here, 
Socrates uses ‘know’ in an ordinary sense, not the technical sense he 
established in Book V and developed in Books VI and VII.) The flute-
maker, who has a correct belief about what a good flute is (having just had 
this explained to them by the expert flutist), sets about making a good 
flute. Socrates does not say, but presumably the flute-maker possesses 
knowledge about the effects of different kinds of wood, different drying 
times, etc. They know how to make a good flute; the flutist knows what 
a good flute is—and this conceptual knowledge is always superior to 
practical know-how, for Socrates. ‘An imitator’, by contrast, ‘has neither 
knowledge nor right opinion’ (10.602a) about good flutes. Knowledge 
and correct belief about what makes a flute good is not needed to paint 
a flute; what the artist has—ignorance—will suffice for their purposes, 
which is imitating how flutes appear, not what they are.
Given how important epistemology is to Plato, we can see why he is 
down on artists. But the epistemological argument is even more serious 
than this, as we see when we shift focus from painting to poetry. Just 
as one can paint a flute without knowing what a good flute is or what 
makes good flutes good, one can ‘imitate images of virtue […] and [yet] 
have no grasp of the truth’ (10.600e). People look to Homer for moral 
guidance, but they should not, Socrates argues, since Homer does not 
know what courage, for example, is; he only knows how to create an 
image of it in poetic song. ‘If Homer had really been able to educate 
people and make them better’ (10.600c), Socrates reasons, ‘if Homer 
had been able to benefit people and make them more virtuous, his 
280 Plato’s ‘Republic’: An Introduction
companions would [not] have allowed either him or Hesiod to wander 
around as rhapsodes’ (10.600d). Instead, they would have insisted that 
Homer and Hesiod stay put and teach them about virtue, or they would 
have followed them in a caravan of moral education. And Homer, had 
he actually possessed such knowledge, would have surely obliged. But 
Homer and Hesiod were allowed to wander, so Socrates concludes that 
they did not possess genuine moral knowledge.
While poets and painters might have good ears and eyes for what a 
culture takes virtue and the virtues to be, one of the lessons of the First 
Wave back in Book V was that we should not take our culture’s norms 
at face value: ‘it is foolish to take seriously any standard of what is fine 
and beautiful other than the good’ (5.452e). Socrates, of course, is not 
a relativist about norms, but neither is he a conservative, at least of the 
sort that gives great weight to tradition as a source of moral wisdom. 
That one’s culture has long approved of certain values carries little or 
no epistemic weight for Socrates. One of philosophy’s tasks is to subject 
these values to rational scrutiny. We saw earlier that the ridiculousness 
of women wrestling naked and governing ‘faded way in the face of what 
argument (λόγος [logos]) showed to be the best’ (5.452d). A perhaps 
unexpected upshot of the ‘image of the soul in words’ in Book IX is 
an objective test of one’s culture’s ‘conventions about what is fine and 
what is shameful. Fine things’, Socrates says, referring to things that are 
kalon, ‘are those that subordinate the beastlike parts of our nature to 
the human […] shameful ones are those that enslave the gentle to the 
savage’ (9.589d). 
Someone friendly to the arts might concede that many artists lack 
philosophical knowledge of the nature of goodness and the virtues 
but they might also insist that many of these artists possess true beliefs 
about these topics and are not ignorant, as Socrates claims. But Socrates 
might reply that this leaves an essential problem untouched—namely, 
the epistemic authority his (and our) culture accords to artists. If 
they lack knowledge, why care what they have to say? Distracted by 
their ‘multicolored’ (10.604e, 10.605a) productions, we think they can 
teach us how to live—an assumption that may seem odd in our age of 
entertainment—but they lack the knowledge required to do so. But if 
we are fools to follow them, the problem seems to be with us rather than 
them. 
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Even readers who are not persuaded by Socrates’ argument might 
concede that it points to something important, something perhaps 
more important in our day than in Socrates’: the supposed authority 
of celebrities to pronounce upon issues of the day, especially political 
issues. Many of us—too many of us—fall for the argumentam ab celebritas, 
as we might call it. While we can revere them as actors, why should we 
take seriously the political pronouncements of Meryl Streep or Robert 
De Niro? They can teach us a great deal about the craft of acting, but is 
there any reason to think that they have a great deal to teach us about 
public policy? They might; but if they do, it is not because they are great 
actors—that is, highly skilled at imitation. 
Many readers will not share Socrates’ expectation that artists teach 
us how to live; but readers of a serious, aesthetic bent will think that 
some novelists, poets, filmmakers, musicians, composers, etc. do aim for 
more than entertainment. Indeed, there is good reason to think of some 
artists as creating philosophical art: art that wrestles with some of the 
same moral, metaphysical, and epistemological problems that occupy 
philosophers. I suspect that many readers have a more expansive view 
of what constitutes philosophy and argument than Socrates does, and so 
are willing to take these artists’ views seriously. But even so we would do 
well to maintain a healthy dose of Socratic skepticism about the moral 
and epistemological authority many of us see them as having. We are 
all prone to confirmation bias, of thinking certain bits of evidence are 
good evidence because they confirm what we already believe. Holding 
our favorite artists’ feet to the philosophical fire and querying the views 
and arguments they offer is a show of respect for them as thinkers that 
is consistent with respecting them as creative artists.
The upshot of the epistemological argument is that, even though 
one might really enjoy reading (or, more likely in the Greek world, 
listening to a performance of) Homer, one would be foolish to ‘arrange 
one’s whole life in accordance with his teachings’ (10.606e), since there 
is no good reason to think that poetic skill overlaps with philosophical 
insight. Thus we should not, as Polemarchus does in Book I, quote poets 
like Simonides as moral authorities on the nature of justice, for example. 
Instead, we should critically examine their sayings and adopt them as 
guides for living only if they pass rational muster. 
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The Moral Argument: Art Corrupts Even the Best of Us
Some readers will have noticed a pattern in the Republic: Plato tends to 
list items in increasing order of importance; the third of three items is 
almost always the most important. The Third Wave is ‘the biggest and 
most difficult one’ (5.472a) and the third argument that the just life is 
happier is ‘the greatest and most decisive’ (9.583b). We see that pattern 
again here: the moral argument against art, to which we now turn, is 
‘the most serious charge against imitation’ (10.605c). 
In the first two arguments, the key notion of imitation (μίμησις 
mimêsis]) seems roughly synonymous with representation: an object or 
action is re-presented by the painter or poet. But in this final argument 
we should keep in mind the more precise sense Socrates had in mind 
when he distinguished the content of poems and stories or what they 
say from how they say it—i.e., their style. Imitation is a matter of 
‘mak[ing] oneself like someone else in voice or appearance’ (3.393c) 
and thus the poet or performer impersonates a character, speaking 
from that character’s point of view, as that character would speak and 
act—as actors do onstage. Imitation in this sense is contrasted with 
pure narration, in which the author or speaker describes but not does 
enact actions and events, telling the audience that a character said such-
and-such but not directly quoting a character’s speech (or if doing so, 
not attempting to imitate the speaker’s voice and mannerisms). Unlike 
the imitative poet, the purely narrative poet ‘never hid[es] himself’ 
(3.393d) behind characters: the narrative poet is always present, never 
impersonating another and never being anything but themself. Socrates’ 
example is a non-poetic summary of the opening scene of the Iliad, a 
summary of events as one might find in a high school ‘book report’ or in 
Cliff or Spark Notes. But narration is also the style of the hymns to the 
god of wine and fertility, Dionysus, known as dithyrambs, which were 
typically sung in the Phrygian mode, one of the two musical modes 
Socrates allows in the ideal polis (3.399a). So presumably dithyrambs 
are among the ‘hymns to the gods’ that are allowed in the ideal city—
indeed, the city’s poets will ‘compose appropriate hymns’ (5.459e) to 
celebrate and consecrate the eugenic marriages discussed in Book V. A 
third kind of style is a mix of narration and imitation, which is the form 
epic poetry takes: a narrator tells the audience about certain events and 
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not merely quotes but enacts other events by imitating or impersonating 
some of the characters. 
In Book III Socrates focused on the moral danger imitation in 
the strict poses to performers, and presumably the creators of such 
poetry would also face moral danger as well. The title character in J. 
M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello wrestles with something like this latter 
problem. Her concern is not with the perils of imitation but with the 
dangers that come with writing about profound evil. To do so well, one 
must confront evil deeply and indeed sympathetically, imaginatively 
entering into the consciousness of Himmler and Hitler and their ilk 
(which suggests a disagreement with the conclusion of Socrates’ 
epistemological argument). And ‘she is not sure that writers who 
venture into the darker territories of the soul always return unscathed’.2 
In Book X Socrates shifts his attention away from the moral dangers 
that imitative poetry poses to its performers and toward the dangers it 
poses to the audience, who identify with the characters the performers 
impersonate. 
Where the epistemological argument focused on poetry’s incapacity 
to make us better, the moral argument focuses on its power to make 
us worse: ‘with a few rare exceptions it is able to corrupt even decent 
people’ (10.605c). We take seriously the sufferings of the protagonist and 
not only enjoy watching or listening but actually ‘give ourselves up to 
following it’ (10.605d). Instead of being properly disgusted at the hero’s 
lamentations (an earlier focus of censorship, for example at 3.387d), we 
enjoy and even praise them (10.605e). But, Socrates argues, enjoying 
other people’s sufferings is ‘necessarily transferred to our own’ (10.606b), 
and thus we nurture ‘the pitying part’ of our soul, which, nourished 
by tragedy, ‘destroys the rational [part]’ (10.605b). The problem is not 
merely that in taking our own sufferings seriously we forget that ‘human 
affairs are not worth taking very seriously’ (10.604c), but rather that we 
dethrone reason from its rightful place and live lives guided by emotion 
when we ‘hug the hurt part’ (10.604c)—which prevents us from being 
just, and thus happy. Socrates’ arguments against comic poetry run 
parallel to his arguments against tragedy: instead of being overcome by 
grief, we are overcome by hilarity. Both involve a dethroning of reason 
2  J. M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello (New York: Viking, 2003), p. 160.
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which we think is temporary but which, Socrates thinks, is anything but. 
Whether we are giving ourselves over to laughter or lamentation, we are 
nourishing and nurturing the appetitive and spirited parts of our souls, 
which house the emotions, and we are unlikely to be able to contain this 
beast within when we leave the theater. 
It is telling that Socrates is especially concerned with imitative poetry’s 
power to make us act, feel, and think differently in private than we do 
in public. He seems suspicious of and often hostile to privacy, which is 
unsurprising given the priority of the community over the individual 
that animates his thought. Socrates’ animus toward privacy pops up 
in various places. For example, that the guardians and auxiliaries have 
little to no privacy, living and eating communally and having no private 
property, fuels Adeimantus’ doubts about whether they can be happy. 
So Socrates’ concern about what we might call emotional privacy should 
not surprise us. A good person who has lost a child, for example, will be 
‘measured in his response to [his] pain […] and put up more resistance 
to it when his equals can see him [than] when he is alone by himself in 
solitude […] [where] he will venture to say and do lots of things that 
he’d be ashamed to be heard saying or seen doing’ (10.603e–4a).
Socrates seems concerned that imitative poetry will encourage a 
kind of hypocrisy: in public, we will follow reason, which bids us to 
quietly bear misfortune, tempering our feelings of grief with proto-
stoic thoughts that ‘human affairs are not worth taking very seriously’ 
(10.604e), that what now seems like a tragedy might ultimately be for 
the best, etc.; but in private we will indulge and give vent to feelings of 
grief. It is no accident that the English word ‘hypocrite’ derives from the 
Greek word for actor, ὑποκριτής (hupokritês), since hypocrisy involves 
pretense (and not mere inconsistency): hypocrites pretend to believe 
what in fact they do not, since appearing to believe certain things and 
acting in certain ways is in their self-interest. 
Socrates’ worry about the way imitative poetry works its dark magic 
in private is perhaps motivated more by simplicity and the unity of the 
soul as ideals of character than by a concern to avoid hypocrisy. ‘A just 
man’, we are told, ‘is simple and noble and […] does not want to be 
believed to be good but to be so’ (2.361b). Although Thrasymachus 
thinks that Socrates’ just person is a sap exhibiting ‘high-minded 
simplicity’ (1.348c), Socrates thinks of simplicity as integrity and purity, 
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in contrast with Thrasymachan duplicity and the specious ‘multicolored’ 
attractions of the democratic constitution and character. The person 
who scorns imitations of excessive grief while at the theater but who 
indulges their grief at home, or who keeps a stiff upper lip in front of 
the children or the troops and then indulges their grief while in private, 
will not be ‘of one mind’ (10.603c). Socrates insists that such a person is 
‘at war with himself’ (10.603c), his soul beset by ‘civil war’ (10.603d)—
which of course has been a major concern throughout the Republic.
But must a person whose emotional responses vary by context fail 
to achieve the virtue of one-mindedness? Socrates treats a person’s 
expressing grief differently in different circumstances as cases of 
changing one’s mind, but perhaps we should think of them instead 
as appropriately varying their responses to the differing demands of 
different situations. That Socrates wants more than a situation-specific, 
context-sensitive ethics was clear almost immediately in the Republic: 
since it is wrong to return the weapon to the deranged friend, returning 
what one has borrowed cannot be what justice is. But as we noted 
earlier, one may think that there are no universal ethical truths of the 
sort Socrates is after; perhaps the best we get are general principles 
or rules-of-thumb that give limited guidance and which must always 
be supplemented with situation-specific insight. (Something like this 
seems to have been Aristotle’s view.) 
We have already remarked on Socrates’ love for poetry, but it bears 
repeating. He loves poetry, but he thinks that it is a love for a dangerous 
object, one best avoided: ‘we will behave like people who have fallen in 
love with someone but force themselves to stay away from him because 
they realize that their passion is not beneficial’ (10.607e). But since he 
lives in the actual world and not in his ideal polis, Socrates will keep 
his arguments against poetry ready to be chanted ‘like an incantation’ 
when he encounters it (10.608a), like ‘a drug to counteract it’ (10.595b). 
Up to this point, ‘useful falsehoods’ (2.382c, 3.389b) have been the 
most prominent drugs in the Republic, prescribed by the guardian-
rulers most famously in the foundational myth of origin known as the 
Noble Falsehood (3.415b). Here the drug (φάρμακον [pharmakon], from 
which English words like ‘pharmacy’ and ‘pharmaceutical’ derive) is 
knowledge—truth, rather than falsehood—and it is self-prescribed. 
It is as if Socrates recognizes an addiction to something that seems so 
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attractive and benign, but which is in fact insidiously harmful. It is a 
kind of self-help that seems to be available only to philosopher-kings 
and -queens; for the rest of us, the ‘drug’ that the rational part of our 
souls can concoct is not strong enough, or, the soul’s rational part has 
been subordinated to the appetitive part—‘the part of the soul […] that 
hungers for the satisfaction of weeping and wailing’ (10.606a). 
In his Poetics, Aristotle famously disagrees with Plato’s assessment 
of tragic poetry, arguing that tragedy is actually good for us, achieving a 
catharsis (κάθαρσις [katharsis]) of pity and fear, the tragic emotions par 
excellence: ‘A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious 
[…] in dramatic, not a narrative form, with incidents arousing pity 
and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions’.3 Pity 
and fear, Aristotle argues in the last chapter of his Politics, ‘exist very 
strongly in some souls, and have more or less influence over all’,4 so 
we are benefitted when our souls are purged of pity and fear. Aristotle 
says surprisingly little about catharsis, given how frequently it takes 
center stage in discussions of his Poetics, and while this is not the place 
to explore it in any depth, a word or two is in order. ‘Catharsis’ means 
cleansing or purification. Understood medically, catharsis is purgation, 
a process by which we are purged of harmful substances. But Aristotle, 
unlike Plato, does not think that emotions are in themselves harmful 
states that get in the way of virtue and are thus to be purged. For 
Aristotle, ‘moral excellence [i.e., virtue] […] is concerned with passions 
and actions’,5 and while reason governs a well-ordered soul, he thinks 
that many emotions and desires can be brought into harmony with 
reason, rather than being forever recalcitrant and in need of subjugation. 
Thus catharsis need not be exclusively a matter of purification by 
purgation; it can also be clarification by education. Consider the tragic 
emotion of pity, which is essentially directed at another’s unmerited 
distress. While Plato thinks that identifying with the tragic hero’s 
distress via pity will displace reason and thus lead to an unjust (or 
at least non-just) soul, Aristotle seems to think that it can lead us to 
appreciate our own vulnerability to the slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune and to cultivate appropriate fellow-feeling and compassion. 
3  Aristotle, Poetics, 6 1149b24–7.
4  Aristotle, Politics, VIII.6 1342a6–7.
5  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.6 1106b16.
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As the eminent contemporary philosopher Martha Nussbaum puts it, 
‘tragedy contributes to human self-understanding precisely through its 
exploration of the pitiable and the fearful’.6 Far from being something 
to be purged from an ideal city, good tragedy should be welcomed, not 
because it is good entertainment or because good art enriches our lives, 
but because it contributes to the moral development and improvement 
of the citizens—much as reading good literature might make us more 
empathic and more sensitive to moral nuance. 
It seems that Plato and Aristotle disagree about the value tragedy 
because they disagree about the value of our emotions, and indeed the 
value of our bodies. Socrates does not fear death, because his death 
means that his soul will at least be freed from ‘the contamination of 
the body’s folly’,7 which prevents the soul from encountering the pure 
reality of the Forms. Readers who share something like Aristotle’s 
attitude toward the emotions—which shows that one need not be a 
full-blown romantic, giving absolute priority to emotion over reason, to 
value emotions positively—will have good reason to be skeptical about 
Plato’s attitude toward imitative poetry.
A Four-Part Soul?
There is an additional problem with Socrates’ treatment of poetry that 
we ought to deal with. It is a problem that at first might seem hardly 
worth noticing, but which is potentially devastating to the project of the 
Republic. In dismissing imitation as a silly waste of time, Socrates focuses 
on the metaphysically thin nature of its objects: they are shadows on 
the cave wall, not to be taken seriously. This critique requires his two-
worlds metaphysics, and we have already dwelled on the inadequacy of 
the support Socrates provides for this distinctive and bold metaphysical 
theory. But after attending to the shadowy nature of the products of 
imitative art, Socrates briefly turns his attention to the activity of 
perceiving these objects. He does not, as we might expect, refer back 
to the Divided Line, the lowest portion of which has artistic creations 
6  Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy (Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1986), p. 390.
7  Phaedo, in Plato: Five Dialogues, trans. by G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1981), p. 103 [67a].
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as its objects. Instead, he asks, ‘on which of a person’s parts does 
[imitation] exert its power?’ (10.602c) Both trompe l’oeil painting and 
ordinary optical illusions can lead us to false judgments about reality. 
My canoe paddle appears bent or fractured when it is submerged, but 
it is not; the lines of the Müller-Lyer illusion, discussed earlier, seem not 
to be the same length, but they are. Only measuring them reveals this, 
and measuring, like calculating and weighing, are rational activities, the 
work of the rational part of the soul (10.602d). 
So where do these potentially erroneous perceptions and perceptual 
beliefs come from? Since ‘the part of the soul that forms a belief contrary 
to the measurements could not be the same as the part that believes 
in accord with them’ (10.603a), they cannot come from the rational 
part of the soul, given the Opposition Principle (4.436b). Nor does 
the spirited part of the soul provide a plausible home for perception. 
Perhaps perception is a function of the appetitive part. In another 
dialogue, the Theaetetus, Plato suggests this possibility and casts the net 
of perception widely, counting ‘desires and fears’ as perceptions, along 
with more obvious examples like ‘sight, hearing, smelling, feeling cold 
and feeling hot’ (156b). Not only do both perception and belief work 
with appetite—my desire for ice cream and my seeing (and believing) 
that there is some in the freezer together explain my reaching in to get 
some—but they have the same objects: I see the ice cream, I want the ice 
cream, etc. Still, it is not clear how perception can be a function of the 
appetitive part of the soul. Perceptions, like desires, are representations, 
pictures of the world, if you will. But they are pictures having different 
directions of fit, as philosophers sometimes say. Beliefs and perceptions 
are mental representations of the world that are supposed to match the 
way the world is; thus they have a mind-to-world direction of fit: the 
mind’s picture is supposed to match the world, and when they do not 
match, I need new beliefs and perceptions—I need a different picture. 
Appetites and desires, by contrast, have a world-to-mind direction 
of fit: they are representations not of how the world is but of how it 
ought to be or I would like it to be. So when the world does not fit my 
picture, I change the world to make it match—as if desires are skippered 
by Captain Picard of Star Trek: The Next Generation, with a ‘make it so’ 
built into their very nature. Wanting more ice cream but seeing my 
bowl is empty, I go to the freezer and get some, so my picture of reality 
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(me eating ice cream) matches reality. (Of course, if one is inclined to 
Stoicism or Buddhism, one often tries to give up the unfulfilled desire, 
since it is the source of one’s discontentment.) 
Thus it seems that there must be another part of the soul, one that 
forms (potentially erroneous) perceptual beliefs—a fourth part of the 
soul, distinct from reason, spirit, and appetite. Okay, so there is another, 
fourth part of the soul. So what? What is the big deal? Well, the big 
deal is that the Republic turns on the analogy between the city and the 
soul: Socrates theorizes the ideal city not for its own sake but as a means 
to investigate the Republic’s two main questions. Back in Book IV all 
‘agreed that the same number and same kinds of classes as are in the 
city are also in the soul of each individual’ (4.441c), but the argument 
against imitative art now suggests that that agreement was a bad one, 
and that there is an important disanalogy between city and soul. Thus 
what followed from that agreement—the answers to the Republic’s two 
main questions about the nature and value of justice—are now called 
into question. 
Alas, neither Glaucon nor anyone else present objects to Socrates’ 
seeming to introduce a new part of the soul and to the problems this 
raises for the Republic’s central analogy. Perhaps this is another one of 
those places in which Plato is hoping his readers see a philosophical 
problem that eludes his characters. And perhaps he is making a point 
about the nature of philosophical inquiry: Socrates now has two views 
that seem to be in conflict with each other, and he needs to do more 
philosophical work to determine which view is more reasonable to 
retain. Readers will be forgiven for thinking that Socrates should have 
left well enough alone and ended things in Book IX.
The Immortality of the Soul (10.608c–614b)
Having excluded almost all poetry from the ideal city, Socrates continues 
to tie up loose ends. Since the genuinely just but seemingly unjust life 
has been shown, he thinks, to be happier than the genuinely unjust 
but seemingly just life, we can now consider the consequences and 
rewards of justice. Adeimantus was especially adamant about excluding 
consideration of the reputational benefits of being thought of as just; 
too much of Athenian culture praised the rewards of being thought just, 
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ignoring justice itself. But now those rewards can be considered, and of 
course they incline in favor of the just life. 
But the philosophically most interesting part of the discussion 
concerns the benefits of being just that extend beyond this mortal coil—
and thus the claim that our souls are immortal. Earlier we emphasized 
that the concept of the soul at work in the Republic lacked the religious 
dimensions of the modern notion of the soul. But here is a place where 
they seem more similar than different. I imagine that many readers will 
agree with Socrates’ claim that each of us has a soul that will survive our 
bodily death. We will see in the final section of this chapter that Socrates’ 
account of the soul’s life after the death of the body differs significantly 
from religious conceptions involving eternal reward or damnation, this 
feature of its nature—immortality—is common to both. 
That the soul is immortal comes as news to Glaucon; more surprising 
still is Socrates’ claim that arguing for it ‘is not difficult’ (10.608d). The 
argument is fairly straightforward and interestingly enough employs an 
inversion of the familiar Specialization Principle. Everything, Socrates 
argues, has a ‘natural’ evil or badness that is ‘proper’ or ‘peculiar’ to it. 
Rot is the natural evil proper to wood, as blight is for grain and rust is for 
iron (10.608e). While we usually think of ‘proper’ as a normative term 
with a positive valence, here it functions descriptively. If a thing is not 
destroyed by its proper evil, it cannot be destroyed by anything. Injustice, 
or vice more generally, is the soul’s proper evil, just as its proper good is 
justice; but while the soul is worsened by injustice, it is not destroyed by 
it. Therefore, the soul cannot be destroyed, and so it is immortal. Here is 
the argument, spelled out in premise-conclusion form:
P1 Everything has a natural evil which worsens and corrupts it. 
(608e)
P2 If something is worsened but not destroyed by its natural evil, 
then nothing else will destroy it. (609a)
P3 Vice is the soul’s natural evil. (609b)
P4 Vice worsens but does not destroy the soul. (609c–d)
C1 Therefore, the soul cannot be destroyed.
P5 If something cannot be destroyed then it must always exist. 
(610e)
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P6 If something must always exist then it is immortal. (611a)
C2 Therefore, the soul must always exist.
C3 Therefore, the soul is immortal.
It is an interesting argument in many ways. The picture of the soul that 
emerges is of a thing that despite having parts is simple; the soul is not 
‘multicolored (ποικιλίας [poikilias])’ (10.611b), which, we learned in the 
discussion of democracy, is a bad thing to be. Plato and Socrates value 
simplicity and unity over complexity and variety, which should come as 
no surprise by this point in the Republic. Nor, given the role reason plays 
in Plato’s thoughts, should we be surprised at the suggestion that ‘the 
soul […] is maimed by its association with the body’ (10.611c). A soul is 
what you and I most fundamentally are, for Plato; we are not primarily 
bodies or body-soul unities.
While the argument is logically valid, it is far from clear that it is 
sound, since P2 is not obviously true, and indeed seems obviously not 
true. Consider some of the examples Socrates employs to illustrate the 
idea of a proper evil: wood’s proper evil is rot; iron’s is rust. But clearly 
wood and iron can be destroyed by things other than rot and rust—
fire comes quickly to mind. So even if the soul cannot be destroyed by 
injustice, it is possible that it can be destroyed by an evil not proper to it. 
We might also question P4, the claim that injustice worsens but does not 
destroy the soul. The tyrannical person starves his rational part and not 
only takes no steps to domesticate the savage elements of his inner beast, 
but actually cultivates them and delights in their wildness. It is not at all 
implausible that such a paradigmatically unjust soul can destroy itself, 
‘consumed with that which it was nourished by’, as Shakespeare says in 
Sonnet 73.8 
It is not clear how seriously Plato intends this argument, especially 
given its rather obvious shortcomings. Its purpose may well be more 
strategic in a literary sense: it gets us thinking about life after death, which 
is the subject of the Republic’s finale, the Myth of Er. Rather than wring 
our hands or arch our eyebrows over the argument, let us turn to the 
8  Shakespeare’s Sonnets, ed. by Katherine Duncan-Jones, The Arden Shakespeare, 
revised edition (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010), p. 257.
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Myth of Er, which is fascinating in itself, and a fascinating way for the 
Republic to end. 
The Myth of Er (10.614a–21c)
Why Plato ends the Republic not with an argument or an exhortation to 
the reader but with a myth is a question well worth pondering. Plato 
caps off the creation of the ideal polis with the Noble Falsehood, which 
suggests how important shared myths and stories are to political unity. 
His ending the Republic with a myth, especially after the many and 
various analogies and metaphors that populate the Republic, suggests 
the importance of myth and narrative to human self-understanding. 
Although philosopher-queens and -kings can subsist on an intellectual 
diet of ‘theoretical argument’, Adeimantus and the rest of us require 
that this diet be supplemented with the relish that stories provide.
The myth concerns a man named Er, who recounts his after-death 
experiences ‘as a messenger (ἄγγελον [angelon, whence our word 
‘angel’]) to human beings’ (10.614d). Er’s tale recounts what happens to 
our souls after they are separated from our bodies in death—hence the 
importance of the argument for the soul’s immortality. There are three 
distinct stages in the myth. In the first, Er finds himself in a beautiful 
meadow, near two pairs of openings, one pair to and from what lies 
below the earth; the other to and from the heavens. The souls of those 
who have acted unjustly are sent to the world below, incurring a tenfold 
penalty for each injustice. The souls of those who have acted justly go to 
the world above. The openings are busy with punished and rewarded 
souls ascending from the world below and descending from the world 
above, and souls of the recently deceased receiving their reward and 
punishment and thus ascending or descending. 
In the myth’s second stage, the returned souls travel to the place 
where the individuals’ fates are spun. I will not replicate Plato’s 
descriptions of the Fates, the Spindle of Necessity, and the entire scene, 
as I could not do them justice. The heart of this stage of the myth is 
a choice: each soul, whether it is returned from heavenly reward or 
heavenly punishment, chooses the life it will inhabit in its return to 
the world. Only for ‘incurably wicked people’ (10.615e) is punishment 
eternal; and presumably—though Plato is mum on the topic—there is 
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eternal reward for the very best. But for everyone else, life after death 
is a matter of having a new bodily life. Although this part of the myth 
concerns the spinning of one’s fate, it is crucial that each soul chooses 
its fate. When one chooses is determined by lot, so there is an element 
of randomness in the procedure, but each person will ‘choose a life to 
which he will then be bound by necessity’ (10.617e). It is an interesting 
kind of necessity or determinism, very different from the causal 
determinism that contemporary philosophers concerned with free will 
tend to worry over. Rather, it is what we might call type determinism: 
a person’s choices are determined by the type of person they are and 
will determine the type of person they will be—and thus the kind of 
life they will lead. Hence the importance of choosing well. And here, 
Socrates tells Glaucon, is ‘the greatest danger’ (10.618b), given that 
the soul’s choice of a life determines to a great extent how happy or 
unhappy that life will be. Thus we see the importance of the Republic’s 
second question: a person’s answer to this question determines the kind 
of life they will lead. We need to choose carefully, and not be dazzled by 
exteriors, which may prove to be false façades. 
The first person to choose ‘chose [his life] without adequate 
examination’ (10.619b); dazzled by wealth and pomp, he chose the life 
of a great tyrant, not realizing until after the choice was made that he 
was fated to eat his own children—a fate that might well be worse than 
death. His reaction is instructive: ‘he blamed chance […] and everything 
else […] but himself’ (10.619c). Blaming others for the results of our own 
poor choices is a profoundly human reaction, it seems to me. In Genesis, 
Adam blames Eve for suggesting they eat the apple, and Eve blames the 
serpent. The irony here is that this chooser had returned from a life in 
heaven, his reward for having lived a virtuous life, though he had been 
virtuous ‘through habit and without philosophy’ (10.619d). That is, he 
was conventionally good but unreflective, which, Socrates argues, left 
him vulnerable to poor choices. His goodness, like Cephalus’, was more 
a matter of luck and circumstance than of a firm inner state of his soul, 
and ironically it is the cause of his undoing. 
The account of the various lives chosen is fascinating, with many 
people choosing to live an animal’s life, and with almost everyone’s 
‘choice depend[ing] upon the character of their former life’ (10.620a). 
The most instructive choice is probably Odysseus’. He was among the 
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last to choose, though there remained many kinds of lives to choose 
from. He scoured the possibilities for ‘the life of a private individual 
who did his own work’ (10.620c), insisting that he would have chosen 
this same life had he been first to choose. What Odysseus has chosen 
is, of course, a just life. That it was ‘lying off somewhere neglected by 
the others’ (10.620c) is no surprise; since most of us are easily dazzled 
by ‘multicolored’ exteriors and do not have a good grasp of the essence 
of justice and its necessity for a happy life, it is no wonder that it is not 
the one most of us choose. 
In the myth’s last stage, the souls, whose fates are now spun 
irreversibly, are brought to the Plain of Forgetfulness and the River 
of Unheeding, where they forget their choice and then re-enter the 
world.
Like most myths, the Myth of Er is best not taken literally. Its 
point, I take it, is that while we each have a natural bent, which is 
then developed in various ways by the kind of nurturing we receive 
from our educations, our cultures, and the constitutions we live under, 
whether we are happy or not depends to a great extent on the choices 
we make. Most of our choices are not as dramatic or as momentous as 
the one-off choices depicted in the Myth of Er. Instead, they are daily 
choices, some large, some small, which shape our characters. In an 
anticipation of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, according to which 
every virtue is a mean between two vices (so courage is a mean between 
cowardice and recklessness, for example), Socrates suggests that a 
good choice is one in which we ‘choose the mean [… and] avoid either 
of the extremes’ (10.619a). We should make our choices carefully, after 
due deliberation. Indeed, we should make choices, not act on impulse 
like the fickle democrat discussed earlier. A wise person ‘chooses [a 
life] rationally and lives it seriously’ (10.619b).
There are fascinating issues here, which we can do no more than 
touch on. Given that our nature and nurture largely determine which 
options will seem sensible and be appealing to us, even though each 
individual makes life-shaping choices, it is not clear how free those 
choices are. And if indeed they are not free (or not sufficiently free)—
as they seem not to be if type determinism is true—then readers may 
well wonder to what extent it makes sense to hold each other morally 
responsible for the choices we make and the actions we undertake. The 
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great twentieth-century philosopher Peter Strawson famously argued 
that holding ourselves and others accountable is so central to being 
human, there is little chance that we could give it up, even if we believe 
determinism to be true. Or, one might argue that although we are not 
fully responsible for the choices we make, perhaps we are responsible 
enough to warrant holding each other accountable. This issue, though 
Aristotle briefly considers it in his Nicomachean Ethics, seems more 
a modern than an ancient concern, so we should not fault Plato for 
not addressing it. Still, it is something that interested, philosophically 
inclined readers will want to explore further.
Perhaps the most fascinating thing about the Myth of Er is that 
Plato chooses to end the Republic with it. Readers will notice the 
abruptness with which the Republic ends. The Republic begins with 
Socrates’ narration: on his way back to town with Glaucon, he meets 
Polemarchus; he tells someone—whom he is speaking to is never made 
clear—about the long philosophical discussion that took place at the 
house of Polemarchus’ father, Cephalus, a discussion which concludes 
with the Myth of Er. Plato reminds us of this by having Socrates 
address Glaucon directly in the Republic’s concluding paragraph. But 
conspicuous by its absence is something that would close the book, 
so to speak, on the book that is the Republic. There is no ‘and then, 
exhausted, I went home’ or ‘and then we had a sumptuous meal’ or 
anything that closes the narrative. 
I suspect that this is Plato’s taking his last opportunity to make a 
philosophical point with a literary device that is analogous to a sudden 
cut to black, as in the much-discussed final episode of The Sopranos. 
Earlier we observed how the opening of Book V echoes the opening 
of Book I; I suggested that this is Plato’s way of making a substantive 
philosophical point—that philosophy is always returning to its 
beginnings, always starting over and reexamining its foundations. 
Here, I suspect, the point is similar, but about endings and conclusions 
rather than premises and beginnings. In not having a conclusive ending 
to the Republic, Plato seems to be telling us that philosophy never ends, 
that the conversation Socrates had at Cephalus’ house does not end, 
but continues every time a reader engages with the Republic, as we 
have done here. 
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Some Suggestions for Further Reading
There is a large literature on Plato’s attitude toward poetry. G. R. F. 
Ferrari, ‘Plato and Poetry’, in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, 
vol. 1, ed. by George A. Kennedy (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), pp. 92–148 is especially insightful and helpful.
Readers who enjoy historical fiction may want to read Mary Renault, 
The Praise Singer (New York: Vintage, 2003), an excellent and moving 
novel about Simonides, the lyric poet Polemarchus quotes in Book I. 
Eric Brown, ‘A Defense of Plato’s Argument for the Immortality of the 
Soul at Republic X 608c–611a’, Apeiron, 30 (1997), 211–38, is a sympathetic 
reconstruction and defense of the argument for the soul’s immortality 
discussed in this chapter. 
Readers interested in the Myth of Er will find an extended discussion in 
Stephen Halliwell, ‘The Life-and-Death Journey of the Soul: Interpreting 
the Myth of Er’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s ‘Republic’, ed. by G. 
R. F. Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), https://doi.
org/10.1017/ccol0521839637, pp. 444–73.
Readers interested in a contemporary discussion of free will and 
determinism will find Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free 
Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) an excellent place to 
begin. 
Readers interested in the idea of direction-of-fit might start with its 
source: G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 56–7 (§ 32). 
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Having travelled so great a distance together, a few words about our 
journey seem in order. Few readers, I suspect, will want to live in Plato’s 
ideal polis—and they will be in good company, if a recent biography of 
Socrates is to be believed: ‘We can be in absolutely no doubt that Socrates 
would have disliked and disapproved of the republic Plato wanted to 
bring into being’.1 Whatever its virtues, it is too lacking in individual 
liberty to suit most of us. Most of us will side with John Stuart Mill 
over Plato, and regard ‘the free development of individuality [as] one 
of the leading essentials of wellbeing’.2 Plato’s utopia is far too much on 
the communitarian side of the spectrum for our comfort. We can set to 
one side the historical unlikelihood of the sort of aristocracy that Plato 
imagines; we are all familiar—though thankfully, for most of us, not in 
a first-hand way—with the evils of totalitarianism. The issue is more 
philosophical than that. Although romantics will demur at enthroning 
reason, many readers will agree that ‘it is better for everyone to be ruled 
by divine reason, preferably within himself and his own’ (9.590e), but 
many of these will insist that ‘preferably […] his own’ is too weak and 
will deny to their dying breaths that this reason may permissibly be 
‘imposed from without’. Most readers will prefer a life in which they 
make their own choices to one in which their choices are made for 
them—even when they acknowledge that their own choices are often 
poor. Mill argues that the evils of paternalism—of interference with the 
choices of others for their own good—far outweigh its benefits. But one 
need not appeal to the consequences to be committed to the priority 
1  Paul Johnson, Socrates: A Man for Our Times (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), p. 93.
2  Mill, On Liberty, p. 69.
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of liberty and autonomy over wellbeing. One might, like Kant, take it 
to be a matter of respect for human dignity, which is grounded in our 
capacity to make choices, to deliberate and decide and then to act. We 
are justified in interfering, says the anti-paternalistic individualist, only 
where our choices harm others. 
But even for such individualistically inclined readers, the Republic 
can offer salutary lessons. For while the pendulum swings too far to 
the communitarian end of the line in the ideal polis, one might concede 
that it swings too far to the individualistic side in, say, contemporary 
American culture. Perhaps we would do better to be more mindful of 
the good of the whole, to see our politics not as a means for advancing 
narrow individual and special interests but rather as a way to ‘promote 
the general welfare’. Plato’s anti-individualistic and anti-democratic 
animus is often expressed in his disdain for diversity and variety and 
complication—with things that are ‘multicolored’ (ποικίλος [poikilos]), 
as he often puts it. Too much variety in poetic meter is frowned upon 
(3.399e), as is medical treatment that is too complicated (4.426a). And 
of course, democracy’s multicolored constitution is the source of its 
specious beauty (8.557c), as are its ‘multicolored pleasures’ (8.559d) 
and the cast of characters that are its citizens, ‘characters fine and 
multicolored’ (8.561e). And let us not forget about the ‘multicolored 
beast’ (9.588c) that embodies our emotions and desires. While we need 
not value diversity for diversity’s sake, taking diversity as an intrinsic 
good when its goodness is more properly instrumental, we need not 
think of it as an intrinsic bad, as Plato seems to do. A community can 
celebrate its diversity while at the same time celebrating and nurturing 
its unity. It can be one from many—e pluribus unum, as it says somewhere 
or other. What is required for this is an attitude toward community and 
individuality that is more complex than Plato offers in the Republic. 
We can celebrate individuality and liberty while at the same time 
enabling individuals to be good team members, good cast members, 
etc. So while most of us do not accept Plato’s full embrace of the good 
of the community over that of the individual, we can incorporate more 
communitarian thinking into our lives and politics. Simply put, to think 
this is a matter of individualism versus communitarianism is to commit 
the all too common (and all too human) fallacy of the false dilemma.
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Similar considerations can apply to other aspects of Plato’s thought 
where we recognize an important insight or truth that we do not feel 
comfortable taking fully on board. Consider justice as each person doing 
their own part and not meddling in the affairs of others. As we saw in 
Chapter Five, Confucius is in broad agreement with this, and one finds 
similar sentiments in the Bhagavad Gita: ‘It is better to strive in one’s own 
dharma than to succeed in the dharma of another. Nothing is ever lost 
in following one’s own dharma, but competition in another’s dharma 
breeds fear and insecurity’.3 
Many readers will find that their peace and serenity and indeed 
their personal happiness increase as they strive to cultivate their own 
gardens, as Voltaire puts it toward the end of Candide, even though 
many of these readers will lament the political acquiescence they see 
in this idea. The trick, it seems, is to find the proper balance—to find 
when it is appropriate to mind one’s own business, as it were, and when 
it is appropriate to demand and work for change. This, I think, is the 
task of practical wisdom, which functions not by applying abstract rules 
and principles but which, with principles operating in the background, 
assesses particular situations to see what each demands. 
There are many other instances of such topics in the Republic, and 
I hope to have brought enough of them to the surface for readers to 
do their own thinking about them. But there is one last big-picture 
consideration I must address before we end. The Republic is one 
of the great books of philosophy, but as we have seen, sometimes in 
perhaps excruciating detail, there are stretches where it is far from great 
philosophy. Its central argument, the Powers Argument of Book V, is 
fatally flawed, yet it is the only argument Plato gives us in the Republic in 
support of his distinctive, two-worlds metaphysics. While the Allegory 
of the Cave can survive at least in part without its support, the Sun and 
Divided Line analogies sink or swim with it, as their central point is 
to make sense of the distinction between the intelligible world of the 
Forms, where knowledge lives, and the visible world of particulars, the 
realm of belief. Moreover, ‘the greatest and most decisive’ argument for 
the view that the just life is happier than the unjust life, the Metaphysics 
of Pleasure Argument, also depends on the Powers Argument. Socrates 
3  Bhagavad Gita, trans. by Eknath Easwaran, 2nd ed. (Tomales, CA: Nilgiri Press, 
2007), p. 108 [Chapter 3, verse 35].
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may be correct in giving the palm to the just life, but he has not 
adequately argued for this conclusion, so his belief in it would seem to 
be unjustified. Socrates recognized in Book I that he jumped the gun in 
thinking he had shown that the just life is happier than the unjust life 
when he had not yet determined what justice is. But having determined 
the nature of justice to his and his interlocutors’ satisfaction, he seems 
oblivious to the ways in which the Metaphysics of Pleasure Argument 
is fruit of the poisoned tree that is the Powers Argument. What gives?
There is a tendency, to which I am prone, to think that this must be 
intentional on Plato’s part, that so smart a philosopher could not have 
unknowingly offered so poor an argument for so important a conclusion. 
Perhaps Plato took himself to be accurately reporting Socrates’ own 
argument rather than giving his own. Perhaps he recognized the 
argument’s shortcomings and left uncovering them to his readers, 
in hope that they—that we—would notice them and become better 
philosophers as we tried to work them out. It is hard to know. 
The eminent philosopher and historian of early modern philosophy 
Jonathan Bennett, that rare bird who was as excellent a teacher as he was 
a philosopher, wrote in the preface to his first book on Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason: ‘Like all great pioneering works in philosophy, the Critique 
is full of mistakes and confusions. It is a misunderstanding to think that 
a supreme philosopher cannot have erred badly and often: the Critique 
still has much to teach us, but it is wrong on nearly every page’.4
Much the same could be said of Plato’s Republic. It might be scant 
comfort to some readers, but it seems to me to offer a powerful lesson on 
the point of doing and reading philosophy, which always requires doing 
it for oneself. Though Socratic wisdom consists in knowing that one does 
not know, it does not require giving up those beliefs one cannot justify. 
The key to being ethically justified in retaining these epistemically 
unjustified beliefs, it seems to me, is humility: we recognize them as 
not justified, perhaps as a result of our intellectual shortcomings, and 
continue to reflect upon them. There is a lot of cognitive space between 
nihilism and dogmatism. That so great a philosopher as Plato is 
frequently wrong is a testament to how hard it is to do philosophy well. 
4  Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 
p. viii.
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That Plato fails to embody philosophical perfection is not a reason to 
give up on him or on ourselves.
Some Suggestions for Further Reading
Readers intrigued by Plato’s thought will want to read Rebecca 
Goldstein, Plato at the Googleplex: Why Philosophy Will Not Go Away (New 
York: Vintage, 2015), a brilliant, wise, and funny book which imagines 
Plato on a contemporary book tour. 
Readers interested in a brief, compelling account of the life of Socrates 
by an eminent biographer should see Paul Johnson, Socrates: A Man for 
Our Times (New York: Penguin Books, 2011). 
Readers interested in exploring more of Plato’s philosophical thought will 
find it all here: Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John Cooper (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1997).
For a canonical philosopher whose thinking is very much at odds with 
Plato’s, interested readers might try both David Hume, An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1993) and Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983).
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